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Abstract
Dam systems are arrangements of interacting components that store and convey water for
beneficial purposes. Dam failures are associated with extreme consequences to human life, the
environment and the economy. Existing techniques for dam safety analysis tend to focus on
verifying system performance at the edge of the design envelope. In analyzing the events which
occur within the design envelope, linear chain-of-events models are often used to analyze the
potential outcomes for the system. These chain-of-events models require that combinations of
conditions are identified at the outset of the analysis, which can be very cumbersome given the
number of physically possible combinations. Additional complications arising from feedback
behaviour and time are not easily overcome using existing tools. Recent work in the industry
has begun to focus on systems approaches to the problem, especially stochastic simulation.
Given current computational abilities, stochastic simulation may not be capable of analyzing
combinations of events that have a low combined probability but potentially extreme
consequences. This research focuses on developing and implementing a methodology that
dynamically characterizes combinations of component operating states and their potential
impacts on dam safety. Automated generation of scenarios is achieved through the use of a
component operating states database that defines all possible combinations of component states
(scenarios) using combinatorics. A Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework
systematically characterizes each scenario through a number of iterations that vary adverse
operating state timing, impacts and inflows. Component interactions and feedbacks are
represented within the system dynamics simulation model. Simulation outcomes provide
useful indicators for dam operators including conditional failure rates, times to failure, failure
inflow thresholds, and reservoir level exceedance frequencies. Dynamic system response can
be assessed directly from the simulation outcomes. The scenario results may be useful to dam
owners in emergency decision-making to inform response timelines and to justify the
allocation of resources. Results may also help inform the development of improved operating
strategies or upgrade alternatives that can reduce the impacts of these extreme events. This
work offers a significant improvement in the ability to systematically characterize the potential
combinations of events and their consequences.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This research presents a novel approach to define and characterize potential combinations of
events that can impact the ability to safely manage water flow in dam systems. Dam systems
consist of infrastructure whose primary purpose is to store and convey water for beneficial
purposes, such as power production, water supply, flood control and recreation. The water
barrier is the dam itself, and water passages may include gated or ungated spillway systems
that release excess flows, diversions, tunnels or penstocks (pipelines) that convey water to
power-generating turbines. Another key part of a dam system is the system operator(s).
Operators can be a single person or an organization. In some cases the operation of the dam
may be automated. Operators make decisions on how to adjust water flow through the dam
based on available information, with the goal to safely and economically manage the reservoir.
The failure of a dam can cause a major flood, potentially having catastrophic consequences to
human life, the environment and the economy. One possible way in which a dam can fail is
through the inadequate control of water flow. For example, should the outflow passages fail to
function, inflows into the reservoir can cause the water level to rise to critical levels that may
result in failure of the dam. This research focuses on the analysis of flow-control in dam
systems. A dam system and the interactions amongst its components are modelled in detail and
an exhaustive list of possible combinations of events is developed. Each of these combinations
is simulated many times to characterize the potential outcomes that may occur. The simulation
model calculates the water levels and flow releases as they change over time. Parameters were
developed to provide some indication about the potential impacts of a scenario. The result is a
systematic characterization of these unlikely, yet potentially hazardous, combinations of events
that can affect the ability to safely operate a dam system. The information produced through
this methodology may be useful in developing operating strategies and emergency response
plans that could occur over the course of a dam’s lifetime.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

This thesis focuses on the development of a new approach to the assessment of dam safety
flow control using a systems approach. Concepts from within risk assessment, general
systems theory and control system theory are investigated as potentially promising
techniques for the assessment of dams as systems. A new methodology is presented which
allows for automated generation and simulation of a more complete range of potential
operating conditions for the system using a Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation
framework with a system dynamics simulation model. System behaviour is quantified
directly from the simulation outputs and helps identify combinations of events which can
lead to the failure of dam systems to safely control inflows.
This chapter contains an introduction to dam systems and a historical overview of dam
failures. An introduction to the systems approach is also provided here, as well as research
objectives and conclusions.

1.1 Dam systems
Dams are highly complex systems containing arrangements of components which interact
to store and convey water for one or more purposes, including hydroelectric power, flood
control, mine tailings impoundment, and water supply for residential, agricultural or
industrial purposes. Dams create reservoirs and use of their storage provides for the
redistribution of inflow in time and space. These systems contain physical infrastructure,
mechanical components, electrical components, communications equipment and human
controllers which are all functioning together for a single purpose: the safe and economical
storage and passage of water. The components that influence the behaviour of a dam system
can be both physical (eg. infrastructure), or nonphysical (eg. operational decision making).
Typical components of a dam system can be grouped into categories of: (1) Infrastructure
components such as the dam, penstocks, spillways, gates, turbines, etc., (2) Actuators
which are typically mechanical or electrical assemblies that make changes to infrastructure
positioning either manually or automatically, remotely or on-site, (3) Operators which
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include human or automated system controllers as well as institutional and organizational
operating guidelines and rules, and (4) Sensory components such as Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems or visual observation. Dam systems have external
inputs, such as reservoir inflows and various disturbances, and system outputs or products.
Products of a dam system can include reservoir outflow, power generation, environmental
or recreational flows, flood control and irrigation water supply. Figure 1-1 contains a
labelled photograph of Revelstoke Dam in British Columbia, Canada, which has a number
of features that are discussed in the following paragraphs.
The key feature of a dam system is the dam itself, which acts as a barrier to the natural
course of a stream or river. Dam structures may be constructed of a variety of different
materials in a variety of different ways, and this choice is dependent on the purpose for
which the dam will serve as well as the geological conditions in the vicinity of the dam and
the availability of construction materials. Materials used in the construction of dams can
include timber, concrete, masonry, steel, as well as earth or rockfill in the form of
embankment dams (Jansen 1983). Some dam sites may have multiple dam structures, with
auxiliary structures known as “saddle dams” that also act to retain the water in the
reservoir. For large dams, concrete and earthfill structures (or a combination of these) are
most common. There are a number of types of concrete dams, including concrete gravity,
arch and buttress dams (Jansen 1983). Earthfill dams may also come in a variety of forms
and may be homogeneous (one material makes up the entire dam) or have zones of different
fill materials with engineer-specified parameters designed to control seepage and hydraulic
gradients. Dams may also have provisions for foundation seepage control such as cutoffs
or grout curtains that increase the seepage path to prevent the erosion of foundation
materials (Jansen 1983). In Figure 1-1, Revelstoke Dam, British Columbia, Canada
consists of a concrete gravity dam and an earthfill dam.
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Figure 1-1: Revelstoke Dam, British Columbia, Canada
In addition to the water barrier, dams are typically equipped with some sort of outlet
structure to pass the water downstream. In the simplest case of a free overflow weir, water
flows over the top of the structure and down the natural course of the river. More complex
dams often involve a number of outlets, which can include free overflow spillways,
spillway gates, low level outlets and turbines (Jansen 1983). Free overflow spillways are
sometimes a lowered section of the dam that is equipped to pass water when the reservoir
exceeds the elevation of the spillway crest. The amount of water passing over the free
overflow spillway is a direct function of the level of the reservoir. These uncontrolled
release structures sometimes involve a chute to direct water downstream. Spillway chutes
may be unlined or lined with a material such as concrete (Jansen 1983). Spillway gates and
low level outlets are mechanically controlled structures (typically gates or valves) which
can be opened and closed to release the desired amount of water. Spillway gates and valves
may direct water into a chute, if there is a considerable distance for the water to pass or
may discharge water directly downstream of the opening. Each gate or valve has its own
rating curve, which is the numerical relationship between gate opening, gate position and
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reservoir level (USBR 1987). Gates require many different components to operate,
including structural, mechanical and electrical – and in some cases can be operated
automatically or remotely as well as onsite. In Figure 1-1, a gated spillway is shown, with
two radial gates that discharge into a concrete chute, terminating in a flip bucket and plunge
pool.
In the case of hydropower dam systems, another key component of the system is the
hydropower generating infrastructure. Intake gates are sometimes used to control the flow
of water towards the generating units from the upstream end. Water passes into a power
conduit, typically a tunnel or penstock depending on the application, and moves
downstream towards the turbine (Komey, 2014). Penstocks are large pipelines, which
may be constructed from steel, woodstave, plastic or concrete. Surge shafts are
sometimes used to regulate pressure transients in the penstock, which can fluctuate
significantly due to adjustments to the turbine flow or closure of valves along the power
conduit. Once the water reaches the end of the penstock, there may be a turbine intake
valve which controls the flow and may be closed for maintenance. Past the penstock,
water enters the turbine. The generator transfers the rotational energy of the turbine into
electrical energy which is then converted unto useable voltage in a switchyard connected
to the power grid. Turbines may also be equipped with Pressure Relief Valves, which
control pressure transients in the penstock during load rejections where the wicket gates
must be suddenly closed (Komey, 2014). At Revelstoke Dam (Figure 1-1), water passes
through penstocks to the turbines at the powerhouse.
There are many other features of a dam system which function to monitor, protect and
control the dam and outlet structures. In some systems, dam operation is implemented
primarily from a control center which may be located far away from the site itself.
Operations planning based on an inflow forecast typically takes place off site at the control
center. Operations may be implemented in real-time, with hourly instructions and minuteby-minute changes to gate and/or turbine flow. The instructions may be sent out as signals
from the control center via satellite or communications towers and are interpreted by
Remote Terminal Units (RTU’s), which convert the signals into instructions for outlets
and/or turbines and may also function to send information back to the control center
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(Komey 2014). These RTU’s are part of the SCADA system which collects and distributes
information and implements controls. Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC’s) are
another key part of the SCADA system with a variety of functions, including
implementation of the instructions transmitted by the RTU’s, implementing controls
through a human-machine interface, as well as the collection and analysis of sensory data
(Komey, 2014). Dams may have extensive monitoring equipment, including gauges to
measure the elevation of the reservoir and positions of the gates, piezometers to measure
the water level in dams, and weirs to monitor dam seepage (Jansen 1983; Duscha and
Jansen 1988). This information can be recorded manually or collected by a PLC and
transmitted to the control center using an RTU.
The key input to a dam system is the reservoir inflows. Inflows are a function of the
watershed characteristics, local climate and the hydrologic cycle. In the hydrologic cycle,
moist air enters the atmosphere through evaporation and transpiration. As it cools, it
condenses to form clouds, which release precipitation. Precipitation can fall in the form of
rain or snow, depending on temperatures and ground elevations. Precipitation and
snowmelt may contribute to reservoir inflows through runoff (water passing over the land
surface) or groundwater (water passing through the sub-surface). Precipitation can vary
significantly depending on the time of year as a result of seasonal climate influences. In
addition to the amount of precipitation, the geological conditions, ground cover, and
topography are significant factors affecting reservoir inflows. In regions closer to the poles,
snow melt and the associated increase in inflows is often referred to as the “freshet”. The
freshet is a period of high inflow resulting, in part, from snowmelt due to increasing
temperatures. Freshet inflows may also be affected by heavy rainfall which can speed up
the rate of snowmelt. The duration and magnitude of the freshet depends significantly on
the regions topography, ground cover and climate. In other parts of the world, there may
be wet and dry seasons that affect seasonal inflows. Contributions to inflow from
groundwater may be significant depending on the regional geology and climate. In addition
to natural inflows, there may also be additional inflows to the system from upstream dam
outflows or in some cases, water diversion facilities. Forecasting of the inflows is a key
part of safe system operation. There is inherent uncertainty in meteorological forecasts,
with forecasting errors generally increasing as inflows increase.
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Internal or external disturbances represent another input to dam systems. These include
earthquakes, debris accumulation, forest fires, extreme wind and rain, ice storms, ice
accumulation, vandalism, rodent activity, human error, component aging, etc. These
disturbances may also be considered inputs to the system. Proper management of the
system under these circumstances is of critical importance in keeping dam systems safe
and preventing losses resulting from failures.
For the remainder of this thesis, a dam system is defined as all components which interact
for the purposes of water storage and conveyance. This includes all civil, mechanical and
electrical infrastructure at a dam site, human operations and decision making, personnel
and staffing, site access, sensory and communications equipment, information flow, as well
as water in storage and conveyance. The dam system input is the inflow as well as any
natural disturbances. The dam system output is the outflows and products of the system
such as energy. This research focuses on the analysis of dam system flow control – that is,
the safe conveyance of water through the system.

1.2 Dam system failures
The three general modes of failure for various types of dam include (1) internal erosion,
which involves the migration of material from an embankment (or abutments) and can lead
to weakening of the water barrier and eventually dam breach, (2) instability, which can
result from uplift pressures or uneven settlement and can lead to failure by toppling or
sliding, and (3) overtopping or flow control failures which result from a loss of control of
the reservoir elevation and can potentially lead to failure modes (1) and (2) (Regan 2009).
Different types of dams have different risks, for example an embankment dam has risks
relating to slope instability, overtopping or internal/foundation erosion whereas a concrete
dam has risks relating to foundation erosion, overtopping and instability due to sliding or
overturning (USBR 1987). Dams also have risks relating to the conveyance of water: if one
or more of the water conveyance components of the system fail or become blocked, there
may be an uncontrolled release of flow or the reservoir could rise to an unsafe level that
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could trigger failure of the entire dam (Baecher et al. 2013; Komey et al. 2015). High
reservoir levels can result in a number of adverse impacts, including increased seepage,
increased foundation or dam uplift pressures that could compromise dam stability, or
overtopping of dam structures and/or abutments which can progress to erosion, headcutting and potentially loss of containment of the reservoir. Further, there are obvious risks
relating to the collection, transfer, and use of information to make decisions that will
ultimately affect the infrastructure and the risk of dam failure or uncontrolled flow release
(Komey et al. 2015). In simple terms, the safety of dams relies on the ability to safely
contain and convey flows through the dam system.
A better understanding of how dams fail to operate safely and what the contributing factors
are can help practitioners identify potential risks in similar structures and system
arrangements. Despite the extreme consequences associated with dam safety incidents,
post-event information is often limited to the immediate failure mode or proximate cause
and the incident consequences. There are very few detailed accounts of the design,
operational decisions and other states of the system that may have contributed to dam safety
incidents. Some of the more well-known post event assessments of dam safety incidents
include Teton Dam (Jansen 1983; Seed and Duncan 1987), Vajont Dam (Jansen 1983;
Genevois and Ghirotti 2005), Baldwin Hills Dam (Jansen 1983), St. Francis Dam (Jansen
1983), Carsington Dam (Kennard and Bromhead 2000), Taum Sauk pumped storage
facility (FERC 2006), Folsom Dam (Todd 1999) and Oroville Dam (France et al. 2018a).
There are a variety of different resources for information about dam safety incidents,
mostly from American organizations. The Association of State Dam Safety Officials
(ASDSO) has a number of sources for information about dam failures in the United States,
including a website with case studies and lessons learned about select incidents (ASDSO,
2016) and a table containing basic information relating to 187 incidents (ASDSO, n.d.).
Jansen (1983) provided an excellent review of dam failure case histories in a technical
publication by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR). The National
Performance of Dams Program (NPDP) is a database of American dam incidents and
failures developed by Stanford University. Most of the incidents are from the late 1900s
but the database includes incidents ranging from 1848 to 2015. A wide variety of incidents
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are covered, from issues discovered during safety inspections to flow control incidents to
complete dam failures, with a total of 2977 incidents. Other researchers have compiled and
assessed similar databases to draw conclusions about dam safety risks (Foster et al. 2000a;
Zhang et al. 2007; Charles et al. 2011). Regan (2009) compiled a database of over 4000
dam failures worldwide, with half of these incidents coming from the United States. The
database was assessed to answer questions mainly about the age of the dam at failure as
well as the type of dam and the general failure mode (flood, seepage/piping, structural).
Fry et al. (2004) developed a web-based Dam Accident DataBase (DADB) with 900
incidents. Database entries included basic information about the dam and breach
characteristics, dates of construction and failure as well as the failure mode, with links to
references for users. Analysis of the past failures has shown that internal or foundation
erosion and flooding events (overtopping) are the two major causes of catastrophic dam
failure (Foster et al. 2000b; Donnelly 2005; Regan 2009).
The likelihood of failure by internal erosion is traditionally estimated using empirical
criteria developed by Foster et al. (2000b) and Foster and Fell (2001). Internal erosion
processes are generally not well understood, and there are ongoing efforts to better
understand the physical processes. Assessment of failure by overtopping is also a
complicated process, because of the sheer number of factors which can contribute to the
likelihood of dam overtopping. Such factors can include but are not limited to inflows,
operational decisions, gate reliability, personnel availability, site accessibility, and natural
disturbances such as ice or debris buildup (Lewin et al. 2003; Regan 2010; Komey et al.
2015). There is a large amount of literature detailing various approaches to extreme flood
estimation (Bocchiola et al. 2003; Kwon and Moon 2006; Kuo et al. 2007; USBR and
USACE 2012), and many risk assessment methodologies check dam performance under
these extreme flood loads (Regan 2010; Komey et al. 2015). However, it is difficult to
assess overtopping incidents that could happen within the design envelope of the dam
system due to a combination of events which together prevent water from being released
and allow the reservoir to rise to an unsafe level (Regan 2010).
Hartford et al. (2016) describes the “uncommon combination of common events”, where
multiple seemingly benign events combine together to become a significant dam safety
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problem. In the Noppikoski Dam failure incident, a number of conditions contributed to an
inability to pass flows through the system, leading to overtopping failure of the dam. The
mechanical hoist equipment did not function, and a crane was unable to be mobilized to
the site in time to remove the stoplogs from the spillway as a result of extreme weather
conditions (loss of access) and site staff unavailability. These issues, combined with higher
than normal inflows, lead to rising reservoir levels which eventually overtopped and failed
the earthfill embankment. Taum Sauk is another example of combinations of events
interacting with disastrous consequences. The pumped storage facility was overfilled and
breached as a result of improperly calibrated reservoir level sensing equipment and
differential settlement of the dam crest.
Lewin et al. (2003) analysed several USACE dams and noted that failure to operate the
gate on demand would increase the probability of failure of the dam by between 2 to 250
times. Furthermore, dams may also be in an unsafe state without complete structural failure
of the dam, as a result of uncontrolled flow releases through a failed conduit. Regan (2010)
and Baecher et al. (2013) assess several dam failures and uncontrolled flow releases, noting
that dam safety incidents are often a result of complex interactions between system
components. Both researchers advocate taking a “dams as systems” approach when
assessing dam safety risks in order to avoid omission of potentially significant failure
modes.
The existing databases relating to dam safety incidents tend to focus more on the proximate
causes of the incidents. The database assessments of Foster et al. (2000a, b) and Zhang et
al. (2007) focus mainly on internal erosion in embankment dams, looking at embankment
design and construction practices. Other assessments (Donnelly 2005; Regan 2010) look
at dams in general but don’t tend to further decompose the incidents to look at contributing
factors such as operational decisions, lack of maintenance, and component failures.
King et al. (2016a) used information from a variety of sources to assess the causes of dam
incidents resulting in uncontrolled releases of water. A database of dam incidents was
compiled, and dam incidents were decomposed as much as possible to determine the
components involved and the contributing factors. Failures were categorized depending on
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the type of incident, with incidents grouped into categories based on the following failure
modes: overtopping, penstock failure, embankment failure, uncontrolled flow release and
other. Internal erosion events were considered to be a design and surveillance issue and as
such were not included in the database, which intended to focus on operational safety. The
database also recorded the type of component involved: Mechanical, electrical, structural,
operational, and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Incidents
relating to a certain type of component could then be broken down more specifically (eg.
for structural the spillway chute, the dam, the penstock, or the gate). Maintenance was
considered to be an operational issue and as such is recorded in that category. Other
relevant factors relating to the incident were also recorded, for example the presence of
disturbances such as debris buildup, landslides, vandalism and earthquakes.
Based on the completeness of information, incidents were then categorized as either
acceptable or incomplete. Incomplete sources were omitted in some of the more detailed
figures to allow for a more accurate assessment of the proportions of various types of
contributing factors. Once all information for an incident was collected, the quality of
information was assessed (acceptable or incomplete) and the incident was assigned a rank
based on its severity using the following guidelines:
•

Catastrophic: Complete loss of flow control

•

Major: Temporary disablement of hydraulic structures leading to temporary loss
of flow control

•

Minor: Temporary disablement of hydraulic structures that could potentially have
resulted in a loss of flow control

Table 1-1 (King et al., 2016) contains a list of the different sources used to compile the
database. The number of incidents contributed to by each source is also listed. Most of the
dams considered are in the United States because this data was most easily accessible. In
the future, accessing the DADB of Fry et al. (2004), which was developed by a European
team, could help increase the number of dams considered outside of the United States.
Figure 1-2 (King et al., 2016) contains a breakdown of the source quality for each source
used. The data from NPDP was scaled by 10 in the figure to make the quality of the other
sources more clearly visible.
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Table 1-1: Sources of incident information for database development (King et al.,
2016)
Source
NPDP (2016)
ASDSO (2010)
USBR (2014a)
Charles (2011)
Tavakoli (2015)
Chanson (2000)
FEMA and NJOEM (2004)
Van Niekerk and Viljoen
(2005)
Other

Number of Incidents
1018
79
17
10
8
5
5
3
37

Figure 1-2: Sources used in dam incidents database (King et al., 2016)
A pie-chart of incident types is shown in Figure 1-3 (King et al., 2016), considering all
incidents in the database. It is clear from the data that the most common incident type in
the database is overtopping. It should be noted that overtopping can be related to many
other factors such as operational decision making, gate failures, turbine failures, ice and
debris buildup, etc.
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Figure 1-3: Dam safety flow control incidents, by incident category (King et al.,
2016)
Figure 1-4 (King et al., 2016) contains a plot showing the factors which contributed to
overtopping events, taking into consideration only incidents with an acceptable amount of
information. The most common reason for overtopping events is due to lack of spillway
capacity. Over half of the overtopping incidents in the database were due to insufficient
spillway capacity. However, this could be an indication that the operator did not leave
enough freeboard in the reservoir to accommodate inflows up to the probable maximum
flood volume. A more detailed analysis of each incident would be required to determine
whether this was the case – such information is often not available or not reported. The
second most common reason for dam overtopping was a result of a blocked spillway (eg.
ice or debris). The next most common contributors to overtopping are gate issues and
operator errors. Operator errors could involve the operator deciding not to open the gate,
opening it too late or opening it to the wrong position.
Figure 1-5 (King et al., 2016) contains a pie chart of the components involved in the
incident, taking into consideration all events in the database that had enough information
(677 incidents). Structural incidents were by far the most common, followed by mechanical
and operational. Fewer events were related to electrical or SCADA failures. This
distribution could be a limitation of the data: because issues relating to electrical and
mechanical components may be more quickly resolved and thus less likely to lead to major
incidents, it is possible that events relating to these components are under-reported.
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Figure 1-4: Factors contributing to dam overtopping (King et al., 2016)

Figure 1-5: Components involved in dam incidents (King et al., 2016)
Figure 1-6 (King et al., 2016) contains a plot of the components involved in structuralrelated dam safety incidents. Incidents are divided in each category to show the proportion
that were catastrophic, major and minor. The most common type of structural incident was
an inadequate spillway capacity; most of these incidents result in complete loss of control
(the reservoir overtops the dam) and are thus classified as catastrophic. It should again be
noted that inadequate spillway capacity may be tied to lack of conservatism in reservoir
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operations. The second and third most common structural incidents were related to the
spillway chute and penstock, respectively. Because these components actively pass water,
they can become deteriorated and may fail if not properly maintained. For the spillway
chute failures, not all were classified as catastrophic (uncontrolled flow release) because in
some cases the gates could be closed or the reservoir level fell below the sill and the chute
could be repaired. Most of the penstock failures are catastrophic because in some systems
the intake gates may not be able to be closed under rupture flows. Penstock intake sills are
also lower in comparison to spillway sills and therefore significantly more reservoir
volume may be released in the event of penstock failure. Structural dam failures and
spillway gate failures were the next most common structural flow control incidents. It
should be noted that internal erosion and foundation failures were removed from the
database and would influence the number of structural dam failures in the figure. Outlet
pipes and intake structures were the least common components involved in structural flow
control incidents.

Figure 1-6: Components involved in structural incidents (King et al., 2016)
Figure 1-7 (King et al., 2016) contains a graph showing the mechanical components
involved in spillway related incidents. Spillway gate issues were by far the most common,
followed by low level outlet and penstock valve failures. Less common were mechanical
issues associated with gates, turbines and siphons. It is likely that turbine related issues are
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under-reported because forced turbine outages may happen at any power generating facility
without impeding the ability of the dam system to operate safely. In some cases, however,
turbine outages during high inflow events could lead to potential loss of flow control. It is
interesting to note that these incidents did not involve a high number of catastrophic events
in comparison with the structural incidents. This is likely due to the fact that mechanical
issues can be more rapidly repaired than structural incidents.

Figure 1-7: Components involved in mechanics incidents (King et al., 2016)
Figure 1-8 (King et al., 2016) contains a plot of the operational factors which contribute to
flow control incidents. The data shows that maintenance issues were the most common
operational factor, followed by the wrong decision being made. There were less instances
of implementation errors or late decisions. It is important to note that operational factors
are likely under-reported. Dam operators are not likely to admit mistakes following an
event for liability reasons. It is also possible that lack of maintenance was a factor in many
of the incidents reported under other component categories but wasn’t explicitly mentioned
in the event synopsis.
There were only 21 total incidents involving electrical issues and these were mostly
related to inability to generate power (forced turbine outage) and power outages. It is
possible that electrical issues are under-reported because electrical problems can be
solved using back-up diesel, battery or mechanical power sources. Turbine-related power
issues are also likely underreported as they are less likely to lead to serious dam safety
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issues since the grid can often be brought back online relatively quickly. There were also
very few issues relating to SCADA systems and it is likely these are also underreported.

Figure 1-8: Operational factors contributing to incidents (King et al., 2016)

Figure 1-9: Components and factors involved in spillway related incidents (King et
al., 2016)
Figure 1-9 (King et al., 2016) shows a plot of the components involved in spillway related
incidents. By far the most common component involved in spillway related incidents was
the chute. Debris buildup and mechanical gate issues were the second most common issue
reported followed by structural gate issues and ice. As discussed earlier, because the sill of
the spillway is relatively high, many spillway related incidents are not catastrophic.
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Figure 1-10: Disturbances contributing to incidents (King et al., 2016)
Figure 1-10 (King et al., 2016) shows the various disturbances involved in flow control
incidents. The most common type of disturbance was landslides, and many of these were
responsible for the penstock rupture incidents. Ice and debris were the next most common,
followed by wind, earthquakes and animal burrows. Some of the disturbances are
indicative of potential maintenance issues; for example, removal of vegetation, debris and
animal burrows should be an important part of any dam safety program. Of all incidents
where information about disturbances was available, 7.5% had multiple disturbances
contributing to the incident.
The results King et al. (2016a) indicate that there are many factors that influence the ability
to control flows in a dam system. As such, dams should be considered (and analyzed) as
complex systems of various components working together, quite often known as
“system(s) of systems”. The sources of information for the King et al. (2016a) study
include many non-technical articles which contained limited information about the
incidents and as such provide only some insight into the complexity of the incidents and
the factors involved. Understanding some of the more detailed event assessments can help
illustrate the complexity of the problem of flow control in dam safety. The recent Oroville
Dam spillway incident provides some useful context with respect to how a variety of
factors may contribute to dam safety incidents. The interplay of components and events
within a system can lead to emergent and dynamic behaviour, which the Oroville incident
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is a good example of. A brief synopsis and discussion of the incident is described in the
following section.

1.2.1 Oroville dam spillway incident
Completed in 1968, the Oroville Dam is a large embankment dam on the Feather River in
California and is located at the upstream end of the Oroville-Thermalito complex, which
consists of a number of dams and generating stations (FERC 2005a; France et al. 2018a).
The Oroville Dam, as shown in Figure 1-11 (France et al. 2018a), consists of an
embankment dam, a gated service spillway with eight operating gates and a large concrete
chute, an emergency spillway overflow weir discharging into an unlined channel, and the
Hyatt Powerplant. There is also a river valve outlet system and a tunnel carrying water
towards another generating station downstream.

Figure 1-11: Overview of the Oroville Dam (France et al. 2018)
In February 2017, after severe storms and above average inflows, the gated service spillway
was opened and discharged 1400 m3/s into the chute. On the morning of February 7, 2017,
engineers noticed spray coming from the spillway chute and the gate was closed. Upon
inspection, a large hole in the foundation and damage to concrete slabs was noticed, as
shown in Figure 1-12 (France et al. 2018a). At this point, the reservoir was still rising, and
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water began flowing over the emergency spillway overflow weir on February 11, 2017,
peaking at around 350 m3/s on February 12. As the water flowed past the spillway crest
structure and onto the natural ground downstream, erosion began to occur, and it
progressed through head-cutting, upstream towards the chute structure as shown in Figure
1-13. Undermining of the emergency spillway structure could have resulted in a
catastrophic, uncontrolled release of flow. As such, an evacuation order was issued on
February 12, 2017 and flow was increased to around 2800 m3/s over the gated service
spillway (France et al. 2018a). This helped lower the reservoir levels to stop flow over the
emergency spillway, however it resulted in extensive damage to the service spillway chute
as shown in Figure 1-14.

Figure 1-12: Oroville spillway chute damage (France et al. 2018)
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Figure 1-13: Erosion downstream of Oroville emergency overflow weir (France et
al. 2018)

Figure 1-14: Oroville spillway chute after incident (France et al. 2018)
Following the incident, an independent forensic team (IFT) consisting of experts from
various organizations was assembled to review in detail the factors contributing to the
incident, providing a detailed report regarding contributing factors and proximate causes
of the failure. The immediate cause of the issues in the service spillway chute was uplift
pressures that were sufficient to dislodge and remove a section of spillway slab, exposing
the underlying foundation directly to high velocity spillway flows. The underlying
foundation consisted of rock that was “moderately to highly weathered and even soil like”,
meaning erosion was able to progress to the degree that additional slab sections both up
and downstream of the initial failure were mobilized (France et al. 2018a). For the
emergency spillway, erosion began to occur of the natural ground downstream of the
spillway structure and in some areas, it began to progress through head-cutting upstream
towards the structure. This was mainly a result of the significant depths of erodible
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weathered rock and soil as well as hillside topography and insufficient erosion protection
and energy dissipation structures.
Management decisions during the events were complicated by a number of issues.
Continued erosion of the spillway chute could potentially lead to failure of a transmission
tower located beside the spillway. There were uncertainties relating to whether progression
of the chute failure upstream could eventually compromise the spillway headgate structure.
Debris blockage of the river in combination with spillway tailwater could result in
powerplant flooding, presenting potentially long-term issues with water management if the
powerhouse was no longer able to discharge flows downstream (France et al. 2018a).
Closing the spillway to mitigate these issues would mean utilizing the emergency spillway,
the consequences of which were not known at the time. A decision was made to reduce
service spillway flows, which resulted in water being released over the emergency spillway
and the initiation of erosion there (France et al. 2018a). This presented a new, avoidable,
and more threatening issue (undermining of the emergency spillway could progress to dam
failure). The system operators were presented with a difficult trade-off and ultimately the
decision to reduce flow over the service spillway meant increased flows were necessary
later on to prevent further erosion at the emergency spillway.
The IFT report also details extensively many indirect causes of the incident. Several issues
in the design and construction of the spillway chute are mentioned, including insufficient
foundation preparation for both the chute and emergency spillway, foundation drains which
protruded into the chute slab sections, lack of additional reinforcement and robust slab joint
keys, and anchor lengths which were insufficient considering the amount of weathered rock
on which the chute was constructed (France et al. 2018a). A number of systemic issues
relating to organizational, industry and regulatory factors were also identified. Examples
of these include a focus on dams instead of spillways, cost control resulting in a reactive
approach to managing infrastructure problems, emphasis on dam production ahead of dam
safety, as well as overconfidence and complacency regarding the safety of the
infrastructure (France et al. 2018a).
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The Oroville Dam spillway failure provides insight into the dynamic and often emergent
nature of dam safety incidents. There were a large number of direct and indirect factors
which contributed to the spillway failures, and management decisions during the incident
were complicated by a number of trade-offs. The incident illustrates well the importance
of considering the degree of complexity and interactivity in dam systems when analyzing
dam safety flow control. This is essential to capture emergent system behaviour, which
may not be obvious through analyses of the individual parts.

1.3 Systems Approach
Hartford et al. (2016) advocate for a systems approach to the problem of operational safety
in dams and reservoirs, noting that:
“A new approach is required, as current engineering practices do not and cannot
address the character of some of the most probable causes of incidents and failures,
which are the unforeseen combination of rather usual conditions. That is, most
incidents and failures occur not because an extreme event occurs (eg. a flood or an
earthquake), but rather because a series of more common events occurs, which in
their unfortunate and unexpected combination leads to an adverse outcome – an
incident or a failure… It may not be possible for an incident or failure to occur if
all components, and therefore events, are in a perfectly normal state. Some
conditions must be in the range of ‘not quite usual’ – for example, a 50-year flood,
lack of required maintenance, slightly incompetent personnel or organization, bad
instructions or policies, a power blackout, or the like – and yet not be extreme or
malicious individually”
Traditional risk assessment approaches include Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA). FMEA is a systematic approach to determining the potential failure
modes of system components and the effects that these may have on the system as a whole.
PFMA is a heuristic failure modes brainstorming technique used commonly within the
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dams industry (particularly in the United States). ETA is an inductive, chain-of-events style
technique that can be used to determine the potential outcomes from a single initiating
event. FTA is a deductive chain-of-events technique that starts with a high-level
undesirable event and proceeds in more levels of detail to determine its causes.
Hartford et al. (2016) suggests that systems safety engineering recognizes the three major
ways for accidents to occur result from (1) the system capacity being exceeded, (2)
combinations of failures of system components, none of which occurring individually
would be cause for concern, or (3) a result of complex interactions between system
components, none of which may have failed. In traditional dam safety practice, a standards
based approach is followed, which addresses the first of these three causes of accidents –
checking the system capacity against expected design loads, including extreme floods and
earthquakes. Existing risk assessment approaches may provide some insight into the
second and third type of accident, however there are a number of shortcomings in this area
which are well documented within and outside of the dams industry (Regan 2010; Hartford
et al. 2016; King et al. 2016b):
1. The focus of traditional risk analysis tends to be on extreme events at the edge of
the design envelope in terms of structural loads and inflows, while failures may
occur well within the design envelope due to an uncommon combination of events
which individually may not be uncommon (Baecher et al. 2013; Komey 2014;
Hartford et al. 2016)

2. Using chain-of-events analyses, all possible system hazards and component
operating states must be determined at the beginning of the analysis. This
requirement creates immense challenges for the analysis of anything other than
simple dam and reservoir systems, since the number of physically possible
combinations becomes overwhelmingly large (Hartford et al. 2016)

3. Traditional analysis techniques such as fault trees and event trees often assume a
linear progression of events, ignoring component interactions and oversimplifying
dynamic system behaviour (Regan 2010; Leveson 2011; Thomas 2012)
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4. Events are often assumed to be completely independent of one another, despite the
fact that common cause events are possible (Putcha and Patev 2000; Leveson 2011;
Komey et al. 2015)

5. Systems are decomposed into more manageable sub-systems for analysis and the
interactions between them are completely ignored or simplified (Regan 2010;
Leveson 2011; Thomas 2012)
A systems approach is beginning to emerge as a new technique to address some of the
aforementioned shortcomings and make progress towards addressing the second and third
type of incident. This is discussed in detail within the recent book “Operational Safety of
Dams and Reservoirs” by Hartford et al. (2016). The systems approach is fundamentally
rooted in systems theory.
Systems theory has a long history of concurrent developments in various fields, with
general systems theory being first defined by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950;
1968). Von Bertalanffy (1968) defines a system as “complex of interacting elements” in
his book dealing with general systems theory and first used the term in a 1950 article
dealing with open systems in the fields of physics and biology (Von Bertalanffy 1950).
Open systems are those which have inputs and outputs resulting in a change in the system
state, whereas closed systems have no external inputs or outputs. The idea of system
feedbacks being a function of the system structure is described in this work, with the theory
of feedback having origins in cybernetics (Wiener, 1948) and social sciences (Richardson
1991).
Von Bertalanffy (1968) and Forrester (1961, 1969, 1971a) further developed the concepts
of systems theory in a series of books dealing with biological, social, economic and other
applications. Systems theory, cybernetics and control system theory were at least partly
influenced by the efforts of some of the key authors to develop automatic systems for antiaircraft weaponry and radar devices during World War II (Wiener 1948; Brown and
Campbell 1950; Forrester 1989), though Von Bertalanffy (1968) describes several other
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key developments which led to a general systems theory. Forrester (1961) began
developing system dynamics to analyze industrial and management systems, and pioneered
the earliest forms of system dynamics simulation software packages. He later extended the
application of system dynamics simulation to model the social dynamics of cities, countries
and the world as a whole (Forrester 1969, 1971b, 1989).
Key concepts in general systems theory include the consideration of the system as a whole
consisting of interacting parts and the system boundary distinguishing its elements from
their surrounding environment. Systems may be as small as a single atom and as large as
the universe (Simonovic 2009). Simonovic (2009) provides a more detailed definition of a
system as “a collection of various structural and non-structural elements that are collected
and organized in such a way as to achieve some specific objective through the control and
distribution of material resources, energy and information”, and formalizes this as:
𝑆: 𝑋 → 𝑌

(1)

Where 𝑋 is an input vector, 𝑌 is an output vector, and the system is a set of operations that
transforms 𝑋 to 𝑌. Figure 14 (Simonovic 2009) contains a schematic presentation of this
definition.

Figure 1-15: Schematic presentation of system definition (Simonovic, 2009)
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Another key concept of systems theory is feedback. Open systems, as shown in Figure 1-16
(a) have inputs and outputs that drive the system behaviour. In feedback systems, as shown
in Figure 1-16(b), the input is influenced by the system’s own past behaviour (Simonovic
2009). The system is able to respond to its outputs by adjusting the inputs. This selfregulating behaviour, known as homeostasis, is present in many mechanical systems and
inspired the work of Wiener (1948) on man-machine systems. Wiener (1948) pioneered
cybernetics – which is the study of control mechanisms in man-machine systems – and his
work introduced the theory of feedback mechanisms, describing a variety of stabilizing and
oscillatory systems. In parallel with the concept of feedback being introduced within the
field of cybernetics, it was also being described within the context of social systems (Kast
and Rosenzweig 1972; Richardson 1991). A thermostat provides an excellent example of
self-regulation, where the thermostat is able to adjust the heat production based on the
temperature in the room and the desired temperature (Simonovic 2009). Homeostasis acts
to steer the system towards some desired goal.

Figure 1-16: Schematic of an open system (a) and a closed system (b)
A feedback loop is a closed path connecting two or more elements of a system.
Understanding feedback loops requires an understanding of causality, that is, what
elements of the system affect other elements of the system. The two types of loops are (1)
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negative or balancing loops, which act to keep the system in a steady state, and (2) positive
or reinforcing loops, which reinforce changes to the system with more change. Systems
may contain one or potentially many of these loops and can be represented using causal
loop diagrams that show the relationships between elements of the system (Forrester
1971a).
Dams may be considered a type of open system, where the inputs consist of system inflows
and disturbances, and the outputs consist of system outflows and products (for example
electricity). This is shown in Figure 1-17.

Figure 1-17: Dams as open systems
This configuration indicates limited “self-awareness” that is seen in closed systems.
Inflows and disturbances cannot be controlled. However, within the system itself there may
be many examples of closed-system type feedback loops present. To model the internal
dynamics of the system itself there are a few useful aspects of general systems theory to
consider. Control systems theory, which falls under the umbrella of general systems theory
(Von Bertalanffy 1968), offers a new way of considering the structure of hydropower
systems, which are effectively flow control systems.
Control systems theory arose as a means of designing man-machine feedback systems that
self-adjust to achieve the desired outputs (Wiener 1948). Åström and Murray (2008) define
control as the use of algorithms and feedback in engineered systems. According to Åström
and Murray (2008), controllers act to dynamically adjust the behaviour of system elements
to achieve desired system outputs, using feedback to make adjustments. One of the earliest
examples of feedback in engineered systems was the development of a centrifugal
governor, which controls the throttle of a steam engine to maintain a constant speed
(Åström and Murray 2008). The central concept of control systems theory is the use of
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feedback loops for sensing, computation and actuation. Leveson (2011) presents a generic
feedback control loop which is simplified slightly in Figure 1-18.

Figure 1-18: Generic control system structure
Considering how the generic control system structure shown in Figure 1-18 can be applied
to dam systems is relatively straightforward. The controlled process represents the
hydraulic system state, that is, the water barriers, passages and infrastructure on the ground
– the dam(s), gate(s) and turbine(s). The system state is measured by sensors – sensors may
measure the current reservoir elevation, positions of gates, and even rainfall to predict
system inputs (inflows). The controller represents the processing of that information into
decisions regarding the required control actions to maintain safety and push the outputs
towards the desired level (outputs can be power production as well as outflow). In a dam
system, the controller may be a software program, a single person interpreting the system
state and making decisions, or multiple people within an organization working together
and using mathematical process models to assist in decision making. The output of the
controlled process in the feedback loop is a set of control actions, or instructions, that are
implemented through actuation of system features that change the hydraulic system state.
Actuators in this case are the mechanical-electrical arrangements of infrastructure that
function to change the positions of outlet structures (gates and turbine) to modify the
outputs and keep the system safe. A control action could be to open the gate (actuate) to a
certain position, with the goal of maintaining a safe reservoir level and avoiding excessive
flooding downstream of the dam.
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Leveson (2011) has applied the concept of control systems to safety in the aerospace
industry, developing the Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling Process (STAMP) for
accident analysis as well as Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) for the design and
analysis of engineering control systems. These methods provide a systematic process for
determining the potential control flaws that can lead to hazards in engineered processes,
and they are based on the analysis of the hierarchical control system structure (Leveson
2011). An STPA analysis is essentially a guided brainstorming session whose participants
work through the control loop to determine potential control flaws, and further analyze
what conditions could possibly lead to them. Identifying the control flaws allows engineers
to determine methods to mitigate or eliminate them in system design and improvement.
One fundamental difference limits the potential of the STPA approach when applied to
dams. Leveson (2011) presents the approach to analyze control systems operating within
the natural environment. Dam systems are systems that both operate within nature and
attempt to control it. The key issue that complicates the problem of dam safety analysis is
that the main system input (inflow) is a completely uncontrollable, nonlinear variable that
the system intends to control. Controls may also be active (gates) or passive (free overflow
spillways). As such, determining how the system will respond to changes in inflow as well
as disturbances (both internal and external) requires a slightly different approach.
Characterizing the reservoir elevation in response to the system operating state and inflows
is a critical problem for dam safety analysis. While STPA can provide very useful insights
regarding the system’s structure and its potential vulnerabilities, dynamic analysis of the
system response is required to fully understand and mathematically characterize system
behaviour.
Two of the major techniques that can be used in the dynamic analysis of systems include
simulation, optimization and multiobjective analysis (which expands on optimization to
problems with multiple objectives). Simulation involves a “what if” assessment of the
various inputs to a system, where outputs are determined in response to a particular set of
inputs. Simulation inputs may be varied to determine system behaviour under a range of
conditions (Simonovic, 2009) and link the system structure to its behaviour. Optimization,
in contrast, provides a single optimal solution to a given system configuration, with
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performance measured based on some objective function (eg. maximize profit).
Optimization techniques are useful mainly for determining optimal operations strategies
driven by a single articulated goal. They are unable to deal with the dynamic, feedbackdriven behaviour of complex systems. Optimization techniques may, however, present a
useful tool for capturing operator’s thought processes and priorities in development of
operating instructions. Optimization can be extremely useful for developing optimal
operating decisions and policies. Simulation is the most promising systems analysis
technique for this research because it (a) facilitates a very detailed representation of system
structure, interactions and feedbacks, (b) links the system structure to system behaviour,
and (c) allows for the assessment of the dynamic system response to various operating
conditions.
System dynamics simulation (Forrester 1971a) is a particularly promising simulation
environment to deal with highly complex hydropower dam systems. In system dynamics
simulation, the pattern of interaction between system elements is called the system
structure, and the behaviour of the system is linked to its underlying structure (the
relationships between system components). System behaviour is defined by the way in
which the system variables change over time. The dynamics of how a system changes over
time can be investigated by changing either the inputs or the system structure (Simonovic,
2009).
In order to carry out a system dynamics simulation, development of a model includes the
following steps (Simonovic 2009):
1. Understanding the system and defining its boundaries
2. Identifying the variables that will influence the system’s behaviour
3. Using mathematical relationships to describe the relationships between the
variables
4. Defining the structure of the model
5. Simulating the model to understand the system behaviour
The building blocks of system dynamics simulation models include (1) state variables
(stocks), (2) flows, (3) auxiliary variables and (4) arrows showing relationships between
variables which may include delays. The links between these model elements are
interactions and feedback loops which ultimately drive the system’s behaviour. Stocks are
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shown as boxes and represent the state-variables, or variables which increase or decrease
in value over time and whose value can only be changed by flows. Flows are represented
as rates over time which change the value of a stock. Each auxiliary variable in the model
represents either an equation that is a function of the inputs (represented by arrows) or a
constant. Delays may be added which represent time lags to variable changes.
The key advantage of system dynamics simulation is the ability for it to be used as a
problem-solving method. When problematic patterns of behaviour are observed, the
relationships in the model that contribute to the issue can be inspected and the system
structure can be modified to potentially eliminate or reduce the problem (Simonovic 2009).
The system behaviour contains dynamic information about the state of each model variable,
which could be useful for characterizing the reservoir elevation in response to a variety of
system loads. System dynamics modelling offers a potential approach for assessment of a
wide range of operating scenarios for a dam system, using automatically generated
scenarios of potential component operating states. System dynamics is particularly suited
for the modelling of control systems. The generic control system of Leveson (2011) is
modified to represent a dam system in Figure 1-19, and extended to show the components
within the different sub-systems in Figure 1-20. These provide a basic representation of a
dam system as defined in this thesis.

Figure 1-19: Generic control system structure adapted for a hydropower system
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Figure 1-20: Detailed control system structure adapted for a hydropower system
The following section describes the proposed objectives of this research in further detail.

1.4 Research Objectives
The primary objective of this research is to apply systems analysis techniques to the
problem of flow control in dam safety. In particular, developing and implementing a
methodology that facilitates the characterization of reservoir elevations for particular sets
of inflows and operational constraints (scenarios) is necessary. This research draws on
aspects of the broad domain of general systems theory as well as risk assessment, with the
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goal of providing a systematic and thorough assessment of dam system performance under
a wide range of loadings. The research objectives are as follows:
1. Investigate the use of systems analysis and risk assessment concepts from within
and outside of the dams industry in terms of their ability to determine potential
operating scenarios for dam systems and the impacts scenarios have on system
outcomes.
2. Develop an approach that helps define a more complete range of potential operating
scenarios (operating constraints) than is possible using existing techniques alone.
3. Develop an improved dam safety analysis methodology that facilitates
investigation of all potential operating scenarios and allows for information
pertaining to individual scenarios to be analyzed.
4. Develop a simulation approach that can handle complexity in system structure,
feedbacks, interactivity and nonlinear behaviour and uses object-oriented
modelling to improve model accessibility.
5. Investigate dynamic indicators of system performance with respect to safety, as
well as scenario criticality parameters that can be used to rank the importance of
various scenarios from the simulation outcomes.
These objectives lead to the development of a methodology that is applied to the
Cheakamus Hydropower Project, which is located North of Squamish, British Columbia,
Canada (See Figure 4-1). Cheakamus Hydropower Project is a single-reservoir system
which discharges water from Daisy Lake through the main dam into the Cheakamus River
through two spillway gates and a low level sluice gate. The Cheakamus River is part of the
Squamish River catchment and flows into the Squamish River further downstream,
eventually discharging into the ocean. Water from the reservoir is also discharged through
two hydroelectric generating units in a remotely located powerhouse on the Squamish
River, upstream of the Squamish-Cheakamus confluence. This system is modelled in detail
and operating scenarios for the system are generated. Due to computational time
limitations, a simpler version of the same system is also created, and the scenarios for the
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simple system are run through a simulation model to produce a wide range of potential
outcomes for the system. A comparison is provided between two different free overflow
spillway configurations and operating schemes, to demonstrate how the modelling
approach can give insight to dam owners and decision makers in terms of how system
modifications affect system safety.

1.5

Research Contributions

The key outcomes of this research, in terms of advancements to the current state-ofknowledge are as follows:
1. It is generally accepted that a complete probabilistic risk assessment of complex
dam systems is outside the current state-of-knowledge. This is partly due to the
difficulties in estimation of failure probabilities (of the individual components and
the systems themselves). This research shifts the focus to assessment of as many
possibilities as can be identified, with the goal of providing a complete and
indiscriminate assessment of as many possible outcomes for the system as can be
generated (improved coverage of the “possibility space”). Probabilistic assessment
is possible using the approach presented but is not the focus of the current research.
However, the direct outputs from simulation can be used to estimate conditional
probabilities of dam overtopping failure and reservoir level exceedance for a
particular scenario.
2. Current practices tend to focus on extreme, low probability events such as the
Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) and Maximum Design Earthquake (MDE) at the
edge of the design envelope, when events well within the design envelope may be
contributing more to the overall risk. Assessment of events within the design
envelope typically rely on expert judgement for scenario selection with only a small
portion of possible scenarios being assessed in detail. There is currently no
automated procedure available to determine a complete set of operating scenarios
for dam systems. This research proposes a methodology that uses combinatorics to
generate a more complete set of potential system operating conditions, including
events within and at the edge of the design envelope. The approach presented in
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this research automates the procedure of scenario generation, producing an
exhaustive list of scenarios which results in slightly reduced subjectivity, though
some subjectivity and expert judgement is inherently required in model
development and operating state definition.
3. Chain-of-event techniques such as fault trees are commonly used in dam safety
assessments. This type of analysis is linear and oversimplified because it is
incapable of properly handling component interaction and system feedbacks. The
simulation model presented in this research is capable of modelling feedbacks and
component interaction, providing a more realistic representation of complex dam
systems. Results show how the reservoir level changes with time, which is a key
goal of dam safety assessments that is not easily achieved using chain-of-event
modelling.
4. The simulation framework presented in this research is capable of a more thorough
analysis of all potential scenarios determined through the automated scenario
generation. In the Deterministic Monte Carlo Simulation framework, scenarios are
the deterministic model inputs. The scenario impacts, timing and inflows can be
varied using Monte Carlo techniques to more thoroughly explore the system’s
“possibility space”. This results in estimates of conditional probabilities of failure
and reservoir level exceedances over key levels, as well as failure inflow thresholds,
which are natural outcomes of the approach presented in this work.
5. The simulation modelling approach presented in this research is easily adaptable
and can be modified to experiment with various sets of potential operating rules,
response strategies and upgrades. When compared, asset owners and decision
makers can quantify how the potential scenario outcomes change as different
measures are introduced.
Much of the recent focus on the operational safety of dams and reservoirs involves the
utilization of fully stochastic simulation techniques, where probabilities of operating states
are defined as inputs and operating states are randomly changed throughout a single
continuous simulation. Stochastic simulation is quite useful and efficient for determining
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the overall likelihood of flow control failure for a dam system. However, the simulation
effort focuses on more likely events, so an extremely large computational effort is required
to thoroughly analyze combinations of events. The coverage of the complete “possibility
space” is driven by the probabilities of the events being considered and the number of years
for which the model is run.
This research proposes a Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework to
systematically analyze combinations of component operating states. A systematically
defined set of possible combinations of operating states (scenarios) is used upfront as a
deterministic simulation input. Monte-Carlo variation of operating state outcomes (such as
outage lengths, error magnitudes, timing of impacts and inflows) explores each scenario
more completely. The key sources of novelty in this work are (a) the automated,
combinatorial definition of operating scenarios and (b) the exhaustive exploration of
scenario outcomes using a Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework. System
dynamics simulation modelling is used to execute the simulations. The modelling approach
is object oriented, providing a convenient tool for representing complex systems, and is
easily modifiable which makes it particularly amenable to optioneering-style assessments.
The analysis in this research is performed for each scenario, regardless of scenario
likelihood. The influence of initial events on subsequent events is analyzed to ensure
scenario outcomes are representative of the input scenario. Useful information can be
extracted from each scenario’s simulation results. The goal is a more thorough assessment
of potential operating scenarios than is possible using traditional risk assessment
approaches or stochastic simulation techniques. The Deterministic Monte Carlo approach
ensures a more complete coverage of the “possibility space” for a dam system. Complete
probabilistic assessment is possible using this approach if information is available to
support it. Sensitivity analysis to operating state probabilities is possible without significant
additional computational effort (this is a particularly promising direction for future research
but is not focused on in the current research).
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1.6 Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 2 provides a literature review detailing existing techniques most commonly used
for traditional dam safety as well as the relatively new field of dam safety risk assessment.
Next, a discussion of the research relating to the shortcomings of the traditional approaches
to general risk assessment techniques is provided, including a review of some more recent
work meant to reduce these shortcomings. Finally, a discussion of systems analysis
techniques is provided, and some conclusions about the capabilities of these techniques are
provided.
Chapter 3 contains the complete and detailed methodology used in this work. An overall
methodology justification and requirements are presented first. Next, the scenario
development is described in two sections relating to the development of the component
operating states database and the mathematical formulation to automatically convert
database information into operating scenarios. Next, the Deterministic Monte Carlo
simulation framework is presented. A description of the system dynamics simulation
modelling approach is described, followed by the Monte Carlo techniques used to create
scenario iterations. The general simulation framework and steps are presented next as well
as a discussion of computational considerations. The following section describes the
necessary simulation model input data. Finally, scenario outcome assessment is described.
Chapter 4 contains a description of the case study. First, a description of BC Hydro’s
Cheakamus Power Project is described, followed by a presentation of the database and
scenario generation. Next, a description of scenario generation for a simplified
representation of Cheakamus is described, followed by a description of the simplified
system dynamics model development, testing and model runs. Simulation model input data
is described in the following section. Finally, results are presented.
Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the results and an overall methodology assessment. A
discussion of future directions for this research is also provided. References and appendices
follow.
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Chapter 2

2

Literature Review

A review of the literature relating to traditional dam safety practice and current risk analysis
techniques is provided in this chapter. The following section describes traditional dam
safety practice. Next, a detailed discussion of risk analysis techniques is provided in the
general context as well as within the domain of dam safety. The final section of this chapter
contains a discussion of the systems approach to safety.

2.1 Traditional dam safety practice
Traditional dam safety practice typically follows a standards-based approach, where a dam
is expected to be capable of passing a certain set of extreme loading conditions, such as the
PMF (Mcgrath 2000). There is a significant amount of effort spent on estimating these
extreme loading conditions, which are the “edge” of the design envelope. Factors of safety
used in the design of the system are checked as more information becomes available and
the estimates of these extreme loading conditions are refined. For example, as new flood
estimation methodologies and improved hydrometeorological and hydrological data
become available, dam owners can use this information to re-calculate the probable
maximum precipitation (PMP), which is then used to compute the PMF (USBR 1987;
USACE 2011). Similarly, structural, seismic and other load conditions relating to natural
disturbances can be refined over time, and the standards-based approach essentially checks
and re-checks whether the dam can withstand them.
The United States Bureau of Reclamation USBR has a series of publicly-available
standards, a number of which relate to dam and spillway design. The Spillway and Outlet
Design Standard (No. 14) deals primarily with flow control in dams. The USBR states that
the hydraulic loadings to be considered in spillway and outlet design are the Inflow Design
Flood (IDF) and construction diversion floods (USBR 2014b). The IDF is defined as the
maximum flood hydrograph used in the design of a dam, and it is either equal to or smaller
than the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). The USBR defines the PMF as “the flood
hydrograph that results from the maximum runoff condition due to the most severe
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combination of hydrologic and meteorological conditions that are considered reasonably
possible for the drainage basin under study” (USBR 2014b). Selection of the IDF in dams
built before the early 1940’s was based on extrapolation of existing data, for example
selecting a flood that was 50% larger than the flood of record for a site (USBR 2014b).
Between the late 1940’s until the 1980’s, IDF’s were set equal to the maximum probable
floods (roughly equal to the PMF but computed with only site specific data) until the PMF
was adopted. IDF selection was then modified to consider the downstream hazard potential
classification and possible impacts relating to loss of operation. Eventually, frequency
flood hydrograph calculations were used in selection of the IDF, where dams of a particular
consequence category were designed to withstand a flood with a particular return period.
Since the mid 1990’s, a quantitative risk-based approach has been adopted by most
American agencies. The USBR utilizes an f-N chart, which is a graph that plots estimated
loss of life against the probability of different failure modes. The USBR’s f-N chart has
defined zones, where points within certain zones of the chart require either increased or
decreased justification for further risk reduction. A starting frequency flood is defined and
f-N pairs corresponding to it are plotted. The frequency flood is then increased until all of
the f-N pairs (for each failure mode) are within the zone indicating decreasing justification
to reduce risks. The USBR’s design standard also contains a description of potential failure
modes (PFM’s).
A similar process for IDF calculation is used by the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) and other American dam organizations, and the process is generalized in the
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) “Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety”
(FEMA 2004). The Canadian Dam Association’s (CDA) guidelines describe both riskbased and consequence-based approaches for selection of IDF and MDE (CDA 2007). The
USACE also provides engineering manuals that include technical guidance and standards.
In the “Safety of Dams – Policy and Procedures” document (USACE 2011), minimum
requirements for hydrology and hydraulics of dam systems are outlined, including the
capacity requirements for spillways and outlet works, as well as the reliability of gates.
Geotechnical and structural minimum requirements are also described, and the document
cites reference material containing quantitative standards, where applicable. Factors of
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safety for structural assessment and design may be provided by the dam agencies, as well
as loading conditions to be considered (CDA 2007)
In addition to standards, there is a considerable focus on best practices in dam safety. The
USBR and USACE developed a Best Practices Training Manual (USBR and USACE
2015a) containing chapters covering a variety of considerations in dam safety. Of particular
relevance to the flow control focus of this work are the chapters relating to overtopping
failure, failure of spillway gates and operational considerations. In the chapter on
overtopping failure, the manual mentions that vulnerability of the system to gate failures
during major floods can be simulated using simple flood routing by eliminating one of the
gates from the analysis. The manual also suggests testing the sensitivity of flood routing
by implementing delayed control of the gates as a result of human error. The chapter on
failure of spillway gates focuses mainly on structural strength and stability assessment, as
well as failure modes and best practices for maintenance. The operational risks chapter
focuses on issues relating to events within the design envelope of the dam and suggests the
use of event trees for their assessment (see Section 2.2.4). There is also a chapter on the
probability of failure of electrical and mechanical systems of spillway gates, which
suggests a multi-step approach to incorporating this equipment in dam safety analysis.
First, probability distributions are applied for estimation of individual component failure
rates. Next, fault trees (see Section 2.2.3) are presented as a way of analyzing the
probability of failure for the gate system as a whole. Finally, event trees detailing the chainof-events for the overall dam system are suggested as a means of determining the overall
likelihood of failure as a result of failure of the gate to operate on demand. Frequent
inspection is suggested as a best practice to identify and address failures of gate equipment.
Gate power supply redundancy is also recommended.
In general, the North American dam associations seem to be shifting towards a risk-based
approach to dam safety, the key tools of which are described in the following section. In
terms of international dam safety practice, McGrath (2000) provides an overview of the
use of risk assessment in dam safety, using specific examples of legislature and current
practice from several countries. Bowles (1998a) provides a review of the state of the
practice based on experience in risk assessment for dams in the U.S. and Australia, noting
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several drivers that have lead dam owners to adopt a risk-based approach. One of the key
issues is that severe standards may require cost-prohibitive measures for compliance.
Bowles (1998a) notes that increasing severity of standards does not always result in
reduced risk because dam owners, regulators, and government agencies simply cannot
afford to meet the standards. In some states, regulators have worked with dam owners in a
risk-based approach which prioritizes projects and partial fixes that are affordable to the
dam owner, resulting in an overall reduced risk (Bowles et al. 1998a). Using a risk-based
approach, dam owners can provide numerical risk assessment outcomes as justification for
focusing on the most significant dam safety risks in the portfolio of dams (Bowles et al.
1998a, b; Bowles 2001). Portfolio risk assessment is a technical ranking method used to
prioritize dam upgrades, and has been applied to dams in Australia (Bowles et al. 1998b;
Foster et al. 2000b), the U.S. (Cyganiewicz and Smart 2000; USACE 2011; USBR 2011;
Srivastava 2013), the U.K. (Morris et al. 2012), Europe and Canada (Donnelly 2005).
It is important to note that the standards-based approach and the risk-based approach are
not mutually exclusive, as standards are typically included in the risk-based approach
(USACE 2011). Further, the focus in these technical guidelines still seems to be placed on
definition of the design envelope and assessment of dam performance at the edge of this
design envelope. In essence, the standards-based approach is still in place – the system’s
design envelope is simply determined using more sophisticated probabilistic risk
assessment tools. While some discussion is provided with respect to operational safety
under normal conditions (eg. USBR 2014b), there is very little guidance relating to how
the operational safety of the systems can be assessed, though event trees are presented as a
potential tool. It is worth noting that Canadian structural code associations are
contemplating a switch to “performance-based engineering” which uses simulation to
assess structural performance risk in response to a range of potential loading conditions
(Ellingwood 2017). This shift has resulted from a need to consider climate change impacts
in structural design.
The following section details some of the current practices in risk analysis, from within
and outside of the dams industry.
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2.2 Current practices in risk analysis
Risk is most frequently defined as the product of the failure probabilities and consequences.
Risk analysis is the process used to determine and estimate risks – this may involve the
definition and analysis of different loading conditions, failure modes and consequences as
well as probability estimation (Cyganiewicz and Smart 2000). Risk assessment is the use
of information from risk analysis to evaluate the various sources of risk and make decisions
(Mcgrath 2000). This section focuses on techniques used for risk analysis.
There are a variety of different practices used in the analysis of risk and safety of
engineered systems. Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)’s Aerospace Recommended
Practice document (SAE 1996), and a number of standards (IEC 2008, 2010) from the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) provide useful reference material for
developing an initial understanding of the various assessment tools. Many of the
approaches described by SAE and IEC are not mutually exclusive; that is, multiple
approaches may be used in a system safety assessment, and the results of one approach
may become the inputs of another. Four of the most commonly used techniques for system
safety assessment, in particular within the dams industry, are Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) and it’s descendant Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA), Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). These are described in the following
sections, which present the general theory, applications and limitations of each approach.
Additional methods are then briefly described.

2.2.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a systematic assessment approach that seeks to determine potential failure modes
and identify their causes and the potential effects on system performance (IEC 2008). It
was first developed in 1949 by the U.S. Military for weapons systems and refined in the
1960’s for applications in the aerospace industry (Stamatis 2002; Thomas 2012). The use
of FMEA was extended in the 1970’s to automotive, aerospace and petrochemical
industries (SAE 1967; National Research Council 1981) and was later applied in the
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nuclear, food, drugs, and cosmetics industries (Duckworth and Moore 2010) as well as the
dams industry (Hartford and Baecher 2004; dos Santos et al. 2012).
There are a number of different implementations of FMEA, however the general approach
remains consistent (Thomas 2013). FMEA essentially identifies components and their
failure modes, and then identifies the causes and effects for each failure mode. Failure
Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) adds an additional step where the
severity and probability of events are used to determine the failure modes criticality
(Thomas 2013). Details regarding the FMEA and FMECA processes are described in the
IEC’s International Standard 60812 (IEC 2008) as well as SAE’s Aerospace
Recommended Practice manual, ARP4761 (SAE 1996).
The IEC standard provides an overview of the information that should be made available
to the team performing the analysis. In particular, the system boundary should be clearly
defined and its elements, their characteristics, function and connections with other elements
should be known. Levels of redundancy, system inputs and outputs, and information
regarding how the system structure changes in response to different operating modes are
also essential for the analyst team (IEC 2008). Representing the hierarchical system
structure through the use of diagrams is recommended to illustrate relationships between
components, redundancies and the inputs and outputs (IEC 2008). Information relating to
maintenance routines, frequency of use of the different aspects of the system as well as
operation should also be made available to the analysis team. The FMEA process described
in IEC 60812 is illustrated in the following diagram (Schmittner et al. 2014):
The process involves identifying failure modes for a particular component, and then for
each failure mode determining the effects, severity, causes and the frequency or
probability. Analysis of severity may be done using qualitative descriptors such as
catastrophic, critical, marginal and insignificant. This process is done for all components
of the system at the particular level of detail of analysis. Once this detailed, componentlevel assessment is complete, the effects of failures on the next level of the system should
be determined (IEC 2008). In a hierarchical system, the effects at the immediate level
become the failure modes at the next level, and this can continue until the highest level of
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the system is analyzed (IEC 2008; dos Santos et al. 2012). In this way, the immediate
effects of a failure on the system as a whole can be determined. In FMECA, criticality is
a qualitative measure of the relative degree of importance of a failure mode, and it is
determined using the likelihood and severity of the failure mode (IEC 2008). There are a
number of different ways in which criticality can be assessed and these are outlined in
IEC 60812.

Figure 2-1: FMEA Process (Schmittner, 2014)
The FMEA/FMECA process typically involves a multi-disciplinary team of experts who
work together to analyze the system (Hartford and Baecher 2004; dos Santos et al. 2012).
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Information from the process is usually recorded in a tabular worksheet form and often
uses the aid of diagrams and flow charts to illustrate how the event propagates through the
system (Mcgrath 2000; Bartsch 2004; IEC 2008; dos Santos et al. 2012). The IEC standard
(IEC 2008) and the dam-specific risk assessment text by Hartford and Baecher (2004)
provide example worksheets similar to the one shown in Table 2-1. Analysts may wish to
consider the ways in which a failure may be detected or prevented in the analysis and can
use the results of the analysis to form conclusions regarding actions that can be taken to
mitigate or eliminate important failure modes.
Table 2-1: FMEA Sample Worksheet
Component

Function

Failure
Modes and
causes

Local
consequence

Global
consequence

Ability
to
detect

Severity

Probability

Treatment
action

Within the dams industry, there are some examples of FMEA being utilized for
assessments of dam safety (Putcha and Patev 2000; Shaw et al. 2000; Hartford and Baecher
2004; dos Santos et al. 2012). Hartford (2001) notes that BC Hydro considered FMEA to
be an important precursor to quantitative risk assessment as early as the mid 1990s. By the
early 2000’s the majority of American dam associations (eg. USBR, USACE, FMEA)
began advocating for a heuristic FMEA-inspired approach called PFMA (see Section 2.2.2)
that would reduce the time and effort required to complete a true FMEA.
The IEC and SAE standards note some limitations of the FMEA/FMECA approach.
Despite successful applications in multi-level hierarchical systems, IEC (2008) states that
analysis of multi-level systems can introduce complications and errors, suggesting that
limiting the analysis to two levels of a hierarchical system is preferable. It is noted that the
key assumption in FMEA is that failure modes are independent. The ability of the FMEA
process to deal with common-cause failure is quite limited, and at best they can only be
analyzed qualitatively (SAE 1996; IEC 2008). This means that only a subset of all possible
failure scenarios are considered (Thomas 2013). There are also limitations in dealing with
human factors and software errors that may contribute to system failures (IEC 2008).
Nonlinear and feedback relationships are unable to be analyzed effectively using
FMEA/FMECA (Thomas 2013), so failure initiation and progression can be extremely
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difficult to assess (Shaw et al. 2000; Bartsch 2004). Zhang et al. (2018) note that analysis
of redundancy in systems is complicated by component interdependency. The IEC (2008)
suggests utilizing fault tree analysis to deal with interrelationship scenarios and common
cause failures. Thomas (2013) suggests that FMEA/FMECA, by its nature, is only able to
analyze scenarios that are triggered by a failure – the result is a set of both safe and unsafe
scenarios, with an equal amount of time spent analyzing each. There are, however, some
unsafe scenarios which may not be triggered by failures at all, and these are omitted from
the analysis. Dos Santos (2012) and Zhang et al. (2018) suggest that components may take
on multiple potential states so the binary definition of functional or failed may not be
adequate. Many authors have also noted that FMEA is a time and resource consuming
process which requires a significant amount of information and spends considerable time
analyzing less-relevant failure modes (Mcgrath 2000; Shaw et al. 2000; Bartsch 2004; IEC
2008; dos Santos et al. 2012). Shaw et al. (2000) points out that FMEA was developed for
active systems, in which each component has an output action – whereas in dam systems,
many of the components are passive. dos Santos et al. (2012) found that FMEA did not
give adequate consideration to time dependencies or deterioration where in reality, some
components progress slowly towards a failed state.
The advantages and disadvantages of the approach are summarized in Table 2-2. In spite
of these limitations, FMEA/FMECA still provides a useful and systematic tool for the
identification and assessment of potential failures modes in a variety of systems and
processes. Identifying failure modes is an important aspect of risk analysis and for the
analysis of system safety in general. Knowing what the possible failures are facilitates the
development of strategies to eliminate, detect, mitigate and/or reduce their likelihood of
occurrence.
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Table 2-2: Advantages and disadvantages of FMEA
Advantages
-Systematic approach1,2,3
-Determines potential failure states of
system components and their effects on
other components of the system1,2,3

Disadvantages
-Failure-focus that can miss unsafe nonfailure component states or interactions2
-Difficulty in analyzing redundancy1,3
-Static analysis with limited ability to
analyze feedback, interaction, time,
dynamic system behaviour1,2
-Common-cause failures, human factors
and software errors are challenging within
this framework2
-Difficulty and significant complexity
with multi-level hierarchical system
analysis1,3

1 Hartford and Baecher (2004)
2 Thomas (2013)
3 IEC (2008)

2.2.2 Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA)
PFMA is a qualitative analysis tool that is utilized primarily within the dams industry.
PFMA is essentially a simplified, heuristic variant of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) which was developed in the early 2000’s by FERC in response to the time and
resource commitments required to perform a comprehensive FMEA (Hartford and Baecher
2004; France et al. 2018a). Dam safety literature pre-dating FERC’s introduction of PFMA
(FERC 2005b) often refers to FMEA (eg. Bowles et al. 1998b; Putcha and Patev 2000;
Stewart 2000; Barker et al. 2003; Faber and Stewart 2003; Hartford and Baecher 2004;
Wieland et al. 2005), though many researchers and dam agencies now use the simplified
PFMA methodology as a result of the influence of the American dam associations (eg.
Bowles et al. 2011; USACE 2011; SPANCOLD 2012; USBR and USACE 2012b; Adamo
et al. 2017).
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Despite sometimes being mentioned as a single approach, there are fundamental
differences between PFMA and FMEA/FMECA. FMEA/FMECA is a systematic approach
that works up from the most detailed level of a hierarchical system to higher levels of the
system. In PFMA, this is done heuristically for the system as a whole. This also means the
definition of a failure mode may be slightly different between the two methods. In FMEA,
a failure is defined as a components ability to achieve it’s intended function – failures are
defined at the component level. In PFMA, failures are defined at the system level – only
events which result in a problem at the system level are considered.
PFMA is essentially a failure mode brainstorming session involving a team of experts,
including engineers, field staff and operating staff. The PFMA team performs a review of
all existing data, historical records and information and uses this to come up with possible
modes of failure for the dam, including their causes, qualitative likelihood descriptors, and
consequences (FERC 2005b). The failure modes are categorized into the following groups
(FERC 2005b):
•
•
•
•

Category I – Highlighted potential failure mode (increased significance and
likelihood)
Category II – Potential failure modes considered but not highlighted (lesser
significance and likelihood)
Category III – More information or analysis needed to classify
Category IV – Potential failure mode ruled out (physically impossible or unlikely)

FERC (2005b) states that the result of a PFMA analysis is an information resource that can
help illuminate failure modes not previously considered, while highlighting the importance
of failure modes with high consequence and likelihood. The guidance document also states
that the analysis may identify some failure modes which are less significant than previously
thought, due to their associated consequences or likelihood (FERC 2005b). It is suggested
by some researchers and organizations (eg. Bowles et al. 1999, 2011; FERC 2007; USBR
and USACE 2015; Adamo et al. 2017) that PFMA is the first step in risk assessment, to be
followed by the quantification of risk, using event trees or other guidelines.
In 2003, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) made PFMA a requirement
for all American dams meeting certain criteria (relating to hazard level and size under the
Code of Federal Regulations 18 Part 12 Subpart D), and published a technical document
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detailing the steps of the analysis (FERC 2005b; Hoeg et al. 2007). The USACE and USBR
also include PFMA in their dam safety policies and best practices manuals (USACE 2011;
USBR and USACE 2015b). Several other agencies have their own guidelines, webinars
and supporting documents (Hydrometrics Inc. 2011; USSD 2013; ASDSO 2018). The
CDA dam safety guidelines do not specifically mention PFMA (CDA 2007).
Despite its widespread use and successes in identifying some failure modes as well as
helping dam owners prioritize risk reduction measures (eg. FERC 2007; Adamo et al.
2017), the PFMA process is not without its shortcomings. This became especially apparent
following the Oroville Dam incident of 2017 (France et al. 2018a).
In the aftermath of the incident, an independent forensic team consisting of engineers from
a variety of organizations was assembled to review the causes of the incident (France et al.
2018a). It was revealed that the dam had been the subject of three PFMA’s in 2005, 2009
and most recently in 2014. Failure modes relating to the emergency overflow spillway and
spillway chute were overlooked in 2005 and 2009. In 2014, two relevant failure modes
were identified. The first was related to the emergency spillway: “A PMF flood event is
occurring and over 10 feet of water is spilling over the emergency spillway at Oroville
Dam. Erosion begins where the flow is entering the Feather River and progresses by headcutting into the reservoir” (France et al. 2018a). The possibility of erosion happening at
lower spillway flows was not considered and the failure mode was classified as Category
IV (non-credible) as a result of its perceived likelihood being small. The second relevant
potential failure mode was the failure of the spillway chute: “Cavitation or slabjacking
results in loss of the concrete lining in the spillway chute downstream of the [spillway
gates]. The rock in the spillway chute erodes and the [spillway gates are] undermined and
lost” (France et al. 2018a). Again, this potential failure mode was classified as Category
IV (non-credible), as a result of its perceived likelihood being small.
The Oroville incident has helped highlight some of the shortcomings of PFMA. In two of
the three PFMA sessions, the pertinent failure modes were completely missed, and in the
third, their likelihoods were perceived to be so low as to not warrant further investigation
or remediation. The 2014 PFMA was the result of two weeks of analysis and was
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considered to be very thorough by all involved, however some key errors in judgement
were made relating to assumptions about the geologic conditions and the condition of the
spillway chute (France et al. 2018a). France et al. (2018a) notes that a considerable
emphasis is placed on loss-of-life during the PFMA process, resulting in some plausible
scenarios being eliminated from the list and categorized as Category IV due to perceived
minimal consequences. In addition to this, there tends to be more emphasis on the dams
themselves, and less emphasis on their appurtenant structures. France et al. (2018a) also
noted issues with the FERC categorization scheme – FERC (2005b) states that “If you do
not fully develop a [potential failure mode], you cannot categorize it”, when in reality more
information is often necessary to properly categorize some of the potential failure modes.
Another key issue with the PFMA process is that the results are subjective and could vary
significantly depending on the individuals involved, the data available and the time
allocated for the process. This is obvious when considering that two of the three PFMA
reports overlooked failure modes relating to the spillways (France et al. 2018a). The
independent forensic investigators also noted that PFMA was considerably less structured
than FMEA.
The advantages and disadvantages of PFMA are summarized in Table 2-3.While PFMA
represents a positive step by the dam industry towards considering more than just
engineering standards like the PMF and MDE, there are some limitations to simplifying
the analysis of such complex systems. The interactions among components and the
consequences of these interactions may be missed in the analysis. The system is not
necessarily broken down and analyzed in a hierarchical way as it is in FMEA/FMECA, so
lower level failures may be overlooked. The approach suffers from the same issues as
FMEA/FMECA in terms of common cause failures, human factors and software errors.
The classification scheme allows practitioners to “rule out” lower-consequence or less
likely events, despite the fact that these events do contribute to the overall system risk. The
focus of the PFMA reports available publicly tends to be on dam breach or collapse over
other seemingly less consequential modes of failure. Many researchers and agencies (eg.
Bowles et al. 1999, 2011; FERC 2007; SPANCOLD 2012; USBR and USACE 2015;
Adamo et al. 2017) consider PFMA to be the first step in quantitative risk assessment (event
tree analysis is often recommended as the next step). While identification of failures modes
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is an important first step in quantitative risk assessment, PFMA effectively rules out some
failure modes and could potentially be missing others. It is also not possible using PFMA
to systematically identify possible sequences of events which may be benign on their own,
but together could lead to catastrophic consequences (Hartford et al. 2016).

Table 2-3: Advantages and disadvantages of PFMA
Advantages

Disadvantages

-Improves the understanding of dam risks
by determining the site-specific causes of
potential issues1

-Heuristic brainstorming approach that
relies on expert judgement and mental
models of complex systems2

-Efficient1

-Failure-focus that can miss unsafe nonfailure component states or interactions
-Tendency to analyze only conditions that
lead to uncontrolled release of the
reservoir2
-Static analysis of linear chains of events,
with limited ability to analyze feedback,
interaction, time, or dynamic system
behaviour2,3
-Human and operational aspects of
failures difficult to analyze2
-Some failure modes may be determined
“non-credible” but may still have
significant safety impacts2

1 FERC (2005b)
2 France et al. (2018a)
3 Regan (2010)

2.2.3 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault trees were originally developed in the 1960’s to analyze missile systems (Thomas
2012). Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed as a way of identifying combinations of
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failures and determining their likelihoods. They were first applied to assess the launch
system of Minuteman I, and were extended for components throughout the system on
Minuteman II (Ericson 1999). Boeing began using fault trees to assess aircraft by 1966 and
by the end of the 1960’s, fault trees were the standard of practice for the weapons and
aerospace industries (Ericson 1999). In the early 1970’s, fault trees were adopted by the
nuclear and chemical industries and software systems were developed to improve analysis
abilities (Ericson 1999; Thomas 2012). In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the approach was being
applied in the robotics industry (Lin and Wang 1997) and software industry (Leveson 1995;
Hansen et al. 1998).
Fault trees can be thought of as the mirror image of event trees, in that they use deductive
reasoning whereas event trees use inductive reasoning. Fault trees start with an undesirable
event and proceed from the general to the specific, using a backward logic to determine the
potential causes of an undesirable event (Hartford and Baecher 2004). The result is a
graphical depiction which moves down the page in levels of detail that progress with each
step in the tree (SAE 1996). This results in a tree structure which shows how combinations
of undesirable events or failures at lower level components can cause the event in question.
In fault trees, faults are the undesirable events (also known as “top events” and lower level
events are failures (Thomas 2012). In FTA, a separate fault tree would be constructed for
each undesirable event (SAE 1996). There are several graphical constructs used in the
development of fault trees including what are known as “logic gates”, which are presented
in Table 2-4 (Lee et al. 1985; SAE 1996). There are also graphical constructs showing
events, with different symbols representing different types of faults (Lee et al. 1985).
The development of a fault tree starts by determining what immediate failures would be
responsible for the top event (fault). The analyst then moves down the tree in increasing
levels of detail, determining the causes of each failure and linking them using the
appropriate logic gates. Fault tree creation stops when the root causes of an event are
determined or further development is deemed unnecessary (SAE 1996).
The act of constructing the fault tree alone can provide useful information in terms of what
needs to fail for the top event to occur. A cut set is a unique combination of events within
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the fault tree that could lead to failure. A fault tree may have many cut sets depending on
its level of complexity. The smallest set of events that can lead to the top event is known
as the minimal cut set (Thomas 2013). Investigating the cut sets and organizing them based
on the number of primary events in each cut set can be a useful qualitative tool for
determining what primary events (or combinations of them) are the most concerning.
Table 2-4: Basic event tree logic gates
Symbol

Name
AND
OR

Description
TRUE if all input events occur
TRUE if at least one of the input events
occurs

VOTE

TRUE if at least m of the input events
occurs

EXCLUSIVE OR

TRUE if only one of the input events
occurs

PRIORITY AND

TRUE if input events occur in a particular
order

INHIBIT

TRUE if all inputs event occur, as well as
an additional (typically external) event

m

Determining the minimal cut set can be challenging if events occur in multiple places
within the fault tree – this can happen if there is dependence between two or more events
and is relatively common for complex systems (SAE 1996). For fault trees without
interdependence (each event occurs only once), relatively simple rules can be followed to
determine the probability of the top event. Assuming the probability of an event A can be
represented by P(A), the basic rules for quantitative analysis are derived from set theory
and are determined as follows (SAE 1996):
•

The probability of events 𝐴 AND 𝐵 both occurring is 𝑃(𝐴𝐵) and is equal to 𝑃(𝐴) ∗
𝑃(𝐵). For three events connected by AND gates, the three probabilities are

54

multiplied, and so on. This represents the intersection of sets A AND B, as shown
in Figure 2-2 by the area represented by AB.

Figure 2-2: Illustration of the intersection of A AND B
•

The probability of events 𝐴 OR 𝐵 occurring can be denoted 𝑃(𝐴 + 𝐵) and is equal
to 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵) – [𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐵)]. For three events connected by OR gates, the
equation

becomes

𝑃(𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵) + 𝑃(𝐶) − [𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐵)] −

[𝑃(𝐵) ∗ 𝑃(𝐶)] − [𝑃(𝐶) ∗ 𝑃(𝐴)] + [𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐵) ∗ 𝑃(𝐶)]. The set theory used to
develop the second equation is shown in Figure 2-3. The total area shaded is known
as the union of sets A, B, and C. Each of the two-circle intersections (AB, AC, BC)
is negated once to avoid double counting, and then the three-circle intersection
(ABC) is re-added to ensure the complete area is counted for.

Figure 2-3: illustration of the union of sets A, B and C (OR)
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•

The probability of mutually exclusive events occurring (if one occurs the other
can’t) is simply equal to 𝑃(𝐴 + 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵), with 𝑃(𝐴𝐵) = 0. The set
theory used to derive this concept is shown in Figure 2-4. Note in this illustration,
there is no overlap between sets A and B, which indicates mutual exclusivity.

Figure 2-4: Illustration of mutual exclusivity in sets A and B
These basic rules, derived from simple set theory, can be applied to calculate the
probability of occurrence for the top event. This is illustrated using an example shown in
Figure 2-5. In Figure 19, the top event can only occur if both Failure A AND Failure B
occur. Failure A can only occur if one OR more of Failure C, D, or E occur. The basic
probabilistic analysis process is shown in the example figure. To calculate the probability
of the top event, the probabilities of Failures B, C, D and E are required. The possible cut
sets are CB, DB, EB, CDB, DEB, CEB, and CDEB. Failure A has its own set of primary
events, so it is not a primary event and is not counted in the cut sets, while Failure B is a
primary event because it is not further decomposed.
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Figure 2-5: Simple fault tree example
As mentioned previously, fault tree analysis can be complicated when events or failures
appear multiple times within the tree. This indicates common-cause failures (SAE 1996).
Qualitatively, this can be analyzed by looking at the list of possible cut sets. For cut sets
where a failure can lead to more than one primary event, a common cause failure has
occurred. This more complex situation necessitates the use of Boolean Analysis to
appropriately compute the probability of the top event (SAE 1996). Boolean algebra is a
mathematical formulation that deals with True or False events (1’s and 0’s), which is useful
for fault trees where events either occur or do not occur (Hartford and Baecher 2004). The
SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice manual provides an excellent example of
“Boolean reduction” in analysis of complex fault trees (SAE 1996). The method for
determining the minimal cut sets is shown and the Boolean Logic rules are described. There
are a variety of computational software packages available to aid in the construction and
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mathematical assessment of fault trees, including Prepp/Kitt, SETS, FTAP, Importance,
Isograph and COMCAN (Lee et al. 1985; Ericson 1999; Barker et al. 2006). These tools
are typically capable of performing cutset determination and probability calculation
automatically (SAE 1996).
Due to its general simplicity and ability to graphically illustrate potential paths to failure,
FTA has become widely used across a variety of industries as mentioned previously. It is
a powerful tool that provides excellent insight into the possible ways in which primary
events (failures) can lead to top events. The limitations of the approach are also well
documented. Thomas (2012) notes that the approach relies heavily on the initial list of top
events – it does not determine these. Some other approach must be used. FTA also heavily
relies on the quality of information pertaining to the system of interest, and it may be
possible to omit events from the tree inadvertently. No systematic techniques are available
to ensure an exhaustive analysis is completed. Thomas (2012) notes that the decomposition
in an FTA often stops at a subjective point in the analysis, where causes of failure become
less obvious and more complex – essentially, “FTA often finds what is only intuitively
obvious”. Human factors and software errors are not easily reduced to a simple binary
representation (failing or functioning) and as such they are not easily incorporated into an
FTA analysis (Thomas 2012). Perhaps most importantly, FTA focuses on failures alone,
and as such it may omit non-failure causes of a top event that could occur as a result of
design errors, omissions or other factors such as delays and human error. Many issues that
contribute to accidents historically are dynamic processes that may not be easily
represented as simple failures (Thomas 2012). Furthermore, the fault tree assumes linear
relationships among system components and is unable to capture component interactions
or time-dependent, nonlinear feedback behaviour which may lead to unexpected outcomes
for the system of interest.
Hartford and Baecher (2004) provide an excellent overview of FTA within the context of
dam safety. They describe methods of estimating the probability of the top event when
common-cause failures are observed. Their review of FTA also discusses methods for
determining the relative importance of cutsets. In general, there are a limited number of
dam safety applications of FTA available within the public domain. Putcha and Patev
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(2005) describe the application of fault trees as a method for analyzing dam gates and
operating equipment, presenting generalized fault trees showing how a gate may fail to
open or close. These generalized fault trees could be useful for practitioners as a starting
point for application to a specific system of interest. Putcha and Patev (2005) suggest the
use of criticality indices derived through FMEA as a means of ranking the relative
importance of components within the gate system fault trees. They go on to use the
criticality along with failure rates to determine probabilities of individual component
failures, which can then be used to determine the overall probability of the top event (Patev
et al. 2005). The approach presented provides a good starting point for fault tree analysis
of dam gate systems.
Barker et al. (2006) used fault tree analysis to assess the reliability of various options for a
spillway system upgrade in Queensland, Australia. A variety of different operating states
were analyzed using fault trees, and human error was included in the analysis. Several
scenarios were tested, and sensitivity analysis was performed for various assumptions
regarding grid reliability, operating staff assumptions, PLC reliability and redundancy, as
well as backup power source reliability and redundancy (Barker et al. 2006). The authors
note that the results of the analysis were useful in selecting the final configuration for the
system upgrade, but do not show the fault tree arrangement or mathematical computations
used.
The advantages and disadvantages of FTA are summarized in Table 2-5. Hartford and
Baecher (2004) note some disadvantages to the use of fault trees for analysis of dam
systems, mainly pertaining to the high level of complexity in large fault trees and the
reliance on expert judgement in their construction. Nevertheless, they note that fault tree
analysis may be the only alternative in some cases to modelling complex systems in an
attempt to understand and quantify failure modes. One key issue in the use of fault trees is
they represent a linear event progression (Thomas 2012). In dam systems, components may
not instantaneously progress towards a failed state, instead degrading in some way over
time. Inflows introduce another nonlinear variable that complicates analysis using fault
trees. Traditional FTA may not be capable of characterizing the reservoir level with respect
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to different system operating conditions and inputs, which is an important goal in the
context of dam safety.
In more recent studies, Bayesian Networks and algorithms have been applied as a means
to overcome some of the limitations associated with fault trees (Ching and Leu 2009; Jong
and Leu 2013). Ching and Leu (2009) used a Poisson process to model time-varying
arrivals of disturbances, representing the system using a fault tree model with a Bayesian
algorithm incorporated to assess uncertainty. The goal of the analysis was to model how
the reliability of civil infrastructure changes over time. The approach was demonstrated on
a spillway gate system for a dam in Taiwan and was found to offer a fast solution that
helped overcome some of the issues associated with lack of failure rate data. Results
showing remaining life and failure rate plotted against time are shown for the case study.
Jong and Leu (2013) applied a hybrid approach using fault tree analysis in conjunction
with Bayesian Networking to overcome some of the limitations associated with both
approaches. Their approach was to transform fault trees, which are more easily and
logically developed, into Bayesian Networks, which are more tedious and difficult to set
up for complex systems but allow for expert knowledge to be incorporated with Bayesian
Probability Theory for improved diagnosis of system faults (Jong and Leu 2013). The
approach was demonstrated on three Taiwanese dam systems and shown to match Weibulldistribution based reliability analysis of those systems. While these approaches do address
the traditional FTA limitation of failure rates that change over time, they do not consider
system inflows, interactions between components or the overall system response to
component failures. These issues remain outside of the capabilities of FTA at the current
time.
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Table 2-5: Advantages and disadvantages of FTA
Advantages

Disadvantages

-Logical and visual method for displaying
failure paths through a system1

-Failure-based method that can miss
unsafe scenarios caused by interactions or
non-failures3

-Can be used to estimate probability of
top events and unique paths to the top
event2
-Works very well at identifying the
importance of component failure modes3

-May not follow system flow diagram so
it can be difficult to relate fault tree logic
to the actual interactions within the
system1
-Difficulty capturing software errors or
human behaviour3
-Relies on mental models of system
structure and expert judgement3
-Static analysis with limited ability to
analyze time or dynamic system
behaviour3
-Discrete component states for variables
that may be continuous or have multiple
states3

1 Hartford and Baecher (2004)
2 Lee et al. (1985)
3 Thomas (2013)

2.2.4 Event Tree Analysis
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) was originally developed for safety assessments of nuclear
power plants in the United States in 1975 through the WASH-1400 study (IEC 2010;
Thomas 2013). The original goal of the WASH-1400 study had been to develop a large
and detailed fault tree of the system, but it was determined that this would be far too large
to be practical. Event trees were conceived as a means of defining potential accident paths,
where failures within the path could be further deconstructed using FTA (Thomas 2013).
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Despite being developed for use alongside FTA, ETA has also been presented as a separate
tool for analysis of system dependability (Skelton 1997; Rausand and Hoyland 2004; IEC
2010).
Rausand and Hoyland (2004) define ETA as an inductive technique that begins with a
problem in the system (an initiating event), and proceeds to identify paths by which the
problem may develop. ETA is similar to FTA in that it is a chain-of-events type analysis,
but differs from FTA in that it starts with an event and proceeds forward to determine the
possible outcomes (Thomas 2013). Event trees can be used to determine the probability of
the possible outcomes resulting from an initiating event (IEC 2010). The International
Electrotechnical Commission has published a standard detailing ETA which documents
the steps in event tree development and quantitative assessment of outcome probabilities
(IEC 2010). In ETA, mitigating factors are considered to be factors within the system that
are intended to reduce the consequences of an initiating event. ETA then logically steps
through each of these mitigating factors and determines what happens next when the factor
either succeeds or fails to perform its intended function (Rausand and Hoyland 2004; IEC
2010). The different steps of the event tree are called nodes, and their probability can be
calculated using FTA, as originally intended by the developers in the WASH-1400 study
(IEC 2010). The probabilities of each unique path in the event tree are then simply
multiplied together to estimate the ultimate probability of the outcome.
It is important to note that in an ETA, the initiating events are not determined through the
analysis. Rather, the sequences of events and outcomes that could possibly result from an
initiating event are determined and their probabilities are quantified (IEC 2010). In this
way, ETA is not a standalone analysis tool (Thomas 2013). Initiating events may be
determined using some other form of analysis. Rausand and Hoyland (2004) mention
FMECA along with Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and hazard and operability
analysis (HAZOP) as potential techniques to determine the initiating event.
The first step in an ETA involves clearly defining the system of interest and its boundaries.
Next, initiating events are selected and the mitigating factors required to prevent outcomes
or accidents are determined and organized depending on their respective time of
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intervention (IEC 2010). The success or failure of a mitigating factor determines the next
step in the tree and in this way, sequences of events are defined. Each unique path through
the tree represents a unique sequence of events. The probability of success or failure of
each mitigating factor is multiplied together along with the initiating event’s probability,
𝑃(𝐼𝐸 ) to determine the probability of the outcome (Rausand and Hoyland 2004). This is
demonstrated using the simple example shown in Figure 2-6.

Figure 2-6: Generic event tree with probability calculation
The IEC standard specifies that overbars are used to indicate failed mitigating factors (IEC
2010). For example, the probability of mitigating factor A failing is 𝑃(𝐴̅). The probability
of success and failure are mutually exclusive. That is, 𝑃(𝐴) = 1 − 𝑃(𝐴̅). A success and a
failure may not occur concurrently.
In general, the ETA method is relatively easy to apply, and quantification uses
straightforward mathematical concepts. It is a useful tool for visualization of event chains
and can enable identification of outcomes that may not be generated using simple
brainstorming (IEC 2010). With a complete set of initiating events, ETA provides a useful
tool for depicting and analyzing potential system outcomes. Event trees are capable of
improving the understanding of various failure modes and estimating the likelihoods of
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failure of systems in general. They remain a widely used tool across many industries,
including but not limited to hazardous processes (Ferdous et al. 2011; Villa and Cozzani
2016), supply chain risk management (Tummala and Schoenherr 2011), infrastructure risk
management (Ezell et al. 2000), and nuclear safety (Rychkov and Kawahara 2015). Many
of the recent applications of ETA incorporate new techniques to deal with uncertainty in
the probability estimates (Ferdous et al. 2011; Srivastava 2013) or dynamic behaviour
(Bowles et al. 2011b; Rychkov and Kawahara 2015).
Like all approaches, ETA is not without its limitations, and these are well documented
within the applicable reference material. The approach is inherently reliant on practical
experience and understanding of the system (IEC 2010). Thomas (2013) points out that
because ETA starts with an initiating event and the functions in place to mitigate its
consequences, preventative measures for the event itself can not be included in the analysis.
Software has also been developed to address human factor considerations in event trees,
however the decisions are typically either randomized or reduced to binary variables of
success or failure (Thomas 2012). Thomas (2012) suggests that the mitigating factors in
event trees are assumed to be independent of one another, when in reality this may not be
the case. He cites the Three Mile Island and Fukushima nuclear incidents as an example of
how seemingly independent issues may be caused by the same factors (Thomas 2013).
Multi-state variables are unable to be modelled in event trees, despite being present in may
complex systems (Villa and Cozzani 2016). Finally, Thomas (2013) states that ETA is
fundamentally a failure-based method focusing on the propagation of component failures
through the system. As such, an entire subset of potentially unsafe scenarios that do not
involve failures at all may be impossible to assess through the use of ETA. Importantly,
Hartford et al. (2016) suggests that the nature of ETA requires that events and their
combinations must be identified at the outset. Because of this, the development of thorough
and complete event trees is incredibly challenging since the number of physically possible
conditions is so large. Further, consideration of time, feedbacks and nonlinear behaviour
present additional challenges that are not obviously surmountable given the current state
of the science (IEC 2010; Hartford et al. 2016).

64

Because of its relative simplicity for the analysis of complex systems, ETA has become a
prominent tool in dam safety risk assessment since the mid 1980s (Whitman 1984;
Stedinger et al. 1989; Bowles et al. 1999; Hill et al. 2001; Hill and Bowles 2003; Goodarzi
2010). They are considered by many to be the next step in quantitative risk assessment after
a PFMA, in particular by the American dam associations (FERC 2005b; Bowles et al.
2011b; USACE 2011; USBR and USACE 2015b).
In the dams industry, the approach is commonly paired with PFMA to further analyze and
quantify chains of events (USBR and USACE 2015b). PFMA is used to come up with the
initiating events and ETA is used to quantify the various potential outcomes. Figure 2-7
(Hill et al. 2001) illustrates an event tree for a fictitious dam, showing how the event
propagates through the system. Some event sequences are collapsed at the black nodes.

Figure 2-7: Event tree examples (Hill et al. 2001)
Whitman (1984) was one of the first authors to apply event trees in the dams domain,
modelling the geotechnical aspects of dam safety with an event tree that progressed from
embankment dam cracks through drain and filter states to either non-failure, piping failure
or slope instability. The event tree is described as a very simplistic and generalized
representation and interpretation of possible outcomes; however, it is thought by the author
to give some structure to a process that would otherwise be very subjective. Similar, high
level event tree examples from the early dam safety ETA literature are presented by Bowles
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et al. (1987) and Yeigan (1991). Quantifying the probabilities of events in the event trees
presents a major analytical challenge, so in early applications of risk analysis a verbal
guideline or “Kent Chart” was used. Kent Charts were developed by Sherman Kent in the
1960’s and were adopted by the CIA for a brief time to assign numerical probabilities to
verbal descriptors (Hartford 2001). Vick (1992) presented one such chart for use within the
dams domain.
By the mid 1990’s and early 2000’s, a “de-compositional” approach to event trees began
being used. In response to the subjectivity of the simplified approaches being utilized, BC
Hydro began investigating the use of analytical techniques for estimating probabilities in
event trees (Hartford 2001). Hartford (2001) presented a detailed event tree as part of the
quantitative risk assessment for seismic events at Hugh Keenleyside dam in BC, noting
that this was the first analytically based risk analysis of a dam performed to date. Analytical
and numerical techniques were used in the quantification of failure probabilities instead of
subjective judgement. Another early application of quantitative, analytical risk assessment
from the late 1990’s was for the Hume Dam in Australia (McDonald and Wan 1999). By
the late 1990’s both BC Hydro and the Australian engineers who performed the Hume Dam
assessment had concluded that simplified risk analysis, using Kent Charts and high-level
event trees, was not sufficient to provide conclusive evidence of a dam’s degree of safety
or for use in dam safety decision making (Hartford 2001).
In more recent years, the use of event tree analysis has become more widespread and
computational tools have been developed to improve the degree of analysis that can be
achieved. DAMRAE is an event tree software which improves the capabilities of event
trees, allowing for (a) modelling of continuous variables (such as inflow or ground
acceleration) and (b) modelling of deterministic relationships between variables, for
example the reservoir stage-discharge relationship or the deformation function as a result
of earthquake loading and initial conditions (Srivastava 2008, 2013; Srivastava et al. 2012).
The DAMRAE software was able to overcome some of the issues with the earlier
applications of event trees and provides a path forward for use of this technique in the
future. It was developed for the USACE to be used in their dam safety risk management
program and is included in USACE’s dam safety policy and procedures (Bowles et al.
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2011a; USACE 2011). The DAMRAE software has since been applied in several
applications (Bowles et al. 2010, 2011a, b, 2015). Srivastava (2013) includes a detailed
description of DAMRAE and uses an example system to show how it can be used to test
various risk-reduction alternatives.
A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of ETA is presented in Table 2-6. Regan
(2010) has identified examples of dam failures, including Teton and Taum Sauk, in which
nonlinear behavior was observed, noting that event trees are too simplistic to anticipate the
complex interactions occurring within various levels of a dam system. This echoes the
general conclusions made by Thomas (2012) with respect to accidents in the nuclear and
aerospace domain. Zhang et al. (2011) note that ETA may not be suitable for analysis when
there are multiple initiating events. Dam systems involve dynamic, interacting components
with time-varying inputs. These result in a time-dependent evolution of events, which the
IEC (2010) identifies as another limitation of ETA. The development of more advanced
software overcomes some of these limitations, however it remains challenging to include
timing in event tree analysis (Hartford et al. 2016). Because of this, ETA has limited
applicability for dam safety applications in which reservoir response to disturbances
occurring over time is a specific goal. Despite these limitations, it remains a useful tool for
envisioning and understanding general possibilities for event propagation through complex
systems.
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Table 2-6: Advantages and disadvantages of ETA
Advantages

Disadvantages

-Logical and visual method for displaying
sequences of events1

-Failure-based method that can miss
unsafe scenarios caused by interactions or
non-failures2

-Very efficient way to estimate the
probability of failure as a result of an
initiating event1

-Static analysis of a one-way chain-ofevents with limited ability to analyze
feedbacks, time or dynamic system
behaviour2
-Difficulty capturing software errors or
human behaviour2
-Discrete component states for variables
that may be continuous or have multiple
possible states2
-Difficult to assess common-cause
failures2

1 Hartford and Baecher (2004)
2 Thomas (2013)

2.2.5 Additional methods
The following sections provide a brief overview of some additional methods that may be
used in system safety assessment.

2.2.5.1

Dependence Diagrams (DD)

Dependence Diagrams (DD) are described by SAE (1996) as “pictorial representation[s]
of combinations of failures for the purpose of probability analysis”. DD’s may also be
referred to as Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD). The DD shows the same logic as a fault
tree using either serial or parallel arrangements of boxes (faults), showing the different
paths that could lead to a top event (failure condition). The fault event links represent AND
events when organized in parallel and OR events when organized in series. The setup and
mathematical formulation are demonstrated using a very simple example shown in Figure
2-8.
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Figure 2-8: Dependence Diagram example
DDs may become very complex, and it may be possible for multiple instances of the same
fault to appear in different paths within the diagram (SAE 1996). These represent the
common cause failures. Like in FTA, Boolean Algebra and Boolean reduction may be
required to ensure probabilities are correctly combined (SAE 1996). A variety of different
box types may be used to illustrate different types of failure events. DDs (or RBDs) and
fault trees achieve the same goal, and they require the same inputs and knowledge of the
system. DDs are particularly useful for showing redundancy, which may not be as
obviously visible in a fault tree. They are also subject to the same limitations as described
in the discussions regarding FTA.

2.2.5.2

Bayesian Networks (BN)

Bayesian Networks (BN) are becoming more widely used in risk analysis across a variety
of industries. They are probabilistic, graphical models of the dependencies between
different variables within a system (Villa and Cozzani 2016). The variables of the system
are represented using nodes, and the dependence between them is represented using arrows.
Each node or variable can be represented by a number of states – these can include
failed/working, true/false, or various literal descriptors or numerical values (Smith 2006).
Probabilistic calculations can proceed based on the diagram using Bayes theorem of
relationships among conditional probabilities, which states that:
𝑃(𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒|𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) =

𝑃(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒) ∗ 𝑃(𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒)
𝑃(𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒)

Figure 2-9 contains a simple example of a BN, with the corresponding probability
calculations shown (Hartford and Baecher 2004). As the number of variables (nodes)
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increases in a BN, the calculation of the probability of the final state becomes increasingly
complex.

Figure 2-9: Simple Bayesian network example
BNs are capable of dealing with multi-state variables and conditional dependencies which
gives them an advantage over other chain-of-event style models like FTA and ETA (Villa
and Cozzani 2016; El-Awady 2019). Villa and Cozzani (2016) notes that ETA and FTA
can be used as a starting point for development of a BN, and presents a software capable
of performing the transformation.
Zhang et al. (2011) applied BN to determine probability of overtopping or internal erosion
failures of embankment dams using data available from an embankment dam distress
database. The networks developed had a number of different components of the dam and
their potential states were either yes/no or a literal descriptor such as satisfactory or
unsatisfactory. The goal of the analysis was to determine the probability of failure and
sensitivity analyses were performed to determine the most important factors that
contributed to the failure modes in consideration (Zhang et al. 2011). Smith (2006)
developed a BN for a dam, considering internal erosion and overtopping failure modes.
The model developed included variables for precipitation and reservoir level, though it is
unclear how these were modelled and whether the approach developed is capable of
determining the reservoir level with respect to time. El-Awady (2019) used simulation
supported BN to improve the ability of the BN approach to model feedback behaviour. The
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approach presented is able to model sub-BN’s of particular components in more detail than
previous applications. Contributors to failure were identified for case studies within the
nuclear and hydropower industries. The approach is promising for determining system
vulnerabilities and estimates of probability given limited information. Despite the advances
offered by the recent applications of BN, the approach may not be well suited to determine
the reservoir elevation (and the values of other variables) with respect to time.

2.2.5.3

Markov Analysis (MA)

Markov Analysis (MA) is another widely-used failure-based method for assessment of
system safety and probability of failure. Markov models (also known as Markov chains)
are useful for representing the different system states and the relationships between them
over time. In Markov models, the transitions between different states are represented by
the rates of failure of the different components. The key property of Markov models is that
future system states depend only on the current system state, regardless of what led to the
current state (SAE 1996). Markov models can be used to represent series systems, parallel
systems, and systems which are able to recover and repair themselves.
MA is able to handle common cause failures and interactions in ways that are more
challenging using FTA and DD’s. They are also able to handle a wider range of system
behaviours (SAE 1996). The size of the Markov model grows exponentially in relation to
the number of components, which can make MA an extremely complex process.

2.3 Systems approach to safety
The research of Leveson (2011) and Thomas (2012) provide an excellent overview of the
limitations associated with the risk-based approaches described in the previous sections.
One of the key issues mentioned is that the commonly used techniques focus on failures,
which means an entire sub-set of potentially unsafe scenarios may be missing in the
analysis. Additionally, the authors state that these traditional risk analysis techniques are
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unable to effectively deal with software issues as well as human error and judgement.
Commonly used risk analysis tools are often static and/or linear, and as such the ability to
determine potentially unsafe scenarios arising from interaction and feedback is limited.
Analysis of common cause failures also presents some challenges. Based on these
limitations, a systems approach to safety engineering has emerged within the aerospace
industry (Leveson 1995, 2011; Leveson et al. 2003), and it is beginning to be recognized
and applied in other industries, including nuclear (Song 2012; Thomas 2012), automotive
(Vernacchia 2018), railway (France et al. 2018b), software (Pope and Breneman 2018) and
dams (Dusil and To 2016; To et al. 2018).
Leveson (2011) utilizes control systems theory to assess several accidents. Many of the
examples deal with aerospace and aviation, however examples from other high-profile
accidents such as the Walkerton drinking water incident and the Titanic disaster are also
provided. Analysis of these accidents led to the development of two generic tools that use
a control systems approach to the analyze system safety. The first is Systems Theoretic
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP), which was developed for post-accident
assessments. The second, Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), stems from the
STAMP technique and was developed for analysis of existing control systems or systems
in the design phase. STPA is a systematic process for brainstorming potential control flaws
of control systems.
Prior to initiating STPA, the hierarchical control system structure for the system of interest
should be developed and the hazards for the system should be defined. This is often done
using a flow chart, showing the interactions among elements at different levels of the
system. Four general categories of unsafe control actions are provided (Leveson 2011;
Thomas 2013):
(1) A required control action not provided or not followed
(2) Unsafe control action is provided that leads to a hazard
(3) A required control action is provided either too late, too early or out of sequence
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(4) A required control action is not applied for the wrong amount of time (either applied
too long or stopped too soon).
The first step of STPA is to define unsafe control actions for each of the controls in the
system of interest. The control actions can be documented using a table such as the example
shown in Table 2-7. For each control action identified, the analysts will describe how the
situation would unfold and what hazard it could lead to. There may be multiple descriptions
under each column for each control action, pertaining to different situations that could lead
to a particular unsafe control action being applied and the resultant effects it would have.
The second step is to take each of the identified unsafe control actions and identify its
causal factors. This is done by using the hierarchical system structure as a guide and
looking at the control loop. Investigating the control loop with respect to each unsafe
control action can help identify how an unsafe control action might occur – for example,
due to incorrect information, a faulty process model or a failed component.
Table 2-7: STPA example table documenting potentially hazardous control actions
Control action

(1) Not
provided

(2) Not
followed

(3) Initiated at
the wrong time

Control action 1

…

…

…

(4) Applied for
the wrong
amount of time
…

The result of the STPA analysis is a detailed list of what might cause hazards within the
system and why. Unlike failure-based methods used in traditional risk assessment, STPA
is able to identify non-failure causes of hazards for a system, which makes it a very
promising tool for system safety assessment. The approach also does not attempt to
estimate probabilities of different outcomes, instead aiming to identify them so they can be
addressed or eliminated.
Thomas (2012) advocates the use of Leveson’s (2011) tools and presents a methodology
for automating the identification of hazards using Leveson’s (2011) Systems Theoretic
Process Analysis (STPA) model, mainly focusing on potential applications in the nuclear
industry. Song (2012) applied the STPA procedure to a specific process at the Darlington
Nuclear facility in Ontario, Canada, finding that this procedure enhanced the ability to
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identify potentially hazardous conditions at the system level. BC Hydro has recently
applied STPA for analysis of dam systems in two applications, the results of which are
described by Dusil and To (2016) and To and Dusil (2018). The researchers found that the
STPA approach is able to identify vulnerabilities which may be overlooked using
conventional risk assessment techniques used for dam safety. It was noted that STPA may
not be able to replace existing techniques, but it does provide useful and complimentary
insights (Dusil and To 2016).
There are two key limitations of STPA as it pertains to the analysis of dam systems. The
first is the natural variability within which the infrastructure is operating and may be
attempting to control (inflows, earthquakes, debris build up, ice, etc.). It is not possible to
use STPA to determine at what inflow a potentially unsafe situation would become an
accident or determine reservoir level response to a set of inflows and operating conditions.
The second limitation is that dam systems have components which control the system in a
passive way, and STPA was designed for analysis of actively controlled systems. In a dam
system, the dams are passively retaining water and the free overflow spillway passively
conveys water. Identifying issues that could arise with these passive system components is
not possible using STPA. Despite these limitations, STPA does offer a promising tool for
addressing issues relating to software and human factors as well as non-failure related
causes of potential hazards.
Another systems technique that is becoming more widely used in dam safety applications
is simulation. Simulation is a “what if” assessment approach that describes how the system
responds to different inputs (Simonovic 2009). A simulation model describes the
relationships and interactions between different components within a system, and it can be
as detailed as is necessary to achieve its desired purpose. Simulation models contain
numerical representations of physical and nonphysical relationships within the system, and
may have some type of operating rules in place to determine how controls are applied
(Simonovic 2009). Simulation results include a set of outputs, which are the values of the
different variables of the system over time. Analysts can experiment with various inputs to
determine how the outputs change. The two most common simulation techniques are
deterministic and stochastic. In deterministic simulation, a specific set of inputs generates
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a specific set of outputs, and multiple runs of the model will always produce the same
results. In stochastic simulation, inputs or internal processes of the model may be randomly
generated using Monte Carlo techniques. This means that two simulation runs with the
same input parameters will produce different results.
Simulation is particularly suited to the problem of dam safety (Hartford et al. 2016). It
allows for interactive and dynamic behaviour to be modelled, which is important when
considering the different types of both physical and non-physical components in dam
systems. Simulation is capable of determining how the system state changes over time
(Simonovic 2009), and as such it is the only tool described in this literature review that is
capable of directly calculating the reservoir level response to various operating scenarios.
Dam system behaviour is highly dependent on the inflows, the initial system state, the
states of operating equipment and many other factors – experimenting with these factors
through simulation is perhaps the most straightforward way to determine the system
response. Simulation allows for an investigation into the emergent behaviour of systems,
which results from complex interactions between components and events, and may be
difficult to envision by analysing components or sub-systems individually. By modelling
the whole system at a sufficient level of detail, the feedbacks and relationships that may
lead to emergent behaviour can be incorporated into the model structure.
The potential benefits of simulation and the systems approach in general are becoming
recognized within the dams industry. Regan (2010), Baecher (2013), Komey et al., (2015),
Micovic et al. (2015), and Hartford et al. (2016) all advocate for the consideration of dams
as systems. Baecher et al. (2013) present a stochastic simulation methodology framework
for dam safety flow control analysis. Hartford et al. (2016) present two examples that
utilize a systems approach embedded within a stochastic simulation to determine the
likelihood of failures for dam systems. One of the examples described by Hartford et al.
(2016) and developed by Komey (2014; 2015) involves stochastic simulation of
hydropower dam response to disturbances such as ice, debris, and human intervention on
the Mattagami River System in Ontario, Canada. The approach utilizes the GoldSim
Monte-Carlo modelling platform to determine various impacts these disturbances may
have on safe operation of the system (Komey 2014; Hartford et al. 2016). A probabilistic
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framework is used to model disturbances such as ice and debris, with fragility curves and
simple failure rates defined to determine the probability of gate or turbine failure, and
gamma distributions to determine time to repair (Komey 2014; Hartford et al. 2016).
(Zielinski et al. 2016) use a similar approach to Komey (2014; 2015) to assess the safety
of the Madawaska River System in Ontario, Canada, using a 10,000 year continuous
simulation to estimate the probability of failure for each dam in the system. Another
example described by Hartford et al. (2016) involves a system dynamics model of the Göta
River System in Sweden, with the system built up in layers of increasing complexity. The
model can be run in either stochastic or deterministic mode and is used to investigate
system response to sea level fluctuations, landslides and climate change.
These probability-driven stochastic model examples help address many of the
shortcomings of traditional risk assessment approaches. Dynamic, nonlinear behaviour can
be captured by these models and they can be developed to be as complex as necessary to
more realistically represent the system of interest. One limitation of the stochastic
simulation approach is that it requires a very large number of simulation years in order to
assess combinations of component operating states that have a very low probability of
occurring together. There is no way of assuring the modeller that a complete set of possible
operating states has been captured in the simulation. The operating state combinations that
arise from a stochastic simulation model will differ between two different runs of a
simulation with the same inputs. Beyond some certain limit, if the stochastic simulation is
run for long enough, there would be a complete set of possible operating scenarios.
However, there would be a significant amount of time and resources spent simulating
conditions where nothing is wrong with the system. Given the large number of potential
combinations of operating states and current computational abilities, a full assessment of
all scenarios using stochastic techniques is not currently possible. Despite these limitations,
the work of Zielinski et al. (2016) and Komey (2014, 2015) provide a good indication that
a shift in focus is required from extreme events to events occurring within the design
envelope that might actually contribute more to the overall system risk.
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2.4 Summary
In the preceding sections of this chapter, a number of tools were presented that are
commonly used within the dams industry to analyze system risk. A description of the
advantages and limitations of each approach was provided. Ultimately, the more commonly
applied techniques in risk analysis have served the dams community well. Hartford et al.
(2016) suggest that the risk based approach has significantly improved the understanding
of dam safety in a number of ways. These include facilitating analysis of less easily
analyzed failure modes such as internal erosion, highlighting the importance of analyzing
human factors, and indicating that the extreme events required for dam design may not be
the most significant contributors to risk. There are, however, limitations to the most
commonly applied techniques. It would be extremely challenging using these approaches
to analyze the combinatorically large number of possible events that may possible occur.
Interactions and feedbacks are typically simplified or omitted using the traditional
techniques, meaning dynamic behaviour cannot be effectively analyzed. Many issues arise
when dealing with human factors, software errors and design flaws. Analysis of timeconsiderations is also beyond the scope of applicability of these existing approaches.
Finally, many existing approaches omit further consideration of certain combinations of
events which have a low combined probability – despite there being enough of these
combinations to add up to a significant risk to the system. The following paragraphs detail
the main conclusions from the assessment of current practices in risk analysis.
FMEA is a tool for determining how components of a system can fail and what their causes
and effects will be. The effects of failures at one level of the system can be determined on
the next level up until the entire system is analyzed. This approach is a useful tool for
brainstorming and determining potential disturbances which create the constraints within
which the system may operate. However, FMEA is a failure-based method that may miss
a sub-set of potentially unsafe scenarios that are not triggered by failures. It is not able to
systematically determine combinations of constraints that could be encountered in system
operation. It is also unable to determine and quantify the reservoir level response and has
presented some challenges when dealing with complexity, feedback and interaction within
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hierarchical systems (the IEC standard on FMEA states that limiting analysis to a
maximum of two levels of hierarchy is good practice).
PFMA is a useful tool for looking at systems as a whole and brainstorming potential failure
modes which could develop at the system level. However, it is a completely heuristic
approach, and does not explicitly involve analysis of various levels of a hierarchical system
or the interactions between the levels. It does not facilitate quantification of system
behaviour and may miss certain components which are considered to be of less importance
to the analysts due to perceived low consequence or likelihood. It has the same limitations
as FMEA and relies more heavily on expert judgement and subjectivity.
ETA and FTA are both very practical tools for quantitative probabilistic assessment of
failures and their impacts. However, these approaches are failure-based, linearize the
progression of events and are unable to easily deal with feedback and nonlinear
interactions. ETA and FTA also begin with initiating events, and top events (faults),
respectively, which must be predetermined in some way. There is a very serious challenge
using these approaches in analyzing combinations of events, of which there may be an
extremely large number of possibilities. This is not a challenge that will be easily overcome
given the current state of the science. Finally, these approaches are not able to determine
the reservoir level response to various operating conditions due to their inability to analyze
component interactions and feedback behaviour.
Ultimately, the existing approaches, while useful, may not be adequate to capture the
dynamic behaviour of complex, interacting hierarchical systems. Because of the
recognized limitations, a systems approach has begun to emerge, and is beginning to gain
some momentum within the dams industry for analysis of system safety (Hartford et al.
2016). STPA is an excellent tool for analyzing potential control flaws in complex, actively
controlled systems. The key limitations of STPA that pertain to the analysis of dam systems
are that (a) dam systems may have many safety-critical components that provide passive
control, and (b) dam systems are acting to control natural inflows, so determining the
dynamic system response to the inflows is necessary to get a complete picture of system
safety. STPA is unable to determine the reservoir level response to various conditions.
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Nevertheless, STPA does provide a good starting point for the assessment of the actively
controlled components of a dam system. It provides very useful information for
determining potential system operating constraints (scenarios) for actively controlled
components in a systematic way and includes both failures and non-failures.
Simulation is another tool that can be used in the systems approach, and it is becoming
more commonly applied within the dams industry for safety analysis. Hartford et al. (2016)
focuses on several applications of stochastic simulation. In stochastic simulation, random
failures of components may be initiated (with random outage lengths) to determine the
overall probability of failure for the system. In this way, each run of a stochastic simulation
model would produce a different output. If run for enough years, the probability of failure
would begin to converge on a single value. The approach is becoming more widely applied
for dam safety analysis (Komey 2014; Komey et al. 2015; Hartford et al. 2016). Stochastic
simulation addresses more of the research requirements described previously than other
safety assessment approaches for dam systems. Stochastic simulation can capture dynamic
feedback relationships between system components if the system is modelled in adequate
detail. Simulation outputs for a dam system can include the reservoir level fluctuations in
response to various inflows and constraints, which makes simulation a particularly
promising tool for dam safety analysis. It is also possible to assess potential “combinations
of events” using stochastic simulation, though the ability to do so is limited by the length
of the run (computing power). Because the probabilities applied to the events (equipment
states) are relatively low, multiple events occurring and impacting one another are very
rare within a stochastic simulation if not run for enough years. In theory, stochastic
simulations run for enough simulation-years would eventually cover all of the possibilities,
however the computational requirements to achieve a complete coverage of the
possibilities would be beyond current capabilities. As such, the existing implementations
of stochastic simulation may not be able to capture a complete set of possible combinations
of component operating states at the current time. Stochastic simulation has the benefit of
easily estimating the overall probability of flow control failure of a system, though the
assessment of criticality for specific scenarios would require the use of data mining
techniques as well as extremely large number of simulation-years. Some of the current
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limitations associated with a purely stochastic approach can be demonstrated using a
simple example.
Consider a system with five components, A, B, C, D and E. Assuming each component is
either functioning or failed, there are 25=32 potential combinations of failures as follows
(normal component states are not shown):
No failures, A, B, C, D, E, AB, AC, AD, AE, BC, BD, BE, CD, CE, DE, ABC, ABD, ABE,
ACD, ACE, ADE, BCD, BCE, BDE, CDE, ABCD, ABCE, ABDE, ACDE, BCDE,
ABCDE.
For this example, assume that the goal of the stochastic simulation is to generate all possible
combinations of the component operating states at least once. Assuming that the probability
of failure for each component is 0.1% per day, and the model is run for as many years as
necessary at a daily time step until each combination has been simulated at least once, the
number of years required to arrive at each combination is shown in Table 2-8, which also
shows the corresponding number of years within which each combination was simulated.
Obviously, the combinations (scenarios) with less failures have a higher probability and
are simulated more frequently than the combinations with a higher number of failures. It is
also worth noting the high number of non-failure years simulated. Averaging over 50 total
runs, the simulation spends about 25% of its time simulating non-failure years. This
number is dependent on the assumed failure rates and will increase as the assumed failure
rates decrease. The amount of effort spent simulating each scenario is a function of its
probability, so some of the worse scenarios are focused on less because of their low
likelihood. About half of the possible scenarios (the lower, less probable part of the list)
are simulated less than 40 times, which means the simulation focuses less than ~0.5% of
the simulation effort on those scenarios. A very large number of simulation-years would
be required to collect enough data with which to assess the criticality of these more severe
and less likely combinations of operating states.
A volumetric representation of the system’s “possibility space” is another useful way of
demonstrating how stochastic simulation samples different events. The “possibility space”
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Table 2-8: Stochastic simulation of operating state combinations
Run
Combination

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

A

1007

485

319

685

1152

667

328

310

498

202

B

922

479

316

674

1132

624

341

313

517

176

C

952

475

312

649

1191

684

349

289

510

191

D

955

462

293

701

1149

625

324

299

508

180

E

984

462

266

683

1183

668

362

295

518

198

AB

192

91

58

125

219

130

57

58

87

40

AC

205

95

55

130

192

138

86

68

104

35

AD

183

77

43

131

212

144

60

49

103

32

AE

172

97

56

128

263

107

72

61

98

40

BC

195

111

61

142

233

118

69

56

105

30

BD

185

95

56

143

225

124

59

59

88

38

BE

184

93

67

126

221

139

68

55

103

32

CD

190

84

65

129

252

145

57

60

112

50

CE

198

92

68

135

218

133

66

57

110

43

DE

188

87

54

135

233

139

77

51

102

42

ABC

36

24

9

29

40

25

11

9

24

7

ABD

46

24

7

27

44

26

18

12

22

8

ABE

34

20

12

24

54

22

11

20

15

8

ACD

45

19

9

25

43

26

14

8

26

6

ACE

31

21

12

36

50

21

13

12

20

6

ADE

30

18

7

24

39

28

15

8

16

9

BCD

44

14

19

29

36

25

11

14

22

6

BCE

34

13

12

29

49

23

14

10

20

9

BDE

25

20

9

16

51

29

12

14

25

8

CDE

39

13

9

15

59

26

14

15

31

7

ABCD

7

3

2

2

6

2

2

1

2

2

ABCE

4

7

3

3

5

6

3

3

3

2

ABDE

10

6

6

7

9

7

1

2

7

1

ACDE

8

2

3

6

3

10

5

5

4

2

BCDE

5

2

1

6

14

5

1

1

5

2

ABCDE
Total number of
failures simulated
Total number of
non-failures
simulated

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

7111

3492

2210

4995

8578

4867

2521

2215

3806

1413

4814

2428

1483

3433

5801

3206

1719

1597

2506

968

11925

5920

3693

8428

14379

8073

4240

3812

6312

2381

Total
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is a visual representation of the full realm of physically possible system states and their
frequency of occurrence. In Figure 2-10 (King and Simonovic, 2020), the frequency, 𝐹𝑁 of
𝑁 components in an adverse operating state (𝑁𝑈 ) is plotted against the frequency, 𝐹𝐷 of
outage durations 𝐷𝑈 . Simple FN relationships are assumed and a 3-dimensional possibility
space is created. The planes of adverse component operating states are represented using
red, orange, green, blue and purple outlined areas. It is important to note that this possibility
space is a very simplified representation of the problem – the possibility space would also
include inflows, starting reservoir elevations and timing of component outages.
Nevertheless, using this simplified example figure, the stochastic samples can be plotted
(shown as black dots). Each dot represents one sample that could be stochastically
generated. The dots are centred around zero component outages, which have a higher
frequency, zero components out of service and zero outage length. While the samples do
extend into the outer reaches of the possibility space, they provide the best coverage of the
higher-frequency scenarios (zero to one components unavailable). The coverage of the less
probable, more extreme scenarios (where more components are out of service) is limited
by the number of years for which the simulation is run. In a stochastic simulation, this
volume is predefined, since the components, their outage frequency and their outage length
frequency are inputs to the model.
In conclusion, neither the more commonly used risk assessment approaches or the existing
techniques utilized from the systems approach are currently capable of systematic and
dynamic evaluation of the combinations of events that can lead to flow control failure in
dam systems. A new methodology is required, building on the existing tools from the
systems approach to define, analyze and evaluate a more complete range of potential
combinations of events (scenarios). The approach must be able to handle complexity,
feedback and nonlinear behaviour. Dynamic indicators of the system performance are a
required output of the analysis, as well as parameters that can be used to rank the relative
importance of a large number of potential scenarios.
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Figure 2-10: Stochastic sampling from within the possibility space
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Chapter 3
Methodology

3

In this chapter, an improved methodology for assessment of flow control in dam safety is
developed. The methodology draws on the benefits of existing approaches where possible,
making improvements that can facilitate a more thorough understanding of system
response to a more complete set of scenarios. The next section describes the methodology
justification and development, followed by a complete description of the methodology
steps.

3.1

Justification and development

A dam system is fundamentally an open control system. It is forced by inputs (inflows)
which vary with time in a relatively predictable way. Dam system outputs (outflows,
energy, etc.) are also constrained in relatively predictable ways, but random deviations
within the system may occur that affect the system outputs. For example, a spillway gate
can open or close to release the desired amount of flow downstream, but failure of
infrastructure which supports the gate function can cause the output constraints to deviate
from their normal values. There is a need within the dams industry to better understand
how dam system outputs may be constrained and what possible system outcomes may
result. Specifically, determining the reservoir level and outflow response to the full range
of possible operating constraints is an important goal that can help dam owners better
understand vulnerabilities within the system and determine appropriate courses of action
to address them. Using the control system structure presented by Leveson (2011) and
modified for a dam system, a basic mathematical framework can be developed for
calculation of the reservoir storage over time (which is directly related to the elevation
through a stage-storage curve). This is shown in Figure 3-1. The boundaries of the system
are the point at which the inflows enter the reservoir and the point at which the outflows
leave the dam. Included in the system is all of the infrastructure at the dam site, including
dams, gates, gate actuators, sensors as well as information relay, processing, operational
decision making and implementation of operations (which may take place off site).
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Figure 3-1: Mathematical framework for determining dam system behaviour
The control loop shows how information is passed through the system and what the main
connections are between different sectors (feedbacks). The relationships between Storage,
Inflow and Release are easily represented by basic mathematical equations and rule curves
for decision making with respect to controlled flow releases. This type of modelling is done
frequently for operations planning and analysis of dam systems. The area where more work
is needed is in determining constraints that come into play in several sectors of the system
and may impact measured system state values, operational decisions, operability of
equipment and capacity of water passages. The goal of this research is (a) systematically
defining these operating conditions and (b) understanding how they may adversely impact
the system state and outputs. A new approach is necessary with the following goals:
•
•
•

•
•
•

Reduced reliance on subjectivity and expert judgement.
Ability to determine potential constraints on system operation.
Ability to determine potential constraints that are not limited to failure modes.
Automatic generation of potential combinations of constraints.
Determine the likelihood of constraints without significant simplifying
assumptions.
Quantification of the dynamic system response to constraints. Specifically, how the
reservoir level and outflows change with time for a given set of constraints
(component operating states), constraint parameters and inflows.
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•
•
•
•
•

Inclusion of feedbacks, interactions and nonlinear behaviour.
Ability to deal with system complexity without the use of extreme simplifications
that undermine the results.
Ability to deal with uncertainty in the outcomes.
Estimation of criticality for a given scenario.
Estimation of overall probability of flow control failure for the system.

Table 3-1 contains a list of the main approaches discussed in the literature review,
evaluating them within the context of these research goals based on the observations in the
previous chapter. It is important to note that many of these tools may not be utilized
independently. The results of FMEA, for example, can be used as inputs to FTA or ETA.
Combining the tools may result in improved ability to achieve these research goals,
however the key limitations remain for the majority: an inability to model dynamic system
behaviour, complexity, feedback and interaction. The most promising tool in terms of the
aforementioned research requirements is the stochastic simulation approach, described in
detail by Hartford et al. (2016). The key limitation of the stochastic simulation is that it
spends a significant amount of effort simulating non-failures, and as such may not be an
efficient means of systematic evaluation of each possible combination of events. The
methodology proposed in this work seeks to determine (a) what the possible combinations
of events are, (b) what their range of impacts might be and (c) what their relative
importance (criticality) is, with respect to other scenarios.
Systematic analysis of each possible scenario, in theory, may be achieved using a
completely deterministic simulation of predefined scenarios. However, the timing of the
scenario’s predetermined adverse operating states (events) and determining whether events
influence one another significantly complicates the analysis. To completely and
deterministically analyze the full range of possible outcomes of a single scenario, all
possible combinations of event timing and inflows should be considered. Consider an
example scenario with three events, A, B, and C, and 10,000 years of possible daily inflow
values (this number of inflow-years is selected, in theory, to include inflows up to the PMF
which has an annual exceedance frequency of 1 in 10,000 years). There are a total of 365 ∗
10,000 = 3,650,000 possible inflow start days. Assuming the events can happen any time
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Table 3-1: Overview of approaches and their applicability to the research problem
Requirement

FMEA

Reduced
subjectivity

Slightly
(systematic
process)

No (fully
heuristic)

Yes

Determine
constraints on
system
operation
Ability to
address nonfailure related
constraints
Automatically
determine
potential
combinations of
constraints
(scenarios)
Determine
likelihood of
constraints
without
significant
simplifying
assumptions
Quantification
of dynamic
system response
Inclusion of
feedbacks and
nonlinear
behaviour
Ability to
handle
complexity
Assessment of
uncertainty in
the outcomes of
a scenario
Ability to deal
with common
cause failures
Estimation of
scenario's
criticality
Estimation of
overall system
flow control
failure
probability

PFMA

ETA

Stochastic
Simulation

FTA

STPA

No

No

Slightly
(systematic
process)

Slightly (simulation
model
automatically
determine system
outcomes)

Yes

No –
Requires this
upfront

No –
Requires this
upfront

Yes

No – Requires this
upfront

No –
Failure
based
method

No –
Failure
based
method

No – Failure
based
method

No – Failure
based
method

Yes

Yes – If nonfailures included in
potential constraints

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No – Static
analysis

No –
Static
analysis

No – Linear
chain-ofevents

No – Linear
chain-ofevents

No – Static
analysis

Yes – Dynamic
analysis

No – Static
analysis

No –
Static
analysis

No – Linear
chain-ofevents

No – Linear
chain-ofevents

Includes
feedbacks
but does not
analyze
system
behaviour

Yes – Dynamic
analysis that can
include feedbacks
and nonlinear
behaviour

Somewhat,
can pose
challenges
No – Does
not
analyze
scenario
outcomes

Somewhat,
can pose
challenges
No – Does
not
analyze
scenario
outcomes

Somewhat,
can pose
challenges

Somewhat,
can pose
challenges

Yes

Yes

Yes – Can
experiment
with
assumptions

Yes – Can
experiment
with
assumptions

No – Does
not analyze
scenario
outcomes

Not directly –
Could potentially
assess specific
scenarios using data
mining

Limited to
qualitative
only

Limited to
qualitative
only

Limited –
requires
careful
consideration

Limited –
requires
careful
consideration

Yes

Yes

No – Static
analysis

No –
Static
analysis

Yes

Yes

No – STPA
is generally
qualitative

Not directly –
Could potentially
assess specific
scenarios using data
mining

No – Static
analysis

No –
Static
analysis

Yes, if all
possible
combinations
included

Yes, if all
possible
combinations
included

No – STPA
does not
involve
probabilistic
assessment

Yes
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within a one-year window, there are a total of 365 ∗ 365 ∗ 365 = 48,627,125 possible
combinations of event initiation times (the day in which the adverse operating state begins).
This means 3,650,000 ∗ 48,627,125 = 1.77 × 1014 possible ways to execute the
simulation for a single scenario with three events occurring. This number considers only
one set of possible impacts for event A, B, and C, which may have impacts (for example,
outage lengths), that can significantly vary. Clearly, the number of combinations and
scenarios that must be analyzed to fully define the suite of potential outcomes for a system
becomes computationally prohibitive, even with state-of-the-art computing technology
such as cluster computing. Monte Carlo selection of event timing and inflow start day from
s synthetically generated inflow record can be useful to sample a small number of these
possibilities and dynamically characterize some of the possible outcomes for a given
scenario. Each predetermined scenario can be simulated through a number of Monte Carlo
iterations to better understand the possible range of outcomes resulting from that scenario.
This is the hybrid Deterministic Monte Carlo approach proposed in this research, where
events (component operating states) are pre-selected and their impacts, timing and inflows
are varied to better understand the possibilities within current computational capabilities.
The scenario inputs represent the deterministic portion of the model, and the varying of
scenario parameters represents the Monte Carlo portion of the model.
The approach presented in this thesis aims to provide a more even coverage of the
possibility space, as shown in Figure 3-2 (King and Simonovic, 2020). The sample dots
are color coded, to indicate which “adverse component operating state plane” the samples
are taken from. The Deterministic Monte Carlo approach forces the simulation to take
samples from within each plane, because it does not rely on the frequencies of failure and
duration to generate the samples. Each plane represents a single scenario, and the scenarios
are predetermined and simulated regardless of their likelihood. For the Deterministic
Monte Carlo approach, only a single sample would be taken to represent “normal”
conditions. In the proposed approach, the frequencies of the component outages and outage
lengths are not required to run the model, so the frequency dimension of the possibility
space is not defined. If enough information is available to define these frequencies, a
complete probabilistic analysis using the results of the analysis is possible.
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Figure 3-2: Deterministic Monte Carlo sampling from within the possibility space
Another key timing related issue that must be considered is the problem of whether
preceding events are influencing the results of subsequent events. Such considerations arise
when a component failure has been rectified, but the overall system remains in a “disturbed
state”, that is, the system has not been restored to the state that it would have been in if the
component failure had not occurred. This means that the “system state deviance” must be
a factor to be considered along with the timing of component failures. Since “system state
deviance” is determined by operational decisions, (eg. The decision to release water to
return to a normal state), these decisions must be somehow included as factors in
determining the extent of the deviance. This can be achieved by analyzing whether the
reservoir level has returned to a predefined “normal” state following the initiation of an
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event. If not, there may be independent sub-scenarios within the simulation that should not
count towards results of the scenario being analyzed. Consider the example shown in
Figure 3-3 (King and Simonovic, 2020), which has three events A, B and C occurring
within some time of one another.

Figure 3-3: Example output reservoir elevations for Scenario ABC (King and
Simonovic, 2020)
In the example, the reservoir has a constant elevation of 1 m under normal circumstances
where everything is operational. The event outage occurrence dates and lengths (durations)
are represented by the horizontal lines above the plots. For Outcome 1 (light red), Event A
causes an increase to about 1.3 m and then the reservoir level returns to the normal
elevation of 1 m prior to the initiation of Event B. The rate at which it returns to the normal
elevation would be determined by the operations planning algorithm within the simulation
model. Event B causes in increase in reservoir elevation to about 1.8 m, after which Event
C begins and increases the reservoir a further 0.1 m. After Event C, the reservoir returns to
its normal elevation as a result of the operations planning decisions. In Outcome 1, Event
A does not have any impact on the outcome of Events B and C, because the reservoir level
has returned to a normal elevation. Event B, however, does impact Event C. Thus, for
Outcome 1, two sub-scenarios are observed: (1) The result of Event A, and (2) the
combined result of Events B and C. In Outcome 2 (dark red), the reservoir rises to about
1.95 m following Event A, at which point dam breach is triggered and the reservoir drops
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to 0 m in elevation. In this case, the only sub-scenario being analyzed is Event A. This
example shows that despite the simulation being intended to analyze the combined impacts
of Events A, B and C, they cannot be assumed to be influencing one another. Some analysis
of each simulated outcome (the reservoir levels from each simulated Monte-Carlo iteration)
is required to ensure simulation results are attributed to the actual scenarios being
represented within the analysis. “Complete iterations” are considered to be the subset of
scenario results where all of the scenario’s events both occurred and affected one another.
In using the proposed Deterministic Monte Carlo approach, it is important to consider that
the goal of the exercise is to analyze all scenarios (predefined combinations of operating
states) as completely as possible given computational time constraints, to determine the
criticality of these combinations and identify particularly vulnerable components. There
should be enough data on each scenario to estimate the range of expected system
performance as well as the failure frequencies, failure inflow thresholds and reservoir level
exceedance frequencies. To ensure there is enough data collected for each scenario, it may
be necessary to limit the time between events to ensure their collective impacts can be
assessed. This limit may be determined as a function of the impact lengths for a given
iteration (for example, by taking the sum of impact lengths). Whether the event initiation
time limit should be more or less than the sum of the impact lengths requires experimenting
with scenarios to determine how long the system typically takes to return to normal
operation. For “flashy” reservoirs with relatively limited storage compared to inflows, the
recovery time following a return to normal operations may be quite short – days or even
hours. For reservoirs with large storage in comparison to inflows, this recovery time may
be significantly longer. The recovery time may also be less than the sum of impact lengths,
due to inflows that are less than the total capacity of the available flow conveyance
facilities. The recovery time should influence the modellers decision regarding the
appropriate time limit for event initiation.
In summary, the methodology developed in this work uses a systems approach for dam
safety analysis, attempting to draw on the strengths of the existing techniques, combining
and building on them with the goal of addressing the key element that is missing in all of
them – assessing outcomes from a large number of the possible combinations of events.
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This research focuses on identification and analysis of a more complete subset of
potentially unsafe scenarios than has previously been considered in dam safety analysis. A
Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation approach is proposed, in which scenarios are
systematically defined upfront and used as a deterministic input to the model. Defining the
complete set of failures and events to be simulated ensures all combinations of the defined
component operating states (or constraints) are evaluated. It also means that the simulation
efforts are divided equally between each scenario (combination of operating states), so a
more thorough analysis of each scenario is possible than using a purely stochastic
approach. Finally, the proposed approach reduces the amount of time spent simulating nonfailures. The scenario parameters, such as the timing and magnitude of impacts, are varied
using Monte Carlo techniques so that each scenario is run as many times as possible given
computational time constraints. Varying impact parameters allows some analysis of the
uncertainty relating to the estimate of scenario impact magnitudes (for example, it is hard
to estimate how long a component will be out of service, so a range of different values can
be tested). Conditional probabilities of failure and reservoir level exceedances above key
elevations (given a scenario has occurred) are direct outputs of the simulation. In this way,
a much larger subset of the events that contribute to the probability are analyzed. Focusing
on numerically assessing the entire design envelope and the complete range of possibilities
can help asset owners in becoming more prepared for any event (or combination of events),
regardless of its probability.
A flow chart detailing the overall methodology is shown in Figure 3-4 (King and
Simonovic, 2020). First, a component operating states database is created, which defines
individual components and their operating states, causal factors and potential range of
direct impacts. These represent the constraints within which the system may have to
function. Population of the database requires extensive knowledge of the system and is
similar to a FMEA but also includes non-failure operating states. A combinatorial
procedure uses the database entries to come up with the complete range of potential
scenarios for the system, which are used as inputs to a simulation model. Synthetic climate
data is generated for the system of interest and used in a hydrological model to develop a
long, synthetic timeseries of inflows to be used as inputs in the simulation model. The
scenarios become the inputs for a deterministic simulation model which is run many times
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for each scenario, with Monte-Carlo generated inputs that vary the inflows and incident
timing, as well as the scenario impacts. Outcomes are descriptors of the system behaviour
over time, including the releases through various conduits as well as adverse impacts, such
as dam overtopping, uncontrolled flow releases, or dam breach. Outcomes for each
scenario are assessed and aggregated performance measures for scenario groups are
computed. The results of the analysis could be utilized to develop or refine response and
mitigation strategies to improve system performance. Further analysis may be possible that
would allow for overall estimates of the probability of failure for each individual scenario,
and probability of failure for the system as a whole – this would require probabilistic
analysis of operating states, which is a complex task that is not explored in this research.
The proposed methodology has been developed to meet as many of the requirements in
Table 3-1 as possible within the time frame of the work. The key missing pieces are that
(a) it still inherently relies on subjectivity in the population of the operating states database
and development of the simulation model – there is currently no substitute for expert
knowledge and engineering judgement; (b) the likelihood of operating states are still
difficult to estimate without significant simplifying assumptions; and, (c) the approach
does not directly result in estimates of overall probability of flow control failure for the
system, though with some additional analysis this may be possible. There are also an
extremely large number of configurations (with different inflow sequences, event timing,
and impact magnitudes) for each combination of operating states, as described earlier in
this section – this approach covers only a small subset of the possible configurations for
each scenario, through the use of Monte Carlo techniques. This means that results between
two identical simulations of a given scenario would vary, and the results are only estimates
of the criticality of each scenario, given computational time constraints.
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Figure 3-4: Overall methodology flow chart (King and Simonovic, 2020)
Each of the methodology steps are described in detail in the following sections. First, a
description of the components operating state database and the process for database
population is provided. Next, scenario development is discussed with a description of the
combinatorial procedure developed in this research. Then, a detailed description of the
Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation approach is presented, which uses a system
dynamics simulation model with Monte-Carlo varied inputs. The following section
contains a description of the modelling approach used for inflow generation. Finally,
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scenario outcome assessment is discussed including the selection of criticality parameters
and performance measures.

3.2 Component Operating States Database
A component operating states database is used to define the operating states for each
system component and the causal factors that could lead to the development of the
operating states. The approach of database population is similar to FMEA but also
considers non-failure related operating states, including normal or functional operating
states. Population of the database can significantly benefit from the application of (a) the
STPA technique for actively controlled components and (b) a single-level FMEA analysis
for system components. There is still a significant amount of reliance on expert judgement,
but this may be slightly reduced if the systematic approach of STPA is used to inform
database population.
In order to develop an exhaustive list of potential operating scenarios for a hydropower
system, each individual component of the system (whether it be physical or non-physical)
must be analysed and its modes of operation considered. This is achieved using an
operating states database, which was designed using a relational database software called
Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL). MSSQL is a software used to generate and populate
computer databases. It can be used to generate interfaces that assist with database
population and information access. Using MSSQL, data are organized into relational tables
to model aspects of reality, such as the system elements, at different levels (system,
component and reservoir), the operating states and their characteristics as well as the causal
factors. Another important feature used in the design of the database is the store
procedures, which include functions that provide flexibility for developers, and are used
to insert and recover data very efficiently from the database with less computational
burden. In addition to this, there are views which allow the combination of several tables
in a relational way and return aggregated data to the user interface. The structure and the
entity relationship (ER) diagram of the database is shown in Figure 3-5 which depicts the
relationships between various levels of the system. The lines connecting the objects (tables)
in Figure 3-5 represent “foreigner keys” which ensure data consistency and integrity. The
database was designed to facilitate simple data entry using a web-based user interface. It
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may also be accessed, modified and queried using MSSQL Server Management Studio.
The design of the database is meant to be as general as possible, facilitating the analysis of
various dam systems with different configurations. Figure 3-5 presents three major groups
of tables organized as: a) System elements: containing the tables representing the System,
Component and Reservoir level elements; b) Operational States: containing the tables
representing the operating states for each of the system elements; c) Casual Factors:
containing the tables storing the causal factors; d) Auxiliary objects: containing tables that
are used to store user accounts and system logs.

Figure 3-5: Database Structure
In order to keep track of and assess each individual component in the system, a hierarchical
database structure is used in which components can be broken down into multiple subcomponents and easily tracked using a components tree with drop-down lists containing
components in an increasingly higher level of detail. Hydropower systems consist of a large
number of complex, interacting components at various levels of the system, and often in
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various locations. Use of a components tree helps the user set up the relationships between
these higher and lower level components of the system.
The components tree consists of three levels. These are as follows:
•

System level, which includes reservoirs, communications equipment and other
high-level components of the overall system

•

Reservoir level, which breaks down the system-level components into their subcomponents. This includes dams, spillway gates, generating units, sensors and other
infrastructure assemblies that exist for a single reservoir. Reservoir level
components also include non-infrastructure system components such as the
operations staff and inflow forecasting for the reservoir.

•

Component level, which breaks down (when possible) the reservoir-level
components into their sub-components. A spillway gate may have several
interacting sub-components which function together, and these can be broken down
at the component level and tied to the gate for which they represent.

These levels of the system are stored as tables in the database and can be seen in Figure
3-5a under “System elements” group and the object names are: “ComponentLevel”,
“ReservoirLevel” and “SystemLevel”. The components tree ensures that each subcomponent is tied to an individual component at a higher level, allowing for complex
system structures to be represented fully while maintaining relationships between the
higher-level components and the sub-components of which they are comprised.
Components are also assigned a type to facilitate integration with the simulation model.
Once components are defined, the individual operating states for each component can be
described. The operating states database includes normal operating status for each
component, as well as adverse operating states which can include failure or non-failure
events. Operating states include several entries, shown in Figure 3-5b under “Operating
States” group and listed below – these may be expanded upon, if necessary, for different
systems being analyzed:
•

Operating state type: normal, failed, failed closed, failed in place, collapsed,
delayed, erroneous
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•

Impact type: none, outage, delay, error, blockage, settlement, cracking, wave,
uncontrolled release of water

•

Operating state description: qualitative descriptor for operating state

•

Minimum impact: numerical minimum value of impact

•

Maximum impact: numerical maximum value of impact

•

Average impact: numerical average value (mode) of impact

•

Unit type: The units of the impact

•

Notes: user entries on data sources and/or assumptions

A numerical range of impact magnitudes is included (see “Operating States” table in Figure
3-5b since it may not be possible to estimate accurately the exact amount of time needed
to repair certain components or the magnitude of error or delay which may occur under
varying circumstances. For the more extreme failure modes, such as collapse of a dam or
spillway gate, the process of repair could take years due to a number of factors including
the degree of damage, the design process, the contract tendering process and even political
considerations. Including a wide range of potential impacts for each operating state allows
the full range of potential impact times to be explored. This structure also facilitates MonteCarlo simulation which can be used to investigate the full range of system behaviour
outcomes for a given scenario (set of component operating states).
Each operating state can be assigned one or more causal factors, with details as specified
in Figure 3-5c under “Causal Factors”. Causal factors are the events which lead to the
operating state being described. Several causal factor types are required as various
components of the system may be vulnerable to different disturbances. These include
earthquake, maintenance, debris, excessive rainfall, ice, etc. The user may create a specific
list for the system of interest. It may be desirable in some cases to define the magnitude of
causal factor that could lead to the event. In the case of an earthquake, certain components
may be vulnerable under certain degrees of ground acceleration. For some causal factors,
it may not be possible to provide a numerical definition. Causal factors may also be
assigned date index ranges, which specify the minimum or maximum date within which
the causal factor can occur (as an integer between 1 and 365). An entry under causal factors
was also added to allow for quantification of the probability of the causal factor leading to
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the operating state. While this information is useful in overall calculations of scenario
probability, it is extremely hard to define in the presence of limited data. The focus of this
research is to define and analyze the full range of potential operating conditions for a dam
system, and probabilistic assessment remains an important area for future work.
The procedure for population of the database is detailed in Figure 3-6. First, system
documentation and details can be used to populate the components tree for the system of
interest. Components at the different levels of the system are defined. Next, gathering of
information relating to failures, expert knowledge, and any FMEA and STPA outcomes

Figure 3-6: Component operating states database population flow chart
should be gathered to begin definition of operating states, population of operating states
tables and causal factor information. Populating the table is quite similar to an FMEA in
that it is expert knowledge and judgement from a variety of experts would be recommended
in populating the database to ensure the most exhaustive list of operating states, impacts
and causal factors which is as accurate as possible. The key difference from an FMEA is
that non-failure operating states may also be included within the database. In addition,
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component failure effects on other components or higher levels of the system can be
programmed into the simulation model and do not need to be addressed within the database.
While a significant amount of subjectivity remains in database population, placing the
focus on individual components at different levels of the system and determining their
direct impacts is necessary to allow for automated scenario generation. The database is
structured so that various users can work together to provide inputs, facilitated using user
identification (see “Auxiliary objects” in Figure 3-5d). Users of the database can enter in
their details and create a user ID and password to be entered upon accessing the database
interface. This, along with IP address tracking ensures all sensitive information is kept
secure.

3.3 Operating State Scenario Development
The information in the database contains as many of the systems components and their
potential operating states that can be defined by the modeller(s). A combinatorial procedure
is required to automatically generate the complete list of operating state combinations from
the database. Each scenario will represent one possible combination of operating states (or
set of constraints) for each component in the system. The use of combinatorics will ensure
an exhaustive list of potential operating scenarios is developed. Deterministic modelling of
each of the scenarios, with Monte Carlo variation of their potential parameters, will allow
for a more complete investigation of scenarios and potential system outcomes than may be
possible using a purely stochastic model.
Consider a system of three components, A, B, and C, each which can either be functional
or failed. The total number of possible combinations of operating states is 23 = 8. These
are:
̅̅̅̅ 𝐶, 𝐴̅𝐵𝐶̅ , 𝐴𝐵𝐶
̅̅̅̅̅̅ 𝐴𝐵̅ 𝐶, 𝐴𝐵𝐶
̅̅̅̅ , 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅
𝐴𝐵𝐶, 𝐴̅𝐵𝐶, 𝐴𝐵
where a solid line over the variable represents its failed state. A process is required that can
not only determine the number of combinations but can determine what the combinations
themselves are. The process should also work for components with more than one
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operating state, since this methodology considers operating states outside of the traditional
binary definition of “functional” or “failed”. The Cartesian Product meets these
requirements. Consider a set of operating states for each component, such that:
𝐴, ̅𝐴 ∈ 𝑨
𝐵. 𝐵̅ ∈ 𝑩
𝐶, ̅̅̅
𝐶 ∈𝑪
The Cartesian Product 𝑨 × 𝑩 × 𝑪 defines all possible combinations, as listed above.
Consider component 𝑨 has an additional operating state in its operating state set, such that
𝐴, 𝐴̅, 𝐴̂ ∈ 𝑨. The operation 𝑨 × 𝑩 × 𝑪 would then yield 3 × 2 × 2 = 12 possible
outcomes, as follows:
̅̅̅̅𝐶, 𝐴̅𝐵𝐶̅ , 𝐴𝐵𝐶
̅̅̅̅̅̅ 𝐴𝐵̅ 𝐶, 𝐴𝐵𝐶
̅̅̅̅ , 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅ , 𝐴̂𝐵𝐶, 𝐴̂𝐵̅ 𝐶, 𝐴̂𝐵𝐶̅ , 𝐴̂𝐵𝐶
̅̅̅̅
𝐴𝐵𝐶, 𝐴̅𝐵𝐶, 𝐴𝐵
This example demonstrates the use of the Cartesian Product for generating all possible
combinations of sets of varying lengths. To achieve the goal of coming up with all possible
combinations of operating states for the system, the information from the database can be
converted into operating state sets for each component of the system. Then, the Cartesian
Product is applied to come up with a list of all possible combinations, where each
combination is one unique set of operating states for each component in the system (a
scenario). The process for scenario generation is detailed in Figure 3-7. The scenarios
generated through this process become the input to the simulation model. The following
paragraphs describe the steps and mathematical descriptions of the process.
From the database, tables detailing the database inputs at each level of the system can be
extracted. The component number and operating state number for each of the components
and operating states can be used to generate unique identifiers, as shown in Equation 3.1.
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Figure 3-7: Scenario generation flow chart
𝐶1 = [𝑐1 𝑜𝑠1 , 𝑐1 𝑜𝑠2 , 𝑐1 𝑜𝑠3 , 𝑐1 𝑜𝑠4 … 𝑐1 𝑜𝑠𝑚1 ]
𝐶2 = [𝑐2 𝑜𝑠1 , 𝑐2 𝑜𝑠2 , 𝑐2 𝑜𝑠3 , 𝑐2 𝑜𝑠4 … 𝑐2 𝑜𝑠𝑚2 ]
⋮
𝐶𝑛 = [𝑐𝑛 𝑜𝑠1 , 𝑐𝑛 𝑜𝑠2 , 𝑐𝑛 𝑜𝑠3 , 𝑐𝑛 𝑜𝑠4 … 𝑐𝑛 𝑜𝑠𝑚𝑛 ]

(3.1)

where 𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑛 represent the system component operating state sets for components 1
through 𝑛 and 𝑛 ∈ (1 … 𝑁), 𝑐1 … 𝑐𝑛 represent the components 1 through n,
and 𝑜𝑠1 … 𝑜𝑠𝑚𝑛 represent operating states 1 through 𝑚𝑛 for component n which has 𝑚
operating states, 𝑚 ∈ (1 … 𝑀). The component operating state sets contain a list of all
unique operating state and causal factor combinations for a given component. The actual
numbers given to components are generated directly from the database identifiers, and the
operating states are then labelled 1 to m. The number of unique operating state/causal factor
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combinations for each component may vary so the component operating state sets are not
equal in length from component to component.
Cartesian product of these sets can be easily obtained using Python’s itertools package,
with the product function (Python Software Foundation 2012). The function is an efficient
iterator containing nested “for” loops which essentially work as an odometer that advances
the rightmost element on each iteration. This produces an exhaustive list of potential
system operating scenarios, which contain one operating state for each component in the
system. Using the Cartesian Product of each component’s operating state set produces an
exhaustive list of elements (scenarios) which include a complete list of operating states for
every component in the system. Scenarios take the form shown in Equation 3.2:
𝑆 = [𝑐1 𝑜𝑠𝑚1 , 𝑐2 𝑜𝑠𝑚2 , … , 𝑐𝑛 𝑜𝑠𝑚𝑛 ]

(3.2)

where each scenario S consists of a single operating state for every component in the
system. The operating states are kept track of using operating state identifiers as shown in
Equation 1.
The total number of possible operating states TS is therefore equal to the number of
elements in the Cartesian product of the component operating state sets. The number of
elements in the Cartesian product is the product of the length of each set:
𝑁

𝑇𝑆 = ∏ 𝑀𝑛

(3.3)

𝑛=1

where 𝑀𝑛 is equal to the number of individual operating state/causal factor combinations
for each component 𝑛, 𝑛 ∈ (1 … 𝑁).
The resultant number of potential scenarios will be a function of the number of operating
states and components, and as such will be extremely high for a complex system modelled
in significant detail. Because the goal of this methodology is to simulate each and every
scenario to determine the potential impacts, it may be necessary in practice to consolidate
multiple components or causal factors into categories based on the modes of failure or
adverse impacts, to reduce the number of scenarios and ensure the computational feasibility
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of the simulation model. This could potentially be achieved through additional analysis –
fault tree analysis may be particularly suited to determining multiple paths of failures that
lead to the same higher-level fault, which could then be consolidated into a single operating
state (this could be particularly promising for spillway gate and turbine systems).
While some of the generated scenarios may be relatively unrealistic in comparison to
others, this approach focuses on determining all of the possibilities. The worst-case
scenario where every component is in an undesirable state is extremely unlikely, yet still
possible and does contribute (in a very small way) to the overall probability of failure.
Understanding system behaviour in response to any scenario can help guide the selection
of operating strategies and investments to improve system safety and guide system
recovery.
This methodology for scenario generation does not consider the time between changes in
operating states for different components or the inflows, which would significantly
complicate the procedure. Instead, this is dealt with using a Deterministic Monte Carlo
Simulation framework, where the operating states for each component (scenarios) are
predetermined and used as inputs to a simulation model. For each deterministic simulation
of a particular scenario, the uncertainty arising from varying time between events, impact
magnitudes and inflows is varied in a number of Monte Carlo iterations, as detailed in
Section 3.4.

3.4 Deterministic Monte Carlo Simulation Framework
This section presents a framework for the Deterministic Monte Carlo Simulation. First, a
description of the simulation model development is provided. In this research, a system
dynamics simulation environment is used. Next, a discussion of the Monte-Carlo variation
of scenario parameters is provided. The system dynamics simulation model is run in a
hybrid deterministic/Monte Carlo environment where (a) the operating states associated
with a single scenario are used as inputs for a single execution of the simulation, and (b)
the parameters of that particular scenario are varied in a series of iterations, using Monte
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Carlo generated parameters for operating state timing, impacts and inflows. The final
section of this chapter details the simulation execution steps.

3.4.1 System Dynamics Simulation Model Development
Simonovic (2009) presents simulation techniques that deal with water resources in general,
with a particular focus on system dynamics simulation as a tool for water resources
engineers. In system dynamics, a stock-and-flow model can be used to represent the system
structure, showing the complex interactions between system components. These complex
interactions are the source of the system behaviour and can help identify emergent
behaviours that may not be easily assessed through analysis of the system’s individual
parts. By modelling the system as a whole and all relevant feedbacks and relationships
between components, the overall system behaviour can be characterized. The stock-andflow representation facilitates easy modification of the system structure to experiment with
various upgrades or operational strategies that have the potential to improve system
performance. Recall, stocks are represented as boxes and flows are represented as pipelines
into or out of the stock controlled by spigots (with a “source” or “sink” that supplies or
drains flows). Flows have units of material over time, and while inflows and outflows for
the dam system are represented as flows in this particular application, there are many other
types of flows that can be used which may have nothing to do with water. Auxiliary
variables and arrows make up the other major components of a stock-and-flow model, and
these represent constants or variables that change with time according to a mathematical
equation or algorithm.
Consider a simple dam system, with a single reservoir and dam that is controlled only by
a free overflow weir. Figure 3-8 contains a representation of this system. Reservoir Storage
is represented as a stock with units m3. The value of Reservoir Storage can only be changed
by the flows into or out of the stock. Flows have the same units as the stock over time. In
this example. Inflow and Outflow are the stocks and have units of m3/s.
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Figure 3-8: Simple dam system with free overflow weir
The change in Reservoir Storage can be computed as:
𝑑𝑆
= 𝐼 − 𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑑𝑡

(3.4)

Where 𝑆 represents Reservoir Storage, 𝑡 represents time, 𝐼 represents Inflows and 𝑂
represents Outflows. System dynamics tools use integration to calculate the value of the
stock at each timestep. The Reservoir Level (𝑅𝑆𝐸) value is a function of the Reservoir
Storage as defined by the Stage-Storage Curve. Similarly, Free Overflow Weir Discharge
(𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 ) is a function of the Reservoir Level, as defined by the Stage-Discharge Curve for
the weir. Equations presented here are generated from the Cheakamus System
characteristics, the details of which are summarized in Appendix A.
𝑅𝑆𝐸 = −1.12 ∗ 10−5 ∗ 𝑆 2 + 3.24 ∗ 10−2 ∗ 𝑆 + 3.64 ∗ 102

(3.5)

𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 = −35.8 ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 3 + 40.9 ∗ 103 ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 2 − 15.6 ∗ 106 ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 + 19.8 ∗ 108
𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 378.41
(3.6)
Note that for “flashy” reservoirs with little storage in comparison to inflow volumes, the
reservoir elevation may vary greatly throughout the day, so weir discharges may also vary
hourly. For a model run on a daily timestep, it may be necessary to compute the Free
Overflow Weir Discharge, 𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 for a given day by iterating within the function over a 24hour period. This will ensure weir discharges accurately reflect reality.
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Inflows represent an external model input, which in this case ranges from 5 to 25 m3/s.
Outflows (𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) are equal to the Free Overflow Weir Discharge:
𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟

(3.7)

If we simulate this model with a constant inflow and user-defined Stage-Storage and StageDischarge curves, as well as an initial starting reservoir level (10 m3/s-d), we can see that
the model reaches a steady state, where the discharge over the weir is equal to the constant
inflow. This is shown in Figure 3-9 for three different constant discharge values. Note that
the reservoir level can be represented using units of volume (m3), however using the units
m3/s-d can considers the available flow rate over time, which simplifies the calculations
required.

Figure 3-9: Simulation of simple dam system with free overflow weir

Suppose we add a single gate to this system, modifying the stock-and-flow diagram in
Figure 3-10. The Gate Discharge (𝑄𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 ) is a function of the Gate Position (𝐺𝑃) and
Reservoir Level, as defined by the Gate Rating Curve (provided by BC Hydro and
summarized in Appendix A). For this single-gate system, the rating curves for both gates
are combined into a single gate (by simply adding the discharge columns). The gate rating
curves can be used in a two-dimensional interpolation to determine what the corresponding
flow is for a given reservoir elevation and gate position. This can be done using simple
Python functions such as interp2d which is part of the scipy package.
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𝑄𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝐺𝑃)

(3.8)

𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 + 𝑄𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒

(3.9)

The outflow then becomes:

Simulating this system for constant inflows of 32 m3/s with a variable gate position yields
a similar result where a steady state is achieved, as shown in Figure 3-11. In the blue line
in Figure 11, the gate position is the smallest and the reservoir rises to the free overflow
spill. At this point, an instantaneous increase in the outflow is observed as the overflow
spillway begins to pass flow. It is important to note that the increase in outflow at a smaller
time step (say, hourly) would be more gradual than the daily plots may indicate.

Figure 3-10: Simple dam system with free overflow weir and gate
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Figure 3-11: Simulation results for simple system with free overflow weir and gate
If we add a sinusoidal relationship to represent seasonal variations in the system inflow,
we start to see some more variation in the resultant reservoir levels, as shown in Figure
3-12. The relationship used in this simple simulation model is chosen to roughly mimic the
natural seasonal variation in flows for the Cheakamus system, with time 𝑡:
𝐼 = 60 ∗ sin 0.015(𝑡 − 80) + 70

(3.10)

Figure 3-12: Simulation results for simple system with free overflow weir, gate, and
sinusoidal-varying inflows
Including some day-to-day variability in inflows for the simple system can be done using
a random normally distributed variable (with a mean of 0 and a scale of 30) which is added
to the time-dependent sinusoidal inflow value. The value is then truncated, so that the
minimum inflow value cannot be less than 2 m3/s. The simple system simulation results
with added daily variability are shown in Figure 3-13. The fluctuation in the reservoir levels
is more extreme, and the resulting reservoir levels and inflows begin to vary more greatly.
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Figure 3-13: Simulation results for simple system with free overflow weir, gate,
sinusoidal inflows with daily variability
Obviously, for normal operation of a dam with a gated spillway, the gate positions are not
kept constant throughout the year and for all inflows. Gate positions may be selected based
on a number of inputs, including the inflow forecast, rule curves, target reservoir
elevations, outflow constraints and downstream impacts. Creating an algorithm to simulate
operations planning is a more challenging aspect of model development, in particular in
the case of cascading and parallel dam systems. Optimization is frequently cited in the
literature and works well for balancing inflows, downstream effects, reservoir operational
limits and outflow constraints. However, optimization may significantly impede
computational efficiency, which is an important consideration when running the simulation
model a large number of times. For this simplified example based on a version of the
Cheakamus project with only a single gate, an if-then-else type algorithm has been
developed for Operations Planning. The algorithm uses 14 days of inflow forecasting to
determine the appropriate gate releases that will keep the reservoir level between target
elevations (see Figure A5 in Appendix A). Inflow Forecast is based on the sinusoidal
relationship described previously, with no random normal variable added. This means the
operations planning algorithm has some indication of the average inflow to expect over the
next 14 days but is not aware of any major deviations from the normal level due to the
random normally distributed variable that is added. The Operations Planning algorithm is
detailed in Figure 3-14 (King and Simonovic 2020). The output variable from Operations
Planning for this simple example is gate flow, which can be transformed into a gate position
instruction. The Gate Position is calculated using a reverse two-dimensional interpolation
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using the Operations Planning output (the desired gate flow) and the Reservoir Level, based
on the Gate Rating Curve. The resultant stock and flow model is shown in Figure 3-15.

Figure 3-14: Simple operations planning algorithm King and Simonovic (2020)
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The simulation results for the example with operations planning implemented are shown
in Figure 3-16. The reservoir rises to the level of El 376.5 m (the Normal Maximum
Reservoir Level), and hovers at that level or just above and below based on the deviations
introduced by the random normal variable added to the inflow. Note that there are no power
flow release facilities included in the model, so the algorithm keeps the reservoir level high
because there is no reason to discharge more additional water than necessary to meet the
maximum reservoir level target.

Figure 3-15: Simple dam system with a single weir and gate, with operations
planning algorithm implemented (King and Simonovic, 2020)
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Figure 3-16: Simulation results for simple dam system with single weir and gate,
with operations planning algorithm implemented (King and Simonovic, 2020)
Another important feature of the simulation model will be the ability to simulate
component failures or outages. Considering the simple example developed, this can be
added by creating a variable that tracks remaining time to repair following gate failures,
Gate Remaining Time to Repair, 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅. This is modelled as a stock, which receives a
pulse of Gate Failure, 𝐺𝐹, when the gate fails. The stock drains with the value time when
its value is positive, using the flow Gate Repair, 𝐺𝑅. The gate remaining time to repair can
then be implemented in the model based on the impacts of a gate outage – in this simple
example the situation modelled will be that the gate fails in the closed position. Gate failure
causes an inflow to the stock of 20 days at time 𝑡 = 100, and the gate becomes stuck in
the closed position for a 20-day period. The modified stock and flow diagram for this is
shown in Figure 3-17.
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Figure 3-17: Simple system with gate and weir, with operations planning and gate
failures implemented (King and Simonovic 2020)
In this example, the gate remaining time to repair is calculated as:
𝑑𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅
= 𝐺𝐹 − 𝐺𝑅
𝑑𝑡

(3.11)

Gate Failure is calculated as:
𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 100, 𝐺𝐹 = 20
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒, 𝐺𝐹 = 0

(3.12)

Gate Repair is calculated as:
𝑖𝑓 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅 > 0, 𝐺𝑅 = 1
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐺𝑅 = 0
The Gate Position can then be calculated based on the gate availability:
𝑖𝑓 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅 = 0, 𝐺𝑃 = 𝑓(𝑂𝑃, 𝑅𝑆𝐸)

(3.13)

114

𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒, 𝐺𝑃 = 0

(3.14)

where 𝑂𝑃 represents the operations planning output, which is representative of the desired
gate flow. Simulating this model yields the outcomes shown in Figure 3-18. The impacts
of the gate failure can be seen in the image starting at day 100 of the simulation, where the
gate position and gate flow drop to zero, and the reservoir elevation rises above the target
elevation. Flow over the free overflow weir is observed during the gate outage (these are
not shown but are the difference between Outflow and Gate Flow). Once the gate is back
online, the gated spillway flow is increased significantly to reduce the reservoir elevation
to within the target levels. The inflow on the day of the gate’s return to service is less than
predicted, so the operator opens the gate more than is necessary and the reservoir drops to
just above the gate sill elevation (El. 367.28 m). In reality, operators will have a relatively
better idea with respect to the expected inflow. Dam operators would also be able to adjust
the gate position within the 24-hour period if the inflows are less than predicted to ensure
rapid drawdown of the reservoir does not occur. This is one potential limitation of running
the model on a 24-hour timestep, though improved inflow prediction for the operations
planning algorithm would avoid the issue. For less flashy reservoirs, a daily time step may
be adequate.
As more features are added to the simple simulation model, the nonlinearity of the problem
becomes more obvious. Calculation of the reservoir level response becomes increasingly
more complex as additional components, variable gate positions, natural variability in
inflows, outages, etc. are added to the simulation model. These interactions are not easily
modelled using traditional tools, so simulation is necessary for quantifying the system
response to various inputs. These simple examples help build a clear case for system
dynamics simulation as a tool to determine reservoir level response to various operating
conditions. The system dynamics platform offers a particularly suitable modelling
environment for complex, dynamic systems with interactions among components. The
object-oriented building blocks help visualize the connections between the different
components of the system. This visual representation of the system structure can be
inspected to help gain confidence in the model performance. Subscripting is another useful
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tool that can help modellers easily add series and parallel dams to a system without
complete re-programming. Subscripting is also useful for the modelling of multiple subcomponents or redundant features of the system.

Figure 3-18: Simulation of simple system with single gate and weir, operations
planning, and gate failure implemented (King and Simonovic 2020)
The general process for the development of a system dynamics simulation model for a
hydropower system is described in Figure 3-19 (King and Simonovic, 2020). The process
is iterative, that is, model development is influenced by model testing, and development
continues until the modeller is satisfied that the modelled system is an adequate
representation of reality. The model is a description of physical and nonphysical
relationships among system components. A significant amount of information about the
system is required to define these relationships mathematically, and expert judgement is
necessary in model development. Dividing the model into interconnected sub-systems
shown in different views or sectors may be helpful to organize the model presentation. Subsystems may be connected to each other by one or more variables. These sectors can follow
a generic control loop, such as the one presented in Section 1.3 and Figure 1-20, as
described by Leveson (2011) and adapted for a hydropower system. The sectors include:

116

(1) A controller, who interprets information relating to the state of the system and produces
a set of operating instructions, (2) Actuators, the mechanical-electrical assemblies which
work to move gates in the controlled process, (3) A controlled process, representing the
infrastructure being controlled or the hydraulic system state, (4) Sensors, which relay
information back to the controller and (5) Disturbances, which are not directly part of the
control loop but may affect the functionality of any one of its features. This high-level
system structure represents a hierarchical system of systems, with each box representing
its own system (Leveson 2011). King et al. (2017) presents a detailed system dynamics
model of a dam system that is broken down into control system sectors. The benefit of
developing a detailed model of the system components is that low-level failures and other
events within the system can be initiated and the simulation model can determine the
system-level impacts for a particular set of inflows and event parameters.
Selection of the variables that will be required to adequately represent the system is
another important step. The variables represent states of the system which the modeller is
interested in over time, and there may also be a number of intermediate variables that
transform information between the key variables of interest. The variable types are
stocks, flows and auxiliary variables. Stocks may include reservoir levels, remaining
repair times and even gate positions, depending on how the modeller wants to set up the
equations. Flows are the values which have units over time and represent the inflow and
outflow of the stock value. Auxiliary variables are neither stocks, nor flows, and may
represent physical or nonphysical relationships and processes. Subscripting can be used
so that a single representation of a variable and its relationships (equations) can be
applied. This is particularly useful for representation of multiple reservoirs, gates or other
redundant features of the system. Defining the relationships requires expert knowledge of
the system, data, and programming capability. Some auxiliary variable equations can be
represented by simple if-then-else type formulae, others may represent nonlinear
relationships or even complex algorithms with a number of processes occurring
internally.
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Figure 3-19: Simulation model development flow chart (King and Simonovic 2020)
The model output is only as good as the modellers understanding of the interactions and
relationships within the system being analyzed. Like all models, simulation models are
abstractions of reality. Sterman (2000) argues that, because of this, all models are “wrong”
and that simulation models can never be validated or verified in the traditional sense of the
word. There are, however, a number of tests that can be done to gain confidence in the
model performance. These tests should be done iteratively throughout the model
development process. Analyzing the system structure and feedbacks to ensure all important
variables are represented and their equations are grounded in reality is important. This
includes checking the water balance, rating curves and other physically-derived variables.
Checking the dimensions is another important model test. Historical records of system
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operation are also particularly useful for testing and development of the model. A direct
comparison between simulated and actual values provides information to the modeller
about how well the system is mimicking reality in terms of normal operation. Comparison
of system reservoir levels and outflows can help the modeller adjust the system structure
so the system behaviour better captures the dynamics – this is particularly important during
the development of operating rules. Once the model results are relatively close to reality,
the model is ready for simulation.

3.4.2 Monte-Carlo variation of scenario parameters
Each automatically generated scenario (see Section 3.3) contains a list of component
operating states which may be normal, erroneous, failed, etc. Each component operating
state is tied to one or more causal factors and has a specified range of impacts that can be
expected should the operating state occur. Impacts may include outage length, error
magnitude, or delay length. Linking this information into the simulation model in a way
that allows a wide range of potential outcomes to be explored for each scenario is a critical
part of the implementation. An example of such a link was shown in the previous section.
System dynamics modelling is inherently deterministic, so specific instructions for how to
implement the scenario must be given to the model before running. Monte-Carlo selection
of simulation inputs is considered to be the most efficient way to assess the outcomes from
as many implementation possibilities for a single scenario as can be achieved within the
computational time constraints. Each operating state has varying impact magnitudes
between minimum and maximum values specified in the database. In addition to this, the
adverse operating states may be occurring within some temporal proximity to one another
but not at the exact same time. Inflows may also significantly affect the way an operating
state changes the system behaviour. While simulation facilitates the assessment of
component interactions, feedbacks and nonlinear system behaviour, the Monte-Carlo
variation of these important simulation inputs can help better capture a range of system
behaviour that is possible as a result of a given scenario. The temporal proximity of the
adverse operating states, the magnitude of impacts and the system inflows can all easily be
varied using a Monte-Carlo simulation approach. Each scenario can be run many times
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(iterations), varying these inputs to explore the system behavior in response to a random
subset of the total implementation possibilities for each scenario. This helps provide more
information about the uncertainty associated with a particular scenario in terms of the range
of system response that can be expected.
A wide range of hydrological conditions may be tested for each operating scenario, by
selecting a random year and start date for each Monte-Carlo run of each scenario. The year
and start date can be linked to a synthetic inflow time series (this is discussed in Section
3.5.2.
Operating state impact magnitudes may be difficult to estimate, and can vary significantly
depending on the timing, organizational factors, and availability of materials to rectify the
adverse operating state, etc. The potential range of operating state impact magnitudes is
represented using minimum impact, maximum impact and average impact (mode) as
specified in the component operating states database in the operating states description.
This information can be used to generate Monte-Carlo inputs with a triangular distribution
(Kotz and van Dorp 2004):
𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 + √𝑈(𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑖min )(𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 − 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 )

𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 < 𝑈 < 𝐹(𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 )

𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 =

(3.15)
{

𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 − √(1 − 𝑈)(𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑖min )(𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 ) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐹(𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 ) ≤ 𝑈 < 1

where 𝑈 represents a random variate from the uniform distribution between 0 and 1, 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛
represents the minimum impact value specified in the database, 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 represents the
maximum impact value specified in the database, 𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 represents the average value
specified in the database and 𝐹(𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 ) = (𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 − 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 )/(𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑖min ). A random impact
magnitude for each operating state is generated in this way and used as the second MonteCarlo input to the simulation model.
Timing of events may also vary within a scenario, and events can occur at the same time
or within hours, weeks or even months of one another. The temporal proximity of events
represents the third Monte-Carlo input to the simulation model. The causal factors for each
operating state play a roll in determining operating state proximity. The number of causal
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factors can be used to determine the number of time steps between adverse operating states
arising from different causal factors. Operating states with the same causal factor (for
example, an earthquake) are initiated at the same time. Operating states for subsequent
causal factors are initiated at some value, ∆𝑡𝑛𝑐 in the future where 𝑛𝑐 ∈ (0, … , 𝑁𝐶) and
𝑁𝐶 is equal to the number of unique causal factors less one (because the first causal factor
is implemented at time t=0 in the simulation). The ordering of causal factors is also shuffled
for each iteration so that the first operating state(s) change between Monte-Carlo inputs.
For some causal factors, including lack of maintenance and aging, impact timing is
completely randomized if more than one component is affected; that is, failure of one
component due to lack of maintenance may not occur at the same time as the failure of
another component that has not been maintained. There may be a time limit within which
these events can occur, as defined by the user for the system of interest. This is a parameter
that helps increase the chance that the events are impacting one another so that the scenarios
represented in the outputs are reflective of the input scenario (discussed further in Section
3.4.3).
In addition to generating these randomized parameters for each scenario, it is necessary to
program component-specific connections that link the database’s operating state identifiers
to the specific point in the simulation model where the component failure, error or delay
occurs. An example of how this can be done was provided in Section 3.4.1. The timing and
impact magnitude can be represented by variables that change with each Monte Carlo
iteration. Inflow sequences for each iteration can be selected from the historical record
using the randomly generated start day and year. Directing the impact towards the correct
component and implementing it requires significant modelling effort and expert
judgement. The implementation of these connections will differ from application to
application and must be done at the front-end of the simulation model to ensure the scenario
information is routed properly through the simulation model. The randomly generated
impact parameters and timing must be connected to the appropriate variable within the
simulation model. Once the connections are made, simulation can proceed following
Figure 3-20 as discussed in the following section.

121

It is important to note that random numbers generated by computer code are not truly
random, because they rely on algorithms that repeat. They are technically “pseudorandom” numbers. When a very large number of scenarios is run for many iterations, there
is a possibility that a pattern may be observed within the random numbers generated by the
model. This issue is not explored further in this research but remains an important issue in
computational science.

3.4.3 Deterministic Monte Carlo Simulation Process
The process for scenario simulation is described in Figure 3-20 (King and Simonovic,
2020). In the simulation, each scenario is given a unique simulation number (“seed
number”). At the start of the simulation, a “seeds to run” list is developed. Each seed
number corresponds to a line in a list of the scenarios, which contains a unique set of
operating state combinations for the system. This is used to gather the information from
the database tables and set-up the Monte-Carlo parameters for the particular scenario being
simulated. The Monte Carlo parameters are randomized inputs that vary within the bounds
specified in the operating states database. This allows for a more subset of the potential
outcomes for a given scenario to be explored. Once the Monte Carlo input generation is
completed based on the scenario of interest, the simulation of the scenario proceeds.
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Figure 3-20: Simulation flow chart
Following the simulation of each scenario iteration, timing considerations must be
addressed, to ensure the results are accurately attributed to the scenario being represented.
This can be done by analyzing the “system state deviance” to determine whether
subsequent events are dependant on preceding events. An event dependency algorithm to
analyze the outputs from each iteration is necessary in order to count the simulation results
towards the scenarios that are truly represented within the output data. Recall the example
reservoir elevation plots for two iterations shown in Figure 3-21 (King and Simonovic,
2020). Given the time of occurrence of A, B and C, the reservoir level under normal
operations, and the resultant reservoir levels, a simple comparison can be used to determine
whether events are influencing one another. The algorithm to analyze scenario outcomes
is shown in Figure 3-22 (King and Simonovic, 2020).
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Figure 3-21: Example output reservoir elevations for Scenario ABC (King and
Simonovic 2020)

First, an empty event list is created, and the time is set to 𝑡 = 0. The analysis starts by first
checking if a new event (adverse operating state) is initiated at the current time step The
event initiation time is determined through Monte-Carlo sampling. If a new event is
initiated, the event is added to the event list. If no previous events are in the list, time t
represents the scenario start day. If there are events in the event list, a check is done to see
whether the event impacts are over – this is a simple comparison of the following y days
of simulated reservoir elevations with the previously expected reservoir elevations for that
set of inflows. The choice of the number of subsequent days to be compared depends on
the system being modelled and may be shorter or longer depending on the storage relative
to the inflows. If the elevations are within a certain threshold, 𝑥, of the previously expected
reservoir levels for all days within a three-day period, the scenario is considered to be over.
The threshold is a small number that indicates the reservoir levels are basically the same –
it may also vary depending on the reservoir being modelled and must be chosen by the
analyst for the system of interest. Once the reservoir levels are restored to the previously
expected values, the results for the scenario are saved, the event list is emptied, and the
analysis proceeds to the next timestep. If the elevations are not yet matching, the analysis
proceeds to the next time step, as long as the reservoir elevations haven’t risen to a
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sufficient level to fail the dam by overtopping. If the dam has failed by overtopping, the
results are processed and saved for the events in the list. The process continues through all
of the timesteps, until either there are no more time steps to analyze or the dam has failed.

Figure 3-22: Event dependency algorithm (King and Simonovic, 2020)
This process, when applied to Outcome 1 in Figure 3-21 saves results for Scenario A, and
Scenario BC. For Outcome 2, it saves results for Scenario A only. This process could also
be useful to analyze outcomes from fully stochastic simulation models, extracting more
information than a singular probability of failure for the system being analyzed (though
this is not examined in this research).
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Once all iterations for a given scenario are analyzed, the scenario results are saved and the
seed number is added to the completed seeds list. Then, a new scenario is chosen from the
seeds to run list and executed. Simulation of the complete list of scenarios is a significant
computational task, depending on the size of the scenario list and complexity of the
simulation model. Linking of each individual component in the database to the
corresponding system dynamics model component is required prior to the start of the
simulation. Synthetic inflow sequences are also required for the simulation, to provide
more variable hydrological conditions than can typically be observed in the historical
record (see Section 3.5.2). Depending on the size of the problem, it may be beneficial to
use cluster computing to simulate multiple scenarios (seeds) in parallel, since the scenarios
are completely independent and do not communicate between one another. More
information about the cluster computing application is provided in Appendix F.
In using the Deterministic Monte Carlo approach, it is important to consider that the goal
of the exercise is to analyze all scenarios (predefined combinations of operating states) as
completely as possible given computational time constraints, to determine the criticality of
these combinations. There should be enough data on each scenario to estimate the range of
expected system performance and calculate the criticality parameters: conditional failure
frequencies, failure inflow thresholds and conditional reservoir level exceedance
frequencies. To ensure there is enough data collected for each scenario, it may be necessary
to limit the time between events to ensure their collective impacts can be assessed. This
limit may be determined as a function of the impact lengths for a given iteration (for
example, by taking the sum of impact lengths). Whether the event initiation time limit
should be greater than or less than the sum of the impact lengths requires experimenting
with scenarios to determine how long the system typically takes to return to normal
operation. For “flashy” reservoirs with relatively limited storage compared to inflows, the
recovery time following a return to normal operations may be quite short – days or even
hours. For reservoirs with large storage in comparison to inflows, this recovery time may
be significantly longer. The recovery time may also be less than the sum of impact lengths,
due to inflows that are less than the total capacity of the available flow conveyance
facilities. The recovery time should influence the modellers decision regarding the
appropriate time limit for event initiation. If the time limit for event initiation is too long,
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there may be two or more sub-scenarios within each scenario, and not enough data relating
to the collective impact of the combination of events.

3.4.4 Computational Considerations
Another important topic relevant to the simulation framework is the computational
considerations. Computational efficiency is a major factor in this research, since a large
number of scenarios are being analyzed, each for many iterations. The computing time for
a single year and the number of scenarios to be analyzed governs the computational effort
that will be required to execute the Deterministic Monte Carlo approach. As the modelled
system complexity increases, so does the length of time to run a simulation. In addition,
the number of scenarios is exponentially proportional to the number of component
operating state-causal factor combinations. As such, a trade-off becomes evident between
the level of detail to which the system is modelled and the amount of computational time
the simulations will take to execute. This is one potential limitation of the approach. Each
modeller may evaluate the trade-off differently, and this could result in two modellers
creating different versions of the same system. Ultimately, this issue remains unavoidable
within current computational abilities. That said, cluster computing is becoming more
widely available and can be utilized to improve the simulation throughput. In the case
study, Compute Canada cluster computing resources are leveraged to evaluate a large
number of scenarios in parallel. This is made possible by the fact that each scenario can
run independently of other scenarios, so a large number of cores may be used independently
to run different scenarios at the same time. Despite the advantages of using cluster
computing, an extremely large number of scenarios may still take a significant amount of
time to evaluate, and output data storage is another potential factor that limits the level of
complexity and number of scenarios that can be efficiently analyzed. The trade-off between
complexity and computational effort remains. While the issue is not investigated further in
this work, there are some potential directions for future research that may help to reduce
the impacts of this limitation.
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3.5

Simulation Model Input Data

There is a significant amount of data required to execute the simulation model. This
includes site-specific physical relationships, synthetic inflows and baseline operations data
for comparison with simulation outcomes to assess whether events are influenced by
preceding events within the simulation.

3.5.1 Physical Relationships
The physical relationships for the system of interest are a required input of the simulation
model. Stage-storage relationships relate the amount of water in the reservoir to the
reservoir elevation which is used in various calculations. These relationships may be
developed using bathymetry or pre-flooding lidar surveys and are typically readily
available for existing dam systems. The relationship may be in the form of a table or a
graph. Curve-fitting can be used to avoid interpolation calculations by creating a function
that is representative of the stage-storage curve for all relevant reservoir elevations (the
minimum to absolute maximum elevation that could be observed in simulation). Piecewise
functions may be required for certain systems, to better capture the relationship over
specific reservoir elevation bands.
Stage-discharge relationships relate the reservoir elevation to water spilling over free
overflow weirs and dam structures and are another required input to the model. These can
be developed using simple free-crest weir equations, and may also be readily available for
the system being modelled. Again, converting the relationship to a function using curvefitting may be desirable to avoid interpolations within the simulation (for efficiency).
Another key input is the relationship between gate position, reservoir elevation and flow,
which is known as the gate rating curve. For most dam systems, these are developed in the
form of either a table or curve. Two-dimensional interpolations can be used within the
simulation to calculate the flow value based on inputs of reservoir level and gate position.
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3.5.2 Synthetic Inflow Generation
For many dam systems, the historical record of inflows may only be as old as the dam itself
and may not be a good indicator of potential variability in inflow conditions. Basing the
outcomes of a dam safety assessment on the historically observed flows alone would
significantly limit the analysis. As such, tools that can be applied for generation of synthetic
inflows are described in this research. First, a stochastic weather generator (KnnCAD) is
used to generate synthetic daily climate data, and next, a hydrologic model (Raven) is used
to convert the daily climate data into reservoir inflows.
The KnnCAD weather generator is a non-parametric tool for stochastic, multi-site, multivariable generation of climate data that was first introduced by Sharif and Burn (2006) and
later modified by Prodanovic and Simonovic (2008), Eum and Simonovic (2012) and King
et al. (2014, 2015). The weather generator is based on the K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN)
resampling technique which reshuffles and perturbs the historical climate data to generate
a longer time series with increased variability that is statistically similar to the historical
record. The approach allows for easy multi-site climate data generation that preserves the
spatial correlation between sites without assuming relationships between weather
variables. In addition, no assumptions about the probability distributions of variables are
required. King et al (2014, 2015) modified the KNN approach using a block resampling
technique which was found to significantly improve temporal correlations in the resulting
temperatures. These temporal correlations are extremely important in climates such as
Canada where snow accumulation and melt contribute significantly to flood events. The
KnnCAD weather generator was chosen for this research due to the demonstrated ability
to generate statistically similar climate datasets. The most current version of the model is
available on the GitHub repository FIDS-UWO/Climate and a technical manual containing
the model equations, scripts and step-by-step instructions was developed by Mandal et al.
(2017). A user interface makes application of this model quite straightforward. Historical
time-series of climate variables are uploaded to the user interface for each site of interest.
Perturbation parameters are selected – these parameters dictate the proportion of
“randomness” that is applied to the climate variables. The model is then run for a userselected number of “blocks” which are the length of the historical input data.
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Following generation of climate data, hydrological modelling is required to convert the
daily climate data into reservoir inflows for the site of interest. There are a number of
approaches that can be used; however Raven Hydrological Modelling Framework is the
platform used by BC Hydro and as such was selected for this project. Raven is a highly
flexible modelling framework that allows the user to select the specific modelling code or
approach to be utilized. In this research, the application is a mountain watershed, and as
such the UBC Watershed Model approach is used (Quick and Pipes 1977; Micovic and
Quick 1999). The UBC Watershed model utilizes daily maximum and minimum
temperatures as well as precipitation to forecast snow accumulation and melt, along with
soil moisture, groundwater transfer and evapotranspiration. Basin area-elevation
characteristics are direct inputs to the model, which has the ability to include several
elevation bands or zones that allows more realistic modelling of mountain runoff (Quick
and Pipes 1977). Calibration of the model involves experimentation with specific
parameters relating to various physical aspects of the system in order to find the parameter
set that most closely correlates the outputs with the runoff calibration period (Quick and
Pipes 1977). Combinations of different weather stations may be experimented with to find
the set that provides the best calibration. Once the model is calibrated, the synthetic daily
climate data from the stochastic weather generator can be used directly as an input to the
calibrated model. Simulation of runoff is done in water-years which begin in October and
end in September, to allow for proper continuity of snowmelt modelling. The resulting
dataset is a long, synthetic inflow time series with higher variability than the historically
observed data. This synthetic inflow set can be used directly in the simulation model.

3.5.3 Baseline Operations Data
Once the simulation model has been completed and synthetic inflows are developed, it is
necessary to develop baseline operations data. The baseline operations data is the normal
reservoir elevations, which are used in the final step of the simulation to analyze whether
the events simulated within an iteration are independent of one another (and whether the
iteration is “complete”). This is described in detail in Section 3.4.3.
The baseline reservoir elevations can be calculated by running a single continuous
simulation of the same length as the synthetic inflows. During the simulation, no
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disturbances are implemented and the system is operated normally. The resulting reservoir
levels are recorded and saved to be utilized in the scenario iteration analysis following each
simulation.

3.6 Scenario Outcome Assessment
Following completion of the scenario simulations, there is an extremely large amount of
data from which useful information needs to be extracted. In this research, criticality
parameters are used to provide information about the severity of a scenario. The criticality
parameters assessed are the conditional failure frequency, conditional frequency of
exceeding key reservoir levels and failure inflow thresholds for each scenario. Ranking and
filtering scenario subsets (of N affected components) can give insights into system
vulnerabilities and key components affecting dam safety.
Accessing and analyzing individual scenario results may also be useful. Dynamic
performance measures are used in this research to better understand the dynamic system
response to a given scenario. These performance measures may differ depending on the
system of interest and can change from application to application. In this work, reservoir
elevations over critical levels, flow conveyance capacity, and uncontrolled releases are
selected and described in the following sections.

3.6.1 Criticality Parameters
The simulation environment presented in this research explores a random subset of the
potential outcomes relating to a given scenario. Each scenario is simulated 2000 times,
providing increased coverage of the possibility space (See Figure 3-2). This allows for an
estimation of the criticality associated with a given scenario. Criticality parameters have
been selected to provide useful insights about the range of outcomes simulated for each
scenario. These include: the conditional failure frequency, the failure inflow thresholds,
and the conditional reservoir level exceedance frequency (conditional on the scenario
occurring).
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As a direct result of the simulation, it is possible to determine the conditional probability
of failure for a scenario from its complete iterations (all of the operating states for that
particular scenario have both occurred and affected one another). This is easily done by
determining the number of complete iterations, calculating the number of dam breaches
occurring within the complete iterations, and determining the total proportion of failures,
as follows.
𝐶𝐹𝐹 (%) =

𝑁𝐵
× 100
𝐼𝑡

(3.16)

where 𝑁𝐵 is equal to the number of breaches observed in all complete iterations, and 𝐼𝑡 is
equal to the number of complete iterations for the scenario being analyzed. Again, complete
iterations are where all operating states for a given scenario have both occurred and affected
one another – so iterations with multiple sub-scenarios or dam breaches occurring prior to
all events being initiated are excluded from the calculation.
Another useful outcome from the simulation model is the inflow thresholds, above which
failure occurs for a given scenario. In this research, the inflow thresholds are computed by
looking at the 5-day average daily inflow preceding a dam breach, as well as the 5-day
maximum daily inflow preceding a dam breach, taking the minimum across all simulations,
as follows.
𝐼𝑇𝑎𝑣 = min(avg [𝐼1 , 𝐼2 , 𝐼3 , 𝐼4 , 𝐼5 ]𝑖𝑓 )

(3.17)

𝐼𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 = min(max [𝐼1 , 𝐼2 , 𝐼3 , 𝐼4 , 𝐼5 ]𝑖𝑡𝑓 )

(3.18)

where 𝐼𝑛 represents the inflow on the 𝑛𝑡ℎ day preceeding the dam breach, 𝑛 = 1. . .5, and 𝑠
represents the simulation iteration, 𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 1 … 𝐼𝑇𝐹 and 𝐼𝑇𝐹 is equal to the number of
iterations that were completely simulated for a certain scenario and where the dam failed.
The minimum is taken of all maximum or average 5-day inflows preceding failure, for the
complete iterations within which a failure occurred. It is also possible to consider volume
of inflows in the days preceding a dam failure, however that was not explored in this
research.
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Another useful criticality parameter is the time it takes, following the start of the scenario,
for the system to reach a failed state. This is simply calculated as the mean time to failure.
Finally, regardless of whether a dam failure occurs, there may be adverse impacts relating
to exceedances above particular reservoir elevations. The likelihood of exceeding a key
reservoir elevation is another easily calculated outcome from the model. The maximum
reservoir elevation for each run of a given scenario can be computed and used to compute
the proportion of runs where elevations exceed the reservoir level of interest, as follows.
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐹(%) =

𝐼𝑅𝑆𝐸>𝐶𝐸
× 100
𝐼𝑡

(3.19)

where 𝐼𝑅𝑆𝐸>𝐶𝐸 represents the number of complete iterations where the reservoir elevation
exceeded the critical level, 𝐶𝐸, and 𝐼𝑡 represents the total number of complete iterations.
This is the conditional probability of exceedance for that reservoir elevation and scenario.
The scenarios can then be sorted based on their criticality parameters to illuminate the most
troublesome operating conditions within which the system may be operating. Grouping the
list of scenarios into a smaller list is possible by combining scenarios that contain the same
operating states with different causal factors. This can help reduce the list size while
providing extra simulation-years with which to estimate the failure frequency. If there is
sufficient information to estimate the frequencies of each operating state in the model, it
may be possible to compute the frequency of failure for the system using simple probability
theory, as can be illustrated using a simple example.
Conditional overtopping failure frequencies for an example scenario are shown in Table
3-2 (given the scenario has occurred). When combined with the estimated frequency of
occurrence of the events, an overall estimate for the frequency of overtopping failure for
the system can be made using basic concepts from probability theory. A simple example is
used to demonstrate this. Consider a system with components A, B, and C, which are each
functional or failed. If each of the three components has lower and upper bound failure rate
estimates ranging from 0.1% to 1%, an overall probabilistic assessment of the system can
be made using the conditional overtopping failure frequencies generated through
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Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation, as shown in Table 3-2. The conditional failure
frequencies are assumed for the sake of the example.
Table 3-2: Probabilistic risk assessment using example simulation

Scenario

Conditional
frequency of system
failure given
scenario occurs (%)

Lower bound frequency of
component failure:
A=0.1%
B=0.1%
C=0.1%

Lower bound frequency of
component failure:
A=1%
B=1%
C=1%

A

1

9.98*10-4

9.80E*10-3

B

1

9.98*10-4

9.80*10-3

C

1

9.98*10

-4

9.80*10-3

AB

5

5.00*10-6

4.95*10-4

AC

5

5.00E*10-6

4.95*10-4

BC

5

5.00E*10-6

4.95*10-4

-8

2.00*10-5

ABC
Total
probability
of flow
control
failure

20

2.00E*10

3.01*10-3

3.09*10-2

In Table 3, the conditional frequency of dam overtopping failure for each scenario is
multiplied by the probabilities of the system states , as follows: 𝑃(𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐵̅) ∗
𝑃(𝐶̅ ) ∗ 𝑃(𝑓), where 𝐵̅ = 1 − 𝐵, and the solid line over the component indicates it is not
failed, and 𝑃(𝑓) represents the conditional probability of overtopping failure for the system
given the scenario has occurred. In the table, the lower and upper bound estimates are
calculated to illustrate the sensitivity of the results to the assumed component failure
probabilities. This is particularly advantageous where failure rate data is limited and
uncertain. The Deterministic Monte Carlo approach does not require complete resimulation if the sensitivity of the results to the assumed probabilities is to be analyzed.
The sensitivity of the overall probability of failure for the system can be easily calculated
by simply modifying the assumed component failure rates and updating the equation. In
contrast, a fully stochastic simulation approach would require re-simulation to analyze the
sensitivity of results to assumed failure rates, since the probabilities are embedded within
the stochastic simulation model.
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In the absence of reliable information relating to the failure of various components, the
overall failure rates were not explored further in this research. This topic remains an
important area for future work.

3.6.2 Performance measures
In terms of overall assessment of the system performance, it is useful to define dynamic
safety performance measures that can be plotted over time from the scenario outputs. These
performance measures show how the system changes over time and, where possible, the
recovery from the disturbance. Different performance measures may be selected for
different systems of interest. In selecting these performance measures, it is important to
consider the functions which a dam is meant to carry out and how the system may reach a
less desirable state.
Dam systems act to store and convey water for beneficial purposes such as hydropower,
water supply and flood control. The dam acts to retain water and its flow-conveyance
features (eg. spillways, turbines, low level outlets and valves) are controlled by dam
operators to pass water and maintain reservoir levels within safe limits. Loss of control of
the reservoir can occur as a result of natural disturbances such as earthquakes, landslides,
debris, etc., as well as a number of internal factors including operational failures, inflow
forecasting errors, site access and staffing problems as well as systemic problems like
failing to maintain and upgrade infrastructure. Loss of functionality of flow-conveyance
features of the system can directly lead to loss of reservoir control, potentially causing
overtopping and failure. Issues with dam design or external disturbances can also affect the
dam itself resulting in the inability to retain water which could potentially lead to dam
collapse and catastrophic flooding. In considering the functions a dam is meant to perform,
it becomes clear that two key performance measures relate to flow retention and flow
conveyance. Flow conveyance capacity and uncontrolled flow releases are chosen to
represent flow conveyance and retention, and reservoir elevations exceeding critical safety
levels is also selected. These performance indicators and their values over time can be
calculated directly from simulation outputs. The result is a numerical indicator showing
how the dams condition changes with time for a given operating scenario.
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It is ultimately up to the experts and asset owners to determine an appropriate amount of
detail for the simulation model and select a particular set of performance measures of
interest for a specific system. The following sections describe the performance measures
selected for this research, but others may be added depending on the dam of interest. A
final section describes aggregation of scenario outcomes to reach general conclusions about
the performance of the dam.

3.6.2.1

Conveyance Capacity

Conveyance capacity represents the ability of flow-conveyance infrastructure such as
turbines and spillways to pass water through the system. This is an important indicator of
system safety because a loss in conveyance results in a lowered ability to manage inflows
safely. Conveyance capacity is equal to the available total discharge capacity as a function
of time (Equation 22):
𝐶

𝐶𝐶(𝑡) = ∑ 𝐹𝐶(𝑐, 𝑡)

(3.20)

𝑐=0

Where 𝐶𝐶(𝑡) is the discharge capacity of the system at full pool for time 𝑡, and 𝐹𝐶(𝑐, 𝑡) is
the discharge capacity of flow-conveyance component 𝑐 (𝑐 = 1 … 𝐶) at full pool for time
𝑡. If all conveyance facilities are performing, the maximum performance value is thus equal
to the maximum discharge at full pool, including free overflow facilities (and the minimum
performance is 0 m3/s).

3.6.2.2

Total Uncontrolled Release

Another key indicator of dam system safety is the ability of the system to retain water
where it is meant to do so. Failure to retain water results in an uncontrolled release of flow,
which may be through the dam itself (dam breach), or through a failed penstock, spillway
gate, or turbine head cover. Uncontrolled release also includes any water passing over the
free-crest spillway and dam, which represents flow that is no longer under the control of
the operators. Total uncontrolled release (𝑈𝑅) is calculated at each time step and is shown
in

Equation
𝑈𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑄𝐷𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑄𝑃𝐿(𝑡) + 𝑄𝑂𝐹(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐻𝐶(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐺𝐶(𝑡)

22:
(3.21)
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Where 𝑄𝐷𝐵 is the dam breach flow, 𝑄𝑃𝐿 is the penstock leakage, 𝑄𝑂𝐹 is the flow passing
through the overflow weir or over the dam, 𝑄𝐻𝐶 is any water escaping through the head
cover of the turbine, and 𝑄𝐺𝐶 is any water passing through a failed spillway gate. The
individual uncontrolled release variables are useful on their own as well, and can be
investigated for a particular scenario and iteration directly from the model output.
Combining these into a single variable, 𝑈𝑅, provides some useful indication about the
performance and helps reduce the size of the simulation output files, but when there are
multiple sources of uncontrolled release it may become more difficult to analyze what the
sources are. This is a minor limitation that can be overcome by saving these flows
separately if additional data storage capacity is available.

3.6.2.3

Reservoir elevations exceeding critical safety levels

Perhaps the most important indicator of dam system safety is the reservoir elevation itself.
Dam systems typically have reservoir operating limits within which the reservoir remains,
known as the normal minimum and normal maximum flows. Some excursions above the
maximum level may be expected during high inflow conditions, and there may be a safetycritical reservoir levels which the reservoir should not exceed due to potential dam safety
problems. For an earth dam, the elevation of the core or filter material should not be
exceeded as this may result in internal erosion and could potentially progress to dam
failure. For a concrete dam, there may be other factors such as structural stability being
reduced above a certain reservoir level. This elevation will differ between dam systems
and could be equal to the height of the dam itself. Elevations over critical safety levels can
be visualized in two ways: (1) by observing the resulting reservoir level plots for each
complete iteration of a scenario, where all scenario events both occurred and affected one
another, and (2) through reservoir level time exceedance frequency plots. These plots can
be easily derived by collecting all observations for each complete scenario iteration and
determining the percentage of time that various elevations are exceeded using the following
formula (USBR 2018):

𝐸𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. =

𝑁𝑜𝑏𝑠 − (𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. + 1)
∗ 100
𝑁𝑜𝑏𝑠 + 1

(3.22)

137

Where 𝐸𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. is the exceedance frequency for a specific reservoir elevation 𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙.,
𝑁𝑜𝑏𝑠 is the total number of observed daily reservoir elevation values from the scenario’s
complete iterations (all events occurring and affecting one another), and 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. is the
number of observations where the elevation exceeded 𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. To generate exceedance
frequency curves, a range of reservoir elevations is taken from the minimum to the
maximum at a user-defined interval, and the exceedance frequency is computed for each.
The reservoir levels are then plotted against the exceedance frequencies. Key critical levels
(such as free overflow spillway sill elevation and the elevations of key structures) can be
plotted on the exceedance frequency curves to help illustrate the severity of the scenario.

3.7

Summary

This chapter presents the methodology for the research. First, a description of the
requirements of a new approach and the ability of existing tools to meet these requirements
is provided. While each approach offers specific advantages, there are limitations inherent
to all of the approaches used within and outside of the dams industry. This leads to the
methodology development, which aims to meet as many of the requirements as possible.
This research proposes using a systems approach to the problem of dam safety analysis,
systematically characterizing pre-generated scenarios through simulation.
A new methodology is presented that uses Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation to analyze
a wide range of potential operating conditions for a dam system. Scenarios are used as
deterministic inputs to the model, and the scenario parameters are varied using Monte Carlo
techniques to explore each scenario’s potential outcomes. In order to generate a list of
scenarios for the simulation model, an operating states database is developed which can be
applied to any system, and used to document components, their operating states, causal
factors, and operating state impacts. Using database outputs and component operating state
sets, a combinatorial procedure applies the Cartesian Product to come up with the complete
range of component operating state combinations (scenarios). The scenarios becomes the
input to the Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework.
The simulation framework uses the pre-generated scenarios (operating states) as inputs,
with Monte Carlo variation of inflows as well as operating state impact timing and
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magnitude. This simulation framework has the advantage of (a) investigating a larger, more
complete set of potential scenarios than is practical using traditional methods, and (b)
providing a more in-depth analysis of the range of system behaviour in response to each
scenario.
Simulations are performed using a system dynamics simulation model, which is capable of
representing complexity, feedbacks and component interactions in a relatively
straightforward way. The object-oriented modelling environment used in system dynamics
clearly shows the components and the relationships between them which improves the
transparency of the model and the ease with which it is built and modified. Timing
considerations are also addressed in this work. An algorithm is proposed to assess whether
preceding events within a simulation affected the events that occurred later.
The results from the simulation can be analyzed in a number of ways. Post-processing of
individual scenarios can be performed to determine the conditional probabilities of failure
and excursions above key reservoir elevations, as well as inflow thresholds for failure.
Individual scenario results can be used to plot the reservoir elevations, flow conveyance
capacity and uncontrolled releases over time, as well as reservoir exceedance frequency
plots. The methodology proposed in this work provides a means of evaluating the full
range of possible operating state combinations for the system within current computational
abilities. At this time, the same outcome would not be possible using stochastic techniques
because the occurrence of these combinations of events is quite rare (they have a low
probability), so a prohibitively large number of simulation-years would be required to
achieve the same result. The methodology in this research also evaluates scenarios dynamic
outcomes, taking into account feedbacks and nonlinear behaviour which are not readily
dealt with using the traditional risk assessment techniques.
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Chapter 4

4

Case Study: Cheakamus Hydropower Project

The methodology presented in the previous chapter has been applied to BC Hydro’s
Cheakamus Hydropower Project. A complete database representation of the system is
presented, and the combinatorial procedure is used to generate all combinations of
component operating states (scenarios). A full detailed system dynamics model
representative of the Cheakamus Project is described in King et al. (2017). Due to an
extremely large number of potential scenarios for the case study, a simplified proof-ofconcept example was subsequently developed, which has some of the characteristics of the
Cheakamus Project. The key difference is a reduced number of system features, with the
goal of reducing the number of potential scenarios to ensure simulation feasibility with the
limited computational resources available. With limited computational resources on the
Compute Canada systems, it was possible to simulate two complete runs through 1.11
Million scenarios, each with over 1000 different Monte-Carlo input parameters (iterations).
The two runs completed were the base case and the dam safety improved case which
contained modifications to operating rules and components.
The following section provides a description of the Cheakamus Hydropower Project which
was the study area for this research. Next, a description of the system dynamics model
development is provided for the detailed representation of this system. The following
section deals with scenario generation for the detailed Cheakamus representation. Next, a
description of the simplified version of the Cheakamus system is provided, due to the
extremely high number of scenarios generated for the complex system representation. The
simplified generation of scenario is described, as well as a detailed description of the
simulation model configuration and testing. Inflow generation for the case study is
presented, followed by a description of the scenario simulation process. Finally, simulation
results and discussion are provided.
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4.1 Cheakamus Hydropower Project Description
The Cheakamus Hydropower Project is located 30km north of Squamish, British
Columbia, Canada and is operated by BC Hydro, the provincial power utility. The
Cheakamus River originates approximately 25km southeast of Whistler, B.C. and has an
area of 1070km2. The headwaters start at 2500m above sea level and the river eventually
discharges into the Squamish River 26km downstream of the dam at El. 30m (above sea
level). Cheakamus Dam impounds Daisy Lake and has a drainage area of 780km2,
receiving about 75% of the Cheakamus river inflow (BC Hydro 2005). The average
reservoir inflow is around 50m3/s (BC Hydro 2005).

Figure 4-1: Cheakamus Hydropower Project area map (BC Hydro, 2005)

141

Figure 4-1 contains a map of the region with the locations of the dam and powerhouse
shown. Daisy lake has a live storage capability of 55 million m3 and a typical operating
range of El. 364.90m to El. 377.25m (BC Hydro 2005). The stage-storage curve for Daisy
Lake is provided in Appendix A.
The Cheakamus Main Dam consists of an Earthfill Dam, a Concrete Main Dam gravity
structure, and a concrete gravity overflow Wing Dam. Daisy Lake is also impounded
Saddle Dam No 1. An overflow channel, along with the Wing Dam and Saddle Dam No.
1, provide free overflow discharge capability for the system. A power canal leads to the
power intake structure at Shadow Lake which is impounded by the Shadow Lake Saddle
Dam. Water for power is drawn through a canal beneath Highway 99 and into an 11km
tunnel through Cloudburst Mountain. At the end of the tunnel, two penstocks carry the
water to a powerhouse that discharges into the Squamish River upstream of its confluence
with the Cheakamus River. The maximum power discharge is 65m3/s which can generate
up to 157MW of power through two vertical Francis units. Flood flows are discharged into
the Cheakamus River at the Concrete Main Dam, which contains two Spillway Operating
Gates (SPOGs) with a combined discharge capacity of 1590m3/s at the maximum normal
reservoir level (MNRL) of El. 378.26m. A low level outlet sluice (LLO) with a discharge
capacity of 196m3/s at MNRL and five free overflow spillway ports are also located at the
concrete dam. There is an additional low level outlet controlled by a Hollow Cone Valve
which is considered to be out of service. Details regarding the relationship between
elevation and discharge for fully open gates are provided in Appendix A. The project
schematic is shown in Figure 4-2. An overall site plan showing the locations of the dams
can be found in Figure 4-3.
The province of BC underwent a water use planning process for Cheakamus Dam that
prescribed minimum discharges downstream of the dam, flow ramping rates (rates of
discharge increase) and operating levels to be adhered to (if possible) by the system
operators. The minimum discharge information is shown in Appendix A (BC Hydro 2005).
The historical daily inflows are also shown in Appendix A.
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Figure 4-2: Cheakamus Hydropower Project system schematic (BC Hydro, 2005)
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Figure 4-3: Cheakamus dam site overview
It is also useful to understand the control system infrastructure in place for the Cheakamus
System. A hierarchical control system structure is shown in Figure 4-4. This schematic
shows the regulatory and organizational controllers at the top, moving down towards the
control infrastructure itself. The exchange, transfer and movement of information
throughout the system is shown in detail in this figure.
The Cheakamus System structure and data were used with the framework described in
Section 3.2 to populate the component operating states database for the Cheakamus System
and generate an extensive list of potential operating scenarios (Section 3.3). This process
is described in the following section.
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Figure 4-4: Hierarchical control system structure of Cheakamus Project

4.2 Cheakamus Database Population and Scenario
Development
To generate scenarios for the Cheakamus System, an in-depth understanding of the system
and its interactions is required. Information should be collected about the system structure,
components and connections. This will help in identifying the components and their
potential operating states within the database. In this research, STPA is used to improve
the understanding of the system for database population. The process also helps inform the
development of the system structure within the simulation model. Following STPA, the
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database is populated and the database outcomes are used to generate the complete list of
scenarios.

4.2.1 Systems Theoretic Process Analysis for Cheakamus System
In order to help facilitate the development of the operating states database, the STPA
procedure of Leveson (2011) was applied to a high-level version of the detailed Cheakamus
system. STPA is a systematic approach to evaluating potential control actions that can lead
to hazards for a system. The control actions can then, if possible, become operating states
within the database or can be programmed into the simulation model.
The goal of the STPA analysis was a high level review of potentially hazardous conditions
at the dam site, to help guide the development of the model and operating states database.
The control system structure developed for this process is shown in Figure 4-4 and
Appendix B contains the complete analysis that was done (though this would likely change
and become much more comprehensive with expert input from BC Hydro).
Prior to initiating an STPA analysis, the high-level system hazards must be defined. The
hazards selected for Cheakamus Dam are as follows:
•

H1: High flows released into Cheakamus River and/or Squamish River (flood)

•

H2: Flow releases to Cheakamus River stopped (fish kill)

•

H3: Equipment damaged (economic/safety impact)

•

H4: Loss of power production (economic impact)

Next, a set of high-level system safety constraints (requirements) are defined, as follows:
•

SH1: Flows released into Cheakamus and/or Squamish must not exceed a level that
causes damage downstream

•

SH2: Flow must always be released to Cheakamus River

•

SH3: Equipment must not become damaged

Following the definition of these hazards and safety constraints or requirements, a detailed
hierarchical control system structure can be developed, as shown in Figure 4-4. Then, the
process can begin, with the first step being to identify unsafe control actions. Unsafe
control actions are defined for each control feature of the system, which in this case
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includes both gates, both turbines and the low-level outlet. A table is used with four
columns that can be used to guide the assessment: providing causes hazard, not providing
causes hazard, wrong timing or order causes hazard, and stopping too soon or applying too
long causes hazard.
Once the unsafe control actions (UCA’s) are defined, the next step in the process involves
looking at each UCA individually and considering how the issue may arise (the causes).
Finally, additional factors can be listed.
Looking at the detailed description of UCA’s and their causes (Step 2 in Appendix B)
provides some interesting insights regarding the degree to which the approach presented in
this work is able to fully cover the range of potential operating states. Focusing on the
scenarios that involve flooding (H1), there are some instances where human factors may
lead to more complicated scenarios than the automated procedure developed in this work
is able to generate. Some scenarios may require additional effort for simulation due to the
complex nature of human decision making. UCA1/UCA10 from the STPA analysis is
presented below to illustrate this.
UCA1/UCA10: SPOG Open command not provided when water level high, inflow high or
both [H1, H3]
Case 1: Water level high, inflow low, open command not provided
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DS) unaware of reservoir level due to
gauge failure, sensor failures or communication delays
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional
flows are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC,
DC) make a decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to an
unsafe state even though the inflow is relatively low.
Case 2: Water level high, inflow high, open command not provided
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-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) believe they can return the reservoir to a
safe level using the powerhouse and/or LLO and/or other SPOG due to
inflow forecast errors
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DS) unaware of reservoir level due to
gauge failure, sensor failures or communication delays
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional
flows are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC,
DC) make a decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to
unsafe levels
-Controllers do not follow procedure (human error due to fatigue or shift
change at PSOSE/FVO)
Case 3: Water level low, inflow high, open command not provided
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) believe they can keep the reservoir at a
safe level without opening the gate, due to inflow forecast errors or process
errors
-Gate(s) out of service for maintenance purposes and therefore cannot be opened.
-Controller thinks gate open (sensor failure, communication delay)
In this example, there is a potential scenario where high tides at Squamish (downstream of
Cheakamus) lead the operator to hold back water when a high-inflow event is occurring.
This scenario would be difficult to analyze within the proposed Deterministic Monte Carlo
model, due to the major factor being human decision making. It would require additional
simulation effort to fully capture this potential scenario. Process errors or controllers not
following procedure are difficult to simulate since there are so many different ways in
which the decision-making can unfold. Some of the causes of the UCA shown above (for
example gates being out of service, sensor failures, communication delays, inflow forecast
errors, etc.) are both easily incorporated into the operating states database, and easily
simulated using the system dynamics model.
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STPA is quite useful as a preliminary assessment tool that can be used to inform the
development of the operating states database and simulation model. The results of the
assessment can also significantly help with identifying and some non-failure related
operating constraints that have the potential to lead to a hazard – the operating states
database and simulation model can then be developed to ensure simulation of these nonfailure related events is possible. Some of the scenarios uncovered through this systematic
assessment approach would be difficult to quantify using the automated simulation
approach described in this work and may not fit well into the database structure. However,
they may be able to be analyzed through a more case-specific simulation experiment.
Performing an STPA is helpful to improve the understanding of the system and ensure
operators are aware of all potential causes of failure for the system in order to manage risks
and avoid catastrophic impacts of dam failure.
It is important to note that the STPA analysis in Appendix B is provided for illustrative
purposes only. It is in no way representative of a complete assessment for the real
Cheakamus System, and was not performed by BC Hydro personnel.

4.2.2 Database Population and Scenario Generation
The component operating states database was populated based on the components in the
Cheakamus Hydropower Project and the information gathered through the STPA process.
The components tree showing the system configuration is provided in Figure 4-5. Each
component in the leftmost column is at the Reservoir Level. Each drop-down to the right
of this consists of the Component Level features of the system. Each of the components
contains a minimum of two operating states (normal and adverse) and each operating state
has a minimum of one causal factor. Each combination of operating state and causal factor
is recorded as a separate operating state. The complete database extract table for the
complex system is presented in Appendix C.
The information in the database is used to come up with a unique identifier for each object
in the system as well as it’s causal factors. For Reservoir Level components, the
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ReservoirLevelID is used as the component identifier, 𝑛, and a number 𝑚𝑛 , 𝑚𝑛 ∈
(1 … 𝑀𝑛 ) is assigned to each operating state/causal factor combination for component 𝑛.
The operating state identifier takes the form 𝑛_𝑚𝑛 , which is used to group the operating
states into sets for each component that are used in the calculation of the Cartesian product.
For objects at the component level, the ReservoirLevelID and the ComponentLevelID are
combined into a three to four-digit number which is used as the component identifier, 𝑛,
since there may be multiple items at the Component Level for a single Reservoir Level
item. Operating state/causal factor combinations are similarly assigned a number 𝑚𝑛 . The
identifiers can be seen in the database extract table in Appendix C Once the identifiers are
assigned, they are grouped into sets and Python’s itertools product function is used to
compute the Cartesian Product, which results in a list of all possible combinations of
operating state identifiers for each component.

Figure 4-5: Components tree for the Cheakamus System
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Table 4-1 contains a list of each component in the system and its object identifier, n, which
is a two-digit number for Reservoir Level items and a three to four-digit number for
Component Level items. The name of each component is shown as well as the total number
of operating states in each operating state set, Mn. Multiplying together all of the numbers
in the column Mn, as per Equation 3 gives the total number of possible scenarios, or the
number of elements in the Cartesian product, which is equal to 1.83 x 1027. This number
can be verified by computing the Cartesian product using Python’s itertools product
function, which generates a list of the same length. Each element in the generated list
contains a single operating state for all components in the system. This is an exhaustive list
which includes everything from a completely functional system to a system where every
component has some adverse operating state.
An additional calculation was done where causal factors leading to the same operating state
were grouped as a single operating state. This would avoid redundant simulations of the
same operating states with different contributing causal factors – though the model does
distinguish between causal factors in terms of time-of-year restrictions. The number of
scenarios with grouped causal factors for the Cheakamus system model is 1.54 x 1017,
which is significantly fewer scenarios than if each causal factor-operating state
combination is considered separately. Grouping of causal factors to avoid redundancy may
potentially be an effective way to reduce the number of simulations required to evaluate
each scenario.
Obviously, simulation of such large number of scenarios would be computationally
prohibitive given the current state of technology and the finite resources available for this
research project. As such, the simulation portion of this research is focusing on a simplified
abstraction of the Cheakamus System, described in the following section.
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Table 4-1: Number of unique operating state and causal factor combinations for
each component in the complex system
Object ID,
n
46
22
18
19
16
17
21
27
29
28
30
31
47
37
39
38
36
41
42
44
43
45
48
1326
1328
1331
1332
1333
1334
1343
1355
1357
1416
1418
1421
1422
1423
1424
1444
1456
1458
836
837
838
1039
1040
1041
1546
1547
1548
1549
1550
1551
1554

ReservoirLevelID
46
22
18
19
16
17
21
27
29
28
30
31
47
37
39
38
36
41
42
44
43
45
48
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
8
8
8
10
10
10
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

ComponentLevelID

26
28
31
32
33
34
43
55
57
16
18
21
22
23
24
44
56
58
36
37
38
39
40
41
46
47
48
49
50
51
54

Reservoir Level Name

Component Level Name

Gate Pier
Main Earth Dam
Dam Programmable Logic Controller
Powerhouse Programmable Logic Controller
Dam Remote Terminal Unit
Powerhouse Remote Terminal Unit
Main Dam
Backup Diesel Generator
Dam Access
Powerhouse Access
Reservoir Elevation Sensor 1
Reservoir Elevation Sensor 2
Reservoir Elevation Sensor 3
Gate 1 Linear Position Sensor
Gate 2 Linear Position Sensor
Gate 2 Rotational Position Sensor
Gate 1 Rotational Position Sensor
Power tunnel
Penstock
Powerhouse Grid
Dam Grid
Inflow Forecast
Site Staff Availability
Gate 1
Gate Hoist 1
Gate 1
Skinplate
Gate 1
Gearbox
Gate 1
Motor
Gate 1
Structural Supports
Gate 1
Hoist Gate Connection 1
Gate 1
Thrustor Brake
Gate 1
Backup Motor
Gate 1
Gate 1 Opening
Gate 2
Gate Hoist 2
Gate 2
Skinplate
Gate 2
Gearbox
Gate 2
Motor
Gate 2
Structural Supports
Gate 2
Hoist Gate Connection 2
Gate 2
Thrustor Brake
Gate 2
Backup Motor
Gate 2
Gate 2 Opening
Turbine 1
Head Cover
Turbine 1
Wicket Gates
Turbine 1
Generator
Turbine 2
Head Cover
Turbine 2
Wicket Gates
Turbine 2
Generator
Low Level Outlet
Hoist
Low Level Outlet
Skinplate
Low Level Outlet
Motor
Low Level Outlet
Support
Low Level Outlet
Hoist Gate Connection
Low Level Outlet
Thrustor Brake
Low Level Outlet
Gearbox

Mn
2
1
3
3
3
3
2
5
5
5
7
7
7
4
4
4
4
2
2
5
5
3
3
6
3
3
4
4
2
3
4
2
6
3
3
4
4
2
3
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
6
3
4
4
2
3
3
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4.3 Simplified System Database Population and Scenario
Development
Due to the extremely large number of scenarios generated for a complex representation of
the Cheakamus System, a simplified abstraction of the system was developed to facilitate
scenario simulation. The goal of this simplification was to create a system that mimics the
function of Cheakamus but has significantly less components and as such fewer scenarios
to simulate. This simplified system provides a proof-of-concept for the methodology
described in this research. For applications to similar systems to Cheakamus, it may be
desirable to utilize some of the simplifications described here, such as aggregating
components with similar impacts into grouped components, with the goal of reducing the
occurrence of redundant scenarios. This process could potentially be guided by the use of
fault tree analysis for sub-systems such as the gate equipment. Due to computational
resource limitations for this research, the simplified system lacks some of the key
redundancy features of the real Cheakamus System that increase its overall level of safety.
As such, results for the simplified system are not considered to be representative of the real
Cheakamus Project safety and performance.
In the simplified version of the system, the existing reservoir stage-storage relationship is
used. The two spillway gates (SPOG1 and SPOG2) are combined into a single gate (SPOG)
with a rating curve equal to the sum of the discharge columns from the individual rating
curves. The Low Level Outlet sluice is omitted from the model. The two turbines are
combined into a single unit capable of conveying the total flow of both units. The main
communications equipment in the Cheakamus System (the PLC and the RTU) are idealized
as a single component (PLCRTU). Gate components are also simplified into categories
representing the impacts that occur upon failure – gate failing in place, gate failing closed,
and gate collapse. The sensors for the reservoir level are combined into a single sensor and
the sensors for gate position are omitted. Wicket gates are eliminated from the turbine
components and a single grid is modelled instead of separate power connections to the
powerhouse and the dam. In addition to the component changes, some causal factors were
omitted from the analysis to reduce further the scenario list, since each operating statecausal factor combination is counted as a unique operating state.
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To show how the model can be useful in assessment of safety improvements realized by
potential capital upgrades and operating rules, two cases are simulated. These are a “base
case” which has a significantly smaller free overflow spillway than the real system, and a
“dam safety improved case” which has an identical free overflow spillway as well as
improved operating rules and a slightly reduced failure frequency for certain components.
These scenarios are described further in Section 4.4.3.
Using the simplified abstraction of the Cheakamus System, a new version of the database
was developed. Figure 4-6 contains the components tree for the simplified system.
Appendix D contains the full database details for the simplified system. Table 4-2 contains
a list of each component in the simplified system including its identifier, 𝑛, the
ReservoirLevelID and ComponentLevelID (from the database), component description
and the number of operating states in each component’s operating state set, Mn.

Figure 4-6: Components tree for the simplified system
Multiplying together the values of Mn as shown in Equation 3 yields the total number of
possible scenarios for the system, which is equal to 5.5 x 105. This number can be verified
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by computing the Cartesian Product using Python’s itertools product function, which
generates a list of scenarios of the same length.
Table 4-2: Number of unique operating state and causal factor combinations for
each component in the simplified system
Object ID, n

ReservoirLevelID

ComponentLevelID

Reservoir Level Name

Component Level Name

18

18

Programmable Logic Controller / Remote Terminal Unit

4

29

29

Dam Access

4

30

30

Res El Sensor 1

5

42

42

Penstock

2

44

44

Grid

4

45

45

CMS Inflow Forecast

1

48

48

Site Staff Availability

3

836

8

36

Turbine 1

Head Cover

2

838

8

38

Turbine 1

Generator

2

1359

13

59

Gate 1

Gate opening

2

1361

13

61

Gate 1

Components failing open

3

1362

13

62

Gate 1

Components failing closed

4

1360

13

60

Gate 1

Components failing in place

3

Comparing the total number of possible scenarios for the complex representation of
Cheakamus to the simple system, it is clear that with more components and a larger number
of operating states and causal factors, the number of possible operating scenarios grows
exponentially. There is a trade-off between the level of complexity represented and the
amount of computational effort required – this requires serious consideration in model
development and could result in different modellers creating different versions of the same
system. It is very important to ensure any simplifications of real-world systems take into
consideration component redundancies that can significantly improve scenario outcomes.
Future work should explore methods for reducing the impact of this tradeoff by decreasing
the computational effort required to cover larger numbers of scenarios – this may include
the use of pattern recognition techniques.
Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 contain the key database parameters from a single example
scenario for the simple system, for the components at the Reservoir Level and the
Component Level, respectively. The example scenario contains the following identifiers
(in the form Component_OperatingStateNumber):

Mn
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[18_1, 44_1, 30_1, 45_1, 29_4, 42_2, 48_3, 838_1, 836_2, 1359_1, 1360_2, 1361_1,
1362_1]

Table 4-3: Database information from example scenario: Reservoir Level
Identifier
18_1
44_1
30_1

Reservoir
Level
Name
PLC/RTU

Operating
State
Name
PLC offline

Grid

Grid failure

Reservoir Elevation
Sensor 1
CMS Inflow Forecast

Wrong Reading

Min

Max

Avg

1

24

6

0.04

7

0.16

10

29_4

Dam Access

Inflow forecast
normal
Typical access time

42_2

Penstock

Normal operation

0

48_3

Site Staff Availability

Staff available

0

45_1

100

0

Temperature

25

0

2

Causal
Factor
Name
Voltage
Fluctuation
Wind storm

None

0

Max
Date

Min
Date

365

0

365

0

365

0

365

1

2.5

None

365

1

0

0

None

365

0

0

0

None

365

0

4

Table 4-4: Database information from example scenario: Component Level
Identifier

838_1

Reservoir
Level
Name
Turbine 1

Component
Level
Name
Generator

Operating
State
Name
Load Rejection

0.1

7

0.25

836_2

Turbine 1

Head Cover

Normal

0

0

0

None

1359_1

Gate 1

Gate opening

Normal

0

0

0

1360_2

Gate 1

Components
failing in place

0.5

120

1361_1

Gate 1

0

1362_1

Gate 1

Components
failing open
Components
failing closed

Components of
the gate fail
causing it to
remain in place
Normal

0

Normal

Min

Max

Avg

Causal
Factor
Name
Maintenance

Min
Date

Max
Date

1

365

1

365

None

1

365

7

Maintenance

1

365

0

0

Normal

1

365

0

0

Normal

1

365

In the example scenario, the PLC/RTU is offline due to a voltage fluctuation, and the grid
is offline because of a wind storm. Temperature fluctuations have affected the reservoir
elevation sensor which is giving a false reading. There is also a load rejection which results
in the unit being offline. Components of the gate are also failed due to a lack of maintenance
and the gate is stuck in its current position. These tables provide a good indication of the
information that the simulation model reads in to run the simulation: The minimum,
maximum and average impact magnitudes and the causal factor date restrictions are used
in the Monte Carlo generation of parameters for each iteration of the particular scenario
being run.
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A description of the system dynamics model developed for the simplified system is
provided in the following section.

4.4 Simplified System Model Description
The simplified system as described in the database was initially modelled using the system
dynamics software Vensim (Ventana Systems 2015) interfaced with Python (Python
Software Foundation, 2012). It was eventually converted into a pure-code Python script
using the sdpy package to facilitate simulation using cluster computing on the Linux
operating systems at Compute Canada. Converting the code to a Python environment also
significantly improved the simulation efficiency by reducing the overhead associated with
passing information between Vensim and Python. Appendix E contains the Python script
for the scenario generation. A complete package that can be used to run simulations can be
found in the electronic files under the dam_safety_simulation folder. This section describes
the model in more detail and provides the model testing results that compare the simulation
outputs to the historically observed Cheakamus System (on which the model is loosely
based). A description of the base case and the dam safety improved case for the simulations
is also provided.
The key benefit of using a system dynamics software package such as Vensim is that the
system structure can be constructed in an object-oriented way, allowing for easy
visualization and modification of the relationships between system components.
Subscripting is another useful feature. Vensim allows for multiple sectors or model views,
which are related to one another using “shadow variables” that link the variables between
the sectors. One drawback associated with Vensim and similar software packages is there
may be limitations to the complexity of functions defined within the software. As a result
of this limitation, a link between the Vensim program and Python programming language
was made using the venpy package (Breach 2015) which allows function equations to be
programmed directly in python. While this link is useful for model development and
testing, there is a significant amount of overhead associated with passing information
between the two programs. Since the goal of this research is to simulate the full suite of
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potential scenarios, the model was eventually converted directly to Python script, however
the model structure remains the same. The object-oriented building blocks and equations
in Vensim and Python can easily be translated to the pure Python environment using the
pysd package (provided in the dam_safety_simulation folder of the electronic appendix).
The following sections describe the system dynamics model development. Screen shots of
the system structure are taken from Vensim.

4.4.1 Model description
The following sections provide the detailed equations used in each of the system dynamics
model sectors. The model sectors follow the generic control loop of Leveson (2011), which
is expanded on to detail the relationships modelled in each sector in Figure 4-7. The
Hydraulic System State sector contains the water balance and pertinent relationships to
that. Reservoir inflows, storage and outflows are modelled. Outflows are a sum of flows
through the turbine, uncontrolled flows through the penstock, gate flows, overflows and
dam breach flows. Dam breach initiation and gate blockage are also modelled within the
sector, as well as the binary position of the power intake gate. The Sensors Sector includes
the collection and relay of reservoir level information for use in the operations sector.
Reservoir sensor errors and relay issues are also modelled within the sector. The Operations
Sector models the decision making and implementation. This includes inflow forecasting,
operations planning, remote or manual actuation and delays in mobilization of personnel
to the site. The Gate Actuators Sector models the gate position and availability, which is a
function of the condition of the gate components as well as power supply. The Turbine
Actuators Sector models the condition of power flow release components and determines
the releases through the unit and uncontrolled releases through a ruptured penstock or failed
head cover. Finally, the Disturbances Sector models the implementation of adverse
operating states (which are a model input). This includes failures, errors and delays as well
as capacity losses at the gate due to debris accumulation.
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Figure 4-7: Simulation model sectors
The following paragraphs provide the stock-and-flow diagrams, details and equations for
each of the model sectors. Each stock-and-flow diagram shows the relationships within the
sub-system. Variables can also enter the sub-system from other sub-systems.

4.4.1.1

Hydraulic System State Sector

The Hydraulic System State Sector is shown in Figure 4-8 with the variable names and
symbols shown in Table 4-5. This sector represents the status of the hydraulic infrastructure
in the system relating to water retention (dams) and conveyance (water passages). It should
be noted that components which move – such as gates, valves, and turbines – are considered
Actuators. The functioning of these electrical, mechanical and structural components are
represented within the Actuators sector and are not modelled as part of the Hydraulic
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System State sector. Reservoir storage, flow conveyance through gates and turbines,
overtopping and breach are represented in this sector.

Figure 4-8: Hydraulic System State Sector
Table 4-5: Hydraulic System State Sector variable names
Variable name
Reservoir Storage (m3/s-day)
Reservoir Level (m)
Inflow (m3/s)
Outflow (m3/s)
Unobstructed gate flow (m3/s)
Gated spill release (m3/s)
Power flow release (m3/s)
Gate position (m)
Gate capacity (%)
Overflow (m3/s)
Breach triggered (binary)
Breach flow (m3/s)
Powerhouse flow conveyance (m3/s)
Penstock leakage (m3/s)
Other component time to repair (penstock) (days)
Intake gate closure (binary)

Variable symbol
S
El
I
O
QGU
QG
QP
g
GC
QOF
EDB
QDB
PQC
QPen
Pttr
IG
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In this sector, reservoir storage is represented as a stock, with flows Inflow, I, increasing
its value and Outflow, O, decreasing its value. The reservoir storage stock value is
calculated by determining the difference in inflow and outflow at each time step, as shown
in Equation 4:
𝑑𝑆
=𝐼−𝑂
𝑑𝑡

(4.1)

Where S represents storage, t represents time, I represents inflow and O represents outflow.
Storage is directly related to reservoir elevation (El) as described by the stage-storage table
for the reservoir of interest. The Stage-storage curve (SSC) which determines reservoir
elevation El from storage S and it’s reverse (SSCRev) are supporting functions described
in more detail in Appendix E.
The model outflow O represents a summation of the outflows from each of the N spillway
gate conduits (QGi, i=1….n), flows passing through the turbines (QP), and any
uncontrolled flow releases (UCR). Uncontrolled flow releases include additional outflows
from penstock leakage (PL), overflows (OF), and dam breach flows (DBF). Equations 5
and 6 pertain to model outflow (O) and Uncontrolled flow releases, respectively:
𝑂 = 𝑄𝐺 + 𝑄𝑃 + 𝑈𝐶𝑅

(4.2)

𝑈𝐶𝑅 = 𝑄𝑃𝐿 + 𝑄𝑂𝐹 + 𝑄𝐷𝐵

(4.3)

Unobstructed gated spill releases (UGO) are a function of reservoir elevation (El) and
spillway gate position (g), as determined by the spill release rating curve. This function
retrieves the value of the reservoir level and the gate position and calls the supporting
function “GateFlowCalc” using those as arguments (See Appendix E).
In some operating scenarios, debris may block the spillway gate opening, reducing the
capacity of the spillway gate, so the unobstructed gated spill release is then multiplied by
the gate’s real time capacity, (GC), to get the actual gated spill release (QG). This is shown
in Equation 7:
𝑄𝐺𝑖 = 𝐺𝐶 ∗ 𝑄𝐺𝑈

(4.4)
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Where GC is a ratio of full capacity and has a value between 0 and 1.
Overflow (QOF) is determined following Figure 4-9 using the overflow stage-discharge
curve OTC as well as the stage-storage curve SSC and its reverse SSCrev from the
supporting functions in Appendix D. The overflow stage-discharge curve represents the
hydraulic relationship between the elevation of the reservoir and the total overflow
discharge (through the free overflow spillways, as well as any additional discharges over
the concrete and earthfill dams). The stage-discharge curve OTC is manipulated in the base
case by increasing the spillway crest by 2m and multiplying the result by 0.3 to represent
a scaled down capacity of the free overflow structures in the base case.

Figure 4-9: Overflow calculation
Because the Cheakamus Reservoir is somewhat flashy (the reservoir can fluctuate
relatively quickly), the daily time step introduces some issues in calculating the aggregated
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daily overflow spill. Because the fluctuations in reservoir level can occur at a finer time
step than daily, the overflow values at the start of the day may not be equal to the overflow
values at the end of the day. To address this problem, a nested hourly calculation is used,
as shown in Figure 4-9. This takes into account whether the reservoir will exceed or drop
below the free overflow spillway within the 24-hour period, and the resultant changes in
overflow spill based on the fluctuating reservoir elevation.
Dam breach is assumed to be triggered (EDB) once the reservoir elevation exceeds a
particular level (DBEl) above the earth dam crest (defined using expert judgement), and
takes on a value of 0 for not breached or 1 for breached (Equations 8 and 9), with dam
breach flows (DBF) equal to the full reservoir storage (the reservoir is completely emptied
when the dam breaches):
𝐹𝑜𝑟 (𝐸𝑙 > 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑙): 𝐸𝐷𝐵 = 1,
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝐷𝐵 = 1: 𝑄𝐷𝐵 = 𝑆,

𝐹𝑜𝑟 (𝐸𝑙 < 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑙): 𝐸𝐷𝐵 = 0

(4.5)

𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝐷𝐵 = 0: 𝑄𝐷𝐵 = 0

(4.6)

Penstock rupture is initiated through the Disturbances Sector when the penstock fails,
which is represented by Other components time to repair with subscript Penstock, 𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑟.
Penstock leakage, 𝑄𝑝𝑒𝑛 is equal to the “head cover max flow” from the turbine actuators
sector (see Section 4.4.1.5), unless the intake gate is closed. This is described in Equation
4.7:
𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐺 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑟 > 0:

𝑄𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹

𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝑄𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 0

(4.7)

The variable intake gate (IG) represents the status of the maintenance gate at the top of the
penstock, where zero represents an open gate and 1 represents a closed gate. Power intake
gates are present in most dam systems with hydropower generation at the upstream end of
the power flow conduit. The intake gate provides a means to dewater and inspect/maintain
the penstock and powerhouse components. In some dam systems, these gates may be able
to close under excessive flows resulting from penstock rupture or head cover failure,
reducing the negative impacts. In other systems, the reservoir must be at an elevation below
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the sill of the intake gate before it can close. In the case of penstock failure, all of the water
moving towards the powerhouse exits the penstock before making it there. Power flow
releases from all units (QP) are equal to the powerhouse flow conveyance PQC less the
water escaping through the penstock (QPen) via leakage or rupture as shown in Equation
4.8.
𝑄𝑃 = 𝑃𝑄𝐶 − 𝑄𝑃𝑒𝑛
𝑄𝑃 = 0

𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐺 = 0,
𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐺 = 1

(4.8)

If the intake gate is closed (IG=1), power outflow (PO) is equal to zero.
Variables shown in Figure 4-8 in grey font with chevron brackets are known as “shadow
variables” These are the key variables which connect into the Hydraulic System State
Sector from other sectors of the model. The variable “Other component remaining time to
repair” enters the Hydraulic System State Sector from the Disturbances Sector. Variables
“Gate position” and “Powerhouse flow conveyance” enter into the Hydraulic System State
Sector from the Actuators Sector, which is broken down into Gate Actuators and Turbine
Actuators.

4.4.1.2

Sensors Sector

The sensors sector is shown in Figure 4-10 and the variable symbols are outlined in Table
4-6.

Figure 4-10: Sensors Sector
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Table 4-6: Sensors Sector variable names
Variable name
Reservoir level (m)
Sensor Error (%)
Sensor condition (binary)
Gauge reading (-)
Gauge processing (-)
Gauge relay (-)

Variable symbol
El
SE
SC
SRd
SP
SRl

If the gauge is functioning properly (SC=1) then the gauge reading is equal to the reservoir
level (El). If the gauge is failed (flat-lined), the value is equal to the last read reservoir
elevation as per Equation 4.9:
𝑆𝐸
)
100
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝐶 = 0: 𝑆𝑅𝑑 = −9999

𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝐶 = 1: 𝑆𝑅𝑑 = 𝐸𝑙 + 𝐸𝑙 ∗ (

(4.9)

The gauge processing (SP) represents the interpretation step in the data collection system,
which is carried out by software (a PLC) and will be site-specific. If the PLC is nonfunctional the SP will return a value of -9999 which indicates a missing value. The
processed value is transmitted to the controller through the gauge relay (SRl) if the relay is
available. The relay is usually carried out by a remote terminal unit (RTU), which is
modelled as a single variable with the PLC. Thus, if the PLCRTU component is nonfunctional (RA=0), this also means that no information is transmitted to the controller
Operations Sector.

4.4.1.3

Operations Sector

The Operations Sector for the hydropower system is shown in Figure 4-11 and Table 4-7
contains the relevant variables. This sector describes the use of information relating to the
current state of the system to forecast inflows and make reservoir operating decisions.
Inflow forecasting may be done by applying a random, normally distributed error to the
actual reservoir inflows, which are an input to the hydraulic system state sector. In
reality, hydrologists use climate forecasts and watershed modelling to develop inflow
forecasts that are considered during operations planning. While these processes could be
incorporated into the simulation model, it would necessitate significant additional
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computational effort. Instead, random errors may be applied to reservoir inflows to
ensure operations planning is simulated using realistically inaccurate inflow information.
Since the objective of this case study is to compare directly the base case and the dam
safety improved case, inflow forecasting errors were removed from the potential
operating states, since the random errors would differ between these two runs. Inflow
forecast is simply the upcoming 14 days of inflows, as follows:
𝐼𝐹𝑑 = 𝐼𝑡+𝑑
where 𝑑 = 0, … ,13 and 𝑡 is the current timestep.

Figure 4-11: Operations Sector

(4.10)

166

Table 4-7: Operations Sector variable names
Variable description
Inflow (m3/s)
Inflow forecast calculation (m3/s)
Operations planning (m3/s)
Turbine instructions (m3/s)
Gate instructions (m)
Gate control redundancy (-)
Other Component time to repair (-)
Sensor time to repair (-)
Manual actuation required (binary)
Delay in contacting site staff
Delay in accessing site
Contact initiated with site staff
Contacting site staff
Time remaining to contact site staff
Plant staff notified
Mobilizing initiated
Mobilizing
Site staff mobilized
Demobilize

Variable symbol
I
IFd, d=1…D
OPf, f=1…F
Ip
Ig
GCR
OCttr
Sttr
MA
Ds
Da
CI
CS
TRC
PSN
MobI
Mob
SSM
Demob

Following inflow forecasting, operations planning (OPf) proceeds. The result for
operations planning is a vector of two variables (f=1…F and F=K+N), each representing
a single instruction for a single controlled flow release component (K turbines and N gates,
in this case study, K=N=1 and 𝐹=2). The main operations planning algorithm takes several
key inputs (inflow forecast, reservoir elevation, day references, component availabilities
and reservoir elevation limits) and determines the corresponding operating instructions for
the system to ensure minimum flow releases are met and reservoir level restrictions are
adhered to if possible. It can be found in the function OpsPlan which is described in
Appendix E. The algorithm begins by assuming the minimum fish flow is released and the
remainder of the inflow is passed through the powerhouse (up to the maximum) for a 14day window from the current date. The resultant reservoir levels are then checked, adjusted
and re-checked to ensure the operating instructions result in reservoir levels that are within
the specified normal maximum (NMax) and minimum (NMin). To ensure enough water is
available for the winter low-flow period, the normal minimum reservoir level was adjusted
to El. 370 m for the months of November and December for the purposes of the modelling.
Operations planning follows the algorithm shown in Figure 4-12, which includes power
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Figure 4-12: Operations Planning algorithm
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flow releases through the turbine, following the logic that (a) fish flows are met, (b)
additional inflows can be released through the power conduit, (c) any exceedance over
NMax can be avoided by releasing more water through the power conduit or spill, and (d)
any exceedance below NMin can be reduced from spill flows, then power flows. The
algorithm generates instructions in terms of flow for the gate and turbine. The operations
planning function in the Operations Sector OPf collects and organizes the information
necessary to be passed to the OpsPlan function which is described further Appendix E.
Gate operation may be carried out remotely or on-site. The default operation is remote,
however manual actuation (MA) may be required if (a) communications equipment
(PLCRTU) is out of service (OCttr>0) or (b) the reservoir elevation sensor is not functional
(Sttr>0). The value of MA is set to 0 as the default, but changes to 1 if the equipment
required to operate the gate remotely is failed, as per Equation 4.11:
𝑀𝐴 = 0

𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑟 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑟 = 0

𝑀𝐴 = 1

𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑟 > 0 𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑟 > 0

(4.11)

When MA=1, manual actuation is initiated. This occurs through a series of auxiliary
variables and stocks which appear complex but are simple value holders that implement
delays in contacting staff and mobilizing them to site.
The stock “Manual actuation initiated” (MAI) is a variable that, when equal to 1, indicates
that the mobilization process is underway. The inflow to this stock is the variable Initiate,
which is calculated as per Equation 4.12:
𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝐴𝐼 = 0: 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1
𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 0

(4.12)

Demobilization (DM) is the outflow of the stock MAI, and sets this value back to zero when
staff have mobilized and are on site (SSM) and manual actuation (MA) is no longer required,
as per Equation 4.13:
𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝐴 = 0: 𝐷𝑀 = 1
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝐷𝑀 = 0

(4.13)
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The next step in the process is notifying the plant manager so that site staff can be
mobilized. This is represented using a stock “Time remaining to contact staff”, (TRC),
which tracks any delays in this process. The stock input is “Contact initiation” (CI) and the
delay associated with the contacting and dispatch of staff, Ds, is an input from the
disturbances sector. Plant staff notified (PSN) is another variable that tracks whether staff
have been made aware of any issues at the site. Contact initiation (CI) is calculated as
follows:
𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑆𝑁 = 0:
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:

𝐶𝐼 = 𝐷𝑠

𝐶𝐼 = 0

(4.14)

This sends a pulse to the TRC stock, which is equal to the predetermined delay time (if
any), which is pre-determined at the start of the simulation through the Monte Carlo
scenario generation. The stock outflow, “Contacting” (CS) is then equal to the timestep
while the value of the stock is greater than zero. Once the TRC stock has filled and drained,
the plant staff are considered to be notified PSN. The PSN variable represents this by taking
on a value of 1 when the staff are dispatched to site, and zero when they are not, as follows:
𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑅𝐶 = 0: 𝑃𝑆𝑁 = 1
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝑃𝑆𝑁 = 0

(4.15)

Next, the site staff begin to mobilize to the site. There may be a delay in mobilization due
to site access issues such as traffic or emergencies, “delay in accessing site” (Ds). These
delays are a direct Monte Carlo generated input from the simulation model when site access
is delayed. This delay is again represented using a stock “Time remaining to access site”,
(TRA), which receives a pulse of inflow from “Mobilization initiated” (MobI), and has
outflow “Mobilizing” (Mob). The variable MobI is calculated as follows:
𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑆𝑁(𝑡) = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑆𝑁(𝑡 − 1) = 0: 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼 = 𝐷𝑠
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑏 = 1: 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼 = 1
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼 = 0

(4.16)

170

This variable sends a pulse equal to Ds (the delay time) when mobilization is initiated, and
zero otherwise except during demobilization, when the standard mobilization time (1 day)
is sent as a pulse to the stock TRA to re-set the standard site access time. The variable
“Mobilizing” (Mob), drains the stock TRA at the rate of time, when its value is positive –
this represents the travel of site staff to the dam. Finally, once the value of the TRA stock
is zero and mobilization is still required (MAI=1), the site staff are mobilized and at the
dam “Site staff mobilized” (SSM=1), as per Equation 4.17:
𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑅𝐴 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝐴𝐼 = 1:
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:

𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 1

𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 0

(4.17)

Once the site staff are mobilized, actuation of the gate can occur manually. Demobilization
(Demob) occurs when manual actuation is no longer required (MA=0) and site staff are
present at the site (SSM=1), as follows:
𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 1:
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:

4.4.1.4

𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑏 = 1

𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑏 = 0

(4.18)

Gate Actuators Sector

The Actuators Sector has been broken down into two sub-sectors: (1) Gate Actuators and
(2) Turbine Actuators, because both the function and purpose of these components are very
different. Outlet Gates may be operated manually or remotely and rely on either grid power
or a backup power source as well as a series of interconnected mechanical and electrical
components which function together to make the gate operable. Turbines are typically
operated remotely, require an operational grid to be functional (power must be exported
somewhere) and rely on vastly different components to achieve their intended purpose. As
such, actuation of a gate is not modelled alongside actuation of a turbine and the sectors
are shown separately.
The Spillway Gate Actuators Sector is shown in Figure 4-13 with relevant variable symbols
presented in Table 4-8. This sector represents each of the mechanical, electrical and
structural components involved in operation of a spill release gate. The components are
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grouped based on the outcomes of component failure into three categories: (1) Components
failing the gate in the closed position, (2) Components collapsing the gate and (3)
Components causing the gate to fail in its current position. The model has been generalized
as much as possible to represent both radial and sluice-type spillway gates but may need to
be modified for representation of different types of gates or for valve release facilities (eg.
Stop-log gates, Hollow cone valves, Howell-Bunger valves). Backup power supplies may
also easily be added to the model.

Figure 4-13: Gate Actuators Sector
Table 4-8: Gate Actuators variable names
Variable Description
Gate instructions (m)
Site staff mobilized (binary)
Gate position (m)
Last gate position (m)
Gate availability (binary)
Gate remaining time to repair (days)
Gate power supply (binary)
Gate collapse (binary)
Gate failed closed
Gate failed in place
Maximum gate position

Variable Name
Ig
SSM
g
Lg
GAv
GRTTRc, c=1…C
GPS
GC
FC
FIP
MGP

Failures of the component groups are each associated with different times to repair which
are modelled in the “Disturbances” sector. Disturbances in the system, for example seismic
events, may affect all or some of these components and the maximum repair time for each
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of the affected components then becomes the length of time the gate is unavailable (out of
service) for.
The gate can either be operated remotely or by site staff if manual actuation (MA) is
triggered as described in the previous section. If MA=1, site staff must be mobilized
(SSM=1) in order for the gate control system to be operated and for actuation to take place.
If MA=0, the gate’s remote actuator is functioning properly and the gate may be operated
from the control center.
The gate components are binary indicators of component availability and are used in the
calculation of overall gate availability and as indicators of whether the gate is collapsed
(GC) or failed in place (FIP) or failed closed (FC). The values of the C affected gate
components for each gate, i, are set to 0 if the remaining time to repair is greater than 0 and
1 if the remaining time to repair is 0 (ie. there is no damage to the component), as per
Equation 4.19:
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑐 > 0: 𝑐 = 0 , 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑐 = 0: 𝑐 = 1

(4.19)

Gate availability is set equal to one if all gate components are available (values equal to
one), the power supply is available (GPS=1) and either remote actuation is possible (MA=0)
or staff are on site to operate the gate (MA=1 and SSA=1). Gate collapse (GCi) is set equal
to one if the “components collapsing gate” is equal to zero and fail closed (FCi) is set equal
to one if the “components failing gate closed” is equal to zero. Gate instructions are
measured in meters of opening and are determined from the Operations Sector, entering
the Gate Actuators sub-system as a shadow variable. Gate position is then determined as
follows.
𝑔𝑖 = 𝑀𝐺𝑃 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝐶 = 1
𝑔𝑖 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝐶 = 1
𝑔𝑖 = 𝐼𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝐴𝑣 = 1
𝑔𝑖 = 𝐿𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝐴𝑣 = 0

(4.20)
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Last gate position Lg is stored by Python and used as the default gate position if the gate is
unable to be moved due to failure of a component. The gate position g is then used as an
input to the Hydraulic System State sector.

4.4.1.5

Turbine Actuators Sector

The model structure for the power Actuators Sector is shown in Figure 4-14 with relevant
variables described in Table 4-9. The power Actuators Sector has been simplified
significantly due to the high complexity associated with operation of a generating unit.
Wicket gates could be modelled as a stock with flows of opening and closing, however this
would require modelling the governor and other turbine components in significant detail.
It was assumed that modelling in this way would increase complexity but not improve the
result significantly. As such, powerhouse flow conveyance is the key variable being
modelled, and the availability of the components required for the powerhouse to function
are shown as inputs that determine whether power can pass through the powerhouse and
electricity can be generated (Power remaining time to repair). The two very high-level
power component failures that are being modelled are the generator (which causes a load
rejection) and the turbine head cover which can fail causing an uncontrolled release of
water into the powerhouse and downstream. In reality, there are many ways in which a
turbine can fail to operate safely, however the inability to pass flow and the uncontrolled
release of flow are the two major outcomes of significant power related failures, so these
components were considered to be representative.
The values for head cover (HC) and generator (PGen) are determined by “Power remaining
time to repair” which tracks the time left in repairs following failures of these components.
If the remaining time to repair value is positive, their value is set to zero (this equation is
the same as for the gate components above). Unit availability then depends on the
availability of the wicket gates, generator and grid (GrAv) following Equation 4.21:
𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝐶 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝐺𝑒𝑛 = 1: 𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 1
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 0

(4.21)
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Figure 4-14: Power Actuators Sector
Table 4-9: Power Actuators variable names
Variable description
Turbine instructions (m3/s)
Unit availability (binary)
Unit flow (m3/s)
Generator (binary)
Head cover (binary)
Powerhouse grid availability (binary)
Powerhouse flow conveyance (m3/s)
Head cover max flow (m3/s)
Intake gate closed (binary)

Variable name
IP
PUA
QU
PGen
HC
GrAv
PFC
HCMF
IG

If any of PWG, PGen or GA are equal to zero, PUA=0 and the unit cannot release any water
(QP=0) unless the head cover (HC) is failed, in which case the maximum head cover flow
is released through the unit, as per Equation 4.22:
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 1: 𝑄𝑃 = 𝐼𝑃
𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝐶 = 1: 𝑄𝑃𝑗 = 0
𝐼𝐹 𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝐶 = 0, 𝑄𝑃 = 𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹

(4.22)

Head cover max flow (HCMF) is a site-specific relationship to be determined by the
modeller. In this case, the assumption is that the maximum turbine flow for the current
reservoir level can be multiplied by five to represent the total flow that would pass through
the failed unit. If this flow causes reservoir elevations to drop below the sill, a correction
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is made to represent the reduction in flow being passed into the power tunnel from the
reservoir (Qsill). The head cover release also depends on the intake gate closed variable
(IG), and is equal to zero if the intake gate is closed. The equation is as follows:
𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐺 = 0: 𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹 = min(5 ∗ 𝑇𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 (𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 1), 𝑄𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑙)
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:

𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹 = 0

(4.23)

Where 𝑇𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 represents the supporting function described in Appendix E which
calculates the maximum flow through the turbine for a given reservoir level (RSE) and
availability set equal to 1. Qsill represents the reduction in this value that would be
observed when the reservoir passes below the sill within the current day. A simple volume
calculation is done to calculate Qsill as follows:
𝑄𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑙 = max (𝑆 + 𝐼 − 𝑄𝐺 − 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑣(363.06), 0)

(4.24)

where S is the storage, I is the inflow QG is the gated spill release, and SSCrev represents
the reverse lookup from reservoir level to storage. El. 363.06 is the elevation of the gate
sill. Qsill cannot be negative. It is important to note here a key difference between the base
case and the dam safety improved case. For the dam safety improved case, the head cover
maximum flow, 𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹, is multiplied by 1/24 to represent intake gate closure within an
hour of rupture occurrence. This is because the time-step of the model is daily and it is
assumed that the gate closure would happen immediately upon detection of the rupture
(within one hour), so the maximum flows are simply scaled by this factor.
Equation 18 shows that the powerhouse flow conveyance (PQC) is equal to the sum of
releases through each turbine:
𝑃𝑄𝐶 = 𝑄𝑈

(4.25)

Powerhouse flow conveyance connects into the Hydraulic System State Sector.

4.4.1.6

Disturbances Sector

The main goal of the Disturbances Sector is to implement component failures which result
from a variety of causes from the components operating state database. Components have
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been divided into four groups: Gate components, power components, other components
and sensors. This helps facilitate detailed modelling of various component failures, for
example the gate hoist or the gate motor becoming out of service following some
disturbance. Other components include the penstock, communications equipment, and the
grid. The gate and power components include all key components of the “Gate actuators”
and “Turbine actuators” sectors, respectively, which may fail resulting in various impacts
to the system. Stocks are used in this sector to represent the remaining time left on the
repair. The stock inflows consist of a single pulse (incoming time to repair). The stocks are
drained by a constant time when their value is positive, as shown in the following equation:
𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅 > 1: 𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 = 1
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑐𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅 < 1: 𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 = 𝑐𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:

𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 = 0

(4.26)

This ensures the stock is drained by time when its value is positive and prevents the stock
value from becoming negative. The small c represents the component type (Gate, Power,
Other or Sensor). The component failure variables connecting to the time to repair stock
inflows receive information from the model to implement component failures of various
lengths at specific time steps (the Monte Carlo inputs). This is demonstrated in Section
3.4.1 and has been generalized to take Monte Carlo inputs of Impact Time 𝐼𝑇 and Impact
Length 𝐼𝐿:
𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 𝐼𝑇: 𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝐼𝐿
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 0

(4.27)

GateAll and PowerAll represent the total maximum remaining time to repair of all
components represented by the stock, as indicators that are used in the Gate Availability
and Turbine Availability calculation. The component Remaining Time to Repair (𝑐𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅)
values for Gate, Power, Sensor and Other components are then routed into the model to the
corresponding location to be implemented in simulation, as described in the previous model
description sections.
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Figure 4-15: Disturbances Sector

4.4.2 Simulation model testing
As discussed in Section 3.4.3, testing can be done to gain confidence in the model
performance. Checking the water balance to ensure the formulae are properly defined is an
important step. Another very useful test is to compare the model outputs with the observed
data for the system. This was done by running the simulation using Cheakamus historical
inflows and comparing the results with the real Cheakamus operating data. The model was
tested by modifying the operations planning function and comparing the results with the
historical data for operations including reservoir elevation, turbine flow and spill. The
results of the model test are shown in Figure 4-16.
Figure 4-16(a) and (b) contain the reservoir elevations from the observed record and
simulation, respectively. It is clear from the plots that the simulation model tends to hold
the reservoir higher than it would be under typical operation. This is a result of the
operations planning algorithm, which does not use optimization. In the initial development
of the complex model, operations planning was performed daily using a differential
evolution optimization model. The optimization model planned reservoir levels for one
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year of expected inflows using the 14-day inflow forecast and weekly average inflows for
the remainder of the year. The change in reservoir storage was used to calculate the
instructions for the gates and turbines. This procedure for operations planning results in a
very accurate model test that is shown in King et al (2017). Once the scale of the simulation
problem was more accurately defined, the optimization step was determined to be
sufficiently time consuming to justify its removal from the program, and the model was
switched to a simple algorithm to calculate releases. As such, the simulated reservoir levels
for the historical model test are not as close to the observed values, however they are still
well within the operational limits.
Figure 4-16 (c) and (d) show the turbine flows from the historical operations record in
comparison to the simulation. The median lines are fairly close, though the simulation
model tends to release more water than the historical record, which is likely due to the fact
that the Cheakamus System is often used for peaking, meaning it may run fully during
certain hours of the day and be shut off at night, resulting in lower overall flows.
Figure 4-16 (e) and (f) show total spill releases for the historical and simulated operations,
respectively. There is a close agreement between the medians for spill release, however
larger spill events tend to be reduced in the simulated results in favour of slightly longer,
more moderate spills.
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Figure 4-16: Operations validation for the simplified system model

4.4.3 Base case vs. dam safety improved model runs
Two full runs through the potential operating scenarios are performed in this research for
two different cases: the base case and the dam safety improved case. The difference
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between these scenarios is described in this section and summarized in Table 4-10. The
goal of these two different runs is to show how the simulation model results can be used to
assess improvements made by changing operating strategies and investing in upgrades to
the system.
Scenario A: The base case is a simplified version of the Cheakamus system as described
above. The key change that was made for this case was that the free overflow spillway
capacity was significantly reduced (by 70%) and the crest was raised by 2m. The purpose
of this was to directly induce more failures in the base case, creating a substantial difference
between the dam safety improved case which has a free overflow spillway identical in size
to the one in the real Cheakamus system. This change was made in response to a very low
observed failure rate for the dam safety improved case, given the ability of the free
overflow spillway to safely pass even large inflows when the capacity of the system to
convey water through the gates and turbines is significantly reduced.
Scenario B: The dam safety improved case has a full-sized free overflow spillway
consistent with that of the real Cheakamus Dam. In addition to this, the intake gate for the
powerhouse is upgraded to allow it to close under penstock rupture or head cover failure
flow. Because of the daily timestep and the relatively small and flashy Daisy Lake, this is
implemented in two ways. First, the intake gate is closed immediately the day after a
rupture or head cover failure is realized. Secondly, the total penstock rupture and head
cover failure flows are reduced to 1/24th of their actual values, to reflect closure of the gate
within an hour of the initiating failure. Another key change in the dam safety improved
model is that in the event of lowered capacity in the system resulting from a gate outage,
or loss of remote control due to PLCRTU outage or grid outage, the target reservoir level
is lowered to El. 367.8m which is 0.5m above the crest of the spillway. The goal of this
operational change is to avoid free overflow events and dam failure by preparing for large
inflow events which the system may not be capable of conveying through the power
passage alone. Increased redundancy in the communications equipment was modelled by
reducing the number of outages for the PLCRTU component to one half of the scenarios.
This is done by modifying the Monte-Carlo generated outage times for a randomly selected
half of the iterations to zero. Sensor errors and outages were similarly reduced by one half
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to indicate improved sensory equipment at the site. Finally, the instances of the gate failing
closed were reduced by 20% to reflect upgraded components in the gate resulting in fewer
of these failures.
Table 4-10: Base Case vs. Dam Safety Improved Case
Base Case
Free overflow spillway restricted to release
only 30% of Cheakamus Dam discharges,
with a crest 2m higher
Single PLC/RTU device
Intake gate unable to close under penstock
rupture or head cover failure flows
Default gate redundancy
Reservoir level targets consistent with
typical Cheakamus operations

Dam Safety Improved
Free overflow spillway identical to
Cheakamus Dam
Dual PLC/RTU device, resulting in
50% fewer outages of that component
Intake gate upgraded to allow closure
under penstock rupture or head cover
failure flows
Gate redundancy improved to reduce
instances of the gate failing closed by
20%
Reservoir level target lowered to El.
367.8m if system capacity is restricted

Each scenario is run through the simulation model with two thousand iterations and the
complete simulation is run once for the base case and once for the dam safety improved
case. The goal of this is to illustrate the improvements made between the two runs. Because
there are such a large number of scenarios and iterations being modelled, more varied
inflow sequences are required than observed in the historical record. This is described in
the following section.

4.5 Simulation Model Input Data
The simulation model data inputs include the physical relationships, the synthetic inflows
and the baseline operations (reservoir levels) for the system.

4.5.1 Physical Relationships
The first physical relationship used in the model is the stage-storage curve, which relates
the elevation of the reservoir to the storage in m3/s-day. The units chosen to represent
storage help simplify the calculations within the simulation model. The stage-storage data
for the Cheakamus Project were used in the simulation model and are presented in
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Appendix A. Curve-fitting was used to develop a relationship valid for the possible
reservoir elevations, and the resultant relationship is described in Appendix E for the stagestorage curve (𝑆𝑆𝐶).
The stage-discharge curve for the Cheakamus System are also used in the simulation model
(See Appendix A). A function representing the total overflow is created using curve-fitting
to reflect the overflow discharge pertaining to a certain elevation. The resultant function is
described in Appendix E for the overflow curve 𝑂𝑇𝐶.
The combined gate rating curve for the two Cheakamus Spillway Operating Gates (SPOGs)
is also used in the model. The rating curves for each gate are combined into a single curve
for a larger gate by adding the discharge columns from the curve. The resulting combined
curve is used directly in the model in a 2-dimensional interpolation.
The maximum turbine flow pertaining to different reservoir elevations is required in the
model to ensure generating restrictions at low reservoir elevations are taken into account.
This is calculated from the units operating curves and converted to a piecewise linear
function. A similar piecewise linear curve is developed for the maximum possible gate
flow at different reservoir elevations.

4.5.2 Synthetic Inflow Generation
Synthetic inflow generation was carried out by reshuffling and perturbing the historical
climate data using a stochastic weather generator (KnnCAD) and using the results as inputs
to the Raven hydrologic modelling tool. KnnCAD and Raven are described in Section
3.3.1. For the Cheakamus Hydropower Project, a single station located at the dam (CMS)
is used for inflow forecasting.
Twenty-seven years of historical daily climate data from the CMS station was used as an
input to the KnnCAD weather generator. The data included daily minimum and maximum
temperatures as well as precipitation. KnnCAD reshuffles and perturbs the historical
climate data to come up with a statistically similar block of data the same length as the
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input data, so 371 blocks of climate data were created by the weather generator for a total
of 10,017 years of data. For real applications of this approach, closer to 1 Million years of
climate data is recommended to ensure adequate variability in the inflow sequences,
however 10,000 was determined to be adequate for the purposes of this proof-of-concept
example.
A validation of the historical versus simulated climate data is shown in Figure 4-17. Figure
4-17(a) and (b) contain boxplots of daily precipitation (no outliers) and total monthly
precipitation respectively. The blue line plot overlaid on the boxplots shows the historical
median values. For daily precipitation, there is a close match between the median historical
and simulated values. The daily precipitation values were shown without outliers because
the outliers were quite high in comparison with the boxplots, with one simulated value
exceeding 800mm in March. The number of outliers in the data indicates the ability of the
model to simulate more extreme precipitation events than in the observed record. The
synthetic climate data tends to underestimate the total monthly precipitation, with the
historical medians being close to the 75th percentile of the simulated data in January, March
through July, October and December. For February and August there is a close agreement
and there is a smaller underestimation in September and November. Despite the
underestimation of the median total monthly precipitation values, the simulated data does
match the monthly trend shape and there are a fair number of outliers from the monthly
data. Figure 4-16(c) and (d) contain monthly minimum and maximum temperature
boxplots of the simulated data, with historical medians overlaid on the graphs. There is a
fairly close agreement in the trends, however both the median minimum and maximum
temperatures do tend to slightly underestimate the historical medians. There are, however,
a significant number of outliers which indicates values outside of the historical record are
present in the simulated data.
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Figure 4-17: Validation plots for synthetic climate data at for CMS station
The UBC watershed model requires water-years as an input, which run from October 1 to
September 31, so some reorganizing of the resultant datasets is required. Once the data is
reorganized, it can be used as an input to the calibrated watershed model (UBC Watershed
model on Raven) for the Cheakamus System. BC Hydro provided an up-to-date calibration
for use in this research so the calibration and validation procedure for the hydrologic
modelling is not discussed in this text.
Figure 4-18 (a) and (b) show the historical and simulated daily inflow data, respectively
with the lightest blue lines showing the 10th and 90th percentiles, the medium blue lines
showing the 25th and 75th percentiles and the 50th percentile shown in dark blue. The
percentiles of the historical vs. simulated data align well and there are significantly more
extreme inflow events observed in the simulated record, which is the goal of synthetic
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inflow generation. The synthetic inflow percentiles are slightly smoother because of the
large number of observations for each day (10,000). The maximum inflow event observed
historically is approximately 650m3/s and the maximum inflow event observed in the
simulated record is about 2000m3/s.

Figure 4-18: Validation of synthetic inflow sequences, Daisy Lake inflows

4.5.3 Baseline Operations Data
The baseline operations data were computed by running the simulation model for the
10,000 years of synthetic inflows and recording the observed reservoir elevations given
that nothing within the system had failed. The results from the baseline operations data are
shown in Figure 4-19. It is important to note that the operations planning algorithm in this
simulation has perfect 14-day foresight about inflows and all flow release facilities are
operational, so only one reservoir level excursion above the normal maximum level of El.
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376.5 is observed over the 10,000 years. This excursion corresponds to a peak daily inflow
of 2,000 m3/s. During this large inflow event, the spill capacity of the gates and power
flow releases are exceeded and the reservoir increases to El. 380 m. This is below the
elevation of the free-overflow spillway, which is at El 380.41 in the base case (the crest of
the concrete dam).

Figure 4-19: Baseline operations data from 10,000 year synthetic inflow record
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4.6 Simulation Results
The results from the simulation are presented in the following sub-sections. There were a
total of 552,960 scenarios run for the base case and the dam safety improved case. Each
scenario was executed for 2000 iterations, for a total of 1.1 Billion simulated years per run.
The high performance computing environment used to execute the scenarios is provided in
Appendix F. The following section presents a description of the overall results, which
include both the criticality parameters as well as maximum and minimum values of
performance measures for each simulated scenario. Next is a description of outcomes for
selected scenarios, where performance measures and reservoir elevations can be explored
in further detail.

4.6.1 Overall results discussion
Using the output .npz files from the simulation, the criticality parameters and minimum (or
maximum) performance measures were computed for each simulated scenario. The output
files and output analysis code are formulated so that only the complete iterations (those
where all scenario operating states both occurred and affected one another) for a given
scenario are considered in the computation of that scenario’s parameters. Results can be
found in the electronic appendix, in the folder “Simulation_Results”. The file
“OutputResultsAll_base.xlsx” contains the simulation results for the base case, and
“OutputResultsAll_dsi.xlsx” contains the results for the dam safety improved case. For the
base case, there were a total of 9,669,654 failures simulated over a total of 857,102,076
completely implemented iterations (regardless of scenario), making the overall simulation
flow control failure rate for the base case equal to 1.13%. This is not to be misinterpreted
as the failure rate for the system – the failure rate for the system overall would be
significantly reduced if the probabilities of occurrence of the operating states were taken
into consideration. For the dam safety improved case, only 2 out of 809,563,591 complete
iterations resulted in dam failure, making the overall simulation flow control failure rate
for the system equal to 2.47 × 10-7%. Again, this is not to be misinterpreted as the overall
estimated failure rate for the dam system – it simply represents the proportion of
simulations that resulted in dam failure, regardless of the probabilities of each simulated
scenario. The number of failures observed in the dam safety improved case was extremely
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small – likely as a result of the significantly larger free overflow spillway being capable of
passing the largest inflows in the synthetic record if the reservoir elevation is below a
certain level. Comparing the simulation failure rates for the two cases shows how
significantly the increased overflow spillway capacity affects the rates of failure for the
scenarios. These results are summarized in Table 4-11.
Investigating specific scenarios can give further insights into the vulnerability of the system
to

various

combinations

of

events.

Within

the

results

spreadsheets

(OutputResultsAll_base.xlsx and OutputResultsAll_dsi.xlsx), column headers are used to
describe the parameters calculated for each scenario. In this analysis, the operating state
impacts did not depend on the causal factors – that is, a single operating state would have
the same range of impacts regardless of what causal factor resulted in it occurring. Because
of this, it is possible to combine scenarios with the same sets of adverse operating states
into a causal factor-independent set of scenarios, which have more observations and
therefore an improved estimate of the criticality parameters. This sorting resulted in a total
of 6,144 combined scenarios that can be easily analyzed in more detail. These are presented
in “Results_CombinedComps_base.xlsx” and “Results_CombinedComps_dsi” for the
base case and the dam safety improved case, respectively. Within each of these results
spreadsheets, there are different tabs containing the complete results (All) as well as filtered
results which contain scenarios that have the same number of adverse causal factors (𝑁 =
1 … 5).
Sorting the failure rate values in the combined results spreadsheet (All) for the base case
shows that for 229 scenarios, the failure rate was greater than or equal to 10%. Scrolling
through this list shows that all of these scenarios involved a restriction in capacity as a
result of the gate being failed, either closed or in place. Interestingly, another component
that frequently appears in the most severe scenarios is the penstock rupture. This is a direct
result of the outage length of penstock rupture scenarios – which can exceed a full year
following the event. In this case, the reservoir would initially drain through the penstock
until it is below the sill of the intake gate, which would then be closed. After the intake
gate is closed, the power water passages are out of service for a significant amount of time.
This means that while initially some uncontrolled release may be observed, there may be
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longer-term complications associated with operating the reservoir once the power passages
are isolated and the flow conveyance capacity has been lost. Turbine head cover failures
are also higher up on the list for the same reasons. Other issues that come up within this
more severe scenario list include site access and staffing issues, communications
equipment (PLC/RTU) failures, and sensor issues.

Table 4-11: Overall results summary
Total number of years
simulated (complete
iterations)
Total number of
failures simulated
(complete iterations)
Simulation Failure
Rate*
Highest scenario
failure rate
Average failure inflow
threshold (mean 5-day
inflow preceding
failure)
Average failure inflow
threshold (max 5-day
inflow preceding
failure)

Base Case

Dam Safety Improved

857,102,076

809,563,591

9,669,654

4

1.13%

2.47 × 10-7%

16.227%

0.005%

114 m3/s

835 m3/s

160 m3/s

1588 m3/s

For the dam safety improved case, the two scenarios that lead to failure resulted from a loss
in gate capacity (gate failing closed or in place), in combination with sensor issues, access
delays. Additionally, both failure scenarios included a loss of power flow conveyance
through either penstock rupture (and subsequent lengthy outage) or as a result of grid
failure and resulting load rejection.
The overall average inflow thresholds – the minimum average/maximum daily inflow in
the 5 days preceding failure – are 114 m3/s and 160 m3/s, respectively, for the base case.
These increase to 835 m3/s and 1588 m3/s for the dam safety improved case (with only two
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failures). Obviously, the failures in the dam safety improved case are a result of very high
inflows that exceed the safe discharge capacity of system.
A few more general conclusions can be drawn from the overall results tables. The highest
observed conditional failure rate in the base case was 16.227%, versus only 0.005% in the
dam safety improved case. For both cases, dam overtopping failure and high reservoir
elevations were most frequently occurring as a result of loss of flow conveyance capacity
– specifically, losses in conveyance capacity involving the gate, which can pass
significantly more flow than the power conduit. Sensor errors, communications failures
and access/staffing issues were also significant contributors to overtopping failures and
reservoir level excursions above the key levels.
Looking at the results based on the number of affected components may also provide useful
insights into the most vulnerable aspects of the system. Filtering the list to only a single
component being affected gives the results in Table 4-12 and Table 4-13, for the base case
and the dam safety improved case, respectively. These tables have been abbreviated
slightly (by reducing number of columns) to ensure the columns fit on the page. The
columns in the table show the conditional failure frequency, failure inflow thresholds,
conditional frequency of exceeding key reservoir elevations, the minimum discharge
capacity and the maximum uncontrolled release. The final column shows the name of the
affected component.
For the base case (Table 4-12), the obvious result is that the components whose failure
results in the most significant capacity loss (the gate components causing the gate to fail
closed or in place) lead to the greatest failure rates and highest reservoir levels. Next are
the sensor errors, which can result in lack of conservatism in reservoir operations. None of
the other components on their own lead to failure in the base case, but gate blockage, grid
outages and sensor failures also caused reservoir elevations to exceed key levels. For the
dam safety improved case, none of the components on their own lead to failure of the dam
due to overtopping. Issues with communication or sensors lead to the highest reservoir
levels. Interestingly, penstock ruptures and head cover failures also resulted in some
scenarios with reservoir elevations exceeding key levels. This is an unexpected result that
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may be a result of the operations planning algorithm not taking into account the lost power
flow release capacity, and thus keeping the spillway gate closed during those scenarios. In
future runs of this model, the unit availability function should be modified to reflect the
lost ability to pass water through the power conduit following closure of the power intake
gate.
Looking more closely at the reservoir level exceedances in the base case, it is clear that
reservoir excursions above key levels were directly related to either a loss of capacity or
loss of remote visibility (reservoir level sensor failure or error). For the base case, failure
of the gate in the closed position had a 15% chance of resulting in overtopping of the
earthfill dam (and a 1.6% chance of overtopping it enough to cause dam breach). The
frequency of overtopping the earthfill dam was reduced to about 2.8% for the gate failing
in place as a result of some residual discharge capacity resulting from the gate being stuck
in the position it was at prior to failure. For the dam safety improved case, overtopping of
the earthfill dam was avoided for all single affected component simulations, except for the
penstock rupture which results in a lengthy outage that, as discussed above, may not (but
should have been) be recognized by the operations planning algorithm. In general for the
dam safety improved case, loss of visibility resulting from either sensor issues or
communication system failure (PLCRTU) resulted in the most significant exceedances of
key reservoir levels. Surprisingly, loss of conveyance through the gate alone was not
enough to cause reservoir level excursions even resulting in spill, which is somewhat
surprising. This is likely a direct result of the conservative operating strategy in the dam
safety improved simulations, which target reduced reservoir elevations in the case of loss
of gate functionality.
Looking at the minimum discharge capacity gives some context to why the reservoir
elevations may have risen. For both cases, the most significant losses in flow conveyance
capacity (the maximum active discharge capacity being 1655 m3/s) resulted from gate
issues – the gate failing closed, in place, or being blocked. Not surprisingly, these were
associated with higher likelihoods of exceeding key reservoir levels in the base case (but
not in the dam safety improved simulations as a result of more conservative operations).
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Table 4-12: Results for a single affected component, base case
Conditional
Failure
Frequency
(%)

5-day
Inflow
Threshold
(average
daily)

5-day
Inflow
Threshold
(maximum
daily)

Conditional
Frequency of
Exceeding El.
377.95 m
(WL Max)

Conditional
Frequency of
Exceeding El.
378.41 m (free
overflow spill)

Conditional
Frequency of
Exceeding El.
380.4 m
(Concrete dam)

Conditional
Frequency of
Exceeding El.
381.42 m
(Earthfill dam)

Minimum
Discharge
Capacity

Mean
time to
failure
(days)

Components

1.63

147.54

229.20

41.41

40.31

36.41

15.53

65.00

34.36

Gate fails closed

0.53

195.65

242.17

18.20

17.37

14.08

2.84

69.91

45.00

Gate fails in place

0.05

753.10

1995.10

10.36

8.50

3.77

0.25

1655.00

7.00

Sensor Error

0.00

NA

NA

48.82

41.81

18.09

0.25

383.60

NA

Gate opening

0.00

NA

NA

26.82

22.02

4.37

0.00

1655.00

NA

Grid

0.00

NA

NA

0.02

0.00

0.00

0.00

1655.00

NA

Sensor Fail

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1655.00

NA

PLCRTU

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1590.00

NA

Penstock

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1590.00

NA

Head Cover

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1590.00

NA

Generator

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1655.00

NA

Gate collapse
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Table 4-13: Results for a single affected component, dam safety improved case
Conditional
Failure
Frequency
(%)

5-day
Inflow
Threshold
(average
daily)

5-day
Inflow
Threshold
(maximu
m daily)

Conditional
Frequency of
Exceeding El.
377.95 m (WL
Max)

Conditional
Frequency of
Exceeding El.
378.41 m (free
overflow spill)

Conditional
Frequency of
Exceeding El.
380.4 m
(Concrete dam)

Conditional
Frequency of
Exceeding El.
381.42 m
(Earthfill dam)

Minimum
Discharge
Capacity

Mean
time to
failure
(days)

Components

0.00

NA

NA

51.55

43.56

0.00

0.00

1655.00

NA

PLCRTU

0.00

NA

NA

40.05

39.07

0.00

0.00

1655.00

NA

Sensor Fail

0.00

NA

NA

28.34

24.59

0.00

0.00

1655.00

NA

Sensor Error

0.00

NA

NA

18.17

17.11

0.03

0.00

1590.00

NA

Penstock

0.00

NA

NA

12.55

9.91

0.00

0.00

1655.00

NA

Grid

0.00

NA

NA

0.18

0.14

0.00

0.00

1590.00

NA

Head Cover

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1590.00

NA

Generator

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

383.60

NA

Gate opening

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

69.91

NA

Gate fails in
place

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1655.00

NA

Gate collapse

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

65.00

NA

Gate fails
closed
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Sensor errors did not result in any losses in discharge capacity but lead to increased
reservoir levels in both cases through improper reservoir level operation.
Another indicator of the criticality of a scenario is the mean time to failure. For the base
case, this ranged from 34-45 days in the scenarios with a loss of conveyance through the
gate. This reduces to only 7 days in the case of reservoir level sensor errors, which indicates
the potential severity of operating the reservoir assuming the reservoir level is lower than
it actually is.
For scenarios with two affected components, the results for the base case and dam safety
improved case are shown in tab N=2 of “Results_CombinedComps_base.xlsx” and
“Results_CombinedComps_dsi.xlsx”, in the Simulation_Results folder of the electronic
appendix. There are 77 total combinations of components in these two-component
scenarios (these combinations represent the combined scenarios which take into account
results from the same scenario with different causal factors). For the base case, the
combinations with the highest failure frequencies (2-15%) involved failure of both gate
and power discharge components. Despite failures of the turbine head cover and penstock
resulting initially in uncontrolled releases, the long-term impacts of these component
failures is lengthy outages of the discharge facilities (once the intake gate is closed) – this
means lower overall flow conveyance capacity in the long term. These higher failure
frequency cases resulted in a 19-35% chance of overtopping the earthfill dam – even if the
overtopping did not lead to a failure, significant damage would be observed in these cases.
For the dam safety improved case, the combined loss of both power and gate releases lead
to some instances of overtopping of the concrete dam, which could potentially cause
significant damage. Free overflow spill was observed more frequently when both gate and
power flow release facilities were out of service, and sensor issues in combination with
gate failures also had a high conditional frequency of free overflow spill.
In the N=3 tabs of the same spreadsheets, the three-component combined scenarios are
presented. For the base case, similar results are seen where the scenarios resulting in a
complete loss of controlled discharge capacity (both gated and power flow releases) had
the highest failure rates. The most extreme case involved a penstock rupture and
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subsequent outage of the power flow release facilities, the gate failing in place and in the
closed position – which had a 16% failure rate and a 43% chance of overtopping the
earthfill dam. In this case, there are two potentially overlapping conditions of the gate –
failed in place and failed closed – in the simulation model, the gate failing closed takes
precedence over failures in place. For the dam safety improved case, the scenarios with the
most significant overflow frequencies tended to include gate outages or capacity
restrictions, loss of flow through the power conduit, and either sensor errors and/or
communications equipment failures.
Another important observation is that for a relatively small proportion of the scenarios
simulated, there may not have been enough complete iterations simulated to develop a
meaningful characterization of the scenario. This is because in the post-processing, an
analysis is done that determines whether all of the events occurred and affected one
another. For some scenarios, events may be initiated after the system has already recovered
from preceding events. In this case, the iteration is not representative of the cumulative
effects of the combination of events and is filtered out of the scenario results. This can be
observed by sorting the “OutputResultsAll_base.xlsx” and “OutputResultsAll_dsi.xlsx” by
the column “Number of simulation-years”. In the base case, about 30,000 scenarios had
less than 500 complete iterations out of 2000 simulated, and 1170 of these had less than
100 complete iterations. About 32,000 scenarios in the dam safety improved case had less
than 500 complete iterations out of 2000 simulated years, and 519 of these had less than
100 complete iterations. This indicates a significant limitation of the modelling framework
applied in the case study – the number of iterations completed may not provide sufficient
data with which to estimate credible conditional failure or reservoir level exceedance
frequencies. This observation indicates that additional computing time may be required to
properly analyze scenarios without sufficient data points – perhaps by setting some
minimum complete iteration threshold within the simulation. It is worth noting that these
scenarios involved a higher number of events occurring. This means that the time frame
within which the different events can occur is relatively large (since it is equal to the sum
of the Monte Carlo generated outage lengths and can be up to 365 days). As such, there
may be several instances where the events do not affect one another (the reservoir level
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recovers prior to the next subsequent event). This observation will be an important
consideration in future applications of this methodology.

4.6.2 Assessment of individual scenario outcomes
Another output from the simulation model is arrays containing the dynamic performance
indicators for complete iterations of each scenario, as well as the reservoir levels. These
can be plotted to visually represent the system behaviour in response to various input
scenarios and Monte Carlo parameters. Five scenarios have been selected and plotted to
illustrate how results individually can be compared between the two cases. The summary
tables containing the key data for each of the selected scenarios are shown in Table 4-14
and Table 4-15 for the base case and the dam safety improved case, respectively.
The first scenario involves the gate failing in the closed position as a result of ice, the grid
being failed due to wind, and the site access being delayed due to traffic issues (Seed
number 301490). Figure 4-20 contains the plotted reservoir elevations (in the first row),
flow conveyance capacities (second row) and total uncontrolled releases (third row), for
the base case (first column) and the dam safety improved case (second column). For the
reservoir levels, the mean value is shown in black and the 10th and 90th percentiles are
shown in darker grey. Each light grey line represents the dynamic reservoir level response
for a single iteration of the scenario. Only completely implemented iterations are plotted –
that is, scenarios in which the dam failed, or the events did not affect one another are not
included. The length of each light grey line depends on the length of time within which the
reservoir differed from the “normal” reservoir elevations for the same time period and
inflow. For this scenario, the maximum length of time for which the reservoir deviated
from the normal elevation was 250 days.
Looking at the reservoir elevation plots, it is immediately clear that the reservoir elevations
in the base case were significantly higher than in the dam safety improved case. In the base
case, no significant efforts are made to operate the system more conservatively given a loss
in capacity. In contrast, for the dam safety improved case, the target reservoir elevation is
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Figure 4-20: Dynamic results for seed 301490
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reduced when the gate becomes unavailable. The reservoir is then lowered with whatever
capacity is available, creating more storage should inflows exceed the remaining available
capacity. As such, the dam safety improved case 90th percentile reservoir levels rise to a
maximum of El. 379 m, which is significantly less than the El. 381 m observed in the base
case. Failures within the base case are observed when the reservoir level sharply drops to
El. 353.75 m. There are a total of 44 failures observed in the base case, with a failure rate
of around 4%. The mean time to failure in this scenario was about 24 days. There were no
failures observed in the dam safety improved case. It is also worth noting that the reservoir
elevations dropped below the normal minimum (NMin) in the dam safety improved case.
It is not immediately clear why this is the case since the target reservoir elevation is equal
to NMin. The problem results from the operations planning algorithm not accounting for
any free overflow spill when the projected reservoir elevations exceed the sill of the
overflow spillway – in these cases, the reservoir level is reduced more than is necessary to
achieve the NMin target. Future runs of the model should address this issue.
The total active flow conveyance capacities are plotted in the second row of Figure 4-20.
The black line represents the mean values. The results are similar for both the base case
and the dam safety improved case. One issue with these values is that the grid failure does
not register as a loss of capacity though the power conveyance system, despite resulting in
a load rejection and closure of the wicket gates. This component interaction is programmed
into the simulation model, but not accounted for in the calculation of available capacity.
Again, future runs of the model can be modified to address this problem. Because of this,
the minimum flow conveyance capacity recorded for both scenarios was 65 m3/s, which is
the maximum flow that can be passed through the power conduit.
The third row shows the uncontrolled releases for the system, which are clearly
significantly higher in the base case as the concrete and earthfill dams are overtopped. The
maximum uncontrolled release for the base case was around 2000 m3/s, and about 620 m3/s
in the dam safety improved case. The average uncontrolled release was similar for both
the base case and the dam safety improved case.
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It is also possible from the dynamic reservoir elevation plots to determine the conditional
reservoir level exceedance frequencies for the scenario – that is, the percentage of time
where the observed reservoir elevations for the scenario exceeded various levels. The daily
reservoir level values are recorded from each complete iteration (where all events occurred
and affected one another) and the percent of observations exceeding various reservoir
levels is calculated. Figure 4-21 contains the conditional reservoir level exceedance
frequencies for seed 301490, with the base case shown in red and the dam safety improved
case shown in blue. This graphic is an excellent indicator of the improvement made by the
dam safety improved case over the base case. The difference between the two lines is
indicative of the level of improvement gained by the system upgrades and operating
strategies employed in the dam safety improved case.

Figure 4-21: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for seed 301490
The second scenario involves debris blockage of the gate as well as a reservoir level sensor
error resulting from temperature fluctuations causing instrument decalibration (seed
386196). The results are shown in Figure 4-22, where the first row shows the reservoir
levels with the base case in the first column and the dam safety improved case in the second
column. For this scenario, results show similar mean and 90th percentile reservoir
elevations, with higher maximum levels observed in the base case. The higher maximum
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levels are a direct result of the increase in free overflow spill capacity, which helps to offset
the loss in capacity caused by debris buildup at the gates. There are some excursions below
the normal minimum (NMin) reservoir level in both cases as a result of the sensor errors.
The dam failed by overtopping in two scenarios for the base case and the average time to
failure was 146 days.
The second row shows the active flow conveyance capacities for the base case and dam
safety improved case in the first and second columns, respectively. The results are similar
for both cases, with average values that are almost equal. The debris blockage is
predetermined using the Monte Carlo randomization of scenario input parameters, however
the length of time for which the debris blockage remains depends on the system inflows.
When inflows fall below 65 m3/s, the simulation model assumes that debris can be removed
from the gate and capacity is restored.
In the third row, uncontrolled releases are presented for the base case and the dam safety
improved case in the first and second column. Again, uncontrolled releases involve any
free overflow spill, as well as dam breach flows and flows from penstock rupture or gate
collapse. In this case, the majority of observed uncontrolled release is due to overflow spill,
which may be through the overflow spillway but potentially can include dangerous
concrete and earthfill dam overtopping. In the base case, there are two spikes when the
uncontrolled releases exceed 1250 m3/s, at approximately day 120 and day 180. These
correspond to the iterations where dam breach occurred. Omitting these two scenarios, the
overall uncontrolled release observed in the dam safety improved case was slightly higher,
likely as a result of the increased free overflow spillway capacity at lower elevations.
Figure 4-23 contains the conditional reservoir level exceedance plots for seed 386196. The
plots for both the base case and the dam safety improved case are very similar, with the
only notable difference at the tail end of the curve where the maximum observed elevations
in the base case exceeded those observed in the dam safety improved case. This small
difference can be attributed primarily to the increased free overflow spillway capacity in
the dam safety improved case – the decrease in the exceedance line occurs just above the
level at which free overflow spill is initiated.
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Figure 4-22: Dynamic results for seed 386196
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Figure 4-23: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for seed 386196
The next scenario is one of the more extreme combinations of events that lead to the highest
combined scenario failure rate in the base case. This scenario involves failure of the gate
in place, failure of the gate closed and a penstock rupture (seed 403429). For the reservoir
elevations, a clear improvement is seen in the dam safety improved case in comparison
with the base case. The reservoir level 90th percentile is around El. 379 m for the dam safety
improved case, and El. 381.13 m in the base case. Because of the higher maximum
reservoir elevations in the base case, a large number of failures are observed (296) and the
failure frequency is quite high (17.3%). The average time to failure in the base case was
114 days. There are no failures in the dam safety improved case, partly due to the increased
free overflow spillway capacity, and partly due to the operator reducing the reservoir level
and operating more conservatively (if reservoir drawdown capacity is available).
The second row shows the available active flow conveyance capacity of the system. For
both cases, the available capacity drops to zero when both power and gated releases are
unavailable as a result of the penstock rupture. The 65 m3/s capacity of the power conduit
is seen at the top part of the figure where the gate capacity recovers but the penstock is still
unavailable. The results are similar between the dam safety improved and the base case.
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The third row shows the total uncontrolled releases for the base case and the dam safety
improved case in the first and second column, respectively. The total uncontrolled releases
include penstock rupture flows, free overflow, dam overtopping flows and dam breach
flows, so it can be somewhat difficult to decipher what the contributing factors are in a
scenario which could have all of these. Obviously, the dam breach flows significantly
increase the maximum values observed in the base case. The uncontrolled releases in the
dam safety improved case have a maximum of about 390 m3/s with the 90th percentile being
around 80 m3/s. For the base case, the 90th percentile values are around the same. The initial
spike in the mean uncontrolled release values can be attributed to penstock ruptures, which
may happen on day 1 of the simulation for about 1/3 of the simulated scenarios (based on
the random selection of initiating event). In the base case, the initial spike is near 100 m3/s,
and this is reduced to about 15 m3/s in the dam safety improved case since the intake gate
can be closed under rupture flows.
Figure 4-25 contains the conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for seed
403429. There is a relatively close agreement between the base case and the dam safety
improved case, with the latter actually exceeding the base case values for elevations less
than El. 378.5 m. This is somewhat surprising given the differences observed in the
dynamic reservoir elevation plots for the same scenario. One potential contributing factor
is that less water is released from uncontrolled penstock rupture flows in the dam safety
improved case (since the intake gate closes under rupture flows). This means the reservoir
level may be higher when gate failures initiate, or that the reservoir level does not decrease
by a substantial amount if the penstock failure is initiated after the gate failure. The result
is moderately higher reservoir elevations through parts of the curve up until free overflow
spill is initiated (El. 378.41 m). Above El 378.5, the dam safety improved case drops off
below the base case curve, meaning the reservoir level did not reach the same maximum
levels. This is a result of the increased free overflow spillway capacity, which helps
maintain reservoir levels below El. 380 m.
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Figure 4-24: Dynamic results for seed 403429
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Figure 4-25: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for seed 403429
The next scenario involves a single component failure – a penstock rupture due to an
earthquake (seed 403440). The reservoir levels are shown in the first row, with the base
case in the first column and the dam safety improved case in the second column. The key
difference between the two plots is that the reservoir level drops significantly lower in the
base case. This is a direct result of the ability of the intake gate to close under rupture flows
in the dam safety improved case. This results in significantly smaller uncontrolled release
flows (see the figures in the third row). It is important to note that the flows recorded
represent the average daily flows, and that peak outflows may be significantly higher for
the dam safety improved case where the intake gate closes within an hour of rupture. The
loss in capacity observed is related to the inability to pass flows through the generating unit
while the penstock is being repaired.
Figure 4-27 contains the conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for the base
case (red) and the dam safety improved case (blue), respectively. The dam safety improved
case has a higher conditional reservoir level exceedance frequency in comparison with the
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base case, as a result of a smaller volume of water being lost through the penstock. This
means the reservoir remains at a higher elevation throughout the course of the scenario.

Figure 4-26: Dynamic results for seed 403440
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Figure 4-27: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequency, seed 403440

The final scenario selected for discussion is one of only two scenarios that resulted in an
overtopping failure in the dam safety improved case. This scenario involved a number of
events: the gate failing closed, a sensor error, delays in accessing the site and an outage of
the grid (seed 281617). Figure 4-28 contains the dynamic results for this scenario. The first
row of the figure shows the dynamic reservoir levels for the scenario. In the base case (first
column) many of the scenarios exceeded the water licensed maximum level and 21 dam
breaches occurred. The average time to failure in the base case was about 47 days. In the
dam safety improved case, there were excursions above the water licensed normal level,
however these tended to be less extreme than in the base case. This is in part due to a larger
free overflow spillway, and also because of the operating strategy to reduce the reservoir
elevation during outages affecting the gate. One failure is observed, occurring within three
days of the start of the scenario. In both cases, the capacity loss is similar, dropping down
to the turbine only being available during the gate outage. Uncontrolled releases are
generally similar between the two cases, with the more extreme spikes in the base case
corresponding with the dam failures. Figure 4-29 contains the reservoir level exceedance
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Figure 4-28: Dynamic results for seed 281617
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plots for seed 281617. There is a significant difference between the two curves, with the
dam safety improved case generally spending less time at higher reservoir elevations than
the base case.

Figure 4-29: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequency, seed 281617

Overall, the results from these individual example scenarios provide useful information
that can help to better understand the dynamic system response to individual scenarios.
Comparing the results between the two cases gives a good indication about the
improvements made by introducing refined operational strategies and improving
infrastructure. The conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies provide an
additional indication of whether there are significant improvements between scenarios.
The summary of the results from each of the highlighted scenarios can be found in Table
4-14 and Table 4-15, respectively. These tables, along with the dynamic results and
reservoir time exceedance plots provide a good comparison between the two runs of the
model. Ultimately, there are a large number of scenarios to be discussed and only a very
small subset were analyzed in this thesis. However, the analysis of these scenarios provides
some indication of how the modifications to the system improve the performance in these
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extreme conditions. The dynamic analyses, as well as the tabular outputs from the
simulation (discussed in the previous section) are useful outputs that can help identify
vulnerable components of the system. Comparing the results between the different model
runs can help build a business case for upgrades to the system and may be helpful to guide
emergency planning activities.
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Table 4-14: Summary of results from individual scenario outcomes, base case
Seed
Number

Condition
al Failure
Frequency
(%)

5-day
Inflow
Threshold
(avg
daily)

5-day
Inflow
Threshold
(max
daily)

Minimum
Discharge
Capacity
(m3/s)

Maximum
Uncontrolled
Release
(m3/s)

Maximum
Reservoir
Level (m)

Number of
Simulationyears

Average time
to failure
(days)

Components

301490

4.37

150

164

65

2026

383.65

1007

23.91

Access delay, grid failure,
gate fails closed

386196

0.10

350

582

383

1928

382.74

1992

145.50

Sensor error, gate opening
blocked

403429

17.32

109

164

0

1766

383.61

1709

114.59

Penstock rupture, gate fails
in place, gate fails closed

403440

0.00

NA

NA

1590

316

377.94

2000

NA

281617

3.11

154

168

65

1671.01

382.33

676

46.76

Penstock rupture
Access delay, sensor error,
grid failure, gate fails closed
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Table 4-15: Summary of results from individual scenario outcomes, dam safety improved case
Seed
Number

Conditional
Failure
Frequency
(%)

5-day
Inflow
Threshold
(avg
daily)

5-day
Inflow
Threshold
(max
daily)

Minimum
Discharge
Capacity
(m3/s)

Maximum
Uncontrolled
Release
(m3/s)

Maximum
Reservoir
Level (m)

Number
of
Simulati
onyears

Average
time to
failure
(days)

Components

301490

0

NA

NA

65

620

379.92

NA

917

Access delay, grid failure,
gate fails closed

386196

0

NA

NA

383

370

379.65

NA

1830

Sensor error, gate opening
blocked

403429

0

NA

NA

0

400

379.52

NA

1691

Penstock rupture, gate fails in
place, gate fails closed

403440

0

NA

NA

1590

14

377.94

NA

2000

Penstock rupture

281617

0.17

835.35

1588.17

65

1882.25

385.29

3

605

Access delay, sensor error,
grid failure, gate fails closed
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4.7 Summary
The methodology developed in this research was applied to the Cheakamus System, located
near Squamish, BC. First, a detailed representation of the Cheakamus System was created
within the components operating state database. Operating states, impacts and causal
factors were defined in the operating states database. The combinatorial procedure
developed in this research was applied to the outputs of the dataset. For the detailed
representation of Cheakamus, a total of 1.83 x 1027 operating state combinations
(scenarios) were defined. This is a good indication of the dimensionality of the problem –
the number of potential scenarios increases exponentially with the level of detail.
A simplified proof-of-concept representation of Cheakamus was developed next, with a
single gate and a single turbine. This representation of the system returned 552,960
potential scenarios. A system dynamics simulation model representative of the simplified
system was developed and tested by comparing the results with historical operations data.
The simulation model was run 2000 times for each of the 552,960 scenarios, and for two
separate cases (a total of 2.2 Billion years of inflows were run through the simulation
model). The base case is representative of the simplified Cheakamus System with a smaller
free overflow spillway. The dam safety improved case represents the same system with a
free overflow spillway size that mimics the real system. The dam safety improved case also
included a number of operational improvements, including power flow intake gates that
could be closed under extreme flows, as well as improved communications redundancy
and more conservative operating rules that aim to prevent reservoir level excursions above
target levels. Each of the 2000 iterations for a scenario contained unique Monte Carlovaried parameters for timing, impact magnitude and inflows. Synthetic inflows outside of
the historically observed range were simulated using a stochastic weather generator and a
hydrological model. The Monte Carlo variation of inflows was done by randomly choosing
a day and year from the historical record and sampling the subsequent inflows. A
triangularly distributed variable was generated using the minimum, maximum and average
specified impact magnitude from the database for each adverse operating state simulated.
Timing of adverse operating states was done by shuffling the operating states and assigning
random times from within the first six months of the year long simulation.
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In terms of implementation, high-performance computing (HPC) resources are required for
implementation of this ambitious simulation exercise. In this research, there were 1.11
Billion years of daily simulations performed, with 2000 Monte-Carlo iterations for each of
the 552,960 Million scenarios. This was performed twice – once for a base case and once
for a dam safety improved case. The total of 2.22 Billion simulation-years was made
possible by development of a very efficient simulation model and use of a serial farming
approach that runs many simulations in parallel on HPC clusters. The simulations were
completed in a period of about three weeks, though results would vary depending on the
resources available and the HPC clusters utilized. The speed with which this large
simulation task was completed is considered to be a substantive achievement.
The results from the simulation were analyzed by sorting and filtering the lists of results
for each scenario. Scenarios with 1, 2 and 3 contributing components were filtered out and
discussed to gain insights about the most critical components that could contribute to
failure. The dam failures in the base case occurred in 1.3% of the total simulated years. For
the dam safety improved case, this was reduced to 2.47 × 10-7% of simulated years. These
failure rates are not to be confused with estimates of overtopping failure frequency for the
system as a whole – in order to compute that, operating state frequencies must be predefined. The proportion of failures simulated does give some indication as to the level of
improvement made when the dam safety improved modifications are made to the system.
For the base case, loss of conveyance through both power and gate release facilities was
the most significant contributor to failure. For the dam safety improved case, only two
failures were observed – both of these corresponded with a loss of gate and power flow
capacity, sensor issues and the most extreme flood in the synthetic record. This is indicative
of a much more robust overflow spillway system in the dam safety improved version of
the model.
An assessment of some of the individual scenario results was also provided. Five scenarios
were selected and the dynamic reservoir elevations and performance measures were
plotted, along with the reservoir exceedance frequencies. These plots provided useful
indications of the difference between the base case and the dam safety improved case for a
given scenario, and could be used to better understand the system response to the scenarios.
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Because the case study and analyses in this work were representative of a very simplified
version of the Cheakamus System, they should not be interpreted as conclusions for the
existing Cheakamus Project. Comparing the base case results (with a smaller free overflow
spillway) to the dam safety results (with a free overflow spillway equal in size to the
Cheakamus Dam), showed that the free overflow spillway was, in all but two cases, able
to prevent reservoir elevations from reaching the level assumed to fail the dam. The
comparison of results between the two cases simulated shows how the methodology may
be useful in quantifying the improvements made by various system upgrades and
configurations. Results from the case study illustrated that the approach presented here
could be useful to assist dam safety emergency response decision making, by indicating
how critical a scenario is and roughly how long there is to regain control over the reservoir.
In addition, the results may be useful in operational decision making with respect to outages
and operating rules, and could help build a business case for capital improvements to the
system. The analysis was also useful in predicting potential combinations of event that
could lead to failure, and identifying the events (or component states) that were most likely
to result in significant safety impacts.
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Discussion and Conclusions

5

Dam systems are arrangements of physical and nonphysical components which act to store
and convey water for beneficial purposes such as power production, irrigation, water
supply and flood control. Dams can be thought of as open systems, where inflows, outflows
and disturbances cross the system boundary. Within the boundary of the system, feedbacks
act to monitor reservoir levels and inflows, and adjust controls to maintain reservoir levels
within target values, and meet desired outflow requirements, if possible. There are a wide
range of potential constraints which may impact the ability of the dam to achieve its desired
purpose for safe containment and conveyance of flows. The major research contributions
in this work are (a) the systematic definition of combinations of events which can influence
the ability to safely control flow in a dam system, and (b) the dynamic characterization of
the system performance in response to these events using a Deterministic Monte Carlo
simulation framework with a system dynamics simulation model.
The following paragraphs discuss the outcomes of this work as they pertain to the
objectives outlined in Chapter 1.
•

The first objective was to investigate the use of systems analysis and risk
assessment concepts from within and outside of the dams industry in terms of their
ability to determine potential operating scenarios for dam systems and the impacts
scenarios have on system outcomes. This was achieved by looking at the relevant
literature and evaluating the various techniques with respect to their ability to
achieve the research requirements.

•

The second objective was to develop an approach that helps define a more complete
range of potential operating scenarios (operating constraints) than is possible using
existing techniques alone. This was achieved through the use of a components
operating states database that details each component, their operating states,
operating state impacts and causal factors. Combinatorics was used to
automatically convert the database entries into an exhaustive list of potential
operating scenarios. The existing methodologies described in the literature review
rely on expert judgement to determine possible combinations of events – of which
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there are so many that it would be unreasonable for a team of experts to conceive
of them. Thus, the number of scenarios that can be defined using this methodology
far exceeds the scope of existing methods.
•

The third objective was to develop an improved dam safety analysis methodology
that facilitates systematic investigation of all potential operating scenarios and
allows for the outcomes of individual scenarios to be characterized. The
Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework proposed in this research is able
to dynamically evaluate each possible scenario through a number of iterations.
Scenarios are used as an input to the model, to ensure each scenario is
systematically characterized and an equal amount of simulation effort is spent on
each. This allows for a more complete assessment of potentially hazardous
outcomes than has been achieved using existing techniques.

•

The fourth objective was to develop a simulation approach that can handle
complexity in system structure, feedbacks, interactivity and nonlinear behaviour
and uses object-oriented modelling to improve model accessibility. The system
dynamics simulation model developed in this work is well suited to this objective
and can be built to as much detail as is required to adequately capture the failure
modes of interest to the modeller.

•

The fifth objective was to investigate dynamic indicators of system performance
with respect to safety, as well as scenario criticality parameters that can be used to
rank the importance of various scenarios from the simulation outcomes. A number
of criticality parameters are proposed in this work, and these as well as the dynamic
outcomes of the system performance were shown in the simulation results.

The following section contains a more detailed evaluation of the methodology which
pertains to the requirements stated in Chapter 3. Next is a discussion of potential areas for
future work.

218

5.1 Methodology evaluation
Like all approaches, the proposed methodology described in this research does have some
limitations. A discussion of its strengths and weaknesses of the methodology is provided
here. The requirements for a new approach to dam safety analysis were outlined in Chapter
3 and are repeated here with a more detailed discussion regarding the progress made
towards each.
The first requirement is for an approach with reduced subjectivity. The approach presented
in this research achieves this requirement. The automated generation of scenarios helps
eliminate reliance on heuristic thinking and expert judgement with respect to combinations
of possible system states. Use of STPA in the development of the operating states database
for actively controlled system components such as gates and turbines also helps to reduce
subjectivity. Despite the improvements in limiting subjectivity, there is still (and will
always be) a requirement for expert judgement in the component operating state database
population and the level of detail in which to model the system.
The second requirement of the approach developed is to address non-failure related
constraints on system operation. All failure-based approaches are inherently limited in
terms of the analysis of non-failures, and this is documented well by Leveson (2011) and
Thomas (2012). Approaches which are focused on failures alone may miss a sub-set of
potentially unsafe scenarios triggered by conditions that did not result from a failure. The
proposed methodology is capable of assessing many of the scenarios not triggered by a
failure. The database developed in this research includes both failure and non-failure
operating states. The database and simulation model are well suited to deal with errors and
delays which do not necessarily involve failure of components. There are, however, some
non-failure related scenarios that were revealed through STPA analysis that were not
captured within the simulation model presented in this work. Human factors and software
requirements are issues that simulation is well-suited to address, so it may be possible in
the future to improve the capabilities of the simulation model in this respect. Design flaws
may be simulated, but need to be well understood and programmed into the simulation
model. The simulations run in the case study do not specifically address these issues, and
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the STPA portion of the case study (Section 4.1) highlights some of the scenarios that were
missed within this application, but could potentially be represented in the future.
The next requirements on the list are to determine the potential constraints on system
operation and to systematically determine potential combinations of these. The approach
presented in this work achieves this requirement through the use of the operating states
database population, and automatically generates combinations of operating states using
the combinatorial procedure. Population of the database will benefit from the strengths of
the systematic FMEA and STPA approaches.
Another requirement is to determine the likelihood of operational constraints (operating
states) without significant simplifying assumptions. This remains a significant issue in
probabilistic risk assessment that is difficult to address in the absence of supporting failure
rate data. The methodology presented in this research does not attempt to address this
problem. However, this research does determine the conditional probability of
failure/reservoir level exceedance, given a scenario. Using this information, it may be
possible to perform sensitivity analyses to assumptions regarding component probability
of failure, without significant simulation effort. This represents one advantage over
completely stochastic simulation models, which require re-simulation to analyze the
sensitivity to assumed probabilities. The extension of this work to include full probabilistic
assessment was not considered, since failure rate data for the components modelled was
not available to provide a meaningful assessment.
The next few requirements are (a) quantifying the dynamic system response to operating
scenarios, (b) including feedbacks and nonlinear behaviour, (c) capability to handle
complexity. These are all dealt with specifically using the system dynamics simulation
approach. System dynamics simulation is well suited to modelling the complex web of
component interactions and feedbacks using object-oriented programming which is
relatively transparent (interactions shown using stock and flow diagrams) and also easily
modifiable. Inspection of the system structure is a useful way of gaining confidence in the
model. The simulation model characterizes how the values of variables change with time
– a direct output of the model is the reservoir level response to a particular scenario, which
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is of significant importance for dam safety analysis. The outputs of the simulation may
indicate emergent behaviour that results from component interactions. One major
consideration for the simulation model presented is that the choice of simulation timestep
must be selected such that all failure modes being considered are properly modelled.
Penstock pressure transients and cavitation in turbines or spillway chutes happens over
seconds, milliseconds or even shorter time intervals. These issues were not explored within
this thesis, but could potentially be included in future applications of the work using nested
processes within a simulation model that operates at a larger timestep (this would reduce
the computational effort associated with such a fine time-resolution). While the approach
presented is, in theory, capable of modelling the system with any desired level of
complexity and at any time-resolution, there may be significant computational challenges
when applying the methodology to very complex systems. As the complexity of the system
being modelled increases, so does computational effort and number of scenarios to be
analyzed. Future research should focus on improving the computational efficiency of the
simulation model framework. Another time-related limitation is that the randomly initiated
failures of components may not coincide with likely instances of failure in the real world.
For example, in a real dam system, a spillway gate may be dormant or not “on demand”
for a substantial period during the year. Failing the gate randomly may under-estimate the
potential impacts this failure could have by initiating it when inflows are normal or low.
That said, with regular gate testing being implemented in many dam safety programs across
the world, it may not be unrealistic to detect a failed state during a low-flow period.
The next requirement is to assess the uncertainty in scenario outcomes. This is a
particularly challenging issue in all modelling exercises. The uncertainty of scenario
outcomes can be assessed by looking at the range of results from the Monte Carlo iterations
of each scenario. By varying the simulation parameters and event timing, the sensitivity of
the results to various inflows, event timing and event impact magnitudes is performed.
There are a number of uncertainties in other model assumptions that have not been
analyzed in this work and remain an important area for future work.
The ability to deal with common cause failures is another requirement of the methodology
presented in this work. This is addressed within the operating states database and
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simulation. Operating states which have the same causal factor are programmed to occur
at the same point in time in the simulation. Computing the scenario probability (if the
failure rate data are available) may be slightly more challenging, since care must be taken
to ensure the probabilities of the common causes are not double counted.
The last two requirements of this research are the ability to calculate the conditional
probability of failure for a given scenario, and the ability to calculate the probability of
failure for the system as a whole. A direct outcome of the Monte Carlo simulation for each
scenario is the conditional frequency of failure for that scenario, given the inflows and the
range of impact parameters simulated. One limitation is that the number of data points with
which to estimate these frequencies may be limited, since there may be many iterations
within a scenario that are not representative of a “complete scenario” where all events are
both occurring and impacting one another. These incomplete iterations, which are not
representative of the scenario, increase the simulation effort without improving the result
and result in fewer data points with which to calculate the overall failure likelihood. In the
future, this could be dealt with by setting a minimum number of “completely implemented”
iterations, or experimenting with the maximum timestep before which all events must occur
within the scenario. Estimation of a system’s overall frequency of overtopping failure is
not a direct outcome of this research. However, assuming the frequency of each operating
state can be estimated, it may be possible to perform a complete probabilistic analysis of
simulation results. Ensuring calculations are correct may be challenging for common-cause
failures, though there is some guidance in the literature on this subject. Running the
simulation using Deterministic Monte Carlo will also facilitate a relatively straightforward
sensitivity analysis to assumed operating state frequencies. This is an important area for
future work.
In general, the approach presented in this work provides some key advantages over the
existing techniques used within and outside of the dams industry. Traditional assessments
tend to rely on techniques developed for use in industries that face different challenges than
are experienced in dams systems. Dam systems are dynamic systems of many interacting
components acting to control (both actively and passively) a randomly varying natural
input (inflow). Determining the reservoir level response to various inflows and operating

222

constraints is not easily done using traditional failure modes brainstorming exercises or
chain-of-event style analysis. Chain-of-events analyses (FTA and ETA) are limited in their
ability to address interactivity and nonlinear response. Existing systems approaches to
safety such as STPA offer some improvements, but are designed to deal with actively
controlled systems, whereas dam systems have both active and passive controls. STPA is
also unable to analyze reservoir level fluctuations in response to constraints. Stochastic
simulation is the only technique that is able to determine reservoir level response to various
constraints. It is also perhaps the easiest approach to estimate the overall system probability
of overtopping failure. If run for enough years, a fully stochastic model, in theory, would
eventually simulate the full range of potential operating state combinations. However, a
fully stochastic simulation spends a significant amount of computational effort simulating
non-failure states and would require a computationally prohibitive number of simulationyears to achieve a more thorough analysis of each possible combination of events.
Ultimately, the ability of the traditional stochastic approach to analyze potentially
threatening combinations of events is limited by the number of simulation-years – at the
current time it is not possible to achieve a full coverage of all potential combinations of
events using this method.
The methodology described in this research draws on the strengths of existing methods to
more fully and systematically determine how the system will respond to as many
combinations of events as can be determined. The operating states database and
combinatorial procedure help to automate the process of determining potential constraints
on system operation. The Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework systematically
characterizes the potential system responses which may be expected for a given scenario.
Scenarios are deterministic inputs to a simulation model that is run for a large number of
iterations with Monte Carlo varying scenario parameters. The system dynamics simulation
model is capable of representing as much complexity as desired in systems with component
interaction and feedback in a transparent and easily modifiable object-oriented
programming environment. The level of detail with which each aspect of the system is
modelled also facilitates linking the model with the components database to enable the
deterministic simulation of all of the possible combinations of operating states arrived at
in the scenario generation procedure. Through system dynamics simulation, emergent
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behaviour may be observed as a result of component interactions, with outcomes that may
not be easily foreseeable by analysing sub-systems or parts of the system. Simulations
automatically generate metrics such as the conditional failure frequencies and reservoir
level exceedance frequencies for a particular scenario. While this research focuses on
safety-specific indicators, it may also be possible to investigate environmental, regulatory
and economic considerations from the simulation outcomes.
There are some limitations of the approach proposed in this thesis. Despite the much larger
number of scenarios that this approach is able to generate and assess, the STPA analysis
identified some scenarios that were not captured by the simulation. These scenarios
involved operational decision making and process model errors, which would add another
(very large) dimension to the simulation analysis – though it is theoretically possible to
analyze such issues using simulation. The results from the case study illustrated how the
number of possible scenarios increases exponentially with the number of components being
modelled and the number of operating state-causal factor combinations. Ultimately, the
methodology presented allows modellers build the system to as high a level of detail as is
desired so that the key interactions and feedbacks are fully modelled. In applying the
approach, however, this may result in computational feasibility challenges. It is possible
that simplifications to improve computational efficiency could affect the outcomes of the
analysis. Future work must address the computational requirements of fully-detailed
models to ensure this approach can be extended to real dam systems. It is also not clear
whether the consideration of each operating state-causal factor as a separate operating state
is necessary – this introduces a fair amount of redundant simulation but was introduced to
ensure causal factors and common cause failures were represented within the model.
Finally, while the post-processing of scenarios helps to filter out scenarios that were not
representative of the input scenario (ie. all events did not occur prior to dam failure, or all
events did not affect one another), it may result in fewer data points than reasonable to
estimate the conditional failure frequency and other criticality parameters.
The following section details some potential directions for future research.
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5.2 Directions for Future Research
For future applications, it may be interesting to simulate the set of scenarios with starting
reservoir elevations that would differ from “normal” conditions, in an attempt to model the
system response to situations that could arise as a result of operational trade-offs that are
difficult to generate automatically.
The most important area for future research relating to this approach is to incorporate
probabilistic assessment into the approach. The methodology presented is set up fairly well
to achieve this goal, in that the operating states database could be extended to allow
estimates of the probabilities of causal factors and/or probabilities of component failure
conditional on the causal factor occurring. These probabilities along with the Deterministic
Monte-Carlo simulation results (conditional probabilities of failure or reservoir level
exceedance) could be used in estimating the overall failure rate for each scenario. The
benefit of the Deterministic Monte Carlo approach for assessment of overall overtopping
failure probability is that the sensitivity to assumed operating state probabilities can be
analyzed without significant additional computational effort. The full suite of results could
be used to assess the probability of overtopping failure of the dam using traditional
probability theory. The results would be a probability assessment that takes into account a
far wider coverage of the possible operating states for the system than may be achieved
using traditional techniques. The probability of flow control failure of the dam is an
important decision-making factor for dam owners in terms of fleet management.
Obviously, resources should be directed towards dams which have a higher probability of
failure and/or a higher consequence category. In addition to this, the change in frequency
of overtopping failure as a result of by different alternative operating strategies and capital
upgrades could help provide a business case for investing in different alternatives (along
with the visual aid of the aggregated scenario performance measure plots).
Another very important area for future work is in improving the computational feasibility
of the approach described in this research. When the combinatorial procedure was applied
to a detailed model of the Cheakamus System, 1.89 x 1027 scenarios resulted. This would
obviously be computationally infeasible in a reasonable amount of time, though advances
in computing capabilities may make it more feasible in the future. In the meantime, work
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on applying the methodology to real systems with grouped components similar to what was
done in the simplified system will help reduce the number of scenarios to a more realistic
and computationally reasonable number. Grouping components could potentially be
guided by a fault tree analysis of sub-systems within the system – for example, a fault tree
analysis of the gate system to determine groups of components that might lead to a specific
operating state for the gate as a whole. Implementing nested time-steps to address issues
such as cavitation, pressure transients, erosion, slope stability and internal erosion would
add additional complexity but is also an important area for future work. Further
improvements to the simulation model speed may also be possible, although they would
require a substantial effort and possibly a switch to a C++ or similar compiled
programming language. Compiled programming languages are generally considered to be
the most computationally efficient, however they are slightly less user friendly and require
more programming experience.
Another potential direction for future work is the integration of the system dynamics
simulation with AI to drive (or even build) the simulation model. Deep learning algorithms
could potentially be applied to process the results to provide additional useful information
from simulation outcomes. Finally, pattern recognition techniques may be useful to reduce
the number of combinations required to assess each simulation outcome. This is a
particularly promising direction that could help improve the limitation resulting from the
trade-off between computational feasibility and level of complexity modelled.
Ultimately, these promising directions for future work may help to strengthen the approach,
making it more readily applicable to existing, highly complex dam systems.
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Appendix A: Cheakamus Hydropower Project Details
This appendix contains the numerical relationships for reservoir storage and flow
conveyance at Cheakamus Dam. These relationships can be found in the publicly
available Water Use Plan.

Figure A1 Stage-Storage curve for Daisy Lake Reservoir (BC Hydro 2005)

Figure A2: Rating Curve for radial gates fully open and free overflow (BC Hydro
2005)
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Figure A3: Rating curve for low level outlet sluice gate fully open (BC Hydro 2005)

Figure A4: Historical Inflows to Daisy Lake (BC Hydro 2005)
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Figure A5: Daisy Lake NMin and NMax reservoir levels (data from BC Hydro
2005)

Figure A6: Minimum discharges below Daisy Lake Dam (data from BC Hydro
2005)
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Appendix B: STPA Analysis of Cheakamus Dam
Cheakamus Dam System STPA analysis
Note that this analysis was not done by BC Hydro personnel and therefore should not be
interpreted to represent real conclusions for the Cheakamus System.
High-level system hazards:
H1: High flows released into Cheakamus River and/or Squamish River (flood)
H2: Flow releases to Cheakamus River stopped (fish kill)
H3: Equipment damaged (economic/safety impact)
H4: Loss of power production (economic impact)
-Not sure about this one. This happens quite often, during low flows or during
maintenance, is it really to be considered an accident? I’ve decided to remove it
from the list because it’s a pretty regular occurrence. It might be more suitable to
be added to the list for a large dam where water is always passing through the
powerhouse (eg. Mica, Revelstoke, GMS)

High-level system safety constraints (requirements):
SH1: Flows released into Cheakamus and/or Squamish must not exceed a level that
causes damage downstream (unless inflows do?)
SH2: Flow must always be released to Cheakamus River
SH3: Equipment must not become damaged
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System Control Structure

Figure B1: Hierarchical system structure
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Table B1: STEP 1: Unsafe control actions
#

Control

Not Providing

Providing

Wrong

Stopping too

Action

causes hazard

causes hazard

timing/order

soon/applying

causes hazard

too long causes
hazard

1

SPOG1

-UCA1 Open

-UCA4 Open

-UCA7 Open

-UCA8 Gate

Open

command not

command

command

not left open

provided when

provided

provided too

long enough,

water level

resulting in

late, after

reservoir

high, inflow

downstream

reservoir filled

continues to

high or both

flooding [H1]

to unsafe level

rise [H1, H3]

[H1, H3]

and/or gates
overtopped
-UCA5 Open

[H1, H3]

-UCA9 Gate

-UCA2 Open

command

left open too

command not

provided when

long, resulting

provided when

gates blocked

in draining of

SPOG2 and

with debris/ice

the reservoir to

LLO closed

[H1, H3]

gate sill and

[H2]

fish kill [H2]

-UCA6 Open

2

-UCA3 Open

command

command not

provided but

provided but

gate stays

gate opens on

closed [H2,

its own [H1]

H3]

SPOG2

-UCA10 Open

-UCA13 Open

-UCA16 Open

-UCA17 Gate

Open

command not

command

command

not left open
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provided when

provided

provided too

long enough,

water level

resulting in

late, after

reservoir

high, inflow

downstream

reservoir filled

continues to

high or both

flooding [H1]

to unsafe level

rise [H1, H3]

[H1, H3]

and/or gates
overtopped
-UCA14 Open

[H1, H3]

-UCA11 Open

command

left open too

command not

provided when

long, resulting

provided when

gates blocked

in draining of

SPOG1 and

with debris/ice

the reservoir to

LLO closed

[H1, H3]

gate sill and

[H2]

fish kill [H2]

-UCA15 Open

3

-UCA18 Gate

-UCA12 Open

command

command not

provided but

provided but

gate stays

gate opens on

closed [H2,

its own [H1]

H3]

SPOG1

-UCA19 Close

-UCA21 Close -UCA23 Close

Close

command not

command

command

provided when

provided when

provided too

inflows and

reservoir

early, reservoir

water level low and/or inflows

level increases

(approaching

[H1, H3]

high [H1, H3]

sill) [H2]
-UCA20 Close
command not

-UCA22 Close -UCA24 Close
command

command
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provided when

provided when

provided too

SPOG2 and/or

SPOG2 and

late, reservoir

LLO releasing

LLO closed

drains [H2]

excess water

[H2]

[H1]

UCA25 Close
command not
provided, gate
closes on its
own [H1, H2,
H3]
4

SPOG2

-UCA26 Close

-UCA29 Close -UCA31 Close

Close

command not

command

command

provided but

provided when

provided too

gate closes on

reservoir

early, reservoir

its own [H1,

and/or inflows

level increases

H2, H3]

high [H1, H3]

[H1, H3]

-UCA27 Close

-UCA30 Close -UCA32 Close

command not

command

command

provided when

provided when

provided too

inflows and

SPOG1 and

late, reservoir

water level low LLO closed
(approaching
sill) [H2]

[H2]

drains [H2]
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-UCA28 Close
command not
provided when
SPOG1 and/or
LLO releasing
excess water
[H1]
5

LLO Open

-UCA33 Open

-UCA34 Open

-UCA35 Open

UCA36 Open

command not

command

command

command

provided when

provided when

provided too

provided too

SPOGs closed

SPOGs open

late [H1, H2,

long, reservoir

[H1, H2, H3]

[H1]

H3]

drains [H2]

-UCA37 Open
command
stopped too
early, reservoir
rises [H1, H3]
6

LLO Close

-UCA38 Close

UCA39: Close

UCA40: Close

command not

command

command

provided when

provided when

provided too

reservoir level

inflows and

early [H1, H2,

approaching

reservoir

H3]

sill [H2]

elevation high
[H1, H2, H3]
UCA41: Close
command
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provided too
late [H2]
7

8

9

T1 Open

T2 Open

T1 Close

-UCA42 Open

-UCA43 Open

-UCA44 Open

-UCA45 Open

command not

command

command

command

provided when

provided but

provided too

provided too

inflows high

does not work,

late, SPOGs

long, reservoir

and SPOGs out SPOGs out of

out of service

level falls

of service [H1,

service [H1,

and inflow

below power

H3]

H3]

high [H1, H3]

intake sill

-UCA46 Open

-UCA47 Open

-UCA48 Open

-UCA49 Open

command not

command

command

command

provided when

provided but

provided too

provided too

inflows high

does not work,

late, SPOGs

long, reservoir

and SPOGs out SPOGs out of

out of service

level falls

of service [H1,

service [H1,

and inflow

below power

H3]

H3]

high [H1, H3]

intake sill

-UCA50 Close

-UCA52 Close -UCA53 Close

command not

command

command

provided when

provided when

provided too

reservoir levels reservoir

late, reservoir

low [H2]

level low [H2]

levels high
[H1, H3]
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-UCA51
Turbine closes
when
command not
provided
causing water
hammer and
penstock
rupture [H3]
10 T2 Close

-UCA54 Close

-UCA56 Close -UCA57 Close

command not

command

command

provided when

provided when

provided too

reservoir levels reservoir

late, reservoir

low [H2]

level low [H2]

levels high
[H1, H3]

-UCA55
Turbine closes
when
command not
provided
causing water
hammer and
penstock
rupture [H2,
H3]
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STEP 2: Causes of unsafe control actions
NOTE: additional details provided about recurring potential issues at end of this section.

UCA1/UCA10: SPOG Open command not provided when water level high, inflow high
or both [H1, H3]
Case 1: Water level high, inflow low, open command not provided
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DS) unaware of reservoir level due to
gauge failure, sensor failures or communication delays
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional
flows are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC,
DC) make a decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to
an unsafe state even though the inflow is relatively low.
Case 2: Water level high, inflow high, open command not provided
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) believe they can return the reservoir to a
safe level using the powerhouse and/or LLO and/or other SPOG due to
inflow forecast errors
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DS) unaware of reservoir level due to
gauge failure, sensor failures or communication delays
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional
flows are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC,
DC) make a decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to
unsafe levels
-Controllers do not follow procedure (human error due to fatigue or shift
change at PSOSE/FVO)
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Case 3: Water level low, inflow high, open command not provided
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) believe they can keep the reservoir at a
safe level without opening the gate, due to inflow forecast errors or
process errors
-Gate(s) out of service for maintenance purposes and therefore cannot be opened.
-Controller thinks gate open (sensor failure, communication delay)

UCA2/UCA11: SPOG Open command not provided when other SPOG and LLO closed
[H2]
-Procedural: Inflow low and operators want to conserve water for power
production
-Controller (ACC) makes a mistake due to being tired or shift change
-Controller thinks gate open (sensor failure, communication delay)

UCA3/UCA12: SPOG Open command not provided but gate opens on its own [H1]
-Gate position sensor failure causes PLC to open gate spuriously

UCA4/UCA13: SPOG Open command provided resulting in downstream flooding [H1]
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) issue a command to open the gate to a large
opening, resulting in downstream flooding
-Inflow forecast error (controller thinks inflow is going to be higher than it
is)
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-Sensor failure or delay resulting in operator thinking reservoir
level/inflow is higher than it actually is and opening gate to return it to a
safe level
-Controllers issue a command to open the gate and the force is too high, alarm
sent and ignored by controller, or sensor fails and alarm not sent - so the steel
yields and there is an uncontrolled release of water. Note – hoist likely to fail first.
-Backup motor engages when main motor functional due to missing signal, two
motors functioning to move gears causing overforce on hoist, hoist failure and
gate fails closed. If inflows high enough, this could potentially result in dam
breach.
UCA5/UCA14: SPOG Open command provided when gates blocked with debris or ice
[H1, H2, H3]
-Operator (remote or manual) tries to open gate but it is blocked by debris/ice and
a gate component fails (hoist, motor, strut) [H3]
-Gate fails open and a large amount of water is released [H1]
-Gate fails closed and no water is released [H2]
-Could potentially result in [H1] if inflows high enough
-Operator (remote or manual) opens gate but debris or ice result in less water
being released than intended. Reservoir then rises to an unsafe level and excessive
flows are discharged via free overflow spillway and/or over the dam crest [H1]
-Gate opens as planned and debris flushed through spillway chute damages chute
[H3]

UCA6/UCA15: SPOG Open command provided but gate stays closed [H2, H3]
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-Gate component has failed (deterioration or disturbance), resulting in inability to
move gate
-Unable to move due to inadequate lubrication of guidewall/skinplate
interface or trunnion
-Gate sensor failed and PLC thinks gate is open so it doesn’t move the gate (or
gate sensor doing it’s job but debris in the way/some sort of interruption that
makes the sensor sense the wrong position)
-Grid failed, diesel backup failed, site staff unavailable to operate temporary
diesel generator
-Emergency situation such as an earthquake/landslide, or site
inaccessibility

UCA7/UCA16: SPOG Open command provided too late, after reservoir filled to unsafe
level and/or gates overtopped [H1, H3]
-Inflow forecast errors so controller doesn’t think gate needs to be opened.
-Sensor errors so controller doesn’t realize reservoir level is high
-Reservoir rises to above gates which can then no longer be opened and
may be damaged [H1, H3]
-Reservoir rises to above gates which may still be opened but too late to
prevent dangerous releases over free overflow and/or dam crests [H1, H3]
-Gate cannot be opened past 2m remotely. Delay in mobilizing site staff leads to
unsafe conditions (access road issues/short staffed due to time of evening or
weekend, inflows high and staff need ~2h minimum to reach site from Mission
office)
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-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional flows
are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DC) make a
decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to an unsafe state even
though the inflow is relatively low. Dam safety controller (DS) steps in at a
certain reservoir elevation to override operations planners but by then it is too late

UCA8/UCA17: SPOG Gate not left open long enough, reservoir continues to rise [H1,
H3]
-Controller thinks reservoir is lower (sensor failure) so they close gate
-Controller thinks inflows are manageable with other release facilities (inflow
forecast/process model error) so they close the gate
-Gate closes on its own due to failure of some gate component (gate fails closed)

UCA9/UCA18: SPOG Gate left open too long, resulting in draining of the reservoir to
gate sill and fish kill [H2]
-Controller thinks reservoir is higher (sensor failure/delay/relay failure) so they
keep the gate open
-Loss of power to close gate (grid, diesel), temporary diesel requiring staff
mobilization which has some delay
-Loss of site access and remote gate control meaning gate cannot be closed until
site accessed or sat/microwave links working
-Gate fails in open position
-Loss of remote gate control, mobilization of staff to site to close gate takes too
long and reservoir drains below sill
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-UCA19/UCA27 SPOG Close command not provided when inflows and water level low
(approaching sill) [H2]
-Reservoir level gauge faulty or delayed so controller thinks reservoir is higher
than it is

and drains it to the sill

-Controller thinks inflows are high (inflow forecast error) and keeps gate open
despite plummeting reservoir elevation
-Operator lowering reservoir following signs of internal erosion or earthquake

-UCA20/UCA28 SPOG Close command not provided when other SPOG and/or LLO
releasing excess water [H1]
-Process model: Controller thinks inflows high so keeps outflows high (past
experience/ inflow forecast error)
-Process model: Controller thinks reservoir is high so keeps outflows high (sensor
error, past experience with flashy reservoir)
-Inflows and reservoir level high, controller following procedure
-Lowering reservoir due to signs of internal erosion/damaged dam(s)

-UCA25/UCA26 SPOG Close command not provided, gate closes on its own [H1, H2,
H3]
-Gate fails closed (failure of hoist, connections, structural, sensor, etc.)
-Spurious closure due to faulty gate position sensor
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-UCA21/UCA29 SPOG Close command provided when reservoir and/or inflows high
[H1, H3]
-Case 1: Reservoir high, inflows low
-Controller relies on past experience and thinks the situation can be
handled with minimum fish flow and maximum power flow releases. If
the reservoir is above the level of the earth dam filter, this decision could
put the dam at risk of failure.
-Controller believes reservoir is low (gauge failure or delay, relay failure)
-Case 2: Reservoir low, inflows high
-Controller wants to fill reservoir higher to conserve water for energy
production. Eventually if inflows stay high, this could mean larger spills
later [H1] or even put the dam at risk in extreme cases [H1, H3]
-Controller believes inflows are low (inflow forecast error)
- High tides at Squamish and high tributary flows in Squamish and lower
Cheakamus mean controller opts to hold water back to prevent flooding.
-Case 3: Reservoir high, inflows high
-High tides at Squamish and high tributary flows in Squamish and lower
Cheakamus mean controller opts to hold water back to prevent flooding.
-Controller believes inflows are low (inflow forecast error) and believes
power and minimum fish flow discharge will be sufficient to return water
level to safe state
-Controller believes reservoir is low (gauge failure or delay, relay failure)
and wants to fill to higher level to use the water for power production
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-Spillway chute becomes damaged (debris? Or age) and operator wants to avoid
further damage to chute so the gates are closed and the reservoir is allowed to rise
to the level of the free overflow spillway. If inflows are high enough, this could
potentially put the dam at risk of overtopping. Could also cause damage to and/or
undermining of saddle/wing dams

-UCA22/UCA30 SPOG Close command provided when other SPOG and LLO closed
[H2]
-Controller thinks water is being released through SPOG and/or LLO for fish
flows (faulty SPOG position gauge and/or delay in information from on-site
operator of LLO)
-ACC controller accidentally sends command to close gate

-UCA23/UCA31 SPOG Close command provided too early, reservoir level increases
[H1, H3]
-Controller thinks reservoir level is low (gauge failure or delay)
-Controller thinks inflow is low (inflow forecast error)
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional flows
are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DC) make a
decision to hold water back, closing the SPOGs to the minimum fish flow,
allowing the reservoir to rise to an unsafe state

-UCA24/UCA32 SPOG close command provided too late, reservoir drains [H2]
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-Controller thinks reservoir level is higher than the gate sill (gauge failure or
delay)
-Controller thinks inflow is high (inflow forecast error) so keeps reservoir open to
pre-spill for a storm that never comes, resulting in the reservoir being drained to
the sill
-Operator is responding to issues at another site and overlooks the fact that the
CMS reservoir is draining to the sill
-MICROWAVE/Sat links fail, by the time site staff arrive to close gate, reservoir
is below gate sill

-UCA33 LLO Open command not provided when SPOGs closed [H1, H2, H3]
-Controller thinks SPOGs are open (SPOG position sensor failure, or relay
failure) [H1, H2, H3]
-SPOGs fail closed, controller unaware [H1, H2, H3]

-UCA34 LLO Open command provided when SPOGs open [H1]
-Controller thinks inflows are very high (inflow forecast error) and releases an
excess amount of water downstream than is necessary to control reservoir level
[H1]

-UCA35 LLO Open command provided too late [H1, H2, H3]
-SPOGs failed, high inflows, operator mobilization to site takes longer than
expected (traffic/personnel issues/timing) [H1, H2, H3]
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-UCA36 LLO Open command provided too long, reservoir drains [H2]
-Controller expects very high inflows (inflow forecast error). Operator mobilizes
to site and opens gate then leaves site. When inflows shown to be low and
reservoir is draining, operator must mobilize to site to close gate (site access
issues, personnel issues)

-UCA37 LLO Open command stopped too early, reservoir level increases [H1, H3]
-Controller thinks inflows are manageable with SPOGs so operator mobilizes to
site to close LLO. SPOGs fail closed after operator leaves site resulting in
increase in reservoir elevation.
-Downstream flooding at Squamish due to high tide and tributary flows, so
controller decides to hold water back and reduces LLO flow to minimum fish
flow. SPOGs closed for maintenance.
-Failure of LLO in closed position, SPOGs closed and/or out of service

UCA38: LLO Close command not provided when reservoir level approaching sill [H2]
-Operator thinks reservoir level higher than it is (sensor failure/delay)
-Damage to dam structure means reservoir must be drained to avoid potential
internal erosion issues (earthquake/aging). Inflow falls to below the set LLO
outflow and reservoir falls below sill, resulting in fish kill.

UCA39: LLO Close command provided when inflows and reservoir elevation high [H1,
H3]
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-Controller feels inflows are manageable with SPOGs and power releases so
operator closes LLO. SPOGs/power releases then fail after operator leaves site
and reservoir rises to unsafe level [H1, H2, H3]

UCA40: LLO close command provided too early [H1, H2, H3]
-Controller feels inflows are manageable with SPOGs and power releases so
operator closes LLO. Inflows increase (inflow forecast error) and/or
SPOGs/Powerhouse fail
-SPOGs out of service for maintenance. During the reverse lockout procedure
when SPOGs are being brought back online, operator closes LLO too early
(communication error with colleagues on site), resulting in fish kill

UCA41: LLO Close command provided too late [H2]
-SPOGs out of service. Controller thinks reservoir level is higher than it is (sensor
failure or delay). Once controller realizes it is approaching sill, staff are mobilized
to site to close the gate, but mobilization takes too long and reservoir drained to
sill of LLO (traffic, personnel, timing)

-UCA42/UCA46 Turbine Open command not provided when inflows high and SPOGs
out of service [H1, H3]
-Grid unavailable so turbine cannot be opened
-Price of power is negative, PSOSE and FVO need to keep generation to a
minimum while they import power from out of province
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-UCA43/UCA47 Turbine Open command provided but does not work, SPOGs out of
service [H1, H3]
-Load rejection at powerhouse, wicket gate failure, etc.
-Failure of remote control, site inaccessibility (forest fire, landslide, washouts in
Squamish valley)

-UCA44/UCC48 Turbine Open command provided too late, SPOGs out of service and
inflow high [H1, H3]
-Remote control failed (MICROWAVE and satellite or issue within powerhouse),
site accessibility is delayed due to poor weather conditions and traffic

-UCA45/UCC49 Turbine Open command provided too long, reservoir level falls below
power intake sill
-Power shortages in lower mainland so PSOSE and FVO opt to prioritize
generation, drawing reservoir to below sill of SPOG/LLO
-Controller unaware that the reservoir is low (sensor failure) runs powerhouse
until reservoir falls below SPOG/LLO sill resulting in fish kill

-UCA50/UCA54 Turbine Close command not provided when reservoir levels low [H2]
-Energy shortage in lower mainland pushes controllers (PSOSE, ACC) to keep
generating when reservoir elevation dropping to below LLO sill
-Controller unaware reservoir is low (sensor failure) so powerhouse is run until
reservoir falls below SPOG/LLO sill resulting in fish kill
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-UCA51/UCA55 Turbine closes when command not provided causing water hammer and
penstock rupture [H2, H3]
-Load rejection, plugging/collapse of surge shaft resulting in water hammer that
ruptures penstock resulting in damage and draining of the reservoir to intake sill

-UCA52/UCA56 Turbine Close command provided when reservoir levels high [H1, H3]
-Price of energy becomes negative, SPOG1 and SPOG2 out of service for
maintenance and inflows high. Controllers choose to close turbines and use LLO
for spill releases, resulting in high reservoir elevations when inflows exceed LLO
capacity
-Price of energy becomes negative. SPOG1 and SPOG2 subsequently fail closed
and reservoir rises to unsafe elevation when inflows exceed LLO capacity

UCA53/UCA57 Turbine Close command provided too late, reservoir level low [H2]
-Remote control of powerhouse fails, water dropping to below sill of LLO before
personnel can access site to close wicket gates (traffic, site access restriction due
to fire hazard, washouts or landslide) [H2]

Further details about specific components/failures:

Other considerations/scenarios for Turbines:
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-Rough load zone operation leading to failure of the head cover(s), draining
reservoir through powerhouse. Though, there does not appear to be a rough load
zone specified for the Cheakamus units. [H2, H3]
-Runaway turbine if generation/grid links severed? [H2, H3]

Non-control related considerations:
-Earthquake causing settlement of earth dam and/or toppling of
wing/saddle/concrete dams [H1, H3]
-Barrier slide failure (may or may not be earthquake induced) leading to buildup
of material in Cheakamus Valley downstream from dam resulting in inability to
pass water through system, eventual overtopping/breach

Causes of failures of recurring components from STPA analysis:
RTU’s (2): (1) Controls SPOGs, (2) Collects sensor info from PLC and relays to
microwave/sat links. Failure resulting in loss of remote gate control and loss of visibility.
-Power supply failure (backup batteries at end of service life)
-Microprocessor failure
-Lightning (one or both)
-Earthquake causing structural movement of RTU/wiring/etc.
PLC:
-Voltage fluctuations causing them to lock themselves out. Automatically reboot
or require manual reboot.
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-Backup batteries at end of service life, voltage too low for PLC
-May lose visibility in the event of grid failure since everything is coming to this
PLC and being transferred to RTU/microwave/satellite

Gate position sensors (2): One rotary, one linear. Rotary converts angular to distance
linearized with shape of gate, lookup table within sensor to determine opening. Linear is
a straight rod at the trunnion, linearized in PLC. Transfers info to PLC.
-Power supply failures (grid or rodent activity)
-Failure of linear sensor in the event of ice storm possible (exposed to elements)
-Linear sensor is temperature sensitive, in hot weather it may appear gate is
moving when it is not.
-PLC issues when one is way off from the other?

Reservoir level sensors (3) + staff gauge: PLC takes standard deviation between each
one. If outside 4cm nominal difference, sensor omitted. Average of 2 or 3 taken. If two
fail, PLC reads reservoir elevation as failed and passes that to RTU for control centre
relay
-Linearity issues
-Temperature issues both high and low temperatures
-Must be rearranged every quarter – potential for issues in readings at end of
quarter.
-If failed, site staff would have to go read staff gauge for accurate reservoir level
reading
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Site access:
-2-2.5 hours optimal
-In emergency, may be able to instruct power crews in Squamish on how to open
gate or fly in (helicopter)
-Forest fires, earthquakes (highway collapse), traffic, barrier slide could all
prevent access
-Overtopping of dam would surely prevent access (it would be flooded. Once that
happens, nobody can access site).

Microwave failure:
-Earthquake
-Ice
-Can only be fixed in summer, very much weather dependant

Gates:
-Multiple motors
-Can be operated by power drill via gearbox
-One gate stiffened for overtopping flows, one isn’t
-Overtravel limit – mechanical switch failure stops drum from turning when gate
opened too high
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-Backup gate drive motor
-Gearbox or drum failure would be catastrophic
-misalignment of gears (earthquake)
-lubrication issue (though would still work for a time)
-May be designed to open with a single hoist (need to check this)
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Appendix C: Operating States Database for Cheakamus System
Table C1: Reservoir-level database components for Cheakamus System
ReservoirLeve
lID
46

ReservoirLevelTy
peID
1

ReservoirLevelNam
e
Gate Pier

OperatingStat
eID
220

22

1

Main Earth Dam

104

18

4

Dam PLC

19

4

16

5

17

OperatingStateName

OperatingStateTy
peID
2

ImpactType
ID
4

CausalFacto
rID
226

CausalFactorTyp
eID
25

None

MaxDa
te
365

MinDa
te
1

None

2

4

227

25

None

365

1

138

Functional

2

4

252

25

None

365

0

Powerhouse PLC

140

Functional

2

4

Dam RTU

142

Functional

2

4

253

25

None

365

0

254

25

None

365

0

5

Powerhouse RTU

144

Functional

2

4

255

25

None

365

0

21

8

Main Dam

106

None

2

4

264

25

None

365

0

27

11
12

Backup Diesel
Generator
Dam Access

113

29

115

None

2

4

265

25

None

365

0

Typical access time

2

2

266

25

None

365

0

28

12

Powerhouse Access

117

Typical access time

2

2

267

25

None

365

0

30

23

31

23

Res El Sensor 1

218

Reading correct

2

4

268

25

None

365

0

Res El Sensor 2

212

Reading correct

2

4

269

25

None

365

0

47

23

Res El Sensor 3

209

Reading correct

2

4

270

25

None

365

0

37

23

SPOG1Position_L

126

Reading correct

2

4

271

25

None

365

0

39

23

SPOG2Position_L

132

Reading correct

2

4

272

25

None

365

0

38

23

SPOG2Position_R

135

Reading correct

2

4

273

25

None

365

0

36

23

SPOG1Position_R

221

Reading normal

2

4

274

25

None

365

0

41

25

Power tunnel

175

None

2

4

275

25

None

365

0

42

26

Penstock

177

Normal operation

2

4

276

25

None

365

0

44

27

CMS Grid

187

Normal Operation

2

4

277

25

None

365

0

43

27

Rainbow Grid

189

Normal Operation

2

4

278

25

None

365

0

45

28

Inflow forecast normal

2

4

279

25

None

365

0

29

CMS Inflow
Forecast
Site Staff
Availability

192

48

214

Staff available

2

4

280

25

None

365

0

NA

CausalFactorName
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ReservoirLeve
lID
18

ReservoirLevelTy
peID
4

ReservoirLevelNam
e
Dam PLC

OperatingStat
eID
139

18

4

Dam PLC

139

16

5

Dam RTU

17

5

16
17

OperatingStateName
PLC offline

OperatingStateTy
peID
1

ImpactType
ID
1

CausalFacto
rID
64

CausalFactorTyp
eID
10

PLC offline

1

1

65

1

143

Offline

1

1

66

Powerhouse RTU

145

Offline

1

1

5

Dam RTU

143

Offline

1

5

Powerhouse RTU

145

Offline

1

21

8

Main Dam

107

Cracking of concrete

27

11

114

27

11

27

11

27

11

29

12

Backup Diesel
Generator
Backup Diesel
Generator
Backup Diesel
Generator
Backup Diesel
Generator
Dam Access

29

12

Dam Access

116

29

12

Dam Access

116

29

12

Dam Access

116

19

4

Powerhouse PLC

19

4

Powerhouse PLC

41

25

42

CausalFactorName

MaxDa
te
365

MinDa
te
0

Earthquake

365

0

11

Lightning

274

120

67

11

Lightning

274

120

1

68

1

Earthquake

365

0

1

69

1

Earthquake

365

0

1

7

72

1

Earthquake

365

0

Generator fails, no power

1

1

82

1

Earthquake

365

0

114

Generator fails, no power

1

1

83

1

Earthquake

365

0

114

Generator fails, no power

1

1

84

9

Aging

365

0

114

Generator fails, no power

1

1

85

2

Lack of maintenance

365

0

116

6

2

86

14

Traffic/traffic indicent

365

0

6

2

87

4

365

0

6

2

88

1

Excessive rainfall causes road
washout
Earthquake

365

0

6

2

89

16

Forest fire resulting in evacuation

273

181

141

Access dangerous, delayed or not
possible
Access dangerous, delayed or not
possible
Access dangerous, delayed or not
possible
Access dangerous, delayed or not
possible
PLC offline

1

1

94

10

Voltage fluctuation

365

0

141

PLC offline

1

1

95

1

Earthquake

365

0

Power tunnel

176

Power tunnel collapse

1

5

111

1

Earthquake

365

0

26

Penstock

178

Penstock rupture

1

9

114

1

Earthquake

365

0

28

12

Powerhouse Access

118

2

152

14

Traffic/traffic indicent

365

0

12

Powerhouse Access

118

6

2

153

4

0

12

Powerhouse Access

118

6

2

154

1

Excessive rainfall causes road
washout
Earthquake

365

28

365

0

28

12

Powerhouse Access

118

6

2

155

16

Forest fire resulting in evacuation

365

0

44

27

CMS Grid

188

Access dangerous, delayed or not
possible
Access dangerous, delayed or not
possible
Access dangerous, delayed or not
possible
Access dangerous, delayed or not
possible
Grid failure

6

28

1

1

156

5

Ice storm

59

0

44

27

CMS Grid

188

Grid failure

1

1

157

7

Wind storm

365

0

44

27

CMS Grid

188

Grid failure

1

1

158

16

Forest fire destroys infrastructure

273

120

44

27

CMS Grid

188

Grid failure

1

1

159

11

Lightning destroys infrastructure

273

120

Voltage fluctuation

272

ReservoirLeve
lID
43

ReservoirLevelTy
peID
27

ReservoirLevelNam
e
Rainbow Grid

OperatingStat
eID
190

43

27

Rainbow Grid

190

43

27

Rainbow Grid

43

27

OperatingStateName
Grid failure

OperatingStateTy
peID
1

ImpactType
ID
1

CausalFacto
rID
160

CausalFactorTyp
eID
5

Grid failure

1

1

161

7

190

Grid failure

1

1

162

Rainbow Grid

190

Grid failure

1

1

CausalFactorName

MaxDa
te
59

MinDa
te
0

Wind storm

365

0

16

Forest fire destroys infrastructure

273

120

163

11

Lightning destroys infrastructure

273

120

Ice storm

46

1

Gate Pier

195

Failure of gate pier

1

1

164

1

Earthquake

365

0

47

23

Res El Sensor 3

210

No Reading

1

1

180

1

Earthquake

365

0

47

23

Res El Sensor 3

210

No Reading

1

1

181

12

365

0

47

23

Res El Sensor 3

210

No Reading

1

1

182

2

Rodent activity causes short in
wiring
Lack of maintenance

365

0

47

23

Res El Sensor 3

210

No Reading

1

1

183

9

Aging

365

0

47

23

Res El Sensor 3

208

Wrong Reading

8

3

184

2

Failed to recalibrate seasonally

365

0

47

23

Res El Sensor 3

208

Wrong Reading

8

3

185

17

365

0

37

23

SPOG1Position_L

128

Wrong Reading

8

3

186

5

High or low temps result in
decalibration
Ice buildup

59

0

37

23

SPOG1Position_L

128

Wrong Reading

8

3

189

2

Lack of maintenance

365

0

37

23

SPOG1Position_L

128

Wrong Reading

8

3

190

1

Earthquake

365

0

39

23

SPOG2Position_L

134

Wrong Reading

8

3

191

5

59

0

39

23

SPOG2Position_L

134

Wrong Reading

8

3

192

2

Ice buildup causes sensor to
decalibrate
Lack of maintenance

365

0

39

23

SPOG2Position_L

134

Wrong Reading

8

3

193

1

Earthquake

365

0

36

23

SPOG1Position_R

131

Wrong Reading

8

3

195

2

365

0

36

23

SPOG1Position_R

131

Wrong Reading

8

3

196

1

Lack of maintenance, sensor
deteriorates
Earthquake

365

0

36

23

SPOG1Position_R

131

Wrong Reading

8

3

197

12

Rodent activity

365

0

38

23

SPOG2Position_R

137

Wrong Reading

8

3

198

2

Lack of maintenance

365

0

38

23

SPOG2Position_R

137

Wrong Reading

8

3

199

1

Earthquake

365

0

38

23

SPOG2Position_R

137

Wrong Reading

8

3

200

12

Rodent activity

365

0

31

23

Res El Sensor 2

211

Wrong Reading

8

3

204

2

Failed to recalibrate seasonally

365

0

31

23

Res El Sensor 2

211

Wrong Reading

8

3

205

17

365

0

31

23

Res El Sensor 2

213

No Reading

1

1

206

1

High or low temps result in
decalibration
Earthquake

365

0

31

23

Res El Sensor 2

213

No Reading

1

1

207

12

Rodent activity

365

0
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ReservoirLeve
lID
31

ReservoirLevelTy
peID
23

ReservoirLevelNam
e
Res El Sensor 2

OperatingStat
eID
213

31

23

Res El Sensor 2

213

30

23

Res El Sensor 1

30

23

30
30

OperatingStateName
No Reading

OperatingStateTy
peID
1

ImpactType
ID
1

CausalFacto
rID
208

CausalFactorTyp
eID
2

No Reading

1

1

209

9

217

Wrong Reading

8

3

210

2

Res El Sensor 1

217

Wrong Reading

8

3

211

17

23

Res El Sensor 1

219

No Reading

1

1

212

1

23

Res El Sensor 1

219

No Reading

1

1

213

12

30

23

Res El Sensor 1

219

No Reading

1

1

214

30

23

Res El Sensor 1

219

No Reading

1

1

45

28

Inflow forecasting error

8

28

194

Inflow forecasting error

8

48

29

215

Staff unavailable

48

29

CMS Inflow
Forecast
CMS Inflow
Forecast
Site Staff
Availability
Site Staff
Availability

194

45

215

Staff unavailable

CausalFactorName

MaxDa
te
365

MinDa
te
0

Aging

365

0

Failed to recalibrate seasonally

365

0

High or low temps result in
decalibration
Earthquake

365

0

365

0

Rodent activity

365

0

2

Lack of maintenance

365

0

215

9

Aging

365

0

3

216

20

Operator fatigue

365

1

3

217

21

Uncertainty

365

1

6

2

218

22

Weekend or evening

365

1

6

2

219

23

Staff are busy and unable to
access site

365

1

Lack of maintenance

274

Table C2: Component-Level database components for Cheakamus System
ReservoirL
evelID
13

ReservoirLeve
lTypeID
2

13

2

13

2

13

ReservoirLev
elName
Gate 1

Component
LevelID
26

ComponentLev
elTypeID
1

ComponentLev
elName
Gate Hoist 1

Gate 1

28

2

Skinplate

Gate 1

31

5

Gearbox

2

Gate 1

32

10

13

2

Gate 1

33

11

13

2

Gate 1

34

12

13

2

Gate 1

43

13

2

Gate 1

13

2

14

2

14

OperatingS
tateID
183

OperatingStateName
Normal

OperatingStat
eTypeID
2

ImpactT
ypeID
4

CausalFactor
TypeID
25

23

Normal

2

4

35

Normal

2

4

Motor

36

Normal

2

37

Normal

38

16

Structural
Supports
Hoist Gate
Connection 1
Thrustor Brake

69

55

10

Backup Motor

Gate 1

57

19

Gate 1 Opening

Gate 2

16

1

Gate Hoist 2

2

Gate 2

18

2

14

2

Gate 2

21

5

14

2

Gate 2

22

14

2

Gate 2

23

14

2

Gate 2

24

12

14

2

Gate 2

44

14

2

Gate 2

14

2

Gate 2

8

3

8
8

CausalFactorName
None

Min
Date
0

Max
Date
365

25

None

0

365

25

None

0

365

4

25

None

0

365

2

4

25

None

0

365

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

165

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

179

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

48

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

Skinplate

44

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

Gearbox

57

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

10

Motor

58

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

11

76

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

65

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

16

Structural
Supports
Hoist Gate
Connection 2
Thrustor Brake

74

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

56

10

Backup Motor

167

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

58

19

Gate 2 Opening

181

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

Turbine 1

36

13

Head Cover

80

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

3

Turbine 1

37

14

Wicket Gates

83

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

3

Turbine 1

38

15

Generator

85

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

10

3

Turbine 2

39

13

Head Cover

87

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

10

3

Turbine 2

40

14

Wicket Gates

90

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

10

3

Turbine 2

41

15

Generator

92

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

15

7

46

1

Hoist

146

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365

15

7

Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet

47

2

Skinplate

148

Normal

2

4

25

None

0

365
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ReservoirL
evelID
15

ReservoirLeve
lTypeID
7

15

7

15

7

15

7

15

7

13

2

ReservoirLev
elName
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Gate 1

Component
LevelID
48

ComponentLev
elTypeID
10

13

2

14

ComponentLev
elName
Motor

OperatingS
tateID
150

49

11

Support

152

50

12

51

12

Hoist Gate
Connection
Thrustor Brake

54

5

Gearbox

26

1

Gate Hoist 1

20

Gate 1

26

1

Gate Hoist 1

20

2

Gate 2

16

1

Gate Hoist 2

94

14

2

Gate 2

16

1

Gate Hoist 2

94

13

2

Gate 1

28

2

Skinplate

13

2

Gate 1

28

2

14

2

Gate 2

18

14

2

Gate 2

18

13

2

Gate 1

13

2

14
14

OperatingStateName
Normal

OperatingStat
eTypeID
2

ImpactT
ypeID
4

CausalFactor
TypeID
25

Normal

2

4

25

155

Normal

2

4

157

Normal

2

160

Normal

24

Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields

Skinplate

24

2

Skinplate

2

Skinplate

31

5

Gate 1

31

2

Gate 2

2

Gate 2

13

2

13

CausalFactorName
None

Min
Date
0

Max
Date
365

None

0

365

25

None

0

365

4

25

None

0

365

2

4

25

None

0

365

3

1

5

Ice force on gate

1

69

3

1

3

Debris force on gate

120

274

3

1

5

Ice force on gate

0

69

3

1

3

Debris force on gate

120

274

4

1

3

Debris force

120

274

Steel yields

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

95

Steel yields

4

1

3

Debris force on gate

120

274

95

Steel yields

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

Gearbox

34

Gearbox stripped

4

1

1

Movement of gears

0

365

5

Gearbox

34

Gearbox stripped

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

21

5

Gearbox

96

Gearbox stripped

4

1

1

Movement of gears

0

365

21

5

Gearbox

96

Gearbox stripped

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

Gate 1

26

1

Gate Hoist 1

20

3

1

8

365

Gate 1

26

1

Gate Hoist 1

20

3

1

8

Both motors engage
resulting in overforce
Overforce alarm fails

0

2

0

365

14

2

Gate 2

16

1

Gate Hoist 2

94

3

1

8

365

2

Gate 2

16

1

Gate Hoist 2

94

3

1

8

Both motors engage
resulting in overforce
Overforce alarm fails

0

14

0

365

13

2

Gate 1

32

10

Motor

40

Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Motor Failure

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

13

2

Gate 1

32

10

Motor

40

Motor Failure

4

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

13

2

Gate 1

32

10

Motor

40

Motor Failure

4

1

9

Old motor

1

364

13

2

Gate 1

55

10

Backup Motor

166

Motor Failure

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

13

2

Gate 1

55

10

Backup Motor

166

Motor Failure

4

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

13

2

Gate 1

55

10

Backup Motor

166

Motor Failure

4

1

9

Old motor

0

365
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ReservoirL
evelID
14

ReservoirLeve
lTypeID
2

14

2

14

ReservoirLev
elName
Gate 2

Component
LevelID
22

ComponentLev
elTypeID
10

ComponentLev
elName
Motor

OperatingS
tateID
97

Gate 2

22

10

Motor

97

2

Gate 2

22

10

Motor

14

2

Gate 2

56

10

14

2

Gate 2

56

14

2

Gate 2

56

13

2

Gate 1

13

2

Motor Failure

OperatingStat
eTypeID
4

ImpactT
ypeID
1

CausalFactor
TypeID
2

Min
Date
0

Max
Date
365

Motor Failure

4

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

97

Motor Failure

4

1

9

Old motor

0

365

Backup Motor

168

Motor Failure

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

10

Backup Motor

168

Motor Failure

10

Backup Motor

168

Motor Failure

4

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

4

1

9

Old motor

0

365

33

11

41

Gate 1

33

11

2

Gate 2

23

11

2

Gate 2

23

11

13

2

Gate 1

33

11

14

2

Gate 2

23

11

13

2

Gate 1

34

12

14

2

Gate 2

24

12

13

2

Gate 1

43

16

Structural
Supports
Structural
Supports
Structural
Supports
Structural
Supports
Structural
Supports
Structural
Supports
Hoist Gate
Connection 1
Hoist Gate
Connection 2
Thrustor Brake

Supports deform and gate
collapses
Supports deform and gate
collapses
Supports deform and gate
collapses
Supports deform and gate
collapses
Supports deform and gate
becomes immoveable
Supports deform and gate
becomes immoveable
Gate connection snaps

5

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

5

1

8

Overforce alarm fails

0

365

14
14

5

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

5

1

8

Overforce alarm fails

0

365

4

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

4

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

3

1

9

Aging

0

365

100

Gate connection snaps

3

1

9

Aging

0

365

70

Brake fails, gate closes

3

1

9

Aging

0

365

13

2

Gate 1

43

16

14

2

Gate 2

44

16

Thrustor Brake

70

Brake fails, gate closes

3

1

8

Feedback failure

0

365

Thrustor Brake

101

Brake fails, gate closes

3

1

9

Aging

0

365

14

2

Gate 2

44

16

Thrustor Brake

101

Brake fails, gate closes

3

1

8

Feedback failure

0

365

13

2

Gate 1

57

19

Gate 1 Opening

180

Opening is blocked

2

5

3

120

274

Gate 2

58

19

Gate 2 Opening

182

Opening is blocked

2

5

3

120

274

Turbine 1

36

13

Head Cover

81

Bolt fatigue, head cover failure

5

9

2

Debris accumulates at gate
opening
Debris accumulates at gate
opening
Lack of maintenance

14

2

8

3

0

365

8

3

Turbine 1

37

14

Wicket Gates

82

Wicket gates fail closed

1

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

10

3

Turbine 2

39

13

Head Cover

88

Bolt fatigue, head cover failure

5

9

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

15

7

48

10

Motor

151

Motor Failure

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

15

7

48

10

Motor

151

Motor Failure

4

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

15

7

48

10

Motor

151

Motor Failure

4

1

9

Old motor

0

365

15

7

Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet

49

11

Support

184

Supports deform and gate
collapses

5

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

41
98
98
42
99
43

OperatingStateName

CausalFactorName
Lack of maintenance
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ReservoirL
evelID
15

ReservoirLeve
lTypeID
7

15

7

15

7

15

7

15

7

15

7

15

7

15

7

15

7

13

2

ReservoirLev
elName
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Gate 1

14

2

15

7

15

7

15

7

15

7

15

7

8

Component
LevelID
49

ComponentLev
elTypeID
11

ComponentLev
elName
Support

OperatingS
tateID
184

OperatingStat
eTypeID
5

ImpactT
ypeID
1

CausalFactor
TypeID
8

Min
Date
0

Max
Date
365

49

11

Support

185

50

12

156

51

12

Hoist Gate
Connection
Thrustor Brake

Supports deform and gate
collapses
Supports deform and gate
becomes immoveable
Gate connection snaps

4

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

3

1

9

Aging

0

365

158

Brake fails, gate closes

3

1

9

Aging

0

365

51

12

Thrustor Brake

54

5

Gearbox

158

Brake fails, gate closes

159

Gearbox stripped

3

1

8

Feedback failure

0

365

4

1

1

Earthquake

0

365

54

5

Gearbox

159

Gearbox stripped

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

47

2

Skinplate

149

Steel yields

4

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

47

2

Skinplate

26

1

Gate Hoist 1

149
20

Steel yields

4

1

3

Debris force on gate

0

365

3

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

3

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

3

1

8

365

1

8

Both motors engage
resulting in overforce
Feedback failure

0

3

0

365

3

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

3

1

5

Ice force on gate

0

365

3

1

3

Debris force on gate

0

365

86

Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Steel yields, hoists fail, gate
fails closed
Load Rejection

Gate 2

16

1

Gate Hoist 2

94

46

1

Hoist

186

46

1

Hoist

186

46

1

Hoist

186

46

1

Hoist

186

46

1

Hoist

186

3

Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Low Level
Outlet
Turbine 1

38

15

Generator

1

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

10

3

Turbine 2

41

15

Generator

93

Load Rejection

1

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

10

3

Turbine 2

40

14

Wicket Gates

Wicket gates fail closed

1

1

2

Lack of maintenance

0

365

216

OperatingStateName

CausalFactorName
Feedback failure

278

Appendix D: Operating States Database for Simplified System
Table D1: Reservoir-Level database components for Simplified System
Ind

Reservoir
LevelId

ReservoirLevel
TypeId

ReservoirLevel
Name

Operating
StateId

18_1

18

4

PLC/RTU

139

18_2

18

4

PLC/RTU

139

Operating
StateTypeId

Impact
TypeId

Min

Max

Avg

UnitId

Causal
FactorId

CausalFactor
TypeId

PLC offline

1

1

1

24

6

2

64

10

PLC offline

1

1

1

24

6

2

65

6

2

4

48

12

1

86

6

2

4

48

12

1

6

2

4

48

12

1

OperatingStateName

Access dangerous,
delayed or not possible
Access dangerous,
delayed or not possible
Access dangerous,
delayed or not possible

CausalFactor
Name
Voltage
Fluctuation

Max
Date

Min
Date

365

0

1

Earthquake

365

0

14

Traffic

365

0

88

1

Earthquake

365

0

89

16

Forest Fire

273

181

29_1

29

12

Dam Access

116

29_2

29

12

Dam Access

116

29_3

29

12

Dam Access

116

42_1

42

26

Penstock

178

Penstock rupture

1

9

60

365

90

1

114

1

Earthquake

365

0

44_1

44

27

Grid

188

Grid failure

1

1

0.04

7

0.167

1

157

7

Wind storm

365

0

44_2

44

27

Grid

188

Grid failure

1

1

0.04

7

0.167

1

158

16

Forest Fire

273

120

30_1

30

23

217

Wrong Reading

8

3

10

100

25

11

211

17

Temperature

365

0

30_2

30

23

219

No Reading

1

1

0.167

5

1

1

212

1

Earthquake

365

0

30_3

30

23

45_1

45

28

48_1

48

29

48_2

48

29

18_3

18

4

29_4

29

12

Reservoir Elevation
Sensor 1
Reservoir Elevation
Sensor 1
Reservoir Elevation
Sensor 1
CMS Inflow
Forecast
Site Staff
Availability
Site Staff
Availability

219

No Reading

1

1

0.167

5

1

1

214

2

Lack of
Maintenance

365

0

194

Inflow forecasting error

8

3

-3

3

0

8

217

21

Uncertainty

365

1

215

Staff unavailable

6

2

1

24

4

2

218

22

Timing

365

1

215

Staff unavailable

6

2

1

24

4

2

219

23

Timing

365

1

PLCRTU

138

Functional

2

4

0

0

0

1

252

25

None

365

0

Dam Access

115

Typical access time

2

2

2

4

2.5

2

266

25

None

365

1

218

Reading correct

2

4

0

0

0

4

268

25

None

365

0

1

276

25

None

365

0

30_4

30

23

Reservoir Elevation
Sensor 1

42_2

42

26

Penstock

177

Normal operation

2

4

0

0

0

44_3

44

27

Grid

187

Normal Operation

2

4

0

0

0

1

277

25

None

365

1

45_2

45

28

192

Inflow forecast normal

2

4

0

0

0

11

279

25

None

365

0

48_3

48

29

214

Staff available

2

4

0

0

0

1

280

25

None

365

0

18_4

18

4

PLC/RTU

139

PLC offline

1

1

1

24

6

2

292

11

Lightning

273

120

30_5

30

23

Reservoir Elevation
Sensor 1

219

No Reading

1

1

0.167

5

1

1

213

12

Rodent
Activity

365

0

44_4

44

27

Grid

188

Grid failure

1

1

0.04

7

0.16

1

159

11

Lightning

273

120

CMS Inflow
Forecast
Site Staff
Availability

279

Table D2: Component-Level database components for Simplified System
Identifier

Reservoir
LevelID

836_1

8

Reservoir
Level
TypeID
3

838_1

8

3

836_2

8

838_2

Reservoir
Level
Name
Turbine 1

Component
LevelID
36

Component
LevelTypeI
D
13

Component
LevelName

Operating
StateID

Head Cover

81

Turbine 1

38

15

Generator

86

Bolt fatigue,
reservoir
drained through
turbine hole
Load Rejection

3

Turbine 1

36

13

Head Cover

80

Normal

2

4

0

0

0.2
5
0

8

3

Turbine 1

38

15

Generator

85

Normal

2

4

0

0

0

248

25

None

1359_1

13

2

Gate 1

59

19

Normal

2

4

0

0

0

281

25

None

1

365

13

2

Gate 1

59

19

223

5

10

80

20

282

3

Debris

90

334

13

2

Gate 1

60

5

4

1

0.5

120

7

283

1

Earthquake

1

365

1360_2

13

2

Gate 1

60

5

Components
failing in
place

225

4

1

0.5

120

7

284

2

Maintenance

1

365

1361_1

13

2

Gate 1

61

11

226

2

4

0

0

0

285

25

Normal

1

365

1361_2

13

2

Gate 1

61

11

Components
failing open
Components
failing open

Gate is blocked
by debris
Components of
the gate fail
causing it to
remain in place
Components of
the gate fail
causing it to
remain in place
Normal

1

1360_1

Gate
opening
Gate
opening
Components
failing in
place

222

1359_2

5

1

210

730

240

286

1

Earthquake

1

365

1361_3

13

2

Gate 1

61

11

Components
failing open

227

5

1

210

730

240

287

8

Feedback
Failure

1

365

1362_1

13

2

Gate 1

62

1

228

2

4

0

0

0

288

25

Normal

1

365

1362_2

13

2

Gate 1

62

1

Components
failing
closed
Components
failing
closed

Components of
the gate
collapse and
water is
released
Components of
the gate
collapse and
water is
released
Normal

3

1

1

120

20

289

9

Aging

1

365

1362_3

13

2

Gate 1

62

1

Components
failing
closed

229

3

1

1

120

20

290

5

Ice

1

59

1362_4

13

2

Gate 1

62

1

Components
failing
closed

229

3

1

1

120

20

291

8

Feedback
Failure

1

365

1360_3

13

2

Gate 1

60

5

Components
failing in
place

224

Components of
the gate fail
causing it to
close
Components of
the gate fail
causing it to
close
Components of
the gate fail
causing it to
close
Normal

2

4

0

0

0
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25

None

1

365

225

227

229

Operating
StateName

Operating
StateType
ID
5

Impact
TypeI
D
9

Min

Max

Avg

365

730

365

1

1

0.1

7

Causal
FactorID

CausalFactor
Name

Min
Date

Max
Date

117

Causal
Factor
TypeID
2

Maintenance

1

365

201

2

Maintenance

1

365

246

25

None

1

365

1

365

280

Appendix E: Simulation Script Organization and Discussion
The general description of the steps within the simulation model code is shown in Figure .
The complete code is presented in Appendix E. The following sub-sections provide
additional information about the equations used in the simulation model.
The first section of the code is entitled “1. Initialization”, where required packages are
imported and data files are read in to be utilized within the code. The simulation model
requires several supporting files, including input CSV’s containing information such as
synthetic inflows, fish flow requirements, database data, baseline operating conditions (no
failure), and rating curves for the spillway. In addition to this, several Python packages
must be installed prior to running. These are listed below:
•

numpy

•

pandas

•

time

•

datetime

•

sys

•

argparse

•

os

•

random

Many of the aforementioned packages are available from an open source Anaconda3
installation at https://www.anaconda.com/distribution/. Most of the packages can be
installed easily using conda install in the command prompt. In addition to these packages,
the sdpy project must also be imported, as well as scenarios.py. These files and all
necessary input files are available in the electronic appendix in the Dam_Safety_Model
folder.
In the initialization section, arguments are also defined that allow the program to be called
from the command prompt with a user-specified seed number and set the number of
years/iterations (𝑁𝑌𝑟) to be simulated. The seed number represents the scenario number
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and for the simplified system it can vary between 0 and 552,960 (the total number of
scenarios).
The following portion of the code is entitled “2. Generating Seeds”. The seed number is
used to retrieve the scenario operating state identifiers as shown in the example scenario in
the previous section. These operating state identifiers are used to extract the pertinent
database information for the scenario of interest and convert the information into MonteCarlo parameters for simulation. The “boolop” parameter is used to determine whether a
seed should be randomized or not. It may be set equal to zero for script testing purposes,
which will set all randomized components of the code to a single value – start dates are set
to zero, start years are set sequentially from zero, average values are chosen for impacts,
and all impacts occur on day 1 of the simulation. If “boolop” is set equal to one, a complete
Monte-Carlo randomization of the inputs is performed. Starting dates from the inflow
sequences are randomized using a start day (0-364) and a start year (0 to the number of
synthetic inflow years simulated) – these can then be used to select the inflows for the
simulation. The impacts for each operating state are randomized using the triangular
distribution, with the minimum, maximum and average values as the inputs. Timing of
impacts is also randomized, with impacts that have the same causal factor occurring on the
same day except for maintenance and aging issues. The first impact begins on day 1 and
subsequent impacts can occur on any day between day 1 and day 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥. For the case study,
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 is set equal to the sum of the outage lengths generated for the iteration being
considered. Truncating the maximum timing allows for the impacts of each operating state
to be realized and, if possible, recovered from, during the simulation time frame. 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 is
selected with the goal of increasing the number of “complete iterations”, where all events
in a scenario both occur and affect one another. This will depend on the system being
modelled and how flashy the reservoir is.
It is important to note that two runs were simulated for the case study (see details in Section
4.5.2). Some of the differences between functions within the two runs are also described
throughout the remaining text in this section.
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The next section of the simulation code is entitled “3. Initializing Supporting Functions
and Arrays” sets up functions and arrays to be utilized within the simulation model. The
supporting functions are not directly part of the system dynamics model but may be called
by it many times during the simulation. The supporting functions are optimized, if

Figure E1: Simulation model process steps
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possible, using “jit” – a “just-in-time” compiler that optimizes their performance. This
ensures these functions, which are called many times in a given simulation, are executed
as quickly as possible. The functions include:
•

Stage-storage curve (SSC) which determines reservoir elevation El from storage S
as in Equation 25, and it’s reverse (SSCRev) which finds the roots of Equation 25
to determine storage from elevation. These functions are located at line 724 and
731 of the code at the end of this Appendix.
𝐸𝑙 = −1.1201𝑒 − 05 𝑆 2 + 0.032473 𝑆 + 364.6572

•

(𝐸. 1)

Stage-discharge curve for the free overflow sections (OTC), which is calculated
using Equation 26, but is manipulated in the base case by increasing the spillway
crest elevation by 2m and multiplying the result by 0.3 to represent a scaled down
capacity of the free overflow structures in the base case. This was done to induce a
larger number of dam failures for the proof-of-concept, since the spillway capacity
of the real Cheakamus Dam is generally sufficient enough to prevent major
consequences in even the most extreme scenarios. The code representing the two
different overtopping curves for the base case and the dam safety improved case
can be found on lines 734 and 2052, respectively, in the code at the end of this
Appendix.

𝑄𝑂𝑇 = −35.75 𝐸𝑙 3 + 40896.27 𝐸𝑙 2 − 15593240.1 𝐸𝑙 + 1981715583.1
•

(𝐸. 2)

Maximum flow calculator for the gate (SPOGMaxFlow), which follows the
piecewise Equation __ (see line 763 of the code at the end of this Appendix). The
maximum flow through the gate is a function of the reservoir level 𝑅𝑆𝐸 and the
gate availability 𝑎𝑣, and was calculated in excel from the combined rating curve
for two Cheakamus gates.
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𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐺𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 (𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 1)
0
𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 367.28
19.1(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 7011.7
𝑖𝑓 367.28 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 367.5
37.3(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 13715.8
𝑖𝑓 367.5 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 367.8
=
49.7(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 18252
𝑖𝑓 367.8 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 369
2
2.15(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 1496.34(𝑅𝑆𝐸) + 258875.4 𝑖𝑓 369 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 381.6
𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐸 ≥ 381.6
{861.1 + 728.9
𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐺𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 (𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 0) = 0
•

(𝐸. 3)

Maximum flow calculator for the turbine (fncTurbineMaxFlow), as per Equation
E.4. This function computes the maximum flow through the turbine for a given
reservoir level, and was calculated from the combined gross head-power-flow
curves from the two Cheakamus units (see line 748 in the code at the end of this
Appendix.).
𝑇𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 (𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 1)
0
13.98(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 5075.44
=
18.02(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 6551.46
{ 65

𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 363.05
𝑖𝑓 363.05 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 365.05
𝑖𝑓 365.05 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 367.05
𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐸 ≥ 367.05

𝑇𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 (𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 0) = 0

•

(𝐸. 4)

A function to convert the spillway flow and reservoir elevation to gate instructions
(GateInstr at line 782 in the code at the end of this Appendix) and a function to
convert gate position and reservoir level to gate flow (GateFlowClac at line 828).
These functions utilize a simple two-dimensional interpolation from the combined
spillway gate rating curves provided by BC Hydro. The relationships between the
maximum gate opening and discharge are shown in Appendix A.
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•

A function which finds the value of 𝑦0 by linear interpolation using the two closest
point pairs (𝑥1 , 𝑦1), (𝑥2 , 𝑦2 ) to a given 𝑥0 , following Equation E.5 (interpolate at
line 814 in the code at the end of this Appendix):
𝑦0 = 𝑦1 + (𝑥0 − 𝑥1 )

•

𝑦2 − 𝑦1
𝑥2 − 𝑥1

(𝐸. 5)

A function to calculate the date reference number that is used to determine the time
of year for reservoir level limits and minimum flow releases (dayrefs at line 923) –
this simply uses the startday (0 to 365) and the time step to determine the day of
the year.

•

A function to get the minimum flow release for the upcoming days (getfishflow)
which simply inserts the day-reference index into the fish flow array (line 902 in
the code at the end of this Appendix)

•

A function to generate an availability array for a component based on the total
outage time (availarray at line 1033) – this simply converts an interger into an array
of zeros and ones that represent whether a component is available or unavailable
over a 14 day window from the current day – for example an input value of 8 would
mean the component is unavailable for the next 8 days, and would produce an array
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1].

•

The main operations planning algorithm, which takes several key inputs (inflow
forecast, reservoir elevation, day references, component availabilities and reservoir
elevation limits) and determines the corresponding operating instructions for the
system to ensure minimum flow releases are met and reservoir level restrictions are
adhered to if possible (OpsPlan at line 960 in the code at the end of this Appendix).
This follows a similar if-then-else type algorithm as presented in Figure 3-14, but
with power flow releases added – see Figure . The algorithm begins by assuming
the minimum fish flow is released and the remainder of the inflow is passed through
the powerhouse (up to the maximum) for a 14-day window from the current date.
The resultant reservoir levels are then checked, adjusted and re-checked to ensure
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the operating instructions result in reservoir levels that are within the specified
normal maximum (NMax) and minimum (NMin). To ensure enough water is
available for the winter low-flow period, the normal minimum reservoir level was
adjusted to El. 370 m for the months of November and December for the purposes
of the modelling.

Figure E2: Operations Planning algorithm for simulation model
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•

A function to retrieve the normal operating maximum and minimum reservoir
elevation corresponding to the reference day (GetNMax at line 1076 in the code at
the end of this Appendix) – this simply inserts the day reference (day of the year)
into an array containing the normal maximum and minimum levels for each day of
the year.

The next section of code (4. Defining sdpy functions) contains the details of the system
dynamics model, broken down into sectors. The functions for the hydraulic system state
are shown in 4.1, the sensors in 4.2, the disturbances in 4.3, operations in 4.4, gate actuators
in 4.5 and turbine actuators in 4.6. The output_saving function (line 1565) is used to store
information from the model in memory for later post-processing. The model sectors are
described in sub-sections 4.4.1.1 to 4.4.1.6.
Section 5 of the code (line 2005) is where the base case model is run. This section utilizes
the features of the sdpy package to run the simulation for each of the iterations. Stocks must
be re-set to their initial value following each iteration. Section 6 (line 2035) contains some
re-initiation of key functions to reflect the changes in the dam safety improved case and
also saves the results from the first run (base case) under different names for postprocessing. Section 6 then re-runs the model with the same inputs as the base case for the
dam safety improved case.
Section 7 of the script (line 2220) contains post-processing of the data, which involves the
analysis of event dependency and saving of pertinent data from the scenario into “.npz”
file formats. This format represents a compressed dictionary of arrays that are easily loaded
into python for future analysis and plotting.
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1. """
2. SIMULATION SCRIPT
3.
4. This code contains the necessary script to run the simplified system dynamics mo
del,
5. with seed inputs as defined by the user, as well as NYr input to set the number
of
6. iterations. Flush_period argument should remain at 1.
7.
8. @author: Leanna King
9. """
10.
11. """
12. 1. INITIALIZATION
13.
14. -Importing necessary directories
15. -Reading and organizing input files
16.
17. """
18.
19. import time
20. t0=time.time()
21. from numba import njit, jit
22. #from scipy.interpolate import interp2d
23. #from scipy.interpolate import interp1d
24. import numpy as np
25. import pandas as pd
26. from datetime import datetime
27. import sdpy
28. import sys
29. import argparse
30. from scenarios import all_scenarios
31. import os
32.
33.
34. def datafile_path(filename):
35.
return os.path.join(os.path.dirname(sys.argv[0]), 'data', filename)
36.
37. def RangeConstrainedParam(name, minvalue, maxvalue):
38.
def parse(s):
39.
n=int(s)
40.
if n < minvalue or n > maxvalue:
41.
raise ValueError()
42.
return n
43.
parse.__name__ = name
44.
return parse
45.
46. maxseednum = len(all_scenarios)-1
47. parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='')
48. parser.add_argument('--NYr',
49.
type=RangeConstrainedParam('NYr', 1, 10000),
50.
default=5)
51. parser.add_argument('--seednum',
52.
type=RangeConstrainedParam('seednum', 0, maxseednum),
53.
default=301476) #813840 represents normal conditions
54. parser.add_argument('--flush_period',
55.
type=RangeConstrainedParam('flush_period', 1, 10000),
56.
default=1)
57. args = parser.parse_args()
58.
59.
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60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

model = sdpy.Sdmodel()
NYr=args.NYr
seednum = args.seednum
year=0
boolop=1 #Set to 1 for randomized, zero for non-randomized.
seedgen=1 #Set to 1 to generate seed, set to zero to read a previously generated
seed file.

NormalRSEs=pd.read_csv(datafile_path(r'BaselineRSEs.csv'), header=0).values
NormalTBFs=pd.read_csv(datafile_path(r'BaselineTBFs.csv'), header=0).values
NormalSPOGs=pd.read_csv(datafile_path(r'BaselineSPOGs.csv'), header=0).values
NormalOTs=pd.read_csv(datafile_path(r'BaselineOTs.csv'), header=0).values
NormalTSs=NormalSPOGs
#Inflow timeseries - SYNTHETIC - 10,374 years
Inflow_year=np.loadtxt(datafile_path("SyntheticInflow_Years.txt"), delimiter=","
)
InflowJan1Start=np.zeros((365*2,10373))
for yr in range(10373):
InflowJan1Start[0:365, yr]=Inflow_year[:,yr]
InflowJan1Start[365:730,yr]=Inflow_year[:,yr+1]

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84. """
85. 2. GENERATING SEEDS
86.
87. -The seeds set the randomized parameters for each NYr using a MonteCarlo framework
88. -Seeds can be loaded from a previous output file if seedgen=0
89. -Or, create a seed from the seed number if seedgen=1
90. """
91.
92. ScenarioRL=datafile_path("S_RLAll-Inds-d.csv")
93. ScenarioCL=datafile_path("S_CLAll-Inds-d.csv")
94.
95. #print("Seednum: "+str(seednum))
96.
97. deltatmax=40 #set this based on system, or make it variable depending on number
of adverse OS's
98.
99. if seedgen==0:
100.
Seeds=np.load(str("Outputs-"+str(seednum)+"-e.npz"))
101.
102.
if seedgen==1:
103.
import time
104.
import random
105.
106.
#Defining dictionaries
107.
#Reservoir Level components
108.
RLev={13: "G",
109.
8: "T",
110.
18: "PLR",
111.
29: "ACC",
112.
42: "PN",
113.
44: "GD",
114.
30: "SN",
115.
48: "STF",
116.
45: "IF"
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117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

}
#Impact Types
Impacts={1: "o",
2: "d",
3: "e",
5: "bl",
4: "n",
9: "ur"
}
#OS Types
OSTypes={1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
8:
}

"f",
"n",
"fc",
"fip",
"c",
"d",
"e"

#Component level components
CLType={13: "HC",
15: "GEN",
19: "GO",
5: "FIP",
11: "FO",
1: "FC",
}
CFType={1: "eq",
2: "mt",
3: "deb",
4: "ra",
5: "ice",
7: "wnd",
8: "fb",
9: "age",
10: "vf",
11: "ltg",
12: "rat",
13: "dsg",
14: "trf",
15: "wsh",
16: "fir",
17: "tem",
18: "wha",
20: "ofa",
21: "unc",
22: "tim",
23: "emr",
25: "non",
}
CFDates={1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
7:
8:

[0,365],
[0,365],
[90,334],
[0,365],
[0, 60],
[0,365],
[0,365],
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178.
9: [0,365],
179.
10: [0,365],
180.
11: [90, 334],
181.
12: [0,365],
182.
13: [0,365],
183.
14: [0,365],
184.
15: [0,365],
185.
16: [151, 304],
186.
17: [0,365],
187.
18: [0,365],
188.
20: [0,365],
189.
21: [0,365],
190.
22: [0,365],
191.
23: [0,365],
192.
25: [0,365],
193.
}
194.
#
@jit
195.
def gen_avg(expected_avg, n, a, b, boolop):
196.
if boolop==1: #random
197.
out=np.random.uniform(a, b, n)
198.
if boolop==0: #nonrandom
199.
out=np.ones(n)*expected_avg
200.
return out
201.
#
@jit
202.
def dayrefs(Startdays, timestep, NYr):
203.
daynum=Startdays+int(timestep) #STARTDAYS CONTAINS 1365 STARTING DAY REF FOR EACH INFLOW SEQUENCE
204.
dayref365=np.zeros((365,NYr))
205.
dayref365[0, :]=daynum
206.
for t in range(364): #Converts vensim date into numbers 1365 to represent dates in the model
207.
for yr in range(NYr):
208.
if dayref365[t, yr]+1<365:
209.
dayref365[t+1, yr]=dayref365[t, yr]+1
210.
else: dayref365[t+1, yr]=0
211.
return dayref365
212.
#
@jit
213.
def randintswitch(low, high, NYears ,boolop):
214.
if boolop==1: #randomly sets int between low and high
215.
out=np.zeros(NYears)
216.
for i in range(NYears):
217.
out[i]=np.random.randint(low, high[i], 1)
218.
return out
219.
if boolop==0: #defaults to low if non-randomized
220.
return np.ones(NYears)*low
221.
#
@jit
222.
def randintswitch2(low, high, NYears ,boolop):
223.
if boolop==1: #randomly sets int between low and high
224.
return np.random.randint(low, high, NYears)
225.
if boolop==0: #defaults to low if non-randomized
226.
return np.ones(NYears)*low
227.
#
@jit
228.
def randintswitchCF(mindate, maxdate, refdates, lowest, highest, bo
olop):
229.
if boolop==1: #randomly sets int between low and high
230.
if mindate!=0 or maxdate!=365:
231.
clipped=np.clip(refdates, mindate, maxdate)
232.
dates=np.random.randint(np.min(clipped), np.max(clipped)
)
233.
return np.where(refdates==dates)[0]
234.
else:

292

235.
return np.random.randint(lowest, highest)
236.
if boolop==0: #defaults to low if non-randomized
237.
return lowest
238.
#
@jit
239.
def randswitch(mini, avg, maxi, Nyears, boolop):
240.
if boolop==1:
241.
return np.random.triangular(mini, avg, maxi, Nyears) #return
s triangular distributed variables
242.
if boolop==0:
243.
return np.ones(Nyears)*avg
244.
245.
name1=ScenarioRL
246.
name2=ScenarioCL
247.
248.
S_RL=pd.read_csv(name1)
249.
S_RL=S_RL.set_index("NewInd")
250.
S_CL=pd.read_csv(name2)
251.
S_CL=S_CL.set_index("NewInd") #setting index to the formatted OS IDs
252.
253.
scenar = all_scenarios[seednum]
254.
ScenarioRL=S_RL.filter(items=scenar[0:7], axis=0)
255.
ScenarioCL=S_CL.filter(items=scenar[7:13], axis=0)
256.
257.
258.
RLInds=ScenarioRL.index.tolist()
259.
CLInds=ScenarioCL.index.tolist()
260.
SD=[]
261.
262.
#Use dictonary to get scenario names
263.
for c in range(np.shape(ScenarioRL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
264.
RLID=RLev[ScenarioRL.loc[RLInds[c]]["ReservoirLevelId"]]
265.
IMP=Impacts[ScenarioRL.loc[RLInds[c]]["ImpactTypeId"]]
266.
OS=OSTypes[ScenarioRL.loc[RLInds[c]]["OperatingStateTypeId"]]
267.
CF=CFType[ScenarioRL.loc[RLInds[c]]["CausalFactorTypeId"]]
268.
SD.append(str(RLID + "-" + OS + IMP + "-" + CF + "_"))
269.
270.
for c in range(np.shape(ScenarioCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
271.
RLID=RLev[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["ReservoirLevelId"]]
272.
CLID=CLType[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["ComponentLevelTypeId"]]
273.
IMP=Impacts[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["ImpactTypeId"]]
274.
OS=OSTypes[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["OperatingStateTypeId"]]
275.
CF=CFType[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["CausalFactorTypeId"]]
276.
SD.append(str(RLID +"-"+ CLID + "-" + OS + IMP + "" + CF + "_"))
277.
278.
#omitting normal conditions
279.
out=[i for i in SD if not ('-nn' in i)]
280.
281.
#Formatting as one long string explaining what's happening in scenar
io
282.
ScenarioDescriptor="".join(out)
283.
284.
#SET RANDOM START DATES FOR SIMULATION
285.
#Between May 1 - Sept 30 thunderstorm season
286.
possible_starts = [ (x, y) for x in range( 0,364 ) for y in range( 0
, 9999 ) ]
287.
if boolop == 1:
288.
Starts = random.sample( possible_starts, NYr )
289.
if boolop == 0:
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290.
Starts = possible_starts[ 0 : NYr ] #just takes the first bunch
if non-randomized
291.
292.
Startdays=np.zeros(NYr)
293.
Startyears=np.zeros(NYr)
294.
for i in range(NYr):
295.
Startdays[i]=Starts[i][0]
296.
Startyears[i]=Starts[i][1]
297.
298.
refdays=dayrefs(Startdays, 0, NYr) #returns 365xNYr array containing
reference dates from 1-365
299.
300.
#Determine unique causal factors for timing
301.
cfs=[]
302.
ScenarioRL2=ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL["ReservoirLevelId"]!=29]
303.
ScenarioRL3=ScenarioRL2[ScenarioRL2["ReservoirLevelId"]!=48]
304.
cfs.append(ScenarioRL3["CausalFactorTypeId"])
305.
#remove site access and staffing delays from cf list since they are
implemented differently
306.
cfs.append(ScenarioCL["CausalFactorTypeId"])
307.
308.
CFS=np.zeros(int(np.size(cfs[0]))+ int(np.size(cfs[1])))
309.
for i in range(len(cfs[0])):
310.
CFS[i]=cfs[0][i]
311.
for i in range(len(cfs[1])):
312.
CFS[i+np.size(cfs[0])]=cfs[1][i]
313.
uniqueCFs=np.unique(CFS)
314.
uniqueCFs=np.setdiff1d(uniqueCFs,[25])
315.
316.
impacttimes=np.zeros((np.size(uniqueCFs), 2,NYr)) #CF, Impact Time,
Year
317.
for i in range(NYr):
318.
if boolop==1:
319.
random.shuffle(uniqueCFs) #does not shuffle if boolop=0 (non
randomized)
320.
impacttimes[:, 0,i]=uniqueCFs
#This is the order of occurrence
of the causal factor impacts for the simulation
321.
for j in range(np.size(uniqueCFs)):
322.
impacttimes[j, 1, i]=randintswitchCF(CFDates[uniqueCFs[j]][0
],CFDates[uniqueCFs[j]][1], refdays[:,i], 1, deltatmax, boolop=boolop) #Sets ran
dom times for subsequent disturbances within 6 months of original
323.
if np.size(uniqueCFs)>0:
324.
impacttimes[0,1,i]=1 #set all first disturbances to day 1
325.
#now make a dataframe with start times for each CF
326.
imptimessorted=np.zeros((np.size(uniqueCFs), 2,NYr))
327.
for i in range(NYr):
328.
imptime=impacttimes[:,:,i]
329.
imptimessorted[:,:,i]=imptime[imptime[:,0].argsort()]
330.
331.
332.
#Debris on gate opening. Set reduced gate capacity
333.
ReducedCapacities=1+np.zeros(( NYr)) #default no blockage
334.
#one for each gate and inflow (can randomize degree of block
age b/w min and max)
335.
AllDebris=ScenarioCL[ScenarioCL["ImpactTypeId"]==5]
336.
AllDebris=AllDebris.reset_index(drop=True)
337.
for c in range(np.shape(AllDebris["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
338.
cavg=1.-(AllDebris["Avg"][c]/100.)
339.
cmin=1.-(AllDebris["Min"][c]/100.)
340.
cmax=1.-(AllDebris["Max"][c]/100.)
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341.

ReducedCapacities=gen_avg(cavg, NYr, cmin, cmax, boolop)

342.
343.
Day1Used_MtnAge=np.zeros((2,NYr))
344.
345.
#Organize outages by component
346.
GateOutagesAll=np.zeros((3, NYr)) #FC, FO, FIP
347.
GateCollapses=np.zeros((1,NYr))
348.
Gdeltat=np.zeros((3, NYr))
349.
SPOG1OutagesCL=ScenarioCL[(ScenarioCL["ImpactTypeId"]==1) & (Scenari
oCL["ReservoirLevelId"]==13)]
350.
SPOG1OutagesCL=SPOG1OutagesCL.reset_index()
351.
for c in range (np.shape(SPOG1OutagesCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
352.
353.
if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==1: #Fail closed
354.
GateOutagesAll[0,:]=randswitch(SPOG1OutagesCL["Min"][c], SPO
G1OutagesCL["Avg"][c], SPOG1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
355.
356.
357.
358.
if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==11: #Fail open/col
lapse
359.
GateOutagesAll[1,:]=randswitch(SPOG1OutagesCL["Min"][c], SPO
G1OutagesCL["Avg"][c], SPOG1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
360.
if SPOG1OutagesCL["OperatingStateTypeId"][c]==5:
361.
GateCollapses[0,:]=1+np.zeros(NYr)
362.
363.
364.
if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==5: #Fail in place
365.
GateOutagesAll[2,:]=randswitch(SPOG1OutagesCL["Min"][c], SPO
G1OutagesCL["Avg"][c], SPOG1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
366.
367.
368.
369.
TurbineOutagesAll=np.zeros((2, NYr)) #HC, GEN
370.
Tdeltat=np.zeros((2,NYr))
371.
TB1OutagesCL=(ScenarioCL[ScenarioCL["ReservoirLevelId"]==8]) #filter
to turbine only
372.
TB1OutagesCL=(TB1OutagesCL[TB1OutagesCL["OperatingStateTypeId"]!=2])
#omit normal conditions
373.
TB1OutagesCL=TB1OutagesCL.reset_index(drop=True)
374.
for c in range (np.shape(TB1OutagesCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
375.
if TB1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==13: #Head Cover HC R
ESULTS IN UNCONTROLLED RELEASE
376.
TurbineOutagesAll[0,:]=randswitch(TB1OutagesCL["Min"][c],TB1
OutagesCL["Avg"][c], TB1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
377.
378.
if TB1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==15: #Generator
379.
TurbineOutagesAll[1,:]=randswitch(TB1OutagesCL["Min"][c],TB1
OutagesCL["Avg"][c], TB1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
380.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==TB1OutagesCL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])
381.
382.
383.
AllOutagesRL=(ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL["ImpactTypeId"].isin([1,9])])
384.
AllOutagesRL=AllOutagesRL.reset_index(drop=True)
385.
ScenarioRL=ScenarioRL.reset_index(drop=True)
386.
AllErrors=ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL["ImpactTypeId"]==3] #Errors to senso
rs and Inflow Forecast
387.
AllErrors=AllErrors.reset_index(drop=True)
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388.
389.
OCOutages=np.zeros((3,NYr))
390.
#PLCRTU, Penstock, Grid
391.
SOutages=np.zeros(NYr)
392.
#Res El Sensor 1
393.
394.
OCdeltat=np.zeros((3,NYr))
395.
Sdeltat=np.zeros(NYr)
396.
for c in range (np.shape(AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
397.
#Other components
398.
if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==18: #Dam PLC failure HOU
RS
399.
OCOutages[0, :]=randswitch(AllOutagesRL["Min"][c], AllOutage
sRL["Avg"][c], AllOutagesRL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
400.
401.
402.
if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==42: #Penstock
403.
OCOutages[1,:]=randswitch(AllOutagesRL["Min"][c], AllOutages
RL["Avg"][c], AllOutagesRL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
404.
405.
if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==44: #CMS GRID
406.
OCOutages[2,:]=randswitch(AllOutagesRL["Min"][c], AllOutages
RL["Avg"][c], AllOutagesRL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
407.
408.
#Sensors
409.
if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==30: #RE Sensor 1
410.
SOutages=randswitch(AllOutagesRL["Min"][c], AllOutagesRL["Av
g"][c], AllOutagesRL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
411.
412.
413.
414.
SErrors=np.zeros(NYr)
415.
SErrorDeltat=np.zeros(NYr)
416.
SErrorDuration=randintswitch2(1, 10, NYr, boolop) #randomly setting
error duration between 1 and 10 days
417.
IFErrorDuration=randintswitch2(1, 10, NYr, boolop)
418.
IFErrorDeltat=np.zeros(NYr) #randomly setting error duration between
1 and 10 days
419.
420.
for c in range (np.shape(AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
421.
#Other components
422.
if AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==30: #Res El Sensor 1
423.
SErrors=randswitch(AllErrors["Min"][c], AllErrors["Avg"][c],
AllErrors["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
424.
425.
if AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==45: #Inflow forecast error
426.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllErrors["CausalFac
torTypeId"][c])[0])
427.
IFErrorDeltat=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
428.
429.
430.
431.
DelayAccess=np.zeros((2, NYr))
432.
DelayStaff=np.zeros(NYr)
433.
AllDelays=ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL["ImpactTypeId"]==2]
434.
AllDelays=AllDelays.reset_index(drop=True)
435.
for c in range (np.shape(AllDelays["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
436.
#Other components
437.
if AllDelays["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==29: #Dam Access
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438.
DelayAccess[0, :]=randswitch(AllDelays["Min"][c], AllDelays[
"Avg"][c], AllDelays["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
439.
440.
if AllDelays["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==28: #Powerhouse Access
441.
DelayAccess[1, :]=randswitch(AllDelays["Min"][c], AllDelays[
"Avg"][c], AllDelays["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
442.
443.
if AllDelays["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==48: #Powerhouse Access
444.
DelayStaff[:]=randswitch(AllDelays["Min"][c], AllDelays["Avg
"][c], AllDelays["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)
445.
446.
447.
"""
448.
NOW DETERMINE MAX IMPACT INITIATION TIME BASED ON TIME TO REPAIR FOR
COMPONENTS THAT CAUSE A LOSS IN CAPACITY
449.
"""
450.
#figure out length of time components are out for...
451.
deltatmax=GateOutagesAll[0,:] + GateOutagesAll[1,:] + GateOutagesAll
[2,:] + TurbineOutagesAll[1,:] + TurbineOutagesAll[0,:] + OCOutages[0,:] + OCOut
ages[1,:]+ OCOutages[2,:] + SErrorDuration + SErrors
452.
deltatmax=deltatmax*0.8 #somewhat arbitrary. Can experiment and sel
ect to ensure enough data points are collected for each scenario
453.
deltatmax=deltatmax.clip(4, 180)
454.
455.
456.
"""
457.
NOW THAT WE HAVE SET DELTATMAX, WE CAN SET THE IMPACT TIMES
458.
"""
459.
460.
for c in range (np.shape(SPOG1OutagesCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
461.
462.
if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==1: #Fail closed
463.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==SPOG1OutagesCL["Caus
alFactorTypeId"][c])[0])
464.
Gdeltat[0,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
465.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2: #mtnce
466.
for y in range(NYr):
467.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
468.
Gdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)
469.
else:
470.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:
471.
Gdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure
472.
else:
473.
Gdeltat[0,y]=1
474.
Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1
475.
476.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9: #aging
477.
for y in range(NYr):
478.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
479.
Gdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure
480.
else:
481.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:
482.
Gdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop)
483.
else:
484.
Gdeltat[0,y]=1
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485.
Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1
486.
487.
488.
489.
if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==11: #Fail open/col
lapse
490.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==SPOG1OutagesCL["Caus
alFactorTypeId"][c])[0])
491.
Gdeltat[1,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
492.
if SPOG1OutagesCL["OperatingStateTypeId"][c]==5:
493.
GateCollapses[0,:]=1+np.zeros(NYr)
494.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2: #mtnce
495.
for y in range(NYr):
496.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
497.
Gdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)
498.
else:
499.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:
500.
Gdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure
501.
else:
502.
Gdeltat[1,y]=1
503.
Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1
504.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9: #aging
505.
for y in range(NYr):
506.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
507.
Gdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure
508.
else:
509.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:
510.
Gdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop)
511.
else:
512.
Gdeltat[1,y]=1
513.
Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1
514.
515.
516.
if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==5: #Fail in place
517.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==SPOG1OutagesCL["Caus
alFactorTypeId"][c])[0])
518.
Gdeltat[2,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
519.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2: #mtnce
520.
for y in range(NYr):
521.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
522.
Gdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)
523.
else:
524.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:
525.
Gdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure
526.
else:
527.
Gdeltat[2,y]=1
528.
Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1
529.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9: #aging
530.
for y in range(NYr):
531.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
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532.
Gdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure
533.
else:
534.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:
535.
Gdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop)
536.
else:
537.
Gdeltat[2,y]=1
538.
Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1
539.
540.
541.
542.
for c in range (np.shape(TB1OutagesCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
543.
if TB1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==13: #Head Cover HC R
ESULTS IN UNCONTROLLED RELEASE
544.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==TB1OutagesCL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])
545.
Tdeltat[0,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
546.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2: #mtnce
547.
for y in range(NYr):
548.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
549.
Tdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)
550.
else:
551.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:
552.
Tdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure
553.
else:
554.
Tdeltat[0,y]=1
555.
Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1
556.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9: #aging
557.
for y in range(NYr):
558.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
559.
Tdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure
560.
else:
561.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:
562.
Tdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop)
563.
else:
564.
Tdeltat[0,y]=1
565.
Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1
566.
567.
if TB1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==15: #Generator
568.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==TB1OutagesCL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])
569.
Tdeltat[1,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
570.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2: #mtnce
571.
for y in range(NYr):
572.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
573.
Tdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)
574.
else:
575.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:
576.
Tdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure
577.
else:
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578.
Tdeltat[1,y]=1
579.
Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1
580.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9: #aging
581.
for y in range(NYr):
582.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
583.
Tdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure
584.
else:
585.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:
586.
Tdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop)
587.
else:
588.
Tdeltat[1,y]=1
589.
Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1
590.
591.
592.
for c in range (np.shape(AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
593.
#Other components
594.
if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==18: #Dam PLC failure HOU
RS
595.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllOutagesRL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])
596.
OCdeltat[0,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
597.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2: #mtnce
598.
for y in range(NYr):
599.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
600.
OCdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop)
601.
else:
602.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:
603.
OCdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 m
tnce failure
604.
else:
605.
OCdeltat[0,y]=1
606.
Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1
607.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9: #aging
608.
for y in range(NYr):
609.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
610.
OCdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age f
ailure
611.
else:
612.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:
613.
OCdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop)
614.
else:
615.
OCdeltat[0,y]=1
616.
Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1
617.
618.
619.
if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==42: #Penstock
620.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllOutagesRL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])
621.
OCdeltat[1,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
622.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2: #mtnce
623.
for y in range(NYr):
624.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
625.
OCdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop)
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626.
627.
628.

else:
if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:
OCdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 m
tnce failure
629.
else:
630.
OCdeltat[1,y]=1
631.
Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1
632.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9: #aging
633.
for y in range(NYr):
634.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
635.
OCdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age f
ailure
636.
else:
637.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:
638.
OCdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop)
639.
else:
640.
OCdeltat[1,y]=1
641.
Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1
642.
643.
if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==44: #CMS GRID
644.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllOutagesRL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])
645.
OCdeltat[2,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
646.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2: #mtnce
647.
for y in range(NYr):
648.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
649.
OCdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop)
650.
else:
651.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:
652.
OCdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 m
tnce failure
653.
else:
654.
OCdeltat[2,y]=1
655.
Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1
656.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9: #aging
657.
for y in range(NYr):
658.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
659.
OCdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age f
ailure
660.
else:
661.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:
662.
OCdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
boolop)
663.
else:
664.
OCdeltat[2,y]=1
665.
Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1
666.
667.
#Sensors
668.
if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==30: #RE Sensor 1
669.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllOutagesRL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])
670.
Sdeltat=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
671.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2: #mtnce
672.
for y in range(NYr):
673.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:

301

674.
Sdeltat[y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boolop
)
675.
else:
676.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:
677.
Sdeltat[y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bo
olop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mtnc
e failure
678.
else:
679.
Sdeltat[y]=1
680.
Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1
681.
if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9: #aging
682.
for y in range(NYr):
683.
if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:
684.
Sdeltat[y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boolop
) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fail
ure
685.
else:
686.
if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:
687.
Sdeltat[y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bo
olop)
688.
else:
689.
Sdeltat[y]=1
690.
Day1Used_MtnAge[1 ,y]=1
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
for c in range (np.shape(AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):
696.
#Other components
697.
if AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==30: #Res El Sensor 1
698.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllErrors["CausalFac
torTypeId"][c])[0])
699.
SErrorDeltat=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
700.
701.
702.
if AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==45: #Inflow forecast error
703.
ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllErrors["CausalFac
torTypeId"][c])[0])
704.
IFErrorDeltat=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]
705.
706.
707.
708.
709.
"""
710.
3. INITIALIZING SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS AND ARRAYS
711.
712.
-Sets up arrays to be populated by SD model
713.
-Sets up supporting functions
714.
Functions defined here are not part of the System Dynamics model but may be call
ed from it
715.
716.
"""
717.
718.
runname="Simple64-i1-O-2018-5yr"
719.
runname1=runname
720.
721.
start=(str(datetime.now()))
722.
723.
@njit
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724.
def SSC(storage): #Stage storage curve
725.
if storage<1400:
726.
return -1.1201e05 * storage**2 + 0.032473 * storage + 364.6572
727.
else:
728.
return 388.16
729.
730.
@njit
731.
def SSCrev(stage): #Storage stage curve
732.
return np.roots(np.array([-1.1201e-05, 0.032473, 364.6572stage]))[1]
733.
@njit
734.
def OTC(elev): #Overtopping curve
735.
if elev<=380.41: #378.41
736.
return 0
737.
else:
738.
return (-35.7505780379803*(elev-2)**3 + 40896.2749435669*(elev2)**2 -15593240.0619064*(elev-2) + 1981715583.08889)*0.3
739.
740.
741.
#Rating curves for different gates to be used to switch between gate pos
ition and flow
742.
RatingCurve1=pd.read_csv(datafile_path("SPOGAllRC.csv"), index_col=0)
743.
x1=np.asarray(RatingCurve1.index.values, dtype=float)
744.
y1=np.asarray(RatingCurve1.columns.values, dtype=float)
745.
z1=np.asarray(RatingCurve1.values, dtype=float)
746.
747.
@njit
748.
def fncTurbineMaxFlow(elev, flagT):
749.
if flagT==1: #// Turb on
750.
if elev < 363.05:
751.
result = 0
752.
elif 363.05 <= elev < 365.05:
753.
result = 13.98 * elev - 5075.44
754.
elif 365.05 <= elev < 367.05:
755.
result = 18.02334 * elev - 6551.46
756.
else:
757.
result = 65
758.
else: #//both off
759.
return 0
760.
return result
761.
762.
@njit
763.
def SPOGMaxFlow(elev, flag): #Sums the values from two gates into a sing
le gate discharge
764.
if flag == 1:
765.
if 367.28<=elev<367.5:
766.
out1= 19.09091*elev-7011.7
767.
if 367.5<=elev<=367.8:
768.
out1= 37.33334*elev-13715.8
769.
if 367.8<=elev<=369:#368.1:
770.
out1= 49.667*elev-18252
771.
if 369 <=elev < 381.6: #367.8 sill
772.
out1= 2.154624239*elev**2 - 1496.3410084*elev + 258875.37647
999998
773.
elif elev >= 381.6:
774.
out1= 861.1+728.9
775.
else:
776.
out1= 0
777.
else:
778.
out1=0
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779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.
786.
787.
788.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.
802.
803.
804.
805.
806.
807.
808.
809.
X1)
810.
811.
812.
813.
814.
815.
816.
817.
818.
819.
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.

return out1
@njit
def GateInstr(ResEl, OP):
y=y1
z=z1
x=x1
GatePosition=0
if (ResEl > 367.28):
Yo=np.abs(y-ResEl).argsort()[0:2]
WtYo0=np.abs((ResEl-y[Yo[0]])/(y[Yo[0]]-y[Yo[1]]))
WtYo1=np.abs((ResEl-y[Yo[1]])/(y[Yo[0]]-y[Yo[1]]))
ResElFlow=(1-WtYo0)*z[:,Yo[0]]+(1-WtYo1)*z[:,Yo[1]]
GateFlow=np.round(OP,2)
GateFlowMax=np.max(ResElFlow)
if GateFlow<=0:
return 0
else:
if (GateFlow>GateFlowMax):
GateFlow=GateFlowMax-0.01
if GateFlow < ResElFlow[0]:
return x[0]
elif GateFlow > ResElFlow[-1]:
return x[-1]
else:
for i in range(len(ResElFlow) - 1):
if ResElFlow[i] <= GateFlow <= ResElFlow[i + 1]:
X1, X2 = ResElFlow[i], ResElFlow[i + 1]
Y1, Y2 = x[i], x[i + 1]
return Y1 + (Y2 - Y1) / (X2 - X1) * (GateFlow else:
return GatePosition
@njit
def interpolate(x0, x, y):
if x0 < x[0]:
return y[0]
elif x0 > x[-1]:
return y[-1]
else:
for i in range(len(x) - 1):
if x[i] <= x0 <= x[i + 1]:
x1, x2 = x[i], x[i + 1]
y1, y2 = y[i], y[i + 1]
return y1 + (y2 - y1) / (x2 - x1) * (x0 - x1)
@njit
def GateFlowCalc(ResEl, GP):
y=y1
z=z1
x=x1
GateFlow=0
if (ResEl > 367.28):
if GP>12.5:
GP=12.4999
Yo=np.abs(y-ResEl).argsort()[0:2]
WtYo0=np.abs((ResEl-y[Yo[0]])/(y[Yo[0]]-y[Yo[1]]))
WtYo1=np.abs((ResEl-y[Yo[1]])/(y[Yo[0]]-y[Yo[1]]))
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839.
ResElFlow=(1-WtYo0)*z[:,Yo[0]]+(1-WtYo1)*z[:,Yo[1]]
840.
#
GateFlow=interpolate(GP, x, ResElFlow)
841.
if GP < x[0]:
842.
return ResElFlow[0]
843.
elif GP > x[-1]:
844.
return ResElFlow[-1]
845.
else:
846.
for i in range(len(x) - 1):
847.
if x[i] <= GP <= x[i + 1]:
848.
X1, X2 = x[i], x[i + 1]
849.
Y1, Y2 = ResElFlow[i], ResElFlow[i + 1]
850.
851.
return Y1 + (Y2 - Y1) / (X2 - X1) * (GP - X1)
852.
else:
853.
return GateFlow
854.
855.
#Storage min and max
856.
Smin=8.864837907352
857.
Smax=516.35
858.
859.
#Set arrays to save model outputs for NYr years of inflows
860.
year=0
861.
RSEs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
862.
TBFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
863.
SPOGs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
864.
OT=np.zeros((365,NYr))
865.
INFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
866.
OUTFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
867.
GPs=np.zeros((365, NYr))
868.
GAVs=np.zeros((365, NYr))
869.
UAVs=np.zeros((365, NYr))
870.
MOBI=np.zeros((365, NYr))
871.
MOB=np.zeros((365, NYr))
872.
TOTR=np.zeros((365,NYr))
873.
DEBRISREMOVAL=np.zeros(NYr)
874.
DAY=np.zeros((365,NYr))
875.
MON=np.zeros((365,NYr))
876.
AllMaxQ_t=np.zeros((365,2, NYr))
877.
AllMaxQ=[861.1+728.9,32.5+32.5]
878.
TTRS=np.zeros((365,8, NYr))
879.
Retention=np.zeros((365,NYr))
880.
yearnum=np.zeros(NYr)
881.
for yr in range(NYr):
882.
yearnum[yr]=str(1984+yr)
883.
GateCaps=np.zeros((365, NYr))
884.
CAPs=np.zeros((365, NYr))
885.
EOCs=np.zeros((365, NYr))
886.
UCRs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
887.
GCRs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
888.
GAVs=np.zeros((365, NYr))
889.
OSDs=-1+np.zeros((36,NYr)) #36 component outage start dates
890.
OLs=np.zeros((36,NYr))
891.
#Inflow forecast accuracy data
892.
#ForecastError=pd.read_csv(datafile_path("CMSForecastError.csv"), index_
col=0)
893.
#day=ForecastError.index.values #day of forecast
894.
#errordata=ForecastError.values #error mean, mean over 110cms and standa
rd deviation, std over 110cms
895.
#MAEt=interp1d(day,errordata[:,0])
896.
#MAE110t=interp1d(day,errordata[:,1])
897.
#SEt=interp1d(day,errordata[:,2])
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898.
#SE110t=interp1d(day,errordata[:,3])
899.
Fish=pd.read_csv(datafile_path("Fish.csv"), header=0).values[:,1].astype
("float64")
900.
901.
@njit
902.
def getfishflow(dayref):
903.
return Fish[int(dayref[0]):int(dayref[0]+14)]
904.
#Fish=np.zeros((3,3))
905.
#Fish-[0,:]=[5,7,3]
906.
#Fish [1,:]=[0,90,304]
907.
#Fish[2,:]=[89,303,365]
908.
#
909.
#@njit
910.
#def getfishflow(dayref):
911.
#
return Fish[int(dayref[0]):int(dayref[0]+14)]
912.
##
ff=np.zeros(14)
913.
##
for i in range(14):
914.
##
if dayref[i]<90:
915.
##
ff[i]=5
916.
##
elif dayref[i]<304:
917.
##
ff[i]=7
918.
##
elif dayref[i]<365:
919.
##
ff[i]=3
920.
##
return ff
921.
922.
@njit
923.
def dayrefs(Startdays, timestep):
924.
daynum=Startdays+int(timestep) #STARTDAYS CONTAINS 1365 STARTING DAY REF
925.
if daynum>365:
926.
daynum=daynum-365
927.
dayref=np.zeros(14)
928.
dayref[0]=daynum
929.
for t in range(13): #Converts vensim date into numbers 1365 to represent dates in the model
930.
if dayref[t]+1<366:
931.
dayref[t+1]=dayref[t]+1
932.
else: dayref[t+1]=1
933.
return dayref
934.
935.
936.
#SETTING UP RANDOM SIMULATION START POINTS AND ASSIGNING BASELINE CONDIT
IONS FROM "NORMAL" OPS
937.
938.
939.
if seedgen==0:
940.
Startdays=Seeds['Startdays']
941.
Starts=Seeds['Starts'] #np.transpose(Seeds["Starts"]) for jan 1 star
ts
942.
943.
944.
#Starts=np.transpose(Starts)
945.
daynum=Startdays.copy()
946.
OutputDayrefs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
947.
OutputDayrefs[0, :]=daynum
948.
for t in range(364): #Converts vensim date into numbers 1365 to represent dates in the model
949.
for yr in range(NYr):
950.
if OutputDayrefs[t, yr]+1<366:
951.
OutputDayrefs[t+1, yr]=OutputDayrefs[t, yr]+1
952.
else: OutputDayrefs[t+1, yr]=1
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953.
954.
StartRSEs=np.zeros(NYr)
955.
for i in range(NYr):
956.
StartRSEs[i]=NormalRSEs[Starts[i][0], Starts[i][1]] #for jan 1 start
s
957.
#StartRSEs[i]=NormalRSEs[Starts[0,i], Starts[1,i]] #for SeedsS_Nov06
_2018
958.
959.
#SET UP INFLOWS AND BASELINE
960.
961.
Inflow=np.zeros((730,NYr)) #2 year min
962.
B_RSEs = np.zeros((365, NYr))
963.
B_TBFs = np.zeros((365, NYr))
964.
B_TSs = np.zeros((365, NYr))
965.
B_OTs = np.zeros((365, NYr))
966.
for i in range(NYr):
967.
startdayind=Starts[i][0]
968.
Inflow[0:int(730startdayind),i]=InflowJan1Start[startdayind:730,Starts[i][1]]
969.
Inflow[int(730startdayind):730,i]=InflowJan1Start[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+1]
970.
B_RSEs[0:int(365startdayind),i]=NormalRSEs[startdayind:365,Starts[i][1]]
971.
B_RSEs[int(365startdayind):365,i]=NormalRSEs[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+1]
972.
B_TBFs[0:int(365startdayind),i]=NormalTBFs[startdayind:365,Starts[i][1]+1]
973.
B_TBFs[int(365startdayind):365,i]=NormalTBFs[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+2]
974.
B_TSs[0:int(365startdayind),i]=NormalTSs[startdayind:365,Starts[i][1]+1]
975.
B_TSs[int(365startdayind):365,i]=NormalTSs[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+2]
976.
B_OTs[0:int(365startdayind),i]=NormalOTs[startdayind:365,Starts[i][1]+1]
977.
B_OTs[int(365startdayind):365,i]=NormalOTs[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+2]
978.
979.
if seedgen==0:
980.
ReducedCapacities=Seeds['ReducedCapacities']
981.
982.
ReducedCapacityMinimumTime=10 #10 days to arrange debris removal, at a m
inimum
983.
global DebrisRemoval
984.
DebrisRemoval=0
985.
986.
Inf114=np.zeros(14)
987.
988.
#This is used to ensure inflow forecast and ops planning done once per 2
4 hours (at midnight)
989.
#def isinterger(number):
990.
#
return np.equal(np.mod(number, 1), 0)
991.
992.
993.
#@njit
994.
#def getmaxq(component, ResEl): #returns the maximum available discharge
for a given component for all res els
995.
#
if component==0: #GATE 1
996.
#
GateFlowMax=SPOGMaxFlow(ResEl, 1)
997.
#
elif component==2: #TURBINE 1g
998.
#
GateFlowMax=fncTurbineMaxFlow(ResEl, 1)
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999.
1000.
1001.
1002.
1003.
1004.
1005.
1006.
1007.
1008.
1009.
1010.
1011.
1012.
1013.
1014.
1015.
1016.
1017.
1018.
1019.
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.
1026.
1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.
1031.
1032.
1033.
1034.
1035.
1036.
1037.
1038.
1039.
1040.

#

return GateFlowMax

@njit
def fncSPOGMaxFlow(elev, flag, El1d):
if flag == 1:
if 367.28<=elev<367.5:
out1= 9.545455*elev-3505.85
out2= 9.545455*elev-3505.85
if 367.5<=elev<=367.8:
out1= 18.66667*elev-6857.9
out2= 18.66667*elev-6857.9
if 367.8<=elev<=369:#368.1:
out1= 25*elev-9187.3
out2= 24.66667*elev-9064.7
if 369 <=elev < 381.6: #367.8 sill
out1= 1.494595567*elev**2 - 1056.252204*elev + 186302.1873
out2= 0.660028672*elev**2 - 440.0888044*elev + 72573.18918
if elev >= 381.6:
out1= 861.1
out2= 728.9
if elev<367.28:
out1= 0
out2=0
if El1d>376.5: #corects max flow for extreme high inflow events
elev=(elev+376.50)/2.
out1= 1.494595567*elev**2 - 1056.252204*elev + 186302.1873
out2= 0.660028672*elev**2 - 440.0888044*elev + 72573.18918
else:
out1=0
out2=0
return out1+out2
@njit
def availarray(length):
out=np.ones(14)
if length>0:
out[0:length]=0
return out
@njit
def OpsPlan(InflowForecast, Storage, dayref, SPG1Av,

TbAv1, resElPens):

1041.
FishFlow=getfishflow(dayref)
1042.
SPOG1Av=availarray(int(SPG1Av))
1043.
TurbAv1=availarray(int(TbAv1))
1044.
1045.
VolInflow=np.sum(InflowForecast)
1046.
#FIRST ASSUME SPILL EQUAL TO FISH FOW
1047.
Spill=min(FishFlow[0],
1048.
fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], 373)
)
1049.
#Assume power flow equal to max. of difference between inflow an fis
h flow, or total available turbine flow
1050.
PFlow=max(min(fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), TurbAv1[0]), InflowFor
ecast[0]-Spill), 0)
1051.
1052.
#Now check multi-day reservoir elevation
1053.
Spl=Spill+np.zeros(14)
1054.
Pow=PFlow+np.zeros(14)
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1055.
HiRes=0
1056.
LoRes=0
1057.
for i in range(13):
1058.
VolOut=(i+1)*(Spill+PFlow)
1059.
VolInflow=np.sum(InflowForecast[0:i+1])
1060.
StorageD=Storage+VolInflow-VolOut
1061.
SLimitsD=GetNMax(resElPens[0,:], resElPens[2,:], resElPens[1,:],
dayref[i])
1062.
1063.
if StorageD>SLimitsD[1]: #If 14 day storage exceeds nmax
1064.
HiRes+=1
1065.
#ensure power flow is max:
1066.
Pow[i]=min(PFlow+(StorageDSLimitsD[1])*(1./(i+1)),fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), TurbAv1[0]))
1067.
#recalculate and recheck
1068.
VolOut=(i+1)*(Spl[i]+Pow[i])
1069.
StorageD=Storage+VolInflow-VolOut
1070.
if StorageD>SLimitsD[1]: #add 1/14 of difference each day to
spill to bring res el down
1071.
Spl[i]=min(Spill+(StorageDSLimitsD[1])*(1./(i+1)), fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(StorageD))
)
1072.
1073.
if StorageD<SLimitsD[0]: #If final storage less than nmin
1074.
LoRes+=1
1075.
#ensure spill is min
1076.
Spl[i]=min(FishFlow[0],
1077.
fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(StorageD)
))
1078.
#recalulate and recheck
1079.
VolOut=(i+1)*(Spl[i]+Pow[i])
1080.
StorageD=Storage+VolInflow-VolOut
1081.
if StorageD<SLimitsD[0]: #reduce power flow to conserve wate
r
1082.
Pow[i]=max(PFlow-(1./(i+1))*(SLimitsD[0]-StorageD), 0)
1083.
1084.
1085.
1086.
if HiRes>0:
1087.
Spill=np.max(Spl)
1088.
PFlow=np.max(Pow) #high reservoir levels trump low reservoir lev
els
1089.
1090.
else:
1091.
if LoRes>0:
1092.
Spill=np.min(Spl)
1093.
PFlow=np.min(Pow)
1094.
else:
1095.
Spill=Spl[0]
1096.
PFlow=Pow[0]
1097.
1098.
1099.
#check day 1 elevs again
1100.
Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow
1101.
SLimitsD=GetNMax(resElPens[0,:], resElPens[2,:], resElPens[1,:], day
ref[0])
1102.
if Storage1d>SLimitsD[1]:
1103.
#increase power
1104.
PFlow=fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), TurbAv1[0])
1105.
#recalculate
1106.
Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow
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1107.
if Storage1d>SLimitsD[1]:
1108.
1109.
#increase spill more
1110.
spl=Spill
1111.
Spill=min(Spill+(Storage1dSLimitsD[1]), fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(Storage1d)))
1112.
if SPOG1Av[0]==1 and Spill<spl+(Storage1d-SLimitsD[1]):
1113.
Spill=min(Spill+(Storage1d-SLimitsD[1]), 1590)
1114.
#recalculate
1115.
Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow
1116.
if Storage1d>SLimitsD[1]+0.1: #if inflow causes reservoir to
rise to extreme levels within 1 ts
1117.
Spill=min(Spill+(Storage1dSLimitsD[1]), fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC((Storage+Storage1d)/2), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(Storage
1d)))
1118.
Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow
1119.
1120.
if Storage1d<SLimitsD[0]:
1121.
#decrease spill
1122.
Spill=max(Spill-(SLimitsD[0]-Storage1d), FishFlow[0])
1123.
#recalculate
1124.
Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow
1125.
if Storage1d<SLimitsD[0]:
1126.
PFlow=max(PFlow-(SLimitsD[0]-Storage1d), 0)
1127.
1128.
if Spill<FishFlow[0]:
1129.
if SPOG1Av[0]==1: #If spill less than FF and spillway is availab
le, readjust SPOG flow and Pflow
1130.
Spill2=min(FishFlow[0], fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av
[0], SSC(Storage1d)))
1131.
PFlow=max(fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), TurbAv1[0]), PFlow
-(Spill2-Spill))
1132.
1133.
Spill2=Spill
1134.
#Now allocate discharge
1135.
Ops=[0,0] #SPOG1,Turb1
1136.
if SPOG1Av[0]==1:
1137.
Ops[0]=min(Spill2, fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(
Storage1d)))
1138.
if SPOG1Av[0]==1 and Spill2>Ops[0]: #this helps with large inflo
w events, where the initial gate capacity is too low, but the reservoir ends up
too high
1139.
Ops[0]=Spill2
1140.
if (SSC(Storage)<367.28):
1141.
Ops[0]=0
1142.
elif SPOG1Av[0]==0:
1143.
if SPOG1Av[0]==1:
1144.
Ops[0]=0
1145.
1146.
if TurbAv1[0]==1:
1147.
Ops[1]=PFlow
1148.
1149.
elif TurbAv1[0]==0:
1150.
Ops[1]=0
1151.
1152.
1153.
return Ops
1154.
1155.
@njit
1156.
def GetNMax(lstResLimitDays, VResLower, VResUpper, dayref):
1157.
i = -1
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1158.
ColumnsCount = VResLower.shape[0]
1159.
if (lstResLimitDays[1] > dayref >= lstResLimitDays[0]):
1160.
i = 0
1161.
if (dayref>= lstResLimitDays[1]):
1162.
i = 1
1163.
if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[2]):
1164.
i = 2
1165.
if (ColumnsCount==4):
1166.
if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[3]):
1167.
i = 3
1168.
if (ColumnsCount==5):
1169.
if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[4]):
1170.
i = 4
1171.
if (ColumnsCount==6):
1172.
if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[5]):
1173.
i = 5
1174.
if (ColumnsCount==7):
1175.
if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[6]):
1176.
i = 6
1177.
return (VResLower[i], VResUpper[i])
1178.
1179.
1180.
#Determines month and day of year so fish flows and res el penalties cor
respond to timing
1181.
1182.
if seedgen==0:
1183.
ScenarioDescriptor=Seeds["ScenarioDescriptor"]
1184.
1185.
1186.
"""
1187.
4. DEFINING sdpy FUNCTIONS
1188.
1189.
Broken down sector-by-sector:
1190.
4.1. Hydaulic System State
1191.
4.2. Sensors
1192.
4.3. Disturbances
1193.
4.4. Operations
1194.
4.5. Gate Actuators
1195.
4.6. Turbine Actuators
1196.
1197.
"""
1198.
1199.
"""
1200.
4.1. HYDRAULIC SYSTEM STATE
1201.
"""
1202.
1203.
initial_reservoir_storage=SSCrev(B_RSEs[0,year])
1204.
if initial_reservoir_storage<=304.1: #making sure initial reservoir level isn't breach level, if any
1205.
initial_reservoir_storage=364.27
1206.
1207.
@sdpy.stock(model, initial_reservoir_storage, name='Reservoir Storage',c
ache=False, jit=False)
1208.
def reservoir_storage(t):
1209.
out=reservoir_inflow(t) - reservoir_outflow(t)
1210.
return out
1211.
1212.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Inflow',cache=False, jit=False)
1213.
def reservoir_inflow(t):
1214.
daytimestep=t
1215.
return float(Inflow[daytimestep,year])
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1216.
1217.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Outflow",cache=False, jit=False)
1218.
def reservoir_outflow(t):
1219.
return float(gated_spill_release(t) + overtopping_flow(t) + power_fl
ow_release(t) + penstock_leakage(t) + earth_dam_seepage(t) + breach_flow(t))
1220.
1221.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Reservoir Level",cache=False, jit=False)
1222.
def reservoir_level(t):
1223.
return SSC(reservoir_storage(t))
1224.
1225.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Overtopping Flow",cache=False, jit=False)
1226.
def overtopping_flow(t):
1227.
level=reservoir_level(t)
1228.
storage=reservoir_storage(t)
1229.
pf=power_flow_release(t)
1230.
sf=gated_spill_release(t)
1231.
inf=reservoir_inflow(t)
1232.
storage2=storage+inf-pf-sf
1233.
Overtoppingflow=0
1234.
OTs=np.zeros(24)
1235.
if level>378.41 or SSC(storage2)>378.41:
1236.
for i in range(24):
1237.
OTs[i]=max(OTC(SSC(storage)), 0)*(1/24.)
1238.
#water balance
1239.
storage=storage+inf/24.-OTs[i]-pf/24.-sf/24.
1240.
Overtoppingflow=np.sum(OTs)
1241.
return Overtoppingflow
1242.
1243.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Unobstructed Gate Flow",cache=False, jit=False)
1244.
def unobstructed_gate_flow(t):
1245.
#
av=gate_availability(t)
1246.
#
ops=operations_planning(t)[0]
1247.
#
SC=sensor_condition(t)
1248.
#
Se=sensor_error(t)
1249.
level=reservoir_level(t)
1250.
#
SE=1
1251.
#
Spillflow=0
1252.
#
if Se!=0:
1253.
#
SE=0
1254.
#
if av==1 and (SE+SC==2) and level>367.28:
1255.
#
#if gate available, sensors functional, man act working or some
one on site set directly to operations plan
1256.
#
Spillflow=ops
1257.
#
else:
1258.
#if gate unavailable or issues with actuation or sensors, use ga
te position to determine flow
1259.
g = gate_position(t)
1260.
Spillflow=GateFlowCalc(level,g)
1261.
return Spillflow
1262.
1263.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Gated Spill Release",cache=False, jit=False)
1264.
def gated_spill_release(t):
1265.
if breach_triggered(t)==0:
1266.
if components_collapsing_gate(t)==1:
1267.
return gate_capacity(t)*unobstructed_gate_flow(t)
1268.
else:
1269.
return min(1590, max(reservoir_storage(t) + reservoir_inflow
(t) - 83.1357, 0))
1270.
else:
1271.
return 0
1272.
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1273.
1274.
1275.
1276.
1277.
1278.
1279.

DebrisRemoval= np.zeros(1)
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Gated Capacity",cache=False, jit=False)
def gate_capacity(t):
timestep=t
#DebrisRemoval = 0 #global todo
currentinflow=reservoir_inflow(t)
inflowthreshold=65 #assume less than this required to remove debris

1280.
Capacity=1
1281.
if ReducedCapacities[year]<1:
1282.
if timestep>=1 and timestep<=24.*ReducedCapacityMinimumTime:
1283.
Capacity=ReducedCapacities[year]
1284.
if timestep>=24.*ReducedCapacityMinimumTime: #debris removal can
start after a minimum time
1285.
if DebrisRemoval[0]==0:
1286.
if currentinflow<inflowthreshold: #Debris removal only
less than inflow threshold
1287.
DebrisRemoval[0]=1
1288.
if DebrisRemoval[0]==0: #if debrs, set to reduced capacitie
s
1289.
Capacity=ReducedCapacities[year]
1290.
if DebrisRemoval[0]==1: #if debris removed, set to full capa
city
1291.
Capacity=1
1292.
return float(Capacity)
1293.
1294.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Power Flow Release",cache=False, jit=False)
1295.
def power_flow_release(t):
1296.
if breach_triggered(t)==0:
1297.
return powerhouse_flow_conveyance(t)
1298.
else:
1299.
return 0
1300.
1301.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Penstock Leakage",cache=False, jit=False)
1302.
def penstock_leakage(t):
1303.
if intake_gate_closure(t)==0 and breach_triggered(t)==0 and other_co
mponent_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0:
1304.
return head_cover_max_flow(t)
1305.
else:
1306.
return 0
1307.
1308.
RESEL_IG=[]
1309.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Intake Gate Closure",cache=False, jit=False)
1310.
def intake_gate_closure(t):
1311.
penstockrup=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]
1312.
hcfail=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]
1313.
igclosed=0
1314.
if hcfail>0 or penstockrup>0:
1315.
RESEL_IG.append(reservoir_level(t))
1316.
if (np.min(RESEL_IG)<363.06): #Intake gate can be closed once re
servoir drawn down past sill of intake gate
1317.
igclosed=1
1318.
return igclosed
1319.
1320.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Uncontrolled Release",cache=False, jit=False)
1321.
def uncontrolled_release(t):
1322.
ucr=0
1323.
if head_cover(t)==0:
1324.
ucr+=np.max([power_flow_release(t),0])
1325.
if gate_collapse(t)==1:
1326.
ucr+=np.max([gated_spill_release(t),0])

313

1327.
ucr+=np.max([penstock_leakage(t),0])
1328.
ucr+=np.max([breach_flow(t),0])
1329.
ucr+=overtopping_flow(t)
1330.
return ucr
1331.
1332.
BREACHT=np.zeros((365,NYr))
1333.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Breach Triggered",cache=False, jit=False)
1334.
def breach_triggered(t):
1335.
bt=np.max(RSEs[:,year])
1336.
if bt>381.73:
1337.
BREACHT[t,year]=1
1338.
return 1
1339.
else:
1340.
return 0
1341.
1342.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Breach Flow",cache=False, jit=False)
1343.
def breach_flow(t):
1344.
if breach_triggered(t)==1:
1345.
return reservoir_storage(t) + reservoir_inflow(t) - (-304.012)
1346.
else:
1347.
return 0
1348.
1349.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Earth Dam Settlement",cache=False, jit=False)
1350.
def earth_dam_settlement(t):
1351.
return 0 #not used for this model
1352.
1353.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Earth Dam Seepage",cache=False, jit=False)
1354.
def earth_dam_seepage(t):
1355.
return 0 #not used for this model
1356.
#IF THEN ELSE(Earth dam settlement=0, 0 ,
1357.
#IF THEN ELSE(Reservoir Level>364.9, Earth dam settlement*Reservoir Leve
l*0.1 , 0 ))
1358.
1359.
1360.
"""
1361.
4.2. SENSORS
1362.
1363.
"""
1364.
1365.
if seedgen==0:
1366.
SErrorDeltat=Seeds['SErrorDeltat']
1367.
SErrorDuration=Seeds['SErrorDuration']
1368.
SErrors=Seeds['SErrors']
1369.
1370.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Sensor Condition",cache=False, jit=False)
1371.
def sensor_condition(t):
1372.
if sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>0:
1373.
return 0
1374.
else:
1375.
return 1
1376.
1377.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Gauge Reading",cache=False, jit=False)
1378.
def gauge_reading(t):
1379.
if sensor_condition(t)==1:
1380.
return reservoir_level(t) + (sensor_error(t)/100)*reservoir_leve
l(t)
1381.
else:
1382.
return -1000
1383.
#IF THEN ELSE( Sensor condition=1 , Reservoir Level+((Sensor Error)/
100)*Reservoir Level , -1000)
1384.
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1385.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Gauge Processing",cache=False, jit=False)
1386.
def gauge_processing(t):
1387.
if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0:
1388.
return -1000
1389.
else:
1390.
return gauge_reading(t)
1391.
#IF THEN ELSE(Other component remaining time to repair[PLCRTU]>0, 1000 , Gauge reading)
1392.
1393.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Gauge Relay",cache=False, jit=False)
1394.
def gauge_relay(t):
1395.
return gauge_processing(t)
1396.
1397.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Sensor Error",cache=False, jit=False)
1398.
def sensor_error(t):
1399.
timestep=t
1400.
error=0
1401.
if (timestep>=SErrorDeltat[year] and timestep<=(SErrorDeltat[year]+S
ErrorDuration[year])):
1402.
error=SErrors[year] #sets sensor components to failure time
1403.
return error
1404.
1405.
"""
1406.
4.3 DISTURBANCES
1407.
1408.
"""
1409.
1410.
gatecomps = sdpy.SubRange('gatecomps', ['C_FC', 'C_FO', 'C_FIP'])
1411.
turbinecomps = sdpy.SubRange('turbinecomps', ['HC', 'GEN'])
1412.
othercomps = sdpy.SubRange('othercomps', ["PLCRTU", "PEN", "GRID"])
1413.
1414.
1415.
if seedgen==0:
1416.
GateOutagesAll=Seeds['GateOutagesAll']
1417.
GateCollapses=Seeds['GateCollapses']
1418.
Gdeltat=Seeds['Gdeltat']
1419.
1420.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Gate Component Failures",cache=False, jit=False)
1421.
@sdpy.subscript(gatecomps)
1422.
def gate_component_failures(t):
1423.
timestep=t
1424.
timetorepair=np.zeros(3)
1425.
#SPOG1, 3 different general components can be set to failure, also o
ne general
1426.
#C_FC, C_FO, C_FIP (fail open/collapse, fail closed, fail in place)
1427.
for c in range(3):
1428.
if timestep==Gdeltat[c, year]:
1429.
if GateOutagesAll[c, year]>0:
1430.
timetorepair[c]=GateOutagesAll[c, year] #sets gate compo
nents to failure time
1431.
return timetorepair
1432.
1433.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Time To Repair',cache=False, jit=False)
1434.
@sdpy.subscript(gatecomps)
1435.
def gate_time_to_repair(t):
1436.
return gate_component_failures(t)
1437.
1438.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Repair',cache=False, jit=False)
1439.
@sdpy.subscript(gatecomps)
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1440.
def gate_repair(t):
1441.
ret=np.zeros(3)
1442.
for i in range(3):
1443.
if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]>1:
1444.
ret[i]=1
1445.
else:
1446.
if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]<=1 and gate_remaining
_time_to_repair(t)[i]>0:
1447.
ret[i]=gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]
1448.
else:
1449.
ret[i]=0
1450.
return ret
1451.
#if_then_else(gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>1, 1,
1452.
#
if_then_else(gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)<1 and gate_r
emaining_time_to_repair(t)>0, gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t),0) )
1453.
#
IF THEN ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[GateComps]>1, 1 , IF THE
N ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[GateComps]<1 :AND: Gate remaining time to r
epair[GateComps]>0,Gate remaining time to repair[GateComps],0) )
1454.
1455.
@sdpy.stock(model, np.zeros(3), name='Gate Remaining Time To Repair',cac
he=False, jit=False)
1456.
@sdpy.subscript(gatecomps)
1457.
def gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t):
1458.
return gate_time_to_repair(t) - gate_repair(t)
1459.
1460.
GFORTTR=np.zeros((365,NYr))
1461.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate All',cache=False, jit=False)
1462.
def gate_all(t):
1463.
GFORTTR[t,year]=gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]
1464.
maxs=np.max(gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t))
1465.
return maxs
1466.
1467.
if seedgen==0:
1468.
TurbineOutagesAll=Seeds['TurbineOutagesAll']
1469.
Tdeltat=Seeds['Tdeltat']
1470.
1471.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Power component Failures',cache=False, jit=False)
1472.
@sdpy.subscript(turbinecomps)
1473.
def power_component_failures(t):
1474.
timestep=t
1475.
timetorepair=np.zeros(2)
#gen #HC
1476.
for c in range(2):
1477.
if timestep==Tdeltat[c, year]:
1478.
if TurbineOutagesAll[c, year]>0:
1479.
timetorepair[c]=TurbineOutagesAll[c, year] #sets gate co
mponents to failure time
1480.
return timetorepair
1481.
1482.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Power Time To Repair',cache=False, jit=False)
1483.
@sdpy.subscript(turbinecomps)
1484.
def power_time_to_repair(t):
1485.
return power_component_failures(t)
1486.
1487.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Power Repair',cache=False, jit=False)
1488.
@sdpy.subscript(turbinecomps)
1489.
def power_repair(t):
1490.
ret=np.zeros(2)
1491.
for i in range(2):
1492.
if power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]>1:
1493.
ret[i]=1
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1494.
else:
1495.
if power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]<=1 and power_remaini
ng_time_to_repair(t)[i]>0:
1496.
ret[i]=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]
1497.
else:
1498.
ret[i]=0
1499.
return ret
1500.
#
if_then_else(power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>1, 1,
1501.
#
if_then_else(power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)<1 and power
_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>0, power_remaining_time_to_repair(t),0) )
1502.
1503.
@sdpy.stock(model, np.zeros(2), name='Power Remaining Time To Repair',ca
che=False, jit=False)
1504.
@sdpy.subscript(turbinecomps)
1505.
def power_remaining_time_to_repair(t):
1506.
return power_time_to_repair(t) - power_repair(t)
1507.
1508.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Power All',cache=False, jit=False)
1509.
def power_all(t):
1510.
maxs=np.max(power_remaining_time_to_repair(t))
1511.
return maxs
1512.
1513.
if seedgen==0:
1514.
OCdeltat=Seeds['OCdeltat']
1515.
OCOutages=Seeds['OCOutages']
1516.
1517.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Other Component Failures',cache=False, jit=False)
1518.
@sdpy.subscript(othercomps)
1519.
def other_component_failures(t):
1520.
timetorepair=np.zeros(3)
1521.
#0 Dam PLCRTU, 1 Penstock, 2 Grid
1522.
timestep=t
1523.
for c in range(3):
1524.
if timestep==OCdeltat[c, year]:
1525.
if OCOutages[c, year]>0:
1526.
timetorepair[c]=OCOutages[c, year] #sets other component
s to failure time
1527.
1528.
return timetorepair
1529.
1530.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Other Component Time To Repair',cache=False, jit=
False)
1531.
@sdpy.subscript(othercomps)
1532.
def other_component_time_to_repair(t):
1533.
return other_component_failures(t)
1534.
1535.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Other Component Repair',cache=False, jit=False)
1536.
@sdpy.subscript(othercomps)
1537.
def other_component_repair(t):
1538.
ret=np.zeros(3)
1539.
for i in range(3):
1540.
if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]>1:
1541.
ret[i]=1
1542.
else:
1543.
if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]<=1 and oth
er_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]>0:
1544.
ret[i]=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]
1545.
else:
1546.
ret[i]=0
1547.
return ret
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1548.
#
if_then_else(other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>1, 1,
1549.
#
if_then_else(other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)<1
and other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>0, other_component_remaining_ti
me_to_repair(t),0) )
1550.
1551.
@sdpy.stock(model, np.zeros(3), name='Other Component Remaining Time To
Repair',cache=False, jit=False)
1552.
@sdpy.subscript(othercomps)
1553.
def other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t):
1554.
return other_component_time_to_repair(t)-other_component_repair(t)
1555.
1556.
if seedgen==0:
1557.
SOutages=Seeds['SOutages']
1558.
Sdeltat=Seeds['SOutages']
1559.
1560.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Sensor Failures',cache=False, jit=False)
1561.
def sensor_failures(t):
1562.
timestep=t
1563.
timetorepair=0
1564.
if timestep==Sdeltat[year]:
1565.
if SOutages[year]>0:
1566.
timetorepair=SOutages[year] #sets sensor components to failu
re time
1567.
return timetorepair
1568.
1569.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Sensor Time To Repair',cache=False, jit=False)
1570.
def sensor_time_to_repair(t):
1571.
return sensor_failures(t)
1572.
1573.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Sensor Repair',cache=False, jit=False)
1574.
def sensor_repair(t):
1575.
if sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>1:
1576.
return 1
1577.
else:
1578.
if sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)<=1 and sensor_remaining_ti
me_to_repair(t)>0:
1579.
return sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)
1580.
else:
1581.
return 0
1582.
1583.
@sdpy.stock(model, 0, name='Sensor Remaining Time To Repair',cache=False
, jit=False)
1584.
def sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t):
1585.
return sensor_time_to_repair(t)-sensor_repair(t)
1586.
1587.
1588.
"""
1589.
4.4. OPERATIONS
1590.
1591.
"""
1592.
controls = sdpy.SubRange('controls', ['g1', 't1'])
1593.
1594.
if seedgen==0:
1595.
IFErrorDeltat=Seeds['IFErrorDeltat']
1596.
IFErrorDuration=Seeds['IFErrorDuration']
1597.
1598.
1599.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Operations Planning',cache=False, jit=False)
1600.
@sdpy.subscript(controls)
1601.
def operations_planning(t):
1602.
timestep=t
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1603.
dayref=dayrefs(Startdays[year], timestep)
1604.
FishFlow=getfishflow(dayref)
1605.
Inf114=Inflow[timestep:14+timestep, year] #Changed to one day ahead
so proper spills are released for Vensim version
1606.
InfForecast=Inf114
1607.
gaugerelay=gauge_relay(t)
1608.
if gaugerelay<900 or gaugerelay>381.73: #If error is so high that it becomes obvious
1609.
storage=-1000
1610.
else:
1611.
storage=SSCrev(gaugerelay)
1612.
StaffOnSite=site_staff_mobilized(t)
1613.
actualstorage=reservoir_storage(t)
1614.
if (StaffOnSite>0) or (storage==-1000):
1615.
if storage==-1000:
1616.
storage=SSCrev(RSEs[timestep1, year]) #if unknown, takes previous days value
1617.
if StaffOnSite==1:
1618.
storage=actualstorage #if someone is on site, takes actual
value
1619.
InitialStorage=np.float64(storage)#+lastinf-outfs
1620.
resElPens=np.zeros((3,3))#Penalties for res el
1621.
resElPens[0,:]=[0,273,304]
1622.
resElPens[1,:]=[426.99, 300.39, 300.39]
1623.
resElPens[2,:]=[99.58693574984267,99.58693574984267, 171.28] #123.60
856547318923 from 87.055 to help reduce 0 spill events
1624.
penstockrup=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1] #penstock
1625.
hcfail=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0] #head cover
1626.
igate=intake_gate_closure(t)
1627.
if penstockrup>0 or hcfail>0:
1628.
if igate==0: #reduce res el targets to get res below intake gate
sill so it can be closed
1629.
resElPens[1,:]=[-48.5, -48.5, -48.5]
1630.
resElPens[2,:]=[-47, -47, -47] #lowered
1631.
#draw down reservoir to sill
1632.
SPOG1Av=gate_all(t)
#Availbility set based on "gate time to repair
"
1633.
TurbAv1=power_all(t)
1634.
Nextday=np.zeros(2)
1635.
1636.
Optimized=OpsPlan(InfForecast, InitialStorage, dayref, SPOG1Av, Tu
rbAv1, resElPens)
1637.
Nextday=np.array(Optimized.copy())
#SPOG1, Turb1
1638.
1639.
Nextday.clip(min=0) #omit negatives.
1640.
1641.
return Nextday
1642.
1643.
BREACHQ=np.zeros((365, NYr))
1644.
IGCLOSE=np.zeros((365, NYr))
1645.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Output Saving',cache=False, jit=False)
1646.
def output_saving(t):
1647.
timestep=t
1648.
outfs=reservoir_outflow(t)
1649.
IGCLOSE[timestep,year]=intake_gate_closure(t)
1650.
BREACHQ[timestep,year]=breach_flow(t)
1651.
GAVs[timestep, year]=unit_availability(t)
1652.
UAVs[timestep,year]=gate_availability(t)
1653.
timetorepairg=gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t) #model['Gate remainin
g time to repair[GateComps]']
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1654.
timetorepairt=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t) #model['Power remain
ing time to repair[TurbineComps]']
1655.
RSEs[timestep, year]=reservoir_level(t) #model['Reservoir Level']
1656.
TBFs[timestep, year]=power_flow_release(t) #model["Power flow releas
e"]
1657.
SPOGs[timestep, year]=gated_spill_release(t) #model["Gated spill rel
ease"]
1658.
OT[timestep, year]=overtopping_flow(t)
1659.
INFs[timestep,year]=reservoir_inflow(t) #model["Inflow"]
1660.
OUTFs[timestep,year]=outfs
1661.
TTRS[timestep,0:3, year]=gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t) #model['Ga
te remaining time to repair[GateComps]']
1662.
TTRS[timestep,3:5, year]=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t) #model['P
ower remaining time to repair[TurbineComps]']
1663.
TTRS[int(timestep),5:8, year]=other_component_remaining_time_to_repa
ir(t) #model['Other component remaining time to repair[Other infrastructure]']
1664.
if TTRS[timestep, 2, year]<=0:
1665.
GPs[timestep,year]=gate_position(t) #model["Gate Position"]
1666.
if TTRS[timestep, 2, year]>0:
1667.
GPs[timestep,year]=GPs[timestep-1, year]
1668.
AllMaxQ_t[timestep,:, year]=np.array(AllMaxQ)
1669.
if timetorepairg[0]>0:
1670.
AllMaxQ_t[timestep,0, year] = 0 #gate fails closed, cap is at 0
1671.
if timetorepairg[1]>0:
1672.
AllMaxQ_t[timestep,0, year] = 861.1+728.9 #gate fails open, cap
is maxed
1673.
if timetorepairg[2]>0:
1674.
tempgatecap=GateFlowCalc(381.6,gate_position(t))
1675.
AllMaxQ_t[timestep,0, year] = tempgatecap #gate fails in place,
cap is max flow @ current opening
1676.
if intake_gate_closure(t)==1: #turbine capacity is zero when intake
gate closed
1677.
AllMaxQ_t[timestep, 1, year]=0
1678.
GateCaps[t,year]=gate_capacity(t)
1679.
AllMaxQ_t[timestep,0, year]=np.multiply(AllMaxQ_t[int(timestep),0, y
ear], GateCaps[t,year]) #account for debris blockage
1680.
if timetorepairt[1]>0: #Generator outage
1681.
AllMaxQ_t[timestep,1, year]=0
1682.
CAPs[timestep, year]=np.sum(AllMaxQ_t[timestep,:, year])
1683.
UCRs[timestep, year]=uncontrolled_release(t)
1684.
GCRs[timestep, year]=gate_control_redundancy(t)
1685.
return 1
1686.
1687.
1688.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Turbine Instructions',cache=False, jit=False)
1689.
def turbine_instructions(t):
1690.
return operations_planning(t)[1]
1691.
1692.
1693.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Instructions',cache=False, jit=False)
1694.
def gate_instructions(t):
1695.
ResEl=reservoir_level(t)
1696.
OP=operations_planning(t)[0]
1697.
gps=GateInstr(ResEl, OP)
1698.
#
print("getALLgp: Gate Instruction q: "+str(OPs[0]) + " Gate positi
on: " +str(gps) + " Res El: "+str(ResEl))
1699.
return gps
1700.
1701.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Manual Actuation',cache=False, jit=False)
1702.
def manual_actuation(t):
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1703.
if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0 or dam_grid_avai
lability(t)==0 or sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>0:
1704.
MOBI[t,year]=1
1705.
return 1
1706.
else:
1707.
return 0
1708.
#IF THEN ELSE(Other component remaining time to repair[PLCRTU]>0 :OR: Ga
te instructions>2 :OR: Dam grid availability=0 :OR: Sensor remaining time to rep
air>0, 1 , 0 )+0*Operations planning[g1]
1709.
1710.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Initiate',cache=False, jit=False)
1711.
def initiate(t):
1712.
#IF THEN ELSE(Manual actuation=1:AND:Manual Actuation Initiated<=0,
1 , 0 )
1713.
if manual_actuation(t)==1 and manual_actuation_initiated(t)<=0:
1714.
return 1
1715.
else:
1716.
return 0
1717.
1718.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Demobilize',cache=False, jit=False)
1719.
def demobilize(t):
1720.
#IF THEN ELSE(Manual actuation=0:AND:Site staff mobilized=1, 1 , 0)
1721.
os=output_saving(t)
1722.
if manual_actuation(t)==0 and site_staff_mobilized(t)==1:
1723.
return 1
1724.
else:
1725.
return 0
1726.
1727.
@sdpy.stock(model, 0, name='Manual Actuation Initiated',cache=False, jit
=False)
1728.
def manual_actuation_initiated(t):
1729.
return initiate(t)-demobilize(t)
1730.
1731.
if seedgen==0:
1732.
DelayStaff=Seeds['DelayStaff']
1733.
1734.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Delay In Contacting Staff',cache=False, jit=False
)
1735.
def delay_in_contacting_staff(t):
1736.
delay=1
1737.
if manual_actuation_initiated(t)==1:
1738.
delay=DelayStaff[year] #sets sensor components to failure time
1739.
return float(delay)
1740.
1741.
if seedgen==0:
1742.
DelayAccess=Seeds["DelayAccess"]
1743.
1744.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Delay In Accessing Site',cache=False, jit=False)
1745.
def delay_in_accessing_site(t):
1746.
delay=3+np.zeros(2)
1747.
for c in range(2):
1748.
if manual_actuation_initiated(t)==1:
1749.
delay[c]=DelayAccess[c, year]
1750.
return float(delay[0]) #Can add powerhouse delays later, ignoring fo
r now.
1751.
1752.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Contact Initiation',cache=False, jit=False)
1753.
def contact_initiation(t):
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1754.
#IF THEN ELSE(Initiate=1 :AND: Site staff mobilized=0 :AND: Plant st
aff notified=0, Delay in contacting staff
1755.
#, IF THEN ELSE(Demobilize=1, 1 , 0 ))
1756.
if initiate(t)==1 and site_staff_mobilized(t)==0 and plant_staff_not
ified(t)==0:
1757.
return delay_in_contacting_staff(t)
1758.
else:
1759.
if demobilize(t)==1:
1760.
return 1
1761.
else:
1762.
return 0
1763.
1764.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Contacting',cache=False, jit=False)
1765.
def contacting(t):
1766.
#IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to contact plant manager and site staff
>0 :AND: Manual Actuation Initiated=1, IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to contact pl
ant manager and site staff<1, Time remaining to contact plant manager and site s
taff, 1) , 0 )
1767.
if time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)>0 and manual_actuation_initiat
ed(t)==1:
1768.
if time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)<1:
1769.
return time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)
1770.
else:
1771.
return 1
1772.
else:
1773.
return 0
1774.
1775.
@sdpy.stock(model, 1, name='Time Remaining To Contact Staff',cache=False
, jit=False)
1776.
def time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t):
1777.
return contact_initiation(t)-contacting(t)
1778.
1779.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Plant Staff Notified',cache=False, jit=False)
1780.
def plant_staff_notified(t):
1781.
#IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to contact plant manager and site staff
<=0 :AND: Manual Actuation Initiated=1, 1 , 0 )
1782.
if time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)<=0 and manual_actuation_initia
ted(t)==1:
1783.
return 1
1784.
else:
1785.
return 0
1786.
1787.
plantStaffNotified=np.zeros(365)
1788.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Mobilization Initiated',cache=False, jit=False)
1789.
def mobilization_initiated(t):
1790.
time=t
1791.
plantStaffNotified[int(time)]=plant_staff_notified(t)
1792.
AccessDelay=delay_in_accessing_site(t)
1793.
demob=demobilize(t)
1794.
Mobinit=0
1795.
if time>0:
1796.
if plantStaffNotified[int(time)]==1 and plantStaffNotified[int(t
ime-1)]==0:
1797.
Mobinit=AccessDelay #Adding delays in access time to stock
1798.
if demob==1:
1799.
Mobinit=1 #returning stock to demobilized value which is 3 hr ti
me to get to site on av
1800.
return float(Mobinit)
1801.
1802.
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1803.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Mobilizing',cache=False, jit=False)
1804.
def mobilizing(t):
1805.
#IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to access site>0 :AND: Manual Actuation
Initiated=1 :AND: Time remaining to contact plant manager and site staff<=0, IF
THEN ELSE(Time remaining to access site<1, Time remaining to access site, 1), 0
)
1806.
if time_remaining_to_access_site(t)>0 and manual_actuation_initiated
(t)==1 and time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)<=0:
1807.
if time_remaining_to_access_site(t)<1:
1808.
return time_remaining_to_access_site(t)
1809.
else:
1810.
return 1
1811.
else:
1812.
return 0
1813.
1814.
@sdpy.stock(model, 1, name='Time Remaining To Access Site',cache=False,
jit=False)
1815.
def time_remaining_to_access_site(t):
1816.
return mobilization_initiated(t)-mobilizing(t)
1817.
1818.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Site Staff Mobilized',cache=False, jit=False)
1819.
def site_staff_mobilized(t):
1820.
#IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to access site<=0 :AND: Manual Actuatio
n Initiated=1 :AND: Time remaining to contact plant manager and site staff<=0, 1
, 0)
1821.
if time_remaining_to_access_site(t)<=0 and manual_actuation_initiate
d(t)==1 and time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)<=0:
1822.
MOB[t,year]=1
1823.
return 1
1824.
else:
1825.
return 0
1826.
1827.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Control Redundancy',cache=False, jit=False)
1828.
1829.
:AND:
1830.
1831.
1832.
1833.
1834.
1835.
1836.
1837.
1838.
1839.
1840.
1841.
1842.
1843.
1844.
1845.
)
1846.
1847.
1848.
1849.
1850.
1851.
1852.

def gate_control_redundancy(t):
#IF THEN ELSE(Manual actuation=0, 2, IF THEN ELSE(Manual actuation=1
Site staff mobilized=1, 1 , 0 ))
if manual_actuation(t)==0:
return 2
else:
if manual_actuation(t)==1 and site_staff_mobilized(t)==1:
return 1
else:
return 0
"""
4.5.

GATE ACTUATORS

"""
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Dam Grid Availability',cache=False, jit=False)
def dam_grid_availability(t):
#IF THEN ELSE(Other component remaining time to repair[Grid]>0, 0, 1
if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0:
return 0
else:
return 1
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Power Supply',cache=False, jit=False)
def gate_power_supply(t):
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1853.
return dam_grid_availability(t)
1854.
1855.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Gate Availability",cache=False, jit=False)
1856.
def gate_availability(t):
1857.
time=t
1858.
gateavail=1
1859.
sstaff=site_staff_mobilized(t)
1860.
staffproblemgate=0
1861.
if time>0:
1862.
if (other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0 or other_co
mponent_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0) and sstaff==0:
1863.
staffproblemgate=1
1864.
gateout=gate_all(t)
1865.
if gateout>0 or staffproblemgate==1:
1866.
gateavail=0
1867.
return float(gateavail)
1868.
1869.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Components Failing Gate In Place",cache=False, ji
t=False)
1870.
def components_failing_gate_in_place(t):
1871.
#IF THEN ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[C FIP]>0, 0 , 1 )
1872.
if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0:
1873.
return 0
1874.
else:
1875.
return 1
1876.
1877.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Components Collapsing Gate",cache=False, jit=Fals
e)
1878.
def components_collapsing_gate(t):
1879.
#IF THEN ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[C FO]>0, 0 , 1 )
1880.
if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0:
1881.
return 0
1882.
else:
1883.
return 1
1884.
1885.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Components Failing Gate Closed",cache=False, jit=
False)
1886.
def components_failing_gate_closed(t):
1887.
#IF THEN ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[C FC]>0, 0 , 1 )
1888.
if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0:
1889.
return 0
1890.
else:
1891.
return 1
1892.
1893.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Gate Collapsed",cache=False, jit=False)
1894.
def gate_collapse(t):
1895.
#IF THEN ELSE(Components collapsing gate=0, 1 , 0 )
1896.
if components_collapsing_gate(t)==0:
1897.
return 1
1898.
else:
1899.
return 0
1900.
1901.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Fail Closed",cache=False, jit=False)
1902.
def fail_closed(t):
1903.
#IF THEN ELSE(Components failing gate closed=0, 1 , 0)
1904.
if components_failing_gate_closed(t)==0:
1905.
return 1
1906.
else:
1907.
return 0
1908.
1909.
max_opening=12.5
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1910.
1911.
1912.
1913.
1914.
1915.
1916.
1917.
1918.
1919.
1920.
1921.
1922.
1923.
1924.
1925.
1926.
1927.
1928.
1929.
1930.
1931.
1932.
1933.
1934.
1935.
1936.
1937.
1938.
1939.
1940.
1941.
1942.
1943.
1944.
1945.
1946.
1947.
1948.
1949.
1950.
1951.
1952.
tock
1953.
1954.
1955.
1956.
1957.
re
1958.
1959.
1960.
1961.
1962.
1963.
1964.
1965.
1966.
1967.
1968.

@sdpy.aux(model, name="Last Gate Position",cache=False, jit=False)
def last_gate_position(t):
timestep=t
gp=GPs[timestep,year]
if gate_availability(t)==0:
gateavinds=np.where(GAVs[:,year]==1)[0]
if np.size(gateavinds)!=0:
lastgateactivets=np.max(gateavinds)
gp=GPs[lastgateactivets, year]
return gp
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Gate Position",cache=False, jit=False)
def gate_position(t):
GColl=gate_collapse(t)
MaxO=12.5
GFClosed=fail_closed(t)
GateAvailability=gate_availability(t)
GAVs[int(t), year]=GateAvailability
GateInstructions=gate_instructions(t)
LastGatePosition=last_gate_position(t)
if GColl==1:
return MaxO
if GFClosed==1:
return 0
if GateAvailability==1:
return GateInstructions
if GateAvailability==0:
return LastGatePosition

"""
4.6. TURBINE ACTUATORS
"""
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Unit Availability',cache=False, jit=False)
def unit_availability(t):
time=t
turbavail=1
if time>0:
turbout=power_all(t)
penstockrup=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1] #pens
if turbout>0:
turbavail=0
if penstockrup>0:
turbavail=0
if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0: #grid failu
turbavail=0
return turbavail
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Head Cover',cache=False, jit=False)
def head_cover(t):
if power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0:
return 0
else:
return 1
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Generator',cache=False, jit=False)
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1969.
def generator(t):
1970.
if power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0:
1971.
return 0
1972.
else:
1973.
return 1
1974.
1975.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Head Cover Max Flow',cache=False, jit=False)
1976.
def head_cover_max_flow(t):
1977.
flag1=head_cover(t)+1 #if head cover = 0 then flag=1
1978.
if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0: #penstock
1979.
flag1=1
1980.
resels=reservoir_level(t)
1981.
t1=fncTurbineMaxFlow(resels, flag1)
1982.
if intake_gate_closure(t)==1:
1983.
return 0
1984.
if intake_gate_closure(t)==0:
1985.
return np.max([np.min([5*(t1), reservoir_storage(t)+reservoir_in
flow(t)-gated_spill_release(t)-(-48.6)]), 0])
1986.
1987.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Turbine Flow',cache=False, jit=False)
1988.
def turbine_flow(t):
1989.
#IF THEN ELSE(Components collapsing gate=1, IF THEN ELSE(Head Cover=
0, Head Cover Max Flow , IF THEN ELSE(Unit availability=1, Turbine instructions
, 0)), 0)
1990.
if components_collapsing_gate(t)==1:
1991.
if head_cover(t)==0:
1992.
return head_cover_max_flow(t)
1993.
if head_cover(t)==1 and unit_availability(t)==1:
1994.
return turbine_instructions(t)
1995.
else: return 0
1996.
else:
1997.
return 0
1998.
1999.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Powerhouse Flow Conveyance",cache=False, jit=Fals
e)
2000.
def powerhouse_flow_conveyance(t):
2001.
return turbine_flow(t)
2002.
2003.
"""
2004.
5. MODEL RUNNING (Base Case)
2005.
2006.
Stocks redefined each loop to ensure initial values are reset.
2007.
This may be changed later so stocks are also defined within their sector
s above.
2008.
2009.
"""
2010.
for yr in range(NYr):
2011.
year=yr
2012.
# Define time parameters to run model
2013.
initial_time = 0
2014.
final_time = 364
2015.
time_step = 1
2016.
model.run(initial_time, final_time, time_step)
2017.
#
print("Completed year :"+str(yr), flush=(yr%args.flush_period==0))
2018.
2019.
304.1:
2020.
2021.
2022.

initial_reservoir_storage=SSCrev(B_RSEs[0,year])
if initial_reservoir_storage<=#making sure initial reservoir level isn't a failure
initial_reservoir_storage=364.27
model.reinitStock(initial_reservoir_storage, reservoir_storage)
model.reinitStock(np.zeros(3), gate_remaining_time_to_repair)
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2023.
model.reinitStock(np.zeros(2), power_remaining_time_to_repair)
2024.
model.reinitStock(np.zeros(3), other_component_remaining_time_to_rep
air)
2025.
model.reinitStock(0, sensor_remaining_time_to_repair)
2026.
model.reinitStock(1, time_remaining_to_access_site)
2027.
model.reinitStock(1, time_remaining_to_contact_staff)
2028.
model.reinitStock(0, manual_actuation_initiated)
2029.
plantStaffNotified=np.zeros(365)
2030.
RESEL_IG=[]
2031.
2032.
2033.
"""
2034.
6. DAM SAFETY PRIORITIZED RUN
2035.
2036.
"""
2037.
2038.
Output=[RSEs, TBFs, SPOGs, OT]
2039.
Otheroutput=[TTRS, TOTR, DEBRISREMOVAL, DAY, MON]
2040.
EOCs=RSEs-376.5
2041.
EOCs[EOCs<0]=0 #Filling in elevations over the core and truncating to ze
ro if less than 376.5
2042.
2043.
@njit
2044.
def OTC(elev): #Overtopping curve
2045.
if elev<=378.41:
2046.
return 0
2047.
else:
2048.
return (-35.7505780379803*elev**3 + 40896.2749435669* elev**2 15593240.0619064*elev + 1981715583.08889)
2049.
2050.
2051.
RESEL_IG=[]
2052.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Intake Gate Closure",cache=False, jit=False)
2053.
def intake_gate_closure(t):
2054.
penstockrup=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]
2055.
hcfail=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]
2056.
igclosed=0
2057.
timestep=t
2058.
if hcfail>0 or penstockrup>0:
2059.
if timestep>OCdeltat[1,year]+1:
2060.
igclosed=1 #closes immediately after 1 timestep
2061.
return igclosed
2062.
2063.
@sdpy.aux(model, name="Head Cover Max Flow",cache=False, jit=False)
2064.
def head_cover_max_flow(t): #reduces to 1/24th of actual release to acco
unt for intake gate closure under rupture flow
2065.
flag1=head_cover(t)+1 #if head cover = 0 then flag=1
2066.
if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0: #penstock
2067.
flag1=1
2068.
resels=reservoir_level(t)
2069.
t1=fncTurbineMaxFlow(resels, flag1)
2070.
if intake_gate_closure(t)==1:
2071.
return 0
2072.
if intake_gate_closure(t)==0:
2073.
return (1/24.)*np.max([np.min([5*(t1), reservoir_storage(t)+rese
rvoir_inflow(t)-gated_spill_release(t)-(-48.6)]), 0])
2074.
2075.
@sdpy.aux(model, name='Operations Planning',cache=False, jit=False)
2076.
@sdpy.subscript(controls)
2077.
def operations_planning(t):
2078.
timestep=t
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2079.
dayref=dayrefs(Startdays[year], timestep)
2080.
Inf114=Inflow[timestep:14+timestep, year] #Changed to one day ahead
so proper spills are released for Vensim version
2081.
InfForecast=Inf114
2082.
gaugerelay=gauge_relay(t)
2083.
if gaugerelay<900 or gaugerelay>381.73: #If error is so high that it becomes obvious
2084.
storage=-1000
2085.
else:
2086.
storage=SSCrev(gaugerelay)
2087.
StaffOnSite=site_staff_mobilized(t)
2088.
actualstorage=reservoir_storage(t)
2089.
if (StaffOnSite>0) or (storage==-1000):
2090.
if storage==-1000:
2091.
storage=SSCrev(RSEs[timestep1, year]) #if unknown, takes previous days value
2092.
if StaffOnSite==1:
2093.
storage=actualstorage #if someone is on site, takes actual
value
2094.
InitialStorage=np.float64(storage)#+lastinf-outfs
2095.
resElPens=np.zeros((3,3))#Penalties for res el
2096.
resElPens[0,:]=[0,273,304]
2097.
resElPens[1,:]=[426.99, 300.39, 300.39]
2098.
resElPens[2,:]=[99.58693574984267,99.58693574984267, 171.28] #123.60
856547318923 from 87.055 to help reduce 0 spill events
2099.
SPOG1Av=gate_all(t)
#Availbility set based on "gate time to repair
"
2100.
TurbAv1=power_all(t)
2101.
if SPOG1Av>0 or other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0 or
other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0:
2102.
#if grid, plc or gate unavailable
2103.
resElPens[1,:]=[100, 100, 100] #reducing target nmax to 367.8 to
keep reservoir low for large inflow events
2104.
Nextday=np.zeros(2)
2105.
2106.
Optimized=OpsPlan(InfForecast, InitialStorage, dayref, SPOG1Av, Tu
rbAv1, resElPens)
2107.
if SPOG1Av>0 or other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0 or
other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0:
2108.
if TurbAv1<=0:
2109.
Optimized[1]=fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(InitialStorage), 1)
2110.
Nextday=np.array(Optimized.copy())
#SPOG1, Turb1
2111.
Nextday.clip(min=0) #omit negatives.
2112.
return Nextday
2113.
2114.
2115.
#indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr
* 0.5))
2116.
#OCOutages[0,indices] = 0
2117.
#OCdeltat[0,indices] = 0
2118.
#indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr
* 0.5))
2119.
#SErrors[indices]=0
2120.
#SErrorDeltat[indices]=0
2121.
#indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr
* 0.5))
2122.
#SOutages[indices]=0
2123.
#Sdeltat[indices]=0
2124.
2125.
2126.
#Save simulation 1 results with 1 in them.
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2127.
2128.
2129.
2130.
2131.
2132.
2133.
2134.
2135.
2136.
2137.
2138.
2139.
2140.
2141.
2142.
2143.
2144.
2145.
2146.
2147.
2148.
2149.
2150.
2151.
2152.
2153.
2154.
2155.
2156.
2157.
2158.
2159.
2160.
2161.
2162.
2163.
2164.
2165.
2166.
2167.
2168.
2169.
2170.
2171.
2172.
2173.
2174.
0.5))
2175.
2176.
2177.
0.5))
2178.
2179.
2180.
0.5))
2181.
2182.
2183.
0.2))

RSEs1=RSEs
TBFs1=TBFs
SPOGs1=SPOGs
OT1=OT
OUTFs1=OUTFs
TTRS1=TTRS
CAPs1=CAPs
EOCs1=EOCs
UCRs1=UCRs
GCRs1=GCRs
GAVs1=GAVs
GPs1=GPs
#Redefining arrays for second run
RSEs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
GAVs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
TBFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
SPOGs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
OT=np.zeros((365,NYr))
INFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
OUTFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
GPs=np.zeros((365, NYr))
TOTR=np.zeros((365,NYr))
DEBRISREMOVAL=np.zeros(NYr)
DAY=np.zeros((365,NYr))
MON=np.zeros((365,NYr))
AllMaxQ_t=np.zeros((365,2, NYr))
AllMaxQ=[861.1+728.9,32.5+32.5]
TTRS=np.zeros((365,8, NYr))
Retention=np.zeros((365,NYr))
yearnum=np.zeros(NYr)
for yr in range(NYr):
yearnum[yr]=str(1984+yr)
CAPs=np.zeros((365, NYr))
EOCs=np.zeros((365, NYr))
UCRs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
GCRs=np.zeros((365,NYr))
#Reducing sensor issues, plcrtu failures by 50%
OCOutages1=OCOutages.copy()
OCdeltat1=OCdeltat.copy()
SErrors1=SErrors.copy()
SErrorDeltat1=SErrorDeltat.copy()
SOutages1=SOutages.copy()
Sdeltat1=Sdeltat.copy()
GateOutagesAll1=GateOutagesAll.copy()
indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
OCOutages[0,indices] = 0
OCdeltat[0,indices] = 0
indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
SErrors[indices]=0
SErrorDeltat[indices]=0
indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
SOutages[indices]=0
Sdeltat[indices]=0
indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
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2184.
2185.
0.2))
2186.
2187.
2188.
2189.
2190.
2191.
2192.
2193.
304.1:
2194.
2195.
2196.
2197.
2198.
air)
2199.
2200.
2201.
2202.
2203.
2204.
2205.
2206.
2207.
2208.
2209.
2210.
2211.
))
2212.
2213.
2214.
2215.
2216.
2217.
2218.
2219.
2220.
2221.
2222.
2223.
2224.
2225.
2226.
2227.
2228.
2229.
2230.
2231.
2232.
2233.
2234.
2235.
2236.
2237.
2238.
2239.
2240.

GateOutagesAll[0,indices] = 0 #gate failing closed 15% improvement
indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
GateOutagesAll[2,indices] = 0 #gate failing in place 15% improvement

for yr in range(NYr):
tm=time.time()
year=yr
initial_reservoir_storage=SSCrev(B_RSEs[0,year])
if initial_reservoir_storage<=#making sure initial reservoir level isn't a failure
initial_reservoir_storage=364.27
model.reinitStock(initial_reservoir_storage, reservoir_storage)
model.reinitStock(np.zeros(3), gate_remaining_time_to_repair)
model.reinitStock(np.zeros(2), power_remaining_time_to_repair)
model.reinitStock(np.zeros(3), other_component_remaining_time_to_rep
model.reinitStock(0,
model.reinitStock(1,
model.reinitStock(1,
model.reinitStock(0,

sensor_remaining_time_to_repair)
time_remaining_to_access_site)
time_remaining_to_contact_staff)
manual_actuation_initiated)

# Define time parameters to run model
initial_time = 0
final_time = 364
time_step = 1

#
#
#

model.run(initial_time, final_time, time_step)
print("Completed DS year :"+str(yr), flush=(yr%args.flush_period==0
tm1=time.time()
timer.append(tm1-tm)
plantStaffNotified=np.zeros(365)
RESEL_IG=[]

"""
7. POST-PROCESSING AND SAVING RESULTS
Percentiles are saved to reduce output file sizes as much as possible
"""
S_RL=pd.read_csv(name1)
S_RL=S_RL.set_index("NewInd")
S_CL=pd.read_csv(name2)
S_CL=S_CL.set_index("NewInd") #setting index to the formatted OS IDs
scenar = all_scenarios[seednum]
ScenarioRL=S_RL.filter(items=scenar[0:7], axis=0)
ScenarioCL=S_CL.filter(items=scenar[7:13], axis=0)
AbnormalRL=ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL['CausalFactorName']!="None"]
AbnormalCL=ScenarioCL[ScenarioCL['CausalFactorName']!="None"]
AbnormalCL=AbnormalCL[AbnormalCL['CausalFactorName']!="Normal"]
ScenarioIDs=[]
for i in range(len(AbnormalRL)):
ScenarioIDs.append(AbnormalRL.index[i])
for i in range(len(AbnormalCL)):
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2241.
ScenarioIDs.append(AbnormalCL.index[i])
2242.
2243.
AllAdScenarios=ScenarioIDs.copy()
2244.
2245.
AllTimes=np.zeros((11, NYr))
2246.
AllTimes[0:3,:]=Gdeltat
2247.
AllTimes[3:5,:]=Tdeltat
2248.
AllTimes[5,:]=Sdeltat1
2249.
AllTimes[6:9,:]=OCdeltat1
2250.
if "1359_2" in ScenarioIDs: #adding debris
2251.
AllTimes[9,:]=np.ones(NYr)
2252.
AllTimes[10,:]=IFErrorDeltat
2253.
AllTimes=AllTimes.transpose()
2254.
ColNames=["1362", "1361", "1360", "836", "838","30", "18","42","44", "13
59", "45"]
2255.
AllTimes=pd.DataFrame(AllTimes, columns=ColNames)
2256.
2257.
PersonnelScenarios=[]
2258.
if "48_1" in ScenarioIDs:
2259.
PersonnelScenarios.append("48")
2260.
ScenarioIDs.remove("48_1")
2261.
if "48_2" in ScenarioIDs:
2262.
PersonnelScenarios.append("48")
2263.
ScenarioIDs.remove("48_2")
2264.
if "29_1" in ScenarioIDs:
2265.
PersonnelScenarios.append("29")
2266.
ScenarioIDs.remove("29_1")
2267.
if "29_2" in ScenarioIDs:
2268.
PersonnelScenarios.append("29")
2269.
ScenarioIDs.remove("29_2")
2270.
if "29_3" in ScenarioIDs:
2271.
PersonnelScenarios.append("29")
2272.
ScenarioIDs.remove("29_3")
2273.
2274.
2275.
2276.
ScenarioIDs_simp=[]
2277.
for i in range(len(ScenarioIDs)):
2278.
head, sep, tail = ScenarioIDs[i].partition('_')
2279.
ScenarioIDs_simp.append(head)
2280.
2281.
AdTimes=AllTimes[ScenarioIDs_simp]
2282.
2283.
TrueScenarios1=[] #this will contain a list of true scenario results
2284.
for yr in range(NYr):
2285.
imptimes=AdTimes.iloc[yr]
2286.
imptimesarr=np.array(imptimes)
2287.
RSEdiff=1 #this means there is a difference between the normal and c
ase reservoir levels
2288.
scenar=[]
2289.
for t in range(361):
2290.
if t in imptimesarr:
2291.
if len(scenar)==0:
2292.
scenstart=t
2293.
imps=imptimes[imptimes == t].index
2294.
for i in range(len(imps)):
2295.
scenar.append(imps[i])
#will keep adding to this s
cenario as events happen, if RSEs don't change
2296.
#NOW check for scenario end, which happens when the next 3 days
RSE is within 0.05 m of normal
2297.
if len(scenar)!=0:
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2298.
if (-0.05<(RSEs1[t+1,yr]-B_RSEs[t+1, yr])<0.05) and (0.05<(RSEs1[t+2,yr]-B_RSEs[t+2, yr])<0.05) and (-0.05<(RSEs1[t+3,yr]B_RSEs[t+3, yr])<0.05) or (RSEs1[t,yr]<=353.75) or (t==360):
2299.
RSEdiff=0
2300.
scenend=t
2301.
if len(PersonnelScenarios)>0:
2302.
#
if imps[i]=='44' or imps[i]=='18': #plc/rtu or grid
failures necessitate site access for gate op
2303.
scenar+=PersonnelScenarios #add site and staff delay
s to ensure they are counted towards scenario
2304.
2305.
if scenstart!=scenend:
2306.
#post process sub-scenario
2307.
Failure=0
2308.
RSEs1subset=RSEs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2309.
SPOGs1subset=SPOGs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2310.
TBFs1subset=TBFs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2311.
OTs1subset=OT1[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2312.
2313.
CAPs1subset=CAPs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2314.
UCRs1subset=UCRs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2315.
GCRs1subset=GCRs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2316.
if np.sum(UCRs1subset)==0:
2317.
UCRs1subset=0 #avoid saving useless info
2318.
if min(CAPs1subset)==1655:
2319.
CAPs1subset=1655 #avoid saving useless info
2320.
if min(GCRs1subset)==2:
2321.
GCRs1subset=2 #avoid saving useless info
2322.
INFsubset=INFs[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2323.
Avg5dInfThreshold=0
2324.
Max5dInfThreshold=0
2325.
if min(RSEs1subset)<=353.75:
2326.
Failure=1
2327.
minind=np.argmin(RSEs1subset)
2328.
if minind>5:
2329.
Avg5dInfThreshold=np.mean(INFsubset[minind5:minind])
2330.
Max5dInfThreshold=max(INFsubset[minind5:minind])
2331.
else:
2332.
Avg5dInfThreshold=np.mean(INFsubset[0:minind
])
2333.
Max5dInfThreshold=max(INFsubset[0:minind])
2334.
maxRSE=max(RSEs1subset)
2335.
#replacing elements in scenar with complete OS ident
ifier
2336.
scenar1= {pref:ele for pref in scenar for ele in All
AdScenarios if pref in ele}
2337.
scenar1 = list(scenar1.values())
2338.
AllOS=['18_3', '29_4', '30_4', '42_2', '44_3', '45_2
', '48_3', '836_2', '838_2', '1359_1', '1360_3', '1361_1', '1362_1']
2339.
for i in range(len(scenar1)): #convert all normal to
the scenario represented in scenar1
2340.
head, sep, tail = scenar1[i].partition('_')
2341.
indices = [i for i, s in enumerate(AllOS) if hea
d in s]
2342.
AllOS[indices[0]]=scenar1[i] #complete list of O
S's
2343.
#Convert list of OS's to seed number
2344.
subseednum=all_scenarios.get_scenario_index(AllOS)
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2345.
sOut1=[subseednum, scenar1, Starts[yr], (scenstart,
scenend), Failure, (Avg5dInfThreshold, Max5dInfThreshold), maxRSE, RSEs1subset,
CAPs1subset, UCRs1subset, GCRs1subset, yr, SPOGs1subset, TBFs1subset, OTs1subset
]
2346.
#reset scenar
2347.
scenar=[]
2348.
TrueScenarios1.append(sOut1)
2349.
if RSEs1[t,yr]<=353.75: #eliminate unnecessary furth
er processing
2350.
break
2351.
else:
2352.
scenar=[] #skips scenarios that didn't cause any dif
ference in reservoir levels
2353.
2354.
# Dam safety improved
2355.
2356.
AllTimes=np.zeros((11, NYr))
2357.
AllTimes[0:3,:]=Gdeltat
2358.
AllTimes[3:5,:]=Tdeltat
2359.
AllTimes[5,:]=Sdeltat
2360.
AllTimes[6:9,:]=OCdeltat
2361.
if "1359_2" in ScenarioIDs: #adding debris
2362.
AllTimes[9,:]=np.ones(NYr)
2363.
AllTimes[10,:]=IFErrorDeltat
2364.
AllTimes=AllTimes.transpose()
2365.
ColNames=["1362", "1361", "1360", "836", "838","30", "18","42","44", "13
59", "45"]
2366.
AllTimes=pd.DataFrame(AllTimes, columns=ColNames)
2367.
2368.
2369.
ScenarioIDs_simp=[]
2370.
for i in range(len(ScenarioIDs)):
2371.
head, sep, tail = ScenarioIDs[i].partition('_')
2372.
ScenarioIDs_simp.append(head)
2373.
2374.
AdTimes=AllTimes[ScenarioIDs_simp]
2375.
2376.
TrueScenarios=[] #this will contain a list of true scenario results
2377.
for yr in range(NYr):
2378.
imptimes=AdTimes.iloc[yr]
2379.
imptimesarr=np.array(imptimes)
2380.
RSEdiff=1 #this means there is a difference between the normal and c
ase reservoir levels
2381.
scenar=[]
2382.
for t in range(361):
2383.
if t in imptimesarr:
2384.
if len(scenar)==0:
2385.
scenstart=t
2386.
imps=imptimes[imptimes == t].index
2387.
for i in range(len(imps)):
2388.
scenar.append(imps[i])
#will keep adding to this s
cenario as events happen, if RSEs don't change
2389.
#NOW check for scenario end, which happens when the next 3 days
RSE is within 0.05 m of normal
2390.
if len(scenar)!=0:
2391.
if (-0.05<(RSEs[t+1,yr]-B_RSEs[t+1, yr])<0.05) and (0.05<(RSEs[t+2,yr]-B_RSEs[t+2, yr])<0.05) and (-0.05<(RSEs[t+3,yr]B_RSEs[t+3, yr])<0.05) or (RSEs[t,yr]<=353.75) or (t==360):
2392.
RSEdiff=0
2393.
scenend=t
2394.
if len(PersonnelScenarios)>0:
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2395.
#
if imps[i]=='44' or imps[i]=='18': #plc/rtu or grid
failures necessitate site access for gate op
2396.
scenar+=PersonnelScenarios #add site and staff delay
s to ensure they are counted towards scenario
2397.
if scenstart!=scenend:
2398.
RSEdiff=0
2399.
scenend=t
2400.
#post process sub-scenario
2401.
Failure=0
2402.
RSEs1subset=RSEs[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2403.
CAPs1subset=CAPs[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2404.
UCRs1subset=UCRs[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2405.
GCRs1subset=GCRs[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2406.
if np.sum(UCRs1subset)==0:
2407.
UCRs1subset=0 #avoid saving useless info
2408.
if min(CAPs1subset)==1655:
2409.
CAPs1subset=1655 #avoid saving useless info
2410.
if min(GCRs1subset)==2:
2411.
GCRs1subset=2 #avoid saving useless info
2412.
INFsubset=INFs[scenstart:t+1, yr]
2413.
Avg5dInfThreshold=0
2414.
Max5dInfThreshold=0
2415.
if min(RSEs1subset)<=353.75:
2416.
Failure=1
2417.
minind=np.argmin(RSEs1subset)
2418.
if minind>5:
2419.
Avg5dInfThreshold=np.mean(INFsubset[minind5:minind])
2420.
Max5dInfThreshold=max(INFsubset[minind5:minind])
2421.
else:
2422.
Avg5dInfThreshold=np.mean(INFsubset[0:minind
])
2423.
Max5dInfThreshold=max(INFsubset[0:minind])
2424.
maxRSE=max(RSEs1subset)
2425.
#replacing elements in scenar with complete OS ident
ifier
2426.
scenar1= {pref:ele for pref in scenar for ele in All
AdScenarios if pref in ele}
2427.
scenar1 = list(scenar1.values())
2428.
AllOS=['18_3', '29_4', '30_4', '42_2', '44_3', '45_2
', '48_3', '836_2', '838_2', '1359_1', '1360_3', '1361_1', '1362_1']
2429.
for i in range(len(scenar1)): #convert all normal to
the scenario represented in scenar1
2430.
head, sep, tail = scenar1[i].partition('_')
2431.
indices = [i for i, s in enumerate(AllOS) if hea
d in s]
2432.
AllOS[indices[0]]=scenar1[i] #complete list of O
S's
2433.
#Convert list of OS's to seed number
2434.
subseednum=all_scenarios.get_scenario_index(AllOS)
2435.
sOut=[subseednum, scenar1, Starts[yr], (scenstart, s
cenend), Failure, (Avg5dInfThreshold, Max5dInfThreshold), maxRSE, RSEs1subset, C
APs1subset, UCRs1subset, GCRs1subset, yr]
2436.
#reset scenar
2437.
scenar=[]
2438.
TrueScenarios.append(sOut)
2439.
if RSEs[t,yr]<=353.75: #eliminate unnecessary furthe
r processing
2440.
break
2441.
else:
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2442.
scenar=[] #skips scenarios that didn't cause any dif
ference in reservoir levels
2443.
2444.
2445.
2446.
#Error messages
2447.
#Check min and max RSEs
2448.
err=[]
2449.
mnrse=np.min(RSEs)
2450.
if mnrse<320:
2451.
err.append("Minimum RSE below el. 320m")
2452.
mxspog=np.max(SPOGs)
2453.
if mxspog>1590:
2454.
err.append("Gate flow exceeds 1590 maximumum")
2455.
2456.
2457.
#reorganizing outputs
2458.
numscen=len(TrueScenarios1)
2459.
seednums1=np.zeros(numscen)
2460.
seedstarts1=np.zeros((numscen,2))
2461.
scendates1=np.zeros((numscen,2))
2462.
failures1=np.zeros(numscen)
2463.
infthresh1=np.zeros((numscen,2))
2464.
years1=np.zeros(numscen)
2465.
maxrse1=np.zeros(numscen)
2466.
for i in range(numscen):
2467.
seednums1[i]=TrueScenarios1[i][0]
2468.
seedstarts1[i,:]=TrueScenarios1[i][2]
2469.
scendates1[i,:]=TrueScenarios1[i][3]
2470.
failures1[i]=TrueScenarios1[i][4]
2471.
infthresh1[i,:]=TrueScenarios1[i][5]
2472.
maxrse1[i]=TrueScenarios1[i][6]
2473.
years1[i]=TrueScenarios1[i][11]
2474.
2475.
seedfailures1=0
2476.
for i in range(numscen):
2477.
if seednums1[i]==seednum:
2478.
seedfailures1+=failures1[i]
2479.
seedsim1=np.count_nonzero(seednums1==seednum)
2480.
2481.
2482.
TSIterations1=np.where(seednums1==seednum)[0]
2483.
if len(TSIterations1)>0:
2484.
scenariolengthmax=int(np.max(scendates1[:,1]-scendates1[:,0]))+1
2485.
RSEs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))
2486.
RSEs1all[RSEs1all==0]='nan'
2487.
SPOGs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))
2488.
SPOGs1all[SPOGs1all==0]='nan'
2489.
TBFs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))
2490.
TBFs1all[TBFs1all==0]='nan'
2491.
OTs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))
2492.
OTs1all[OTs1all==0]='nan'
2493.
2494.
CAPs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))
2495.
CAPs1all[CAPs1all==0]='nan'
2496.
UCRs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))
2497.
UCRs1all[UCRs1all==0]='nan'
2498.
GCRs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))
2499.
GCRs1all[GCRs1all==0]='nan'
2500.
for j in range(len(TSIterations1)):
2501.
i=TSIterations1[j]

335

2502.
scenariolength=int(scendates1[i,1]-scendates1[i,0])
2503.
RSEs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][7])]=TrueScenarios1[i][7]
2504.
if RSEs1all[j,len(TrueScenarios1[i][7])-1]<=353.75:
2505.
RSEs1all[j, len(TrueScenarios1[i][7]):scenariolengthmax]=353
.75 #count breach all the way to the end for plotting
2506.
try:
2507.
CAPs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][8])]=TrueScenarios1[i][8]
2508.
2509.
2510.
2511.

except:
CAPs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][8]
try:
UCRs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][9])]=TrueScenarios1[i][9]

2512.
2513.
2514.
2515.
0]
2516.
2517.
2518.
2519.
12]
2520.
2521.
2522.
2523.
3]
2524.
2525.
2526.
2527.
]
2528.
2529.
2530.
2531.
2532.
2533.
2534.
2535.
2536.
2537.
2538.
2539.
2540.
2541.
2542.
2543.
2544.
2545.
2546.
2547.
2548.
2549.
2550.
2551.
2552.
2553.
2554.
2555.

except:
UCRs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][9]
try:
GCRs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][10])]=TrueScenarios1[i][1
except:
GCRs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][10]
try:
SPOGs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][12])]=TrueScenarios1[i][
except:
SPOGs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][12]
try:
TBFs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][13])]=TrueScenarios1[i][1
except:
TBFs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][13]
try:
OTs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][14])]=TrueScenarios1[i][14
except:
OTs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][14]
else:
RSEs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])
SPOGs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])
TBFs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])
OTs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])
CAPs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])
UCRs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])
GCRs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])

#reorganizing outputs
numscen=len(TrueScenarios)
seednums=np.zeros(numscen)
seedstarts=np.zeros((numscen,2))
scendates=np.zeros((numscen,2))
failures=np.zeros(numscen)
infthresh=np.zeros((numscen,2))
maxrse=np.zeros(numscen)
years=np.zeros((numscen,2))
for i in range(numscen):
seednums[i]=TrueScenarios[i][0]
seedstarts[i,:]=TrueScenarios[i][2]
scendates[i,:]=TrueScenarios[i][3]
failures[i]=TrueScenarios[i][4]
infthresh[i,:]=TrueScenarios[i][5]
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2556.
maxrse[i]=TrueScenarios[i][6]
2557.
years[i]=TrueScenarios[i][11]
2558.
2559.
seedfailures=0
2560.
for i in range(numscen):
2561.
if seednums[i]==seednum:
2562.
seedfailures+=failures[i]
2563.
seedsim=np.count_nonzero(seednums==seednum)
2564.
2565.
TSIterations=np.where(seednums==seednum)[0]
2566.
if len(TSIterations)>0:
2567.
scenariolengthmax=int(np.max(scendates[:,1]-scendates[:,0]))+1
2568.
RSEsall=np.zeros((len(TSIterations), scenariolengthmax))
2569.
RSEsall[RSEsall==0]='nan'
2570.
CAPsall=np.zeros((len(TSIterations), scenariolengthmax))
2571.
CAPsall[CAPsall==0]='nan'
2572.
UCRsall=np.zeros((len(TSIterations), scenariolengthmax))
2573.
UCRsall[UCRsall==0]='nan'
2574.
GCRsall=np.zeros((len(TSIterations), scenariolengthmax))
2575.
GCRsall[GCRsall==0]='nan'
2576.
for j in range(len(TSIterations)-1):
2577.
i=TSIterations[j]
2578.
scenariolength=int(scendates[i,1]-scendates[i,0])
2579.
RSEsall[j,0:len(TrueScenarios[i][7])]=TrueScenarios[i][7]
2580.
if RSEsall[j,len(TrueScenarios[i][7])-1]<=353.75:
2581.
RSEsall[j, len(TrueScenarios1[i][7]):scenariolengthmax]=353.
75 #count breach all the way to the end for plotting
2582.
try:
2583.
CAPsall[j,0:len(TrueScenarios[i][8])]=TrueScenarios[i][8]
2584.
except:
2585.
CAPsall[j,0]=TrueScenarios[i][8]
2586.
try:
2587.
UCRsall[j,0:len(TrueScenarios[i][9])]=TrueScenarios[i][9]
2588.
except:
2589.
UCRsall[j,0]=TrueScenarios[i][9]
2590.
try:
2591.
GCRsall[j,0:len(TrueScenarios[i][10])]=TrueScenarios[i][10]
2592.
2593.
2594.
2595.
2596.
2597.
2598.
2599.
2600.
2601.
2602.
2603.
2604.
2605.
2606.
2607.
2608.
2609.
2610.
2611.
2612.
2613.
2614.

except:
GCRsall[j,0]=TrueScenarios[i][10]
else:
RSEsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])
SPOGsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])
TBFsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])
OTsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])
CAPsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])
UCRsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])
GCRsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])

#Write txt output file
if len(err)==0:
np.savez_compressed(str("Outputs-"+str(seednum)+".npz"),
seednums1=seednums1,
seedstards1=seedstarts1,
scendates1=scendates1,
failures1=failures1,
infthresh1=infthresh1,
maxrse1=maxrse1,
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2615.
seedfailures1=seedfailures1,
2616.
seedsim1=seedsim1,
2617.
RSEs1all=RSEs1all.transpose(),
2618.
CAPS1all=CAPs1all.transpose(),
2619.
UCRs1all=UCRs1all.transpose(),
2620.
GCRs1all=GCRs1all.transpose(),
2621.
seednums=seednums,
2622.
seedstards=seedstarts,
2623.
scendates=scendates,
2624.
failures=failures,
2625.
infthresh=infthresh,
2626.
maxrse=maxrse,
2627.
seedfailures=seedfailures,
2628.
seedsim=seedsim,
2629.
RSEsall=RSEsall.transpose(),
2630.
CAPSall=CAPsall.transpose(),
2631.
UCRsall=UCRsall.transpose(),
2632.
GCRsall=GCRsall.transpose()
2633.
)
2634.
2635.
2636.
if len(err)>0:
2637.
np.savez(str("Outputs-"+str(seednum)+"-e.npz"),
2638.
seednums1=seednums1,
2639.
seedstards1=seedstarts1,
2640.
scendates1=scendates1,
2641.
failures1=failures1,
2642.
infthresh1=infthresh1,
2643.
maxrse1=maxrse1,
2644.
seedfailures1=seedfailures1,
2645.
seedsim1=seedsim1,
2646.
RSEs1all=RSEs1all.transpose(),
2647.
CAPS1all=CAPs1all.transpose(),
2648.
UCRs1all=UCRs1all.transpose(),
2649.
GCRs1all=GCRs1all.transpose(),
2650.
seednums=seednums,
2651.
seedstards=seedstarts,
2652.
scendates=scendates,
2653.
failures=failures,
2654.
infthresh=infthresh,
2655.
maxrse=maxrse,
2656.
seedfailures=seedfailures,
2657.
seedsim=seedsim,
2658.
RSEsall=RSEsall.transpose(),
2659.
CAPSall=CAPsall.transpose(),
2660.
UCRsall=UCRsall.transpose(),
2661.
GCRsall=GCRsall.transpose()
2662.
)
2663.
2664.
t0_2=time.time()
2665.
2666.
#print("elapsed time: " +str(t0_2-t0))
2667.
#
2668.
#
2669.
#print("number of data points, base case:" +str(np.count_nonzero(seednum
s1==seednum)))
2670.
#
2671.
#print("number of data points, DSI case:" +str(np.count_nonzero(seednums
==seednum)))
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Appendix F: High Performance Computing
There are a total of 552,960 simulations, each simulated for 2000 iterations for two runs:
the base case and the dam safety improved case. Each iteration lasts for one year, so there
are a total of 2.2 Billion simulation-years. This is obviously a very large simulation exercise
that requires HPC resources to be executed efficiently. Compute Canada offers several
HPC clusters, and this research utilized Graham, Cedar and Niagara to complete the
simulations. Each cluster has thousands of nodes and each node may have several cores.
Because the scenarios are completely independent of one another, serial farming is the best
implementation for efficient simulation for this project. Serial farming means that
processes can run completely independently on multiple cores at a time, and their order of
execution is not important. In order to set up the serial farming environment, a simulation
controller is required.
The controller is a bash-scripted program that performs several functions and was
developed with assistance from a programming consultant due to its complex nature. It is
used to set up workspaces on the various clusters, and to send scenarios to the clusters in
preparation for simulation. Once the simulations are on the cluster and ready for
processing, the controller is used to initiate “jobs” which process the simulations on the
cluster. When submitting a job, the user can specify the number of jobs, the number of
cores to be used for each individual job as well as the time limit after which the job
terminates. The controller also manages the list of scenarios which have been completed,
submitted, failed or are still running and ensures there are no duplicating simulations for a
single scenario. The status of the jobs in terms of the number of scenarios running,
completed, and waiting in the queue can be queried by the user. Once jobs on Graham or
Cedar clusters are finished, the controller automatically resubmits the jobs to continue
processing the list of scenarios. The user must monitor the job status periodically, and
ensure more scenarios are available on the list for continued processing. For the Niagara
cluster, jobs are not able to re-submit themselves, so the user must manually submit either
smaller numbers of large jobs or larger numbers of small jobs and monitor them. Finally,
the controller is used to download the scenario output files to the local machine, which in
this case is a virtual private server. Given the 10TB storage capacity, the *.npz compressed
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array files contain only the key outputs – dynamic reservoir level response, criticality
parameters and performance measures. These *.npz array files are stored in a directory that
contains sub-folders with 1000 files each.
During the initial test run of the controller, some issues with the simulation model for
specific scenarios were identified and repaired. The initial run of the model was completed
over a three-week period. Compute Canada has a specific scheduling algorithm which
allocates resources to users based on their priority as well as the amount of processing
previously carried out. The jobs wait to start in a queueing system, and once a user’s
allocation is used up the priority of their jobs is reduced. This queuing system makes it
difficult to estimate exactly what the throughput and simulation time will be. Resource
allocations significantly improve throughput, and this was realized on the second complete
simulation of the scenarios.
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